THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

Nicolas Lewkowicz

The United States, the Soviet Union and the Geopolitical Implications of the Origins of the Cold War

The United States, the Soviet Union and the Geopolitical Implications of the Origins of the Cold War

Nicolas Lewkowicz

ANTHEM PRESS

Anthem Press
An imprint of Wimbledon Publishing Company
www.anthempress.com

This edition first published in UK and USA 2018
by ANTHEM PRESS
75–76 Blackfriars Road, London SE1 8HA, UK
or PO Box 9779, London SW19 7ZG, UK
and
244 Madison Ave #116, New York, NY 10016, USA

This title is also available as an e-book.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Confluence of the Metapolitical, Institutionalist and Geopolitical Perspectives in the Understanding of the Origins of the Cold War

The link between metapolitics, institutionalization and geopolitical concerns constitutes a useful platform from which to analyze the manner in which the post–World War II international order was configured. This work examines the origins of the Cold War from the perspective of classical geopolitical thinking. The scheme of foreign policy deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II was geared toward establishing the basis for the division of Europe into spheres of influence that would allow each superpower to retain a level of control over the areas of the world with the highest degree of geoeconomic and geopolitical relevance. The geopolitical interests of the United States and the Soviet Union were underpinned by concerns that were more or less permanent in nature. The United States occupies a semi-peripheral position in the system of states, as it is located on an outlying island of the world. The United States is situated between two countries (Mexico and Canada) that do not pose a threat to US geopolitical interests. The conflict that emerged between the two superpowers in the aftermath of World War II has to be appreciated from the perspective of the willingness of the United States to retain a central position in the affairs of the "world island," composed of the European, Asian and African continents. The American political leadership reversed the US isolationist stance in regard to the affairs of the European continent for the purposes of preventing the possible onset of another economic depression and the establishment of geopolitical poles that would menace the position of the United States in the international order. There is an important primordialist element attached to the way in which the United States reacted to the political expediencies that informed the end of World War II. The entry of the United States into the war was justified by making reference to the need to emancipate the world from oppressive ideologies. There was an appeal on the part of the US political leadership to the exceptionalist nature of the United States. Overtones of American exceptionalism had been employed in the past in order to expand into the West and into the Caribbean Basin. The use of exceptionalist overtones is indicative of the metapolitical approach employed to achieve the possible institutionalization of the post–World War II international order according to the geopolitical needs and interests of the United States.

The scheme of foreign policy deployed by the Soviet Union responded to long-term geopolitical concerns. The Soviet Union was the successor state of the Russian Empire. The ideological orientation that informed the Soviet leadership was centered on the need

to ensure that the country would be able to deal with its geographical encirclement and its own sense of destiny as a great geopolitical power on the Eurasian continent. The security of the Soviet Union depended on the possibility of expanding its geographical sway farther into the central part of the European continent and on entrenching its hegemonic position in the Eurasian hinterland. The superpowers also had important geopolitical interests in the Asian continent, particularly in East Asia and the Middle East. However, the concerns that arose in the European continent dictated the overall scheme of institutionalization that operated in the international order at large. This is because countries like China, Japan and Korea were not in a position to exert independent foreign policies that would pose a challenge to the hegemonic position of the superpowers after the end of World War II.

This book describes the geopolitical implications of the institutionalization of the system of states instigated by the hegemonic practices put in place by the superpowers after the end of the war. The main argument of this book is that the United States and the Soviet Union were compelled to establish the foundations for the institutionalization of the international order in order to achieve their geopolitical interests in the postwar era. These tasks were facilitated by making reference to the metapolitical principles inherent in the concepts of American exceptionalism and Eurasianism. The Cold War was, first and foremost, a geopolitical "standoff" between the United States and the Soviet Union that had its epicenter in Europe.[1] The European political order had been profoundly affected by the rise of a unified German state and, later on, by the revisionist drive launched by Nazi Germany. These two historical processes were crucial in producing the deinstitutionalization of the international order. This is why, after World War II, the negotiations over the "German Question" had such a prominent role in the reconstitution of the international order. The quality of interstate relations during the interwar years deteriorated due to the lack of a sound body of legal and social norms capable of being enforced by the great powers of the day. The most prominent members of the system of states were not willing to undertake the level of responsibility that was necessary for the purposes of maintaining stable interstate relations. The present work analyzes how the use of ideology and the instrument of political intervention in the American and Soviet spheres of influence led to the establishment of a stable postwar international order. The element of conflict present in the early period of the Cold War served to demarcate the geopolitical scope of action of the superpowers. However, the level of conflict that was present in the nascent system of states was moderated by the configuration of social norms that enabled the superpowers to actualize their geopolitical interests. The attainment of vital geostrategic aims required the implementation of social norms of behavior that could be adhered to by the units of the system of states. This book argues that the establishment of the spheres of influence system constituted the most valuable instrument for the institutionalization of the postwar international order,

---

1. See M. Kramer and V. Smetana (eds.), *Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015).

as they provided certainty to the spectrum of interstate relations that emerged after the end of World War II.

The geopolitical perspective, oftentimes neglected by the scholarship on the origins of the Cold War, is very important for understanding the implications of the process of institutionalization that took place in the aftermath of World War II. The breakdown of the international order during the interwar years stemmed from the fact that countries acted according to a short-sighted formulation of the principle of self-interest. A close reading of the primary sources related to the interaction between the superpowers after the end of World War II indicates that international stability is fostered when there is a correlation between the pursuit of self-interest and the establishment of a wide spectrum of cooperation enforced through multilateral social norms. By institutionalizing a system of interstate relations according to the establishment of spheres of influence, the superpowers succeeded in marrying their geostrategic aims to the preservation of a peaceful international environment. This situation differed greatly from what happened during the interwar years. National states augmented the security dilemma by pursuing power in a selfish manner, as seen, for instance, in the revisionist drive of Italy and Germany and in the protection of the British imperial economic space after 1932.[2] The breakdown of the international order is enhanced when there is no explicit willingness on the part of a great power or coalition of great powers to dissuade any revisionist elements from causing disruption in the international order. The events that unfolded during the interwar years show that the breakdown of interstate relations takes place when prominent states are not willing to exercise a hegemonic role within the spectrum of multilateralism and some form of global governance. The exercise of hegemonic practices requires the application of the measures that are necessary to ensure that stability of the system. The breakdown of the international order can also come about from the refusal to legitimize the geopolitical aspirations of prominent members of the system of states, as seen in the isolation of the Soviet Union during the 1920s and the failure to resolve the geopolitical aspects related to the position of Germany in the post–World War I scenario.[3]

This book focuses on three elements that served to institutionalize the postwar international order: (1) great-power management; (2) the curtailment of the spectrum of sovereignty; and (3) the imposition of a bipolar balance of power. The process of institutionalization was propelled through the political, economic and military intervention exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union in order to attain a workable geopolitical settlement in Germany and Europe. The disruption caused by the revisionist drive of Nazi Germany prompted the need to establish social norms that could preserve the stability of the system of states over a long period of time. The parameters of institutionalization imposed by the superpowers in the aftermath of World War II

2. F. Carnevali and J. Strange (eds.), *20th Century Britain: Economic, Cultural and Social Change* (London: Routledge, 2007), 154.

3. G. Flynn, *The West and the Soviet Union: Politics and Policy* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 195.

responded to the need to avert the possibility of widespread conflict in the emerging international order. The level of institutionalization achieved at the end of the war had important liberal overtones, as it unfolded as a result of the belief in the perfectibility of the material conditions that affected interstate relations. This is another important geopolitical legacy of the origins of the Cold War. The international order that emerged in the wake of World War II actualized the aspirations of liberal thinkers such as Norman Angell, who stated the need to check the, "quarrelsome and unreasonable" nature of man by establishing "rules […] disciplines, and […] suitable institutions" capable of expanding the spectrum of peace.[4] Although the Cold War international order was marked by the existence of conflict, it did not disrupt the smooth functioning of interstate relations in the core section of the system of states. The institutionalization of the international order was attained by making the notion of order compatible with the concept of justice, to the point that the two were (at least to a certain extent) mutually dependent.[5] There was a symbiotic relationship between the preservation of systemic stability and the legitimization of the superpowers' geopolitical needs and interests in the postwar scenario. The willingness to perfect the conditions that informed interstate relations was embodied in the expansion of international organization and the widespread use of multilateral mechanisms in order to improve the material conditions of the benighted areas of the world.

The configuration of the postwar international order was carried out by devising clear rules of engagement, which would be crucial for the purposes of taming down the spectrum of conflict. The institutionalization of the system of states required the imposition of a hierarchical ordering, achieved through a strict demarcation between rule makers and rule takers. These parameters of institutionalization were vital to ensure the prevalence of peaceful interstate relations; especially in the context of the expansion of international organization that took place after the end of World War II. The process of institutionalization entailed the limitation of the scope of sovereignty possessed by individual nations. Reducing the scope of sovereignty for the nations that belonged to the spheres of influence established by the superpowers was meant to stabilize the international order by suppressing the advent of revisionism. The curtailment of sovereignty for the countries that belonged to the spheres of influence created by the superpowers was an important prerequisite in the establishment of an international environment based on the effective management of the security dilemma engendered by the ideological and geopolitical clash between the superpowers. The institutionalization of the international order was facilitated by the greater scope of intervention brought forth by World War II. In order to facilitate the application of political and economic intervention, the superpowers established the concept of spheres of influence. This construct legitimized the bipolar nature of the postwar international order by making the implementation of international law compatible with the pursuit of the geopolitical interests

---

4. N. Angell, *The Great Illusion* (London: William Heinemann, 1933), 267.
5. R. Vincent, "Order in International Relations," in J. Miller and R. Vincent (eds.), *Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 60–61.

of the superpowers. The *modus vivendi* reached between the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II through the implementation of the spheres of influence was crucial for the purposes of allowing the superpowers to implement their vital geopolitical interests within the principle of coexistence. The United States and the Soviet Union agreed on the idea that the stability of the system depended on the use of rational mechanisms for resolving disputes, as in the case of the United Nations Security Council. The effectiveness of the scheme of institutionalization depended on ensuring that the superpowers would retain, to the fullest extent possible, a hegemonic position in the management of the international order. The mutual recognition of the spheres of influence system *and* the creation of a rational framework for the resolution of disputes led to the reversal of the process of deinstitutionalization that had taken place in the interwar years.

The orientation that guided the actions of the United States and the Soviet Union in the sphere of foreign policy was dictated by a number of metapolitical principles that responded to the primordialist values that informed their position in the geopolitical order. The study of metapolitics is concerned with the philosophical guidelines that inform the actions of nations over a long period of time. While the actions that are exerted in the field of foreign policy respond to the necessities of a particular historical juncture, they are dictated by the philosophical principles that explain how the nation is ontologically constituted and how it is willing to project itself to the wider world. Metapolitics emerges from the cultural values that are representative of each nation. As such, they tend to provide relatively stable concepts about what is right and what is wrong and what is possible to achieve through political action.[6] The metapolitical approach that guided the actions of the superpowers at the end of World War II served to change the foundations of the international order that had existed during the interwar years. The concept of metapolitics has acquired a renewed level of importance in recent times. In the United States, Western Europe and Russia, metapolitics has become a useful tool in order to address certain negative externalities created by the age of globalization.

The metapolitical approach is informed by the primordialist elements that constitute the concept of nationhood in each country. This approach is useful to appreciate how the particular ordering of the system of states is enacted at critical historical junctures. The establishment of spheres of influence was guided by the metapolitical categories derived from the concepts of American exceptionalism and Russian Eurasianism. The metapolitical orientation used in this book aims to identify the hegemonic practices that arose from the metapolitical categories that informed the actions of the superpowers. National states do not put in motion geopolitical strategies that deviate from the aspirations and anxieties of the collective consciousness that emerges in public life. The choices that national states make reflect, at least to a certain extent, the aspirations of the people who give legitimacy to their political leaders. There was a metapolitical urge on the part of both superpowers to be on "the right side" of history—a fact that motivated

---

6. See J. Bowden, *Extremists: Studies in Metapolitics* (San Francisco: Counter-Currents, 2017).

them to articulate a scheme of foreign policy based on the exceptionalist and Eurasianist metapolitical orientation. The metapolitical perspective enabled the superpowers to achieve the functional mechanisms needed for sustaining their hegemonic position for a long period of time.

The process of institutionalization was undertaken with a geopolitical perspective in mind because the superpowers were nations of continental size that had vested geopolitical interests in different parts of the world. This state of affairs led the United States to propagate policies that were of a liberal, rather than libertarian order. The United States could only actualize its geopolitical aims by applying a great deal of intervention at an international level. American exceptionalism constituted a mechanism to bring about an effective "engagement" with the world.[7] The adoption of an isolationist stance in the aftermath of World War II could not have guaranteed that the country would be able to prevent another economic depression. Furthermore, an isolationist stance could have enabled the expansion of Communism and, potentially, other totalitarian ideologies that would have disrupted interstate relations in the postwar period. There is a nationalism of "cultural uniqueness" that serves to demarcate what are the values that form part of the American experience.[8] In this context, the exceptionalist credo was reshaped by liberal rather than libertarian tendencies, which manifested themselves in the realm of economics and geopolitics.

The Eurasianist perspective is a useful standpoint from which to appraise the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II. The primoridalist elements that informed Stalin's foreign policy mirrored the values that gave direction to Russia's historical evolution. This metapolitical approach responded to the need to preserve the presence of "Russia" as a relevant geopolitical actor on the Eurasian continent. This meant that the deployment of communist ideology became a means to actualize Russia's main geopolitical aim: the entrenchment of its territorial standing on the Eurasian landmass. The Eurasianist perspective that traditionally guided Russian foreign policy was reshaped and re-legitimized by Communism, which enabled the Soviet Union to disseminate an eschatological message aimed at consolidating its hegemonic position in the postwar environment. The superpowers were imbued with the idea that it was possible to create a system of states more resilient than the system that existed in the interwar period. This was to be done through the establishment of institutional mechanisms that would allow the resolution of problems regarding the organization of the international order. There appeared to be a determination not to foster a revisionist environment that would lead to the disruption of the system of states. The managerial approach that dictated government action in the domestic sphere was applied to the management of the international order. The effective management of the postwar system of states required the imposition of a hierarchical order capable of actualizing the interests of

7. P. Bergmann, "American Exceptionalism and German 'Sonderweg' in Tandem," *The International History Review*, 23, 3 (2001), 534.

8. J. Koschmann, "The Nationalism of Cultural Uniqueness," review of *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, by Seymour Martin Lipset, *The American Historical Review*, 102, 3 (1997), 762.

the superpowers within the spectrum of a more equitable scheme of interstate relations. This was manifested in the decolonization of large parts of Asia and Africa and the configuration of multilateralist regimes and organizations that promoted greater coordination among the members of the system of states.

1.2 Chapter Outline

Chapter Two outlines the conventional explanations of the origins of the Cold War, paying attention to the main arguments put forward by the orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist camps. Furthermore, this chapter deals with the manner in which the functional relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union and the militarization of their foreign policy apparatus became influential factors in the establishment of the institutional framework that would inform interstate relations during the Cold War. Chapter Three charts the deinstitutionalization that stemmed from the emergence of a unified Germany in the late nineteenth century, outlining the way in which it provoked the disruption of interstate relations in the European political order. This section of the book examines the inability of the Weimar Republic to resolve the most fundamental issues related to Germany's position in the European political spectrum. Furthermore, this chapter also delves into the uniqueness of the National Socialist movement in German history and the way in which Nazism reconfigured the position of Germany in the international order.

Chapter Four postulates that the prevalence of conflict was a crucial factor in the process of institutionalization that took place at the end of World War II. Particular attention is given to the concept of great-power management as an instrument of institutionalization of the international order that emerged in the aftermath of the war. This section underlines the importance of the establishment of the spheres of influence as an element of conviviality in the scheme of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. This chapter outlines the way in which the redefinition of the spectrum of sovereignty was used as an instrument of institutionalization, highlighting the link between the curtailment of the notion of absolute sovereignty that affected the subaltern units of the superpowers' spheres of influence and the establishment of a stable international order. This chapter analyzes how the bipolar settlement established after World War II contributed to institutionalizing the international order by establishing some balance between the universalist aspirations of the superpowers and the need to attain a *modus vivendi* conducive to the establishment of a peaceful scheme of interstate relations.

Chapter Five presents the idea that the United States facilitated the institutionalization of the international order through the enforcement of its vital geopolitical interests in Western Europe. The United States used the element of intervention to accomplish its geopolitical interests in Western Europe. This section argues that intervention was brought forth by the spectrum of political inequality that developed in the postwar international order as a result of the demoted position of the Western European powers. This chapter also postulates that the scope of intervention was propelled as a result of the demise of the old political and social order in Western Europe. The United States intervened in the

reconfiguration of the political order in Western Europe for the purposes of attaining a solution to the problems that affected the reorganization of the international order in the postwar era. This chapter posits that the intervention of the United States in Western Europe established the transition from a system based on bilateral interstate cooperation into one in which the international community became dedicated to the solution of common problems. This chapter argues that the magnified spectrum of intervention arose as a result of the determination of the United States to forge a collective identity with the Western European nations, a policy aimed at anchoring Washington's economic interests in the postwar era. Chapter Six concentrates on the central role that ideology occupied in the deployment of American geopolitical power in the aftermath of World War II. This chapter focuses on the idea of political intervention as an instrument of institutionalization and on the importance of American exceptionalism in the configuration of the geopolitical strategy put forward by the United States at the end of the war. This chapter charts the influence of the policy of containment on the institutionalization of the Cold War international order and the manner in which the spirit of the Truman Doctrine served as an instrument to halt revisionist political tendencies in areas of vital geostrategic importance to the United States.

Chapter Seven analyzes the manner in which the Soviet Union contributed to institutionalizing the international order by establishing the parameters of intervention that would regulate interstate relations at the end of World War II. This chapter examines four different themes linked to the role that Soviet security needs played in the institutionalization of the postwar system of states. Soviet foreign policy enhanced the spectrum of institutionalization of the postwar system of states by contributing to the management of the postwar international order in accordance with the need to fulfill specific geopolitical ambitions. This chapter underlines the idea that Soviet security concerns overrode ideological considerations, establishing a situation in which the scope of action of the Soviet Union would be restricted to the creation of a geopolitical foothold in Germany and a buffer zone in the Intermarium. This chapter also evaluates the implications of the "national front" policy, which allowed the Soviet Union to legitimize the imposition of the communist political system in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter Eight examines the role of ideology in the articulation of the scheme of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era. The institutionalization of the postwar international order was ushered in by the strengthening of communist ideology as a result of the victory achieved in World War II. This chapter also analyzes how the geopolitical culture of Russia and the concept of Eurasianism explain the motivations behind the establishment of the spheres of influence system that operated during the Cold War. Chapter Nine outlines some conclusions regarding the geopolitical implications of the origins of the Cold War. The interaction between the superpowers during the early Cold War period was conducive to establishing a strong link between notions of order and justice. This chapter posits that the hegemonic practices put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union were framed by the concern to incorporate the "common man" as a subject of international relations. Chapter Nine also focuses on the way in which the devastation caused by World War II created a disjuncture in the international order that originated in the push for

greater European unity in the postwar period. There will also be a treatment of the interaction between the concepts of order and hegemony and the manner in which they contributed to consolidating the institutionalization of the postwar international order. This chapter also underlines the role that intervention played in the preservation of an institutionalized geopolitical order in the postwar era.

Chapter Two

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER

2.1 Introduction

The accomplishment of the geopolitical objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II depended on ensuring the institutionalization of the postwar international order. The ideational and material practices put in motion by the superpowers in their respective spheres of influence had the ultimate aim of bringing about the fulfillment of their basic geopolitical interests in the postwar era. The interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union contained elements of conflict. Nevertheless, conflict was moderated by the fact that both superpowers had a mutual interest in making sure that the realignment of the system of states would cater to their geopolitical interests, which entailed the need to institutionalize the social norms that would guide interstate relations in the postwar era. The first part of the present chapter outlines the conventional explanations of the origins of the Cold War, highlighting the gap that exists in the scholarly literature regarding the metapolitical orientation that dictated the geopolitical strategy delineated by the superpowers after World War II. Particular attention will be paid to the reconfiguration of American exceptionalism and Russian Eurasianism according to a liberal and communist orientation, respectively. It will be argued that the rearticulation of the metapolitical perspective that informed the scheme of the foreign policy of the superpowers was used to consolidate their hegemonic position in the postwar scenario. This chapter proceeds to examine the geopolitical perspective on the origins of the Cold War, looking at three interrelated issues that led to the institutionalization of the postwar international order: the providential concept of nationhood espoused by the superpowers; their ambitious geopolitical design and the creation of geopolitical realms. This chapter also evaluates the spectrum of institutionalization that emerged in the postwar international order. This section of the book posits the notion that institutionalization is likely to occur when the establishment of a sound normative framework is conflated with the interests of the great powers in charge of guaranteeing the effective functioning of the new constitutional order.

2.2 The Conventional Explanations of the Origins of the Cold War

The geopolitical implications of the process of institutionalization of the international order that took place in the first years after World War II have been somewhat overlooked by the three main scholarly traditions on the origins of the Cold War. There is a tendency

to emphasize situational perspectives rather than focusing on the long-standing interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. The orthodox tradition pins the blame for the onset of the Cold War on the expansionist drive of the Soviet Union and the inability of American policy makers to anticipate this problem. According to the orthodox view, the Soviet Union, emboldened by the presence of the Red Army in Central and Eastern Europe, actively worked for the establishment of communist systems of government in the Intermarium. The orthodox camp postulates that the "West" could have averted the onset of the Cold War by adopting a more aggressive attitude toward the Soviet Union in the initial stages of confrontation.[1] The orthodox view suggests that American leaders failed to identify the long-term difficulties arising from the interaction between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership labored under the assumption that any accommodation with the West was only temporary, and that their different ideological templates would inevitably magnify the spectrum of conflict.[2] Victory in World War II provided vindication for the effectiveness of the communist system and entrenched the feelings of mistrust toward capitalism and the Western democracies.[3] The orthodox camp maintains that the expansionist drive of the Soviet Union began in 1939 with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which enabled Moscow to acquire a geopolitical foothold in Central Europe.[4] The Soviet Union exercised a policy of geopolitical aggrandizement that revolved around the establishment of provisional governments in the liberated areas of Central and Eastern Europe that were friendly toward Moscow.[5] The assumptions put forward by the orthodox camp need to be appraised within the context of the ideological factors that guided the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, Soviet foreign policy was informed by the need to preserve Moscow's geopolitical interests in the Eurasian "heartland." American officials argued that the main aim of Soviet foreign policy was "to extend their virtual domination over all, or as much as possible, of the Eurasian land mass," taking advantage of the power vacuum left by the defeated Axis.[6]

The assumptions of the orthodox camp have to be appraised in the context of the specific geopolitical and historical circumstances that arose after World War II. The orthodox camp claims that the policies enacted by the Soviet Union were aggressive in nature. However, the seemingly aggressive attitude of the Soviet Union was specifically aimed at protecting the country and its traditional geopolitical realm. Therefore, any hostile attitude displayed vis-à-vis the Western powers was conditioned by the need to accomplish a well-defined geostrategic objective; namely, to maintain the Eurasian

---

1. V. Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War, Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 360.
2. A. Schlesinger Jr. "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, 46, 1 (1967), 50.
3. H. Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–50* (New York: W. W. Norton 1970), 4–5.
4. R. C. Raack, *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 3.
5. R. Woods and H. Jones, *The Dawning of the Cold War* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991), 13.
6. Report by the Policy Planning Staff, Washington, November 6, 1947, PPS/13, Resume of World Situation—FRUS, General; The United Nations (1947), 772.

heartland free from the interference of the United States and its allies. To some extent, this task was facilitated by the fact that this part of Europe was significantly less developed (in economic terms) than Western Europe. This meant that there was not a natural propensity on the part of the Western powers to establish a geopolitical foothold in that area of the world. The differentiation between the Intermarium and Western Europe was also informed by the fact that the Central and Eastern European nations aspired to be a part of Western civilization on their own "peculiar terms."[7] In a speech allegedly given by Stalin to the Politburo in August 1939, the Soviet leader argued that if Germany would prevail, "in a struggle against England [*sic*] and France, it would give Moscow the chance to enlarge its zone of geopolitical influence into Poland, Hungary, Romania and (possibly) Yugoslavia."[8] World War II increased the ontological gap between the Intermarium and the West. This situation led the Western powers to seek a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. General Władysław Sikorski, the former prime minister of Poland, repudiated the signing of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942, suggesting that it would impair the possibility of constructing in Central Europe federative blocs capable of checking German (and Soviet) power.[9] In 1947, some Czechoslovak leaders held the view that the Slavic nature of the country, "fear of Germany," proximity to the Soviet Union and the "strong position of the Communist Party" were factors that were propitious for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union; a situation that could only be reversed by engaging in "firm resistance" against the Soviet Union.[10] The Intermarium could not retain its independence, nor join Western Europe. This state of affairs gave the Soviet Union an important window of opportunity in order to proceed with the process of Sovietization.

The "revisionist" camp highlights the prominent role played by the United States in the ideological confrontation that emerged in the aftermath of World War II. The revisionist camp maintains that the United States conducted an aggressive foreign policy toward the Soviet Union, epitomized in the launch of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the creation of the national security establishment. According to this view, the most peremptory concern of the United States in the postwar scenario was to avoid another economic depression. In order to attain that goal, Washington pursued the creation of a free-market trading area in Western Europe capable of absorbing American capital and the surplus of the goods manufactured in the United States. This free-market trading area would be guarded from Soviet interference through the implementation of the policy of "containment."[11] The revisionist camp argues that America's aggressive geopolitical stance prompted Moscow to create a buffer zone in Eastern Europe for

---

7. See M. Chodakiewicz, *Intermarium: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas* (London: Routledge, 1917).
8. Stalin's speech to the Politburo on 19 August 1939: theeasternfront.org/mein_sozialismus/downloads/articleI.pdf
9. The Ambassador to the Polish Government in Exile (Biddle) to the Secretary of State, London, April 24, 1942—FRUS, Europe (1942), 141.
10. The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Prague, May 8, 1947—FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 206–7.
11. G. Kennan, *Memoirs: 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 359.

the purposes of avoiding encirclement by the Western powers.[12] According to the revisionist camp, the central motivation that guided US foreign policy in the first years after World War II was to seize opportunities for capitalist expansion in order to prop up the "health of capitalism and its social system at home as well as internationally."[13] World War II raised the prospect of the possible control of the Eurasian peninsula by a single power. This state of affairs led the United States to discard isolationism and implement a scheme of foreign policy geared toward ensuring the accomplishment of America's vital geopolitical interests.[14] There is an important geopolitical perspective that stems from the views put forward by revisionist scholars. Washington sought to recreate the international order by making reference to the values stemming from American exceptionalism.[15] The themes of "electedness" and the "the frontier mentality" were aspects that informed American policy making soon after World War II.[16] The exceptionalist orientation was used to configure the concept of a Western bloc capable of fending off the threat of Communism in Western Europe and accomplishing the needs and interests of the United States in the postwar scenario. In philosophical terms, American exceptionalism appears to lie somewhere between libertarian thinking and liberal humanism.[17] However, World War II prompted the United States to adopt a more liberal overtone in order to accomplish certain geopolitical goals and ensure the establishment of a favorable scheme of institutionalization of the international order.

It is important to stress that the scholarly work carried out for the purposes of understanding the origins of the Cold War is influenced by the taxonomical parameters established by the academic tradition of the English-speaking world. Therefore, the prevailing views on the origins of the Cold War are dictated by a perspective that is culturally biased. The English-speaking academia and commentariat tends to see the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom as vital in the defeat of the Axis. This state of affairs has significant implications for the way in which the origins and evolution of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union is understood. To a large degree, the hermeneutical orientation that informs the study of the origins of the Cold War is affected by the considerations stemming from the manner in which it impacted the geopolitical interests of the United States. In order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding of the reasons behind the emergence of a state of conflict between the superpowers, it is important to incorporate the Soviet perspective. The idea

12. W. A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 14; G. Kolko and J. Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–54* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 360.

13. G. Kolko and J. Kolko, *The Limits of Power—The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper Row, 1972), 709.

14. R. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 26–27.

15. M. Leffler, "Interpretive Wars over the Cold War, 1945–60," in Martel G. (ed.), *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890–1993* (London: Routledge, 1994), 120.

16. W. A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 229.

17. See R. Kirk, *Roots of American Order* (Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2003).

that the origins of the Cold War came about as a result of an action–reaction symbiosis between the superpowers fails to provide us with a complete explanation regarding the geostrategic motivations of the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario. Conflict was a by-product of the need of the superpowers to attain certain geostrategic aims. The novelty produced in the system of states that emerged after World War II was that, to a large extent, these aims were accomplished through the use of social norms. The process of institutionalization of the postwar international order was crucial for the purposes of actualizing the needs and interests of the superpowers. The "post-revisionist" camp seeks to forge a synthesis between the orthodox and revisionist schools by looking at the geopolitical motivations of both superpowers. This synthetic approach is useful for appraising the manner in which the institutionalization of the postwar international order contributed to regulating relations between the superpowers and moderating the implications of the security dilemma that emerged in the aftermath of World War II. The Soviet Union did not just think about the Cold War in terms of a great-power confrontation. The geopolitical clash between the United States and the Soviet Union evolved according to the projection of "opposite social and economic projects" and within "a theatre of cultural and ideological warfare."[18] Hopf argues that the Cold War was "made nearly inevitable by the fact that both the United States and the Soviet Union operationalized their scheme of foreign policy according to universalist ideologies: liberalism and communism, respectively."[19] The state of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union was compounded by the "logic of preemption" that informed American policy makers in the late 1940s.[20] The realities of the postwar period led to the onset of a prolonged period of military readiness and the creation of a national security establishment capable of dealing with the threat posed by Communism at a global scale.[21] The Soviet leadership regarded war with the Western world as inevitable because of the significant ideological disparities between the communist and capitalist systems.[22]

Post-revisionist authors argue that American policy makers probably overestimated the nature of the external threats that affected the United States in order to accomplish certain political and economic goals, both at home and abroad.[23] The discussions over the settlement of the "German Question" exposed the inherent incompatibilities

---

18. See V. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).
19. T. Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War—The Early Years, 1945–1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 266.
20. M. Trachtenberg, *History and Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 22 and 26.
21. D. Yergin, *Shattered Peace—The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (New York: Andre Deutsch, 1977), 5–9.
22. W. Wolhforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 64–65.
23. J. L. Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 7, 3 (1983), 179–81; R. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 244–46.

between the communist and capitalist systems and the different geopolitical perspectives that informed the superpowers. The political expediencies that emerged in the immediate aftermath of World War II compelled the superpowers to grab a foothold in Germany in order to safeguard their vital geopolitical interests. In the case of the United States, those interests revolved around the creation of a free-trade area in Western Europe. In the case of the Soviet Union, the consolidation of a foothold in Germany was geared toward shoring up the buffer zone that was being created in the Intermarium. The main aim behind the establishment of this buffer zone was to prevent the possibility of another military attack by Germany and/or any other hostile Western power.[24] Political geography allows us to understand the way in which the superpowers attained their objectives in the postwar scenario. The hegemonic standing of the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario depended on holding on to a geographical space as close to the central part of Europe as possible, for the purposes of sustaining their status as geopolitical superpowers. Ideology played a significant role in the demarcation of the interests of the superpowers. The configuration of the American and Soviet spheres of influence at the end of World War II resulted from the reshaping of the exceptionalist and Eurasianist blueprints in accordance with liberal and communist orientations respectively. The tacit agreement to carve out spheres of influence was an acknowledgement of the limitations inherent in the exercise of geopolitical action. The relative geographical isolation of the United States from the Eurasian heartland made it incumbent upon the US establishment to create a geopolitical space in Western Europe. This instrument was seen as a means to project America's geostrategic power while acknowledging the differences that existed in regard to the economic and political interests of its Western European allies. In the case of the Soviet Union, the configuration of a geopolitical realm entailed the linkage of the domestic and foreign policies of the countries of the Intermarium to Moscow's geopolitical designs in the postwar era. The anti-imperialist narrative was used to create a spirit of unity that disguised Moscow's willingness to dominate the domestic and foreign policy of these countries for the purposes of entrenching the buffer zone established at the end of World War II. American officials held the view that the, "Kremlin desire[d] that its power should be felt but not seen [… hence acquiring] in this way something of the awesome quality of the supernatural."[25] This strategic stance fell in line with the overall idea of projecting the notion of the Soviet Union as a country that was interested in protecting the Central and Eastern European nations from imperialist aggression. As we can see, the explanatory framework regarding the origins of the Cold War needs to incorporate a geopolitical and metapolitical perspective in order to elucidate which elements contributed to setting in motion the institutionalization of the postwar international order and the reduction of the spectrum of conflict. The conventional explanations

---

24. N. Lewkowicz, *The German Question and the International Order, 1943–48* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); N. Lewkowicz, *The German Question and the Origins of the Cold War* (Milan, IPOC, 2008).
25. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, July 15, 1945— FRUS, Europe (1945), 867.

regarding the origins of the Cold War tend to prioritize narratives of conflict. Conversely, the present work outlines a systemic interpretation based on the geopolitical perspective adopted by the superpowers, with attention to the metapolitical orientation that dictated the process of institutionalization of the postwar era.

2.3 A Geopolitical Perspective on the Origins of the Cold War

Geopolitics is the study of the way in which spatial considerations inform the foreign policy of national states.[26] The study of geopolitics originally emerged as a response to the configuration of the European national states in the second part of the nineteenth century. The emergence of new nation-states such as Germany and Italy prompted the emergence of a body of thought that linked geographical considerations to the exercise of political choices on the part of the main European powers. Friedrich Ratzel argued that the urge to expand is concomitant with the vigor of the nation. Rudolf Kjellen expanded this concept, pointing out the synergetic relationship that exists between state and society.[27] The main geopolitical thinkers of the past century made the case for the connection between the exercise of violence and geographical expansion. At the same time, Alfred Mahan posited that the protection of commerce and the ability to display naval power were decisive factors in the pursuit of warfare, adding that the development of naval resources is crucial in order to seek "gain by way of the sea."[28] Halford Mackinder argued that the railways brought forth a realignment of world politics. This perspective also gave rise to the possibility of the emergence of a single power (or combination of powers) capable of ensuring the political and economic unification of the Eurasian landmass.[29] There is also a "critical" geopolitical perspective informed by the idea that geopolitics should study the reasons for the unequal distribution of power that exists in the system of states. Critical geopolitics labors under the assumption that the categories we use to describe geopolitical phenomena are dictated by the way that we think and speak about the world. Dittmer argues that while classical geopolitics is focused on "the way the world is," critical geopolitics is interested in ascertaining "how and why we have come to think of the world (or parts of it) in a certain way."[30] According to a critical geopolitical viewpoint, the power games that take place in the international order respond to the way in which issues related to the "dilemmas of international politics" are represented by national elites.[31] Critical geopolitical thinkers highlight the importance

---

26. P. Kelly, *Classical Geopolitics: A New Analytical Model* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 23.
27. J. Dittmer, *Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010), 4.
28. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783* (New York: Dover, 2012), 82.
29. R. Kaplan, *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate* (New York: Random House, 2013), 102.
30. J. Dittmer, *Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010) 11.
31. G. Ó. Tuathail, "The Bush Administration and the End of the Cold War: A Critical Geopolitics of U.S. Foreign Policy in 1989," *Geoforum*, 23, 4 (1992), 439.

of the needs and interests of certain groups within national states. Lacoste argues that geography is a tool that enables national states to control the population living under its jurisdiction, providing great powers with the opportunity to make war by establishing geostrategic strongholds.[32]

The geopolitical perspective on the origins of the Cold War is of particular importance to understand the motivations that led the United States and the Soviet Union to establish the institutional framework that would guide interstate relations after World War II. The institutional framework that sustained the system of states in the postwar scenario consisted of a bipolar arrangement based on the spheres of influence system, the curtailment of the spectrum of sovereignty held by subordinate nations and effective great power management. In this context, "institutionalization" is to be understood as the implementation of functionalist mechanisms for the purposes of attaining certain geopolitical interests. The functionalist instruments mentioned above institutionalized the postwar international order by producing a hierarchical ordering favorable to the interests of the superpowers. The process of institutionalization that emerged soon after World War II determined the geopolitical reordering of the system of states.[33] These circumstances dictated that the subaltern units of the system of states were compelled to accept the diktat of the superpowers in matters related to international organization. A report produced by the US Department of State in 1945 concluded that "by the time the war in the Far East is over Russia will find herself, for the first time in her history, without a single great power rival on the Eurasian land-mass." The report also highlighted that in the postwar period, the Soviet Union would find "herself in physical control of vast new areas of this land-mass: some of them, areas to which Russian power had never before been extended."[34] Furthermore, the United States propped up its geopolitical reach by extending its influence into Western Europe, East Asia and Latin America.

The scholarship on the origins of the Cold War has not made substantial use of geopolitics as an interpretative platform. The emphasis has been placed on applying a theoretical model that is based on assessing the relations of power between the United States and the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II. Geopolitics is an important platform for understanding the kind of international order that emerged after the war. Both superpowers put in motion a scheme of foreign policy that responded to long-standing considerations about the role of the United States and the Soviet Union (as the successor state of the Russian Empire) in the system of states. Furthermore, the war raised the prospect of the appropriation of great swathes of landmass by the superpowers. The Axis attempted to build autarkic economic structures in Europe and East Asia.

32. Y. Lacoste, *La géographie, ça sert, d'abord, à faire la* guerre (Paris: La Découverte, 2014), 57 and 63.

33. C. Hay, "Good in a Crisis: The Ontological Institutionalism of Social Constructivism," *New Political Economy*, 21, 6 (2016), 524.

34. Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Kennan), Russia's International Position at the Close of the War with Germany, Moscow, undated—FRUS: diplomatic papers, 1945. Europe (1945), 853.

The wartime geopolitical perspective was informed by the notion that the Axis "scheme [was] to mobilize [the United States] by forcing [it] onto the defensive; to cut [the country's] supply lines to China, Russia and Britain; and to place [it] on an ersatz basis in reference to certain essential raw materials […] thus hampering [America's] productive capabilities." It was also believed that the Western Hemisphere would be under siege if an armistice could be reached, allowing the Axis' countries to absorb the "virtually exhaustless resources at their disposal."[35] The United States and the Soviet Union succeeded in preventing the accomplishment of this goal. Moreover, the power vacuum generated by the defeat of Germany and Japan prompted the superpowers to establish their own geopolitical realms of continental magnitude. An important strand of opinion among the American political and economic elites did not consider the industrial development of the Soviet Union to be a threat to the United States.[36] The spectrum of competition did not extend to the realm of economics. This is an important aspect to bear in mind in order to understand the reasons why the superpowers managed to construct an international order based on a modicum of coexistence.

For all the reasons cited above, it is important to outline a definition of geopolitics that contributes to explaining the transformation of the system of states after World War II. Geopolitics deals with the study of the geographical considerations that influence the functioning of the international order. There are three variables that explain how the process of institutionalization that took place in the wake of the war was linked to geopolitical concerns. First, *only a small number of states operate under a providential view of nationhood capable of facilitating the establishment of a hegemonic position in the international order.* The providential view of nationhood is a metapolitical element that enables the great powers to deploy their geopolitical power over a long period of time. The specific political instruments used to do so might change, but as long as the providential orientation remains intact, the great powers will be able to retain geopolitical preponderance. The material and conceptual capabilities possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union enabled them to suppress the rise of would-be competitors and establish a hierarchical ordering that subjected smaller states to their geopolitical designs.

A metapolitical reading of the interaction between states would look at the manner in which certain symbols, ideas and philosophical categories influence their geopolitical projection. The metapolitical approach presupposes the existence of a, "metaphysics of the political," which is useful to analyze the phenomenological aspects derived from the actions of certain actors as well as the language that is used to construct a particular geopolitical design.[37] The metapolitical approach is useful in order create specific

---

35. W. Ziff, *The Coming Battle of Germany* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1942), 60–62.
36. Letter to Stalin from Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board, November 12, 1943, cited in D. Koenke and R. Bachman (eds.), *Revelations from the Russian Archives*, Documents in English (Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 1997), 649.
37. See A. Buela *Metapolítica y Teoría* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Teoría, 2002).

ideological systems capable of propelling a scheme of action in the realm of geopolitics. The recognition of the "other" to exist is contingent upon denouncing its deviation from a well-established concept of the common good.[38] The metapolitical orientation of the actions of the superpowers in the postwar era explains why the United States established a hegemonic position within the Western world and why Russia worked to retain its carved-out role as a custodian of the Intermarium and large swathes of the Eurasian continent. Prominent states produce the material conditions that bring about their hegemonic status by referring to the collective consciousness that exists within their societies. The idea of the United States and the Soviet Union as providential nations with a civilizing and redemptionist mission informed the geopolitical project undertaken by Moscow and Washington immediately following World War II. The providential facet of nationhood constituted a metapolitical orientation that allowed revisionist regimes such as Germany, Italy and Japan to disrupt the international order in the interwar era. Conversely, the providential orientation of the United States and the Soviet Union was used for the purposes of imposing stability and predictability on the international order. The idea of international organization that came to inform the system of states in the aftermath of World War II was guided by a metapolitical orientation centered on the providential mission of the superpowers within their spheres of influence.

Second, *the shape of the institutionalization of the system of states is constituted by the deployment of an ambitious geopolitical design by a small number of states.* Smaller states do not usually play a great role in establishing the social norms that may lead to the institutionalization of the international order. This means that the shape of the scheme of institutionalization that may prevail at any given historical juncture coincides with the geopolitical designs of the great powers. The notion of order that guides the scheme of institutionalization might lead to the establishment of more equitable relations between the different units of the system of states. However, for the great powers, this appears to be a "second order" consideration. The prime motivation of the great powers is to create a scheme of institutionalization that advances their national interest. All manifestations of the political have the "will to power" as their main psychological informant.[39] The task of institutionalizing the system of states is usually undertaken by a handful of units capable of producing and enforcing the rules and norms that regulate the behavior of the units that make up the international order. There is a strong link between institutionalization and the attainment of geopolitical aims. Furthermore, the prospect of attaining these geopolitical objectives is linked to the possibility of using hard power. The institutionalization of the international order in the aftermath of World War II had a strong military prong attached to it. American officials held the view that "free institutions" could only be defended with a "determination that would remove uncertainty."[40] Likewise, the Soviet Union, contributed

---

38. S. Chambers, *The Lessons of Rancière* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 137.
39. H. Morgenthau, *The Concept of the Political* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 106.
40. Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, July 6, 1948—FRUS, Western Europe (1948), 154–55.

to constructing the framework of institutionalization of the postwar international order by fending off the threat posed by the Western powers and the would-be revisionist nations within the communist world, such as Yugoslavia and China.[41] The United States and the Soviet Union disseminated their social and political values in their spheres of influence. This state of affairs entailed a suppression of alternative forms of geopolitical organization by the subaltern units of the system of states. Most states have neither the capability nor the willingness to contest the geopolitical drive of the most prominent members of the system of states. This situation creates a hierarchical order that is based on the entrenchment of rules and norms designed for consolidating the hegemony of the dominant powers. The superpowers achieved their position of superiority by carrying the brunt of the war against the Axis and by working for the institutionalization of the postwar political order as the fighting went on. The origins of the Cold War created another important geopolitical legacy for the system of states. The functionalist forms of international organization that emerged during the Cold War left the subaltern units of the system of states with less leeway for the pursuit of ambitious geopolitical projects. At the same time, this situation entrenched the idea that prominent national states may be willing to undertake the responsibility of marshaling the international order only if doing so correlated with the advancement of their geopolitical interests.

Third, *the institutionalization of the international order at a particular historical juncture aims to protect the scope of action of the hegemonic powers within well-defined geographical areas.* Institutionalization has practical implications for the hegemonic practices put in place by the great powers. Institutionalization is, therefore, not an end in and of itself, but a means to accomplish certain material objectives within specific geographical areas of influence. In the case of the superpowers, bloc formation and the establishment of spheres of influence institutionalized hegemonic practices that were needed to attain certain economic and security aims. The United States and the Soviet Union deployed their geopolitical scheme of action with reference to spatial considerations. The superpowers' scheme of geopolitical action was ontologically sustained by American exceptionalism, in the case of the United States, and Eurasianism, in the case of the Soviet Union. The values that stemmed from American exceptionalism were employed by the United States to bring about the establishment of a community of Western nations. Eurasianism allowed the Soviet Union to retain its role as the custodian of the Eurasian heartland. Ideology serves to institutionalize the international order in accordance with the fulfillment of the needs and interests of the prominent members of the system of states. The institutionalization of the postwar international order assuaged the complexities that informed the scheme of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The establishment of well-defined geopolitical realms meant that the geopolitical interests of the superpowers would be accomplished without causing a disruption of interstate relations. The specific historical circumstances that emerged at the end of World War II entailed that American exceptionalism would adopt a liberal overtone, one based on

---

41. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Davies), Moscow, July 10, 1945, Estimate of Soviet Policy in East Asia—FRUS, The Far East, China (1945), 928.

the establishment of interventionist mechanisms that would facilitate the expansion of free trade and the democratic system of government in areas of geostrategic concern to the United States—particularly in cases in which these values advanced the American national interest. The exceptionalist orientation that guided the foreign policy of the United States was based on the idea of America as the epitome of Western civilization. It should be noted that this orientation was designed to allow Washington to have a geopolitical preponderance within specific areas of influence. The Department of State recommended that "assistance should be concentrated on those countries of primary strategic importance to the United States in case of ideological warfare."[42] The geopolitical realm established by the United States after World War II was sustained by the idea of America as a nation composed by virtuous people who wanted to advance the cause of liberty throughout the world: a framework that was conducive to the propagation of the ideas of personal freedom, the rule of law and free markets. In addition to this, the establishment of spheres of influence ensured that Japan and Germany/Western Europe would not operate according to foreign policies that could bring about a sudden disruption of the system of states. In the case of the Soviet Union, the process of institutionalization followed a Eurasianist rationale that aimed to emphasize the cultural, economic and social commonalities that existed between Russia and the Intermarium. The communist overtones of Eurasianism allowed the Soviet leadership to entrench the institutionalization of the international order in a manner that would be satisfactory to Moscow's security needs. The inability of the Central European nations to project their own geopolitical visions upon the international order was seized by the Soviet Union as an opportunity to absorb the Intermarium countries into its Eurasianist geostrategic project.[43] The international order configured after World War II brought forth an enhanced spectrum of stability by establishing geopolitical realms that prevented the onset of revisionist tendencies on the part of countries or groupings of nations that could have disrupted the international order. Eurasianism was one of the metapolitical elements that legitimized the idea of the Soviet Union as one of the two great powers capable of marshaling the postwar international order. The metapolitical tenets derived from Eurasianism provided the Soviet Union with an important intellectual framework to delineate its foreign-policy strategy in the postwar international order. Neither the Soviet leadership or the American policy makers in charge of resisting Communism outlined the significance of Eurasianism in explicit terms. For the latter, the cultural values that underscored the metapolitical approach of Eurasianism were not seen with the same level of importance as the ideological motivations derived from the Communist nature of the regime. However, the Eurasianist stance of the Soviet leadership was a powerful

42. United States Assistance to Other Countries from the Standpoint of National Security, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Washington, April 29, 1947—FRUS, 1947. General; The United Nations (1947), 737.

43. See S. Troebst, "'Intermarium' and 'Wedding to the Sea': Politics of History and Mental Mapping in East Central Europe," *European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire* 10, 2 (2003), 293–321.

factor in the configuration of a bi-continental territorial foothold in the aftermath of World War II.

2.4 The Institutionalization of the Postwar International Order

The United States and the Soviet Union institutionalized the postwar international order by establishing social norms that enabled both countries to retain hegemonic positions. The system of spheres of influence was a pivotal instrument in the construction of a stable system of states in the postwar era. Institutions develop incrementally, responding to the gradual changes that take place in society over time.[44] However, the process of institutionalization can be established more quickly when there is a need to fill a normative void, as it was the case in the aftermath of the war. Little attention has been paid to the factors that propel the spectrum of deinstitutionalization in the international order. *Deinstitutionalization occurs when there is an erosion of the magnitude and efficacy of the institutions that sustain interstate relations.* The enfeeblement of institutions leads to a situation in which individual states feel compelled to act in order to maximize their interests, usually at the expense of other states. The revisionist drive launched by Germany, Italy and Japan in the interwar years contributed to deinstitutionalize the international order. This state of affairs compelled the main actors of the system of states to a find a new communicational framework for the purposes of regulating interstate relations in an expanded international order. The spectrum of institutionalization that emerged after World War II responded to the need to regulate the "open access order" that originated from the rise of a globally oriented arrangement based on the "formal" equality of rights among states.[45] The framework of institutionalization set up after the war ensured that the newly established configuration of the system of states could be managed according to the hierarchical ordering established by the superpowers. The global nature of the war and the scope of responsibilities that burdened the superpowers in the aftermath of the conflagration required the construction of an international order based on a normative framework capable of accommodating the interests of the superpowers. Institutionalization led to the establishment of well-demarcated legal rules ensuring that the superpowers' lack of a common ideological background would not result in the disruption of the emerging international order. The institutionalization of the postwar system of states was meant to place important constraints on state action. The more assiduous diplomatic interaction between countries led to the emergence of institutions that constrained the ability of states to undertake a revisionist stance.[46] The international order becomes more stable when the actions of the less prominent units of the system of states are

---

44. D. North, *Understanding the Process of Economic Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 25.
45. J. Kelly and M. Kaplan, "'My Ambition is Much Higher than Independence': US power, the UN world, the nation-state and their critics," in Duara, P. (ed.), *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then* (London: Routledge, 2003), 149.
46. R. Keohane and J. Nye, "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1998), 81.

constrained by a relatively high degree of great-power management. Great powers have been characterized as states whose capabilities are so extensive as to "affect the course of international affairs" in a significant way.[47] Institutionalism serves to advance the interests of the great powers. Nevertheless, the hegemonic practices rolled out by the great powers do not preclude the possibility of establishing a solid framework of cooperation between the units of the system of states.

There is a close link between the accomplishment of geopolitical objectives and the creation of institutional frameworks capable of creating a modicum of stability in the system of states. The establishment of geopolitical realms in well-defined areas of the world relies on the tacit and explicit construction of rules and norms that demarcate the scope of action of the great powers. Institutions have been defined as the legal constraints that shape the interaction between the members of a political community. Institutions are also responsible for introducing a measure of regularity and stability in interstate relations.[48] Ikenberry argues that "the incentives and capacities of leading states to employ institutions as mechanisms of political control are shaped by two variables: the extent of power disparities after [a] war and the states that are party to this settlement."[49] The overwhelmingly powerful position of the superpowers after World War II enabled them to impose the institutional framework that would guide interstate relations within their respective spheres of influence. The bandwagoning of the countries that joined the American and Soviet spheres of influence was facilitated by the fact that they lacked the necessary capabilities to embark on an independent political project. Ideology is an important component of the process of institutionalization of the system of states. Although prominent geopolitical actors may want to impose their own values, when they join an institutional framework they are willing to be constrained by certain normative rules. The behavior of international actors might be constrained by the "patterns of interaction" that arise in the system of states.[50] This theoretical framework explains why the Western European countries refrained from pursuing an independent geopolitical path in the years following World War II. Moreover, in spite of certain attempts to break free from Soviet influence, the countries of the communist bloc operated under the assumption that the Western bloc was not really interested in bringing about a change of circumstances in the European political order that emerged after World War Two. Institutionalization tends to diminish uncertainties among the members of a particular political order, as it provides them with a framework to maximize benefits and reduce costs.[51] The level of institutionalization of the system of states

47. W. Aslam, *The United States and Great Power Responsibility in International Society: Drones, Rendition and Invasion* (London: Routledge, 2013), 10.
48. S. Harty, "Theorizing Institutional Change," in Lecours, A. (ed.), *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2005), 56.
49. J. Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 5.
50. G. Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), 160–61.
51. M. Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development," *American Political Science Review*, 87, 3 (1993), 567.

propelled by the superpowers was indicative of their willingness to create a hierarchical ordering that would lead to the actualization of their geopolitical interests.[52] It is possible to identify conflictual and transformative aspects within the framework of institutionalization that was configured by the superpowers after World War II. The conflagration had caused a high level of devastation, which originated from the revisionist drive of Italy, Japan and Germany and the military actions carried out by the Allied efforts to restore order in the system of states. The international order that emerged at the end of the war was directed toward reducing the possibility of the onset of another such conflagration. The institutionalization of the system of states was facilitated by the higher level of intervention exercised by the superpowers and by the augmented spectrum of international organization.[53] The Cold War is traditionally seen by the scholarship as a conflictual symbiosis between the two superpowers. However, the enhanced spectrum of institutionalization that was generated in the aftermath of World War II shows the willingness of the superpowers to create a balance-of-power system that would demarcate the limits to the deployment of their geopolitical power.[54] The spectrum of institutionalization that emerged was aimed at preventing the units of the system from using power in a manner that would be detrimental to the security of the international order.[55] This state of affairs indicates the espousal of a functionalist approach to the management of geopolitical power—a factor that contributed to the consolidation of an order capable of restricting the scope of conflict. This was facilitated by the adoption of elements of central planning as well as the higher emphasis placed on the provision of welfare instruments to the citizenry. The ideological symbiosis that resulted from the confrontation that took place during the Cold War enabled the Soviet Union and its satellite countries to exercise a measure of soft power over the Western nations and the countries of the Third World.[56] The managerial approach employed to resolve domestic problems was an important element for the attainment of a balance-of-power system underscored by the growing importance of international organization. Moreover, the experience of having defeated a common enemy engendered a modicum of conviviality between the two superpowers.[57]

The process of bloc formation contributed to the normalization of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. American policy makers believed that a

---

52. N. Lewkowicz, *The German Question and the International Order, 1943–1948* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 173–75.

53. N. Onuf, "Institutions, Intentions and International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, 28, 2 (2002), 211–28.

54. See K. Spandler, "The Political International Society. Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions," *Review of International Studies*, 41, 3 (2015), 601–22.

55. N. Dogan, *Pragmatic Liberal Approach to World Order—The Scholarship of Inis L. Claude, Jr.* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2013), 90–91.

56. E. H. Carr, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 106–13.

57. M. Laserson, *Russia and the Western World: The Place of the Soviet Union in the Comity of Nations* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 11–46.

comprehensive understanding among the Western nations was a necessary prerequisite to attain a convivial arrangement with the Soviet Union.[58] In May 1945, Harry Hopkins, the former US secretary of commerce, was sent to Moscow to reassure Stalin about the willingness of the United States to establish a scheme of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Hopkins stated that, "despite [the] different political and economic ideology in the two countries, the United States and the Soviet Union could work together after the war in order to bring about a secure peace for humanity."[59] The experience of fighting a common enemy was influential in the drive for institutionalization instigated by the two countries after the war. Moreover, both countries faced the challenge of reframing the socioeconomic structure in order to work for the attainment of greater living standards for the public. These are factors that facilitated the spectrum of institutionalization in the postwar era and the attainment of a large degree of coexistence between the superpowers.

One of the lessons that might be learned from the pattern of institutionalization that emerged after World War II is that great powers are prepared to exert coercion for the purposes of managing the system of states only when the undertaking of a wide range of responsibilities is conflated with the actualization of vital geopolitical interests. The superpowers acquired a vast scope of responsibilities in order to ensure the sound management of the system of states. The United States and the Soviet Union realized that there was a need to establish an international order that would enable them to retain the high degree of power accumulated during the war. This is an aspect of paramount importance for understanding the functional symbiosis that emerged between the superpowers in the postwar period. Certain segments of the American political establishment had originally espoused a "One World" geopolitical orientation in which the political and economic tenets of the United States would be embraced by the rest of the countries.[60] However, the political settlement that emerged at the Yalta Conference produced a *modus vivendi* between the two superpowers, underpinned by the demarcation of spheres of influence. The outcome of the Yalta Conference was, according to US Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, favorable to the cause of world organization. Moscow acquiesced to the voting formula desired by the United States in the newly formed United Nations, hence contributing to the consolidation of the spectrum of conviviality that had been forged during the war.[61] These are factors that indicate the commitment to ensuring that the nascent international order would not be subject to the disruptive tendencies that had taken root during the interwar period.

The United States maintained its dominant position in world affairs thanks to a "power elite" that established a cultural superstructure guided by the notion of a

---

58. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 6, 1945—FRUS, Europe (1945), 822.
59. Memorandum by the Assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen), Moscow, May 26, 1945—FRUS, Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference)1945, 26.
60. W. Wilkie, *One World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943).
61. E. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (New York: Doubleday, 1949), 295–96.

permanent state of confrontation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.[62] The geostrategic position of the United States in the postwar scenario propelled the establishment of a national security doctrine that militarized US foreign policy. At the same time, the militarization of Soviet foreign policy emerged as a result of the impetus for bloc formation that materialized toward 1948. The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was seen by the Soviet authorities as a "struggle for peace," aimed at challenging the "encirclement" instigated by the Western powers. The Soviet leadership believed that it was acting in response to the formation of political and economic "blocs" established by the Western powers for the purposes of containing the Soviet Union and its "sister democracies."[63] The Soviet foreign-policy apparatus used covert means of operation as well as the element of hard power provided by the powerful military position of Moscow in the postwar scenario. By 1947, American officials labored under the assumption that the Soviet Union gained everything they could from "cooperation and parliamentary infiltration." According to this perspective, Moscow was ready to use more overt tactics in Western Europe, possibly through the use of trade unions and the development of strategy aimed at engendering the right conditions for revolutionary activity.[64] This is an aspect of Soviet foreign policy that was duly identified by American policy makers in these years. The Department of State proposed that, "depending upon the needs and circumstances of the moment," the Soviet Union could "openly use force, or threaten to use force, to influence foreign countries or it can try the inside job method, using the local communist party and bring [chaos] from within as they are now doing in France."[65] The spectrum of militarization was important in order to accelerate the establishment of spheres of influence capable of causing disruptive conflict in the nascent international order. The state of confrontation between the superpowers was magnified as a result of the onset of the nuclear age.[66] The advent of the confrontation stemmed from the anxieties that resulted from the massive military power that both nations had accumulated during the world war. The existence of weapons of mass destruction raised awareness that there would be no return to the geopolitical status quo that existed before the war.[67] The prospect of the militarization of the American and Soviet systems of government contributed to enhancing the spectrum of institutionalization in some fundamental ways. Militarization enabled both to demarcate the

62. C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3–6 and 202.

63. The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, August 21, 1948—FRUS, General; the United Nations (in two parts) (1948), 611–13.

64. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, November 5, 1947—Evaluation of President Kremlin International Policies, FRUS, 1947. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 609.

65. Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Matthews), Washington, February 17, 1947—FRUS, 1947. General; The United Nations (1947), 715.

66. See D. Hoffman, *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy* (New York: Anchor, 2010).

67. J. Masco, "Terror as Normality," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 69, 6 (2013), 31.

scope of their geopolitical interests, hence engendering a balance of power system that would be based on predictable parameters. The element of militarization that was part and parcel of the superpowers' foreign policy allowed them to identify the mechanisms needed for taming the spectrum of conflict that informed their symbiotic relationship. The normative framework that emerged through the functional symbiosis between the superpowers and the militarization of foreign policy provided the framework needed to ensure the accomplishment of their vital geostrategic goals.[68] These elements were influential in the construction of a normative framework capable of sustaining the needs and interests of both parties.[69] The concept of institutionalization that took root in the system of states did not emerge in a vacuum. The volatility that had engulfed the system since the late nineteenth century was a crucial factor for bringing about legal and diplomatic mechanisms aimed at reducing the tensions that existed in the core areas of the world, especially in Europe. The functionalist approach that informed the push for further international organization became more peremptory because of the level of destruction from the conflagration and the power vacuum left by the defeat of the Axis. The drive for a more comprehensive scheme of international organization was primarily guided by the quest for equilibrium and the advancement of the national interests of the superpowers.

2.5 Conclusion

The conventional explanations on the origins of the Cold War tend not take into account the metapolitical orientation that informed the geopolitical strategy established by the superpowers in the first years after World War II. American exceptionalism and Soviet Eurasianism were reformulated in accordance with a liberal and communist orientation, respectively. This is a factor that enabled the United States and the Soviet Union to keep their dominant positions in the postwar scenario. The geopolitical perspective is useful to understand the origins of the Cold War. The providential concept of nationhood that guided the geopolitical stance of the superpowers was a crucial factor in the establishment of spheres of influence at the end of World War II. The ambitious geopolitical design of the superpowers was crucial to institutionalize the postwar international order. The establishment of specific geopolitical realms capable of allowing the United States and the Soviet Union sufficient scope for action tamed the spectrum of conflict that emerged after the war. Institutionalization is likely to take place when the creation of a normative framework goes hand in hand with the attainment of the geopolitical interests of the great powers. In this context, the militarization of the scheme of foreign policy of the superpowers was an important element in ensuring the stability of the nascent international order. The institutionalization of the system of states in the postwar era had an

---

68. P. Hall and R. C. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies*, 44, 5 (1996), 936–57.

69. T. Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, 1 (1998), 171–200.

orientation that was dictated by the metapolitical conception that informed the geopolitical objectives of the superpowers. The concerns for the restoration of social, political and economic life in Western Europe motivated the United States to rehabilitate inter-state relations in a manner that would satisfy its economic and geopolitical requirements in the postwar period. In the case of the Soviet Union, institutionalization emerged as a useful instrument for the purposes of bolstering the legitimacy of the Soviet system of government and production. The consolidation of the Soviet Union as a superpower was crucial in crushing the possible advent of revisionist tendencies in the Intermarium. At the same time, the institutionalization of this buffer zone created an important degree of ontological separation vis-à-vis the Western powers, which enhanced the stability of the nascent system of states.

Chapter Three

THE GERMAN QUESTION AND THE DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM (1871–1945)

3.1 Introduction

The modern formulation of the 'German Question' originated in the context of the process of political unification that took place in the German-speaking territories during the nineteenth century. German unification upset the balance of power that existed in Central Europe and led to the gradual deinstitutionalization of the European political order. This state of affairs arose as a result of the revisionist drive instigated by Imperial Germany. The German Question emerged as a result of the inability of great powers such as France and the United Kingdom to incorporate the newly established state into a continental institutional setting capable of catering to the interests of its most prominent constituents. After World War II, the treatment of the German Question was one of the most important variables of the process of re-institutionalization of the international order. The treatment of the German Question provided the wartime Allies with an opportunity to establish the basis for the creation of a bipolar system of states. This section of the book introduces the notion of deinstitutionalization for the purposes of describing the way in which the emergence of a unified Germany disrupted the status quo that prevailed in the European continent in the latter part of the nineteenth century. This chapter examines how the emergence of the German Question changed the configuration of the European political spectrum, paying special attention to the geopolitical challenges attached to the establishment of the German Empire in 1871 and the circumstances that led to World War I. This chapter also tackles the inability of the Weimar Republic to resolve the issues related to Germany's demoted position in the European political spectrum. This chapter analyzes the uniqueness of National Socialism in the spectrum of German history and the main implications of Hitler's expansionist drive in the European continent.

3.2 The Importance of the German Question in the European Political Spectrum

The unification of Germany overhauled the conservative order that informed the European geopolitical spectrum since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The German

Question can be understood as the series of factors involving the reconciliation between the recognition of Germany's geopolitical interests and the preservation of peace and order in the international political system. Prior to 1945, the German Question could have been resolved by establishing multilateral mechanisms capable of catering to the interests of Germany within the context of cooperation among the members of the European order. There are a number of factors that contributed to magnify the geopolitical threat posed by the German Question. The advent of nationalism prompted the quest for a definition of the values that demarcated the political culture of Germany. This situation posed serious questions as to how Germany could fit into the European system of states without threatening the security of its neighbors.[1] The dominance of Prussian culture over the German political order that emerged in the nineteenth century entailed the prevalence of an ideology that emphasized "the cult of the colossal, the worship of success, historical evolutionism and the over-rating of purely material progress." According to Röpke, these are factors that explain the rise of the Nazi movement.[2] Verheyen highlights four interrelated dimensions that define the nature of the German Question: concern about German identity; the issue of German unity; Germany's place and role in the European order; and the projection of German power upon European and international politics.[3] The ideological aspects involved in the process of German unification were influential in bringing about deinstitutionalization in the European political order.[4] The advent of nationalism was responsible for breaking down the conservative order imposed by the great powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The unification of Germany propelled the forces of nationalism throughout the European continent. This state of affairs presented the great powers with a security dilemma, centered around the presence of Germany as a challenger to the established European order. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 resulted in the merging of the northern and southern German states into a unified empire under the leadership of King William I of Prussia. The provisions of the Treaty of Frankfurt, signed in May 1871, effectively diminished the status of France in the European political spectrum. Germany's dominant position in the European order was entrenched through the militarization of parts of the vanquished nation, the payment of war indemnities and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine into the newly established German Empire. The provisions of the Treaty of Frankfurt also included the treatment of Germany as a most-favored trading nation on the part of France.[5] The spectrum of the deinstitutionalization of the European political order took place as a result of Germany's push to

---

1. S. Wolff, *The German Question since 1919—An Analysis with Key Documents* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 4–7.
2. W. Röpke, *The German Question* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1946), 151.
3. D. Verheyen, *The German Question—A Cultural, Historical and Geopolitical Exploration* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 2–4.
4. B. Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 166.
5. A. Oakes (ed.), *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), 284.

overcome its own geopolitical limitations by attempting to create an enlarged economic space in its immediate neighborhood.

The entrenchment of nationalist tendencies prompted a significant debate about the political implications of a unified German empire. The *kleindeutsche* solution, based on leaving Austria out of the newly unified German Empire, was criticized by commentators such as Frantz, who envisaged a situation in which a unified German political entity would attempt to establish continental hegemony, leading to a confrontation against a grand alliance of states. According to Frantz, liberal and nationalist tendencies could have been reconciled through the adoption of federalist mechanisms that would have led to a geopolitical space encompassing Austria–Hungary, the German Empire and, possibly, France. Frantz pointed out that the German Question was linked to the configuration of a workable European political system.[6] The idea of a loose federalist structure in Central Europe is reminiscent of the concept of German unity espoused by Klemens von Metternich, the state chancellor of the Austrian Empire. The original intention of Metternich's policy, outlined in the Vienna Conferences of 1820 and 1834, was to enhance the level of integration between the different German states within a federalist, monarchist and conservative political orientation. Metternich's policy was geared toward protecting Germany from the overzealous influence of nationalism and liberalism and to ensure the peaceful unfolding of interstate relations in Europe.[7] Here we see a concern regarding the possibility that a change in the status quo would have engendered the breakdown of the European political order. The federalist orientation of a future German political entity could have endowed the revamped European order with an important level of institutionalization that could have prevented the slide into an uncontainable security dilemma among the great powers.[8]

The fate of Germany as a world power was, in the mind of prominent geopoliticians like Karl Haushofer, connected to the possibility of configuring a continental European bloc that would replicate the tendency toward a "large space organization, such as the British Empire [and] the United States." European unity, under the aegis of Germany, was seen as the only way to establish Germany as a great power and to deal in an effective manner with the internal political divisions and geoeconomic constraints of the continent.[9] The breakdown of the European political order was accelerated because of the British and French resistance to acknowledging the irretrievable nature of the new order of things that emerged after 1871, giving rise to a period of geopolitical uncertainty that would last until 1945. The apprehension regarding the geopolitical stance

---

6. See C. Frantz, *Die preussische Intelligenz und ihre Grenzen* (Munich: Verlag des Literarischen Instututs von M. Huttler, 1874); P. Merkl, *German Unification in the European Context* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 33.

7. Billinger, R., *Metternich and the German Question: States' Rights and Federal Duties, 1820–1834* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1991), 12–13.

8. D. North, J. Wallis and B. Weingast, *Violence and Social Order: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 143–54.

9. A. Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer—Geopolitics in Action* (New York and Toronto: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942), 141–42.

undertaken by Imperial Germany responded to the peculiar political development of Germany. The *Sonderweg* thesis posits that between 1848 and 1945 the German political system diverged from the "normative" path that led to the establishment of liberal democracy in Western Europe. The late consolidation of Germany as a nation-state was responsible for the development of a political system that deviated from the notion of constitutional liberalism espoused by nations such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.[10] German philosophical thinking emphasized non-rational aspects of social integration that responded to primordialist notions of *Kultur*. The primordialist stance in cultural matters entailed the rejection of the ideals of the French Revolution, which were centered around the universal principles of equality and fraternity.[11] The divergent nature of German political culture compounded the problems associated with the reluctance of the great powers to cater to the geopolitical interests of Imperial Germany. Institutions develop incrementally, responding to the gradual changes that take place in society over a long period of time. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, interstate relations did not unfold within a comprehensive institutional framework capable of transcending the logic of anarchy. The scheme of diplomatic action was circumscribed to the maintenance of a fragile balance of power, based on a series of bilateral treaties aimed at respecting territorial claims, as seen in the case of the Entente Cordiale (1904) between the United Kingdom and France. The emergence of a unified Germany disrupted the European political order that arose in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars in an irreversible manner.[12] The institutional framework that existed in the European continent in the nineteenth century was not solid enough to deal with the challenge presented by the onset of nationalism. The thin level of institutionalism that existed in the continent prevented the most prominent units of the system of states to anticipate the possibility of future gains. For nations like Germany, revisionism offered the chance of greater geopolitical payoffs.[13]

The impressive economic growth attained by Germany since the onset of unification was another factor that contributed to the deinstitutionalization of the international order. When looking at the link between economic growth and deinstitutionalization, one finds that disruption ensues from a situation in which nations that experience rapid economic growth are willing to revise the status quo prevailing in the international order. Deinstitutionalization might also be brought forth by the efforts instigated by the hegemonic powers in order to prevent the geopolitical rise of a nation that is experiencing a high level of economic growth. There is a distinct geopolitical perspective attached to the process of German unification, which resulted in a drive toward the establishment of a common economic area in *Mitteleuropa,* linked through bilateral trading links

---

10. See R. Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979).
11. D. Blackbourn and G. Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 3.
12. D. North, *Understanding the Process of Economic Change* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 25.
13. R. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 33 and 68.

and preferential tariffs. This can be seen in the establishment of the Mitteleuropäischer Wirtschaftstag, founded in 1904 by Julius Wolf. Other groups like the Bund der Industriellen took the idea of a Central European customs union and the ideas of Friedrich List as their model. These groups agreed on the broader principle of a great economic space (Grossraum) stretching from the English Channel to the Balkans, with a *Pax Germanica* reigning over Asia Minor and the Balkans.[14] The projection of German power had the potential of leading to the diminution of the geopolitical status of France and the configuration of a Central European federation of states "under German leadership."[15] At the beginning of the twentieth century, prominent members of the British Foreign Office envisaged the possible establishment of a German economic space carved out through the use of military might:

> [T]he dream of a Colonial Empire had taken deep hold on the German imagination. Emperor, statesmen, journalists, geographers, economists, commercial and shipping houses, and the whole mass of educated and uneducated public opinion continue with one voice to declare: We must have real Colonies, where German emigrants can settle and spread the national ideals of the Fatherland, and we must have a fleet and coaling stations to keep together the Colonies which we are bound to acquire. To the question, "Why must?" [T]he ready answer is: "A healthy and powerful State like Germany, with its 60,000,000 inhabitants, must expand, it cannot stand still, it must have territories to which its overflowing population can emigrate without giving up its nationality."[16]

The vision of an economic space in *Mitteleuropa* was an integral part of the September Memorandum drawn up in 1914 by Germany's Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, which was based on the submissions that he received from a variety of German industrial concerns. The September Memorandum polarized the debate between those who wanted a German victory in the war in order to establish a formal continental empire and those who favored the creation of an informal Central European economic sphere. The September Memorandum included the call for the creation of a highly integrative framework of interstate relations in Central Europe:

> A central European economic association is to be constructed through common customs agreements, to comprise France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland (!) and possibly Italy, Sweden, and Norway. This association will probably have no common constitutional head and will provide for ostensible equality among its members, although it will in fact be under German leadership; [stabilizing] Germany's economic predominance in central Europe.[17]

---

14. V. Berghahn, *Quest for Economic Empire—European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century* (Providence, RI and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1996), 8–9.

15. F. Fischer, *Germany's Aims in the First World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967), 34.

16. E. Crowe, "Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany, January 1, 1907," in G. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, vol. 3 (London: HMOS, 1928), 402–6.

17. T. Bethmann-Hollweg, *The September Memorandum, 9/9/1914*—http://germanhistorydocs. ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=1811

As an industrial power, Germany needed raw materials as well as access to European and overseas markets, a situation that was geopolitically threatening for the United Kingdom, France and Russia. By 1914, Germany's gross domestic product (GDP) stood at 310 billion marks; this was more than double the French GDP and slightly higher than the British GDP.[18] Coal production in Germany had risen by about 290 percent since the 1880s, compared to a 80.4 percent rise in the case of the United Kingdom. During the same period, pig-iron production increased by 390 percent in contrast to 13.3 percent in the United Kingdom and steel production by about 1,335 percent as a result of the application of new technological processes.[19] Economic advancement made Germany dependent on world markets. The imperial policy set in motion in 1897–1898 was geared toward securing adequate sources for the continued industrial expansion of the nation.[20] The circumstances that gave rise to the emergence of a putative German threat to the European political spectrum were fomented by the delegitimization of the geopolitical interests of Germany on the part of the United Kingdom and France. These two countries were threatened by the rise of a revisionist power that sought to alter the distribution of power in the European system of states. Bismarck's policies were not aggressive enough as to constitute an outright overhaul of the foundations that sustained the European political order. The delegitimization of Germany's geopolitical claims obeyed the logic of power maximization exercised by the United Kingdom and Britain. Bismarck's foreign policy, which took into account the potential vulnerabilities of the newly established kingdom, was ultimately based on the preservation of a workable European political system.[21] The Chancellor's policies were geared toward ensuring the viability of Wilhelmine Germany. According to Bismarck, the accomplishment of this goal required the exercise of a prudent scheme of foreign policy.[22] The chancellor adopted a cautious approach in order to prevent the formation of a coalition of countries hostile to Germany's emergence as a rising geopolitical power.[23] In any case, the logic of revisionism dictated that Germany was compelled to seek new sources of raw materials and markets for the goods that it produced. Bismarck pressed forward for the acquisition of colonies in Africa and Oceania. However, German expansionism went hand in hand with a prudent approach to foreign-policy matters in the European continent. For instance, Bismarck refrained from committing Germany to an alliance with

18. H. Böhme, *An Introduction to the Social and Economic History of Germany—Politics and Economic Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 78.

19. H. Böhme, *An Introduction to the Social and Economic History of Germany* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1978), 88–90.

20. K. Borchardt, *The Industrial Revolution in Germany 1700–1914* (London: Harper Collins, 1972), 44–45.

21. E. Brandenburg and A. Adams, *From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), 3.

22. O. Bismarck, *Reflections and Reminiscences*, ed. Theodore S. Hamerow (London: Harper Torchbooks, 1968), 168.

23. E. Brandenburg and A. Adams, *From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), 1.

Austria-Hungary and Italy; as this would have increased the state of animosity with the United Kingdom and France.

After Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, there was a reformulation of Germany's colonial strategy. The growing tensions between the United Kingdom and Germany and the state of suspicion that originated from Germany's colonial policy in Africa was exacerbated by the "Krüger Telegram," which contained an imperial endorsement of the actions undertaken by the Afrikaner South African Republic to defeat a raid by British irregulars from the Cape Colony in 1896.[24] Although the United Kingdom initiated a rapprochement toward Germany before the onset of World War I, London's unwillingness to accommodate the geopolitical interests of Germany was one of the factors that brought about the breakdown of the European political system.[25] The British political establishment labored under the assumption that the United Kingdom would be forced to wage a war against Germany. In fact, the intentions of the British government on the eve of World War I appeared to be quite hostile. George V, the British monarch, asked Edward Gray, the foreign secretary, to find any excuse to wage war. According to George V, Britain could not refrain from the pursuit of war, as this would have enabled Germany to "mop up" France and, consequently, the United Kingdom.[26] Both Henri Poincaré, the French president, and King Albert I of Belgium pressed the United Kingdom to enter the war on their side, using the pretext of the violation of Belgian territory, which had been one of the main legal provisions for the maintenance of the status quo in the European continent.[27] As we can see, entry into the war had a geopolitical component that was geared toward preventing Germany from establishing a dominant position in the European continent. This would have resulted in the demotion of the standing of France and the United Kingdom, not only in the European spectrum but also at a broader level. This is because Germany would have been able to amalgamate the resources of the European continent around a German-dominated economic sphere and launch itself into the wider world from a position of great advantage.

The emergence of a unified Germany led to the gradual breakdown of the social norms that underpinned the functioning of a workable European political order. The main pillars of the revisionist stance adopted by Germany were (1) the possible creation of a unified economic area in Central Europe and (2) the country's geoeconomic expansion into the wider world. Germany's geopolitical interests could have been made compatible with those of France and the United Kingdom by establishing a multilateral institutional arrangement that would set the boundaries for geopolitical action by the most prominent members of the European political order. Institutions encourage

---

24. Wilhelm II to Paulus Krüger, 3/1/1896—http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=754
25. E. Brandenburg and A. Adams, *From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1927), 107.
26. A. Gray, *The Upright Sheaf—Germany's Intentions after the War* (London: Methuen, 1915), 52.
27. Interview with H. M. the King at Buckingham Palace, 8/10/1933—i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02987/PX5689635_Lewis-Wh_2987125a.jpg

and facilitate cooperation between states by allowing political leaders to anticipate the possibility of future gains to be attained by more assiduous commercial links with other states. The attainment of a high level of institutionalization moderates the spectrum of conflict, since it impels states to maintain a peaceful stance when engaging in diplomatic intercourse.[28] The deinstitutionalization of the European political order brought forth by the unification of Germany came about as a result of the lack of openness in the scheme of interstate relations that existed in Europe. The revisionist stance of Germany could have been halted through the reconciliation of the interests of the great powers of the continent in a more effective manner. For instance, Germany should have been more vociferous in attempting to explain that the construction of a German-led economic space in the continent of Europe would not have been necessarily inimical to the interests of the United Kingdom and France. Moreover, the establishment of a multilateral institutional framework could have produced a system of incentives capable of integrating Germany into a European political and economic order that could cater to the interests of all its members. This normative framework would have allowed the establishment of a communicational framework geared toward preventing disruptive conflict. Deinstitutionalization was also fomented by the lack of legal and political mechanisms that would have enabled the establishment of a peaceful European political order. The element of recognition was not incorporated into the scheme of foreign policy deployed by the United Kingdom and France vis-à-vis Germany. This stance led to the exacerbation of the security dilemma that spread throughout the European continent on the eve of the World War I.

3.3 The German Question and the Advent of Nazism

The advent of Nazism exacerbated the breakdown of interstate relations, as it magnified the revisionist tendencies that had affected the European political order since the unification of Germany. The spectrum of deinstitutionalization that emerged after the end of World War I was informed by the demise of the imperial order established after 1871 and the formal constraints imposed on Germany by the Allies. The legal provisions of the Treaty of Versailles (1919) generated a great deal of resentment among the German citizenry. This resentment grew over time and contributed to the onset of geopolitical revisionism during the 1930s. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, France put pressure on the American and British delegations in order to instigate a punitive settlement for Germany. The rationale used by the French delegation for the inclusion of the "guilt clause" was underpinned by the idea of containing the potential geopolitical revival of Germany. France was also concerned about the rapid economic development of Germany in the previous three decades before the onset of World War I. The French delegation held the view that the containment of

---

28. See D. Bearce, "Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace," *International Studies Quarterly*, 47, 3 (2003), 347–70.

German power would prevent the demotion of the standing of France in the inter-national order.[29]

The United Kingdom was interested in creating the conditions for a secure geopol-itical environment in the postwar scenario and in ensuring that no continental power would attain a dominant position in European affairs. The British delegation was not as keen as the French contingent on imposing a harsh regime on Germany. The British delegation held the view that the imposition of a harsh settlement could lead to the eco-nomic crippling of Germany. Harold Nicolson, who was a member of the British nego-tiating team, stated that the task of making peace with Germany should have been left to the diplomats. According to this perspective, the problems that arose as a result of the Treaty of Versailles were generated by the "political leaders" of the Allied nations. The Paris negotiators were not fully aware about "what sort of peace they really wanted to make [… World War I] aroused the worst passions of the human soul, which culminated in a victory so overwhelming that the conquered enemy had practically ceased to exist."[30] The main concern of the American delegation revolved around the reconstitution of the trade links with Europe. The United States was interested in setting in motion a rapid disentanglement from the internal political affairs of the continent.[31] The Allies blamed Germany for starting the war. This stance justified the harsh economic clauses attached to the Treaty of Versailles. The Allies agreed to establish a clause that stated in unequivocal terms "the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies."[32] The war guilt clause legitimized the reparations regime imposed upon Germany. The large sum of money that Germany was required to pay for war reparations (underwritten by loans from the United States) had the ultimate effect of arresting the economic development of the country in the postwar scenario. The reparations clause prescribed the payment "during 1919, 1920 and the first four months of 1921, [of] the equivalent of 20,000,000,000 gold marks."[33] The reparations regime hindered Germany's capacity to reconstitute its economy after the end of the war. Germany paid 3.5 billion marks in reparations in kind until 1924. Germany also paid $2 billion marks in gold. Moreover, Germany handed the Allied nations a further "$3 billion in non-military material" left in "enemy territory." At the same time, the "economic value of the loss of the colonies was estimated at 80 to 100 billion marks."[34] Germany was deprived of all her colonial possessions in the wider world; an element

29. See M. MacMillan, *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War* (London: John Murray, 2009).

30. H. Nicolson, *Why Britain Is at War* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1939), 143–45.

31. See M. MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (London: Random House, 2003).

32. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Article 231—en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles

33. Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Article 235—en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles

34. H. Schacht, *The End of Reparations—The Economic Consequences of the World War* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1931), 34–37.

that was conducive to the contraction of its economic power. This clause was designed to restrict the projection of Germany's naval power overseas, which could have threatened the hegemonic positions of France and the United Kingdom in the international order. It should be noted that these two countries were able to enlarge their overseas territorial possessions in the aftermath of World War I.

The Allies wanted to ensure that Germany would not be in a position to convert its industrial production for military purposes. In order to prevent this situation from happening, the Allies required the demilitarization of the Rhineland and imposed strict scrutiny of the nation's air space and waterways.[35] These provisions generated a great deal of resentment among the German public. The harsh measures imposed by the Allies at the Paris Conference went some way toward creating the conditions for the political turmoil that engulfed postwar Germany. The "war guilt" clause was an important factor in the establishment of an atmosphere of distrust between Germany and the Allies in the postwar scenario. In any case, the Weimar Republic had managed to avoid paying the bulk of the reparations prescribed by the postwar settlement. The Dawes Plan and the Young Plan restructured the German debt, lifting the country out of economic stagnation and hyperinflation in the 1920s. Furthermore, the reparations regime was cancelled one year before Hitler came to power.[36] Fergusson argues that, while it would not be accurate to pin the blame for the emergence of Nazism on the advent of hyperinflation in the 1920s, this phenomenon facilitated the coming to power of Hitler. This is because the onset of hyperinflation aggravated the looming threat of political extremism. Politicians such as Adolf Hitler were able to expose the shortcomings of the Weimar Republic and the geopolitical settlement that emerged after the end of World War I.[37]

It is worth mentioning that the plans to disarm Germany were never fully completed, as Germany masked some of its expenditures on military items as being civilian goods in order to comply with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles.[38] The Reichswehr was at the center of the efforts to rearm Germany illegally, as the armed forces never accepted the liberal nature of the Weimar Republic. Furthermore, the political environment had been greatly radicalized due to the propagation of paramilitary organizations on the right and left of the political spectrum. The legal provisions enshrined in the Treaty of Versailles dented the prospect of the resolution of the German Question, due to the blatant refusal of the Allies to legitimize Germany's geopolitical claims. The Treaty of Versailles entrenched the status quo that preceded the start of the next conflagration. France and Britain, fearing a demotion in the European political order, worked to prevent the rise of Germany as the main hegemonic power in Europe.[39] The onset of the

35. See H. Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1995).

36. R. Vansittart, *Lessons of My Life* (London: Hutchinson, 1944), 128.

37. A. Fergusson, *When Money Dies—The Nightmare of the Weimar Hyperinflation* (London: Old Street, 1975), 3 and 250.

38. E. Gumbel, "Disarmament and Clandestine Rearmament under the Weimar Republic," in S. Melman (ed.), *Inspection for Disarmament* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), 206.

39. See M. Boemeke, G. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds.), *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Great Depression would have a significant impact on the international political system and the evolution of the German Question, as it gave rise to the emergence of National Socialism as a strong political force. Moderate conservative elements became comfortable with the idea of allowing Hitler into power, as his Nazi Party pledged to restore political stability and to improve the country's economic situation. The coming to power of Hitler in 1933 put an end to the symbolic quarantine that the Treaty of Versailles placed on the geopolitical claims of Germany. The deinstitutionalization of the international order that unfolded during the 1930s originated as a result of the great revolutionary force of Nazism, keen to enforce Germany's geopolitical claims by attaining a broader level of preponderance in the European continent. According to Hannah Arendt, the uniqueness of Nazism resides in the fact that the ideology of the party, based upon the primacy of the concept of race, was mobilized in order to serve the needs of the state.[40] However, the seizure of power by the Nazi Party can also be understood by making reference to the manner in which it attempted to solve outstanding domestic problems. According to Hitler, Nazism wanted to break down "the partitions between the classes, so as to enable every man to rise," and to create "a standard of living such as the poorest will be assured of a decent existence" and to bring about the necessary conditions so that, "the benefits of civilisation [would] become common property."[41] Lasswell argues that Hitlerism moderated the "emotional conflicts" of the lower middle class and, at the same time, "reduced labor costs for the industrial concerns."[42] This situation attests to the willingness of the Nazi Party to create a spectrum of cooperation between the different social classes.

Neumann described Nazism as an unprecedented phenomenon in German political history because of its "anti-democratic, anti-liberal, and profoundly anti-rational" values.[43] Meinecke regarded the antinomies of socialism and nationalism, power and culture, and rationality and mystique as of paramount importance for understanding Hitler's coming to power in 1933.[44] The rise of Nazism may be examined from the perspective of the "diachronic gradient of informalization" that informed the standard of behavior in European societies in the twentieth century. This level of "informalization" ushered the advent of a more relaxed social space that allowed for the emergence of grassroots political ideologies such as Nazism.[45] Foerster describes Hitlerism as "the greatest and most unrestrained revolt of the vital force in man's nature known to history."[46] The destruction and barbarism exercised by the German armed forces during World War II attests to the

40. H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), 420.
41. A. Hitler, *Hitler's Table Talk, 1941–1944: His Private Conversations*, introduced by Hugh Trevor-Roper (New York: Enigma Books, 2000), 335.
42. H. Lasswell (1933) "The Psychology of Hitlerism," *Political Quarterly*, 4, 373.
43. F. Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1942), 375–77.
44. See F. Meinecke, *The German Catastrophe-Reflections and Recollections* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1946).
45. N. Elias, *The Germans—Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Michael Schröter (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 29.
46. F. W. Foerster, *Europe and the German Question* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1941), 435.

truth of that statement. The initial stance of the Hitlerite regime was conciliatory, in the sense that there were no immediate plans to repeal the Weimar constitution or to outlaw the Communist Party, in fear of the possible retaliation by elements close to Moscow. In addition to this, there appeared to be an element of goodwill toward the trade unions and the Social Democrats, in order to allow the Nazi Party to consolidate its grip on power.[47] However, the 1933 Enabling Law (*Ermächtigungsgesetz*) provided the Hitlerite regime with a high degree of political power. After the "Night of the Long Knives" in 1934, there was no internal opposition coming from within the Nazi Party. Moreover, the regime did not have to submit itself to any kind of parliamentary, judicial or administrative scrutiny. The demise of the liberal order unfolded as a result of the inability of the political class to take care of the needs of millions of Germans who became unemployed after 1929. This situation was propitious for the rise in the support given by people of left-wing persuasions to the Nazi Party. The "left-wingers of the Right" were disenfranchised citizens who lent their support to the Nazi Party as a result of the dire economic situation that affected Germany in the early 1930s.[48] One of the most important elements of the Nazi discourse was the idea of a true spirit of nationhood and the creation of one class of people. There was a distinct penchant for utopian discourse, centered on the primacy of the common man, the prospect of a better future and the drive for national unity. This is what transpires from Joseph Goebbels' ideological writings:

> We will take Germany's fate in our hands. We will resolve the question of socialism, radically and completely, disregarding tradition, education, wealth, social standing and class. Our only concern will be the future of the creative German people […] Then we will prove that National Socialism is more than a comfortable moral theology of bourgeois wealth and capitalist profit. A new spirit of nationalism will grow from the ruins, displaying the most radical form of ethnic self defense.[49]

The Nazi Party was able to capitalize on the volatile ideological environment that took root in Germany upon the onset of the economic crisis in 1929, mobilizing the support of the industrial elite and a vast segment of the disenfranchised German population. The Nazi Party filled in the ideological gap left vacant by the Social Democrats, who had failed to provide a solution to the problems that affected Germany. The very same people who financed Hitler's rise maintained that the situation could have been avoided if the Social Democrats had adopted a "more nationalist" position.[50] Hitlerism was unique among the right-wing dictatorships that sprang up in Europe after World War I. Other right-wing populist political outfits such as Italy's National Fascist Party lacked the intense racialist view of the world that characterized Nazism. The kind of national psychosis created by the Hitlerite regime in Germany never engulfed Italy with the same

---

47. The Chargé in Germany (Kliefoth) to the Secretary of State, Berlin, January 31, 1933, FRUS, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa (1933), 183–85.
48. H. Gisevius, *Adolf Hitler* (Barcelona: Plaza & Janes, 1966), 198–99.
49. J. Goebbels, *Der Nazi-Sozi* (Elberfeld: Verlag der Nationalsozialistischen Briefe, 1927), 45.
50. F. Thyssen, *Yo Pagué a Hitler* (Seville: Renacimiento, 2017), 115–16.

vehemence. Benito Mussolini never commanded the overwhelming support of the Italian people. As World War II became unwinnable for Italy, Mussolini's regime was deposed and replaced by a government friendly to the Western Allies. Nazism also exhibited fundamental differences with Stalinism. The "Hitler Myth" was indispensable to and indistinguishable from the Nazi movement. Although Stalin cultivated a cult of personality, the Soviet system survived for another three decades after his death.

Nazism was quite unique, both in its nature and in the magnitude of its geopolitical drive. Nazism was a revisionist movement that revolved around the concept of the *Volk* as a political idea that superseded the concept of the state. Hitler's idea of a master race (*Herrenvolk*) dominated his geopolitical vision and the conduct of Germany during the war. The notion of racialism seemed to permeate the whole world view of Nazism, especially in its doctrine ascribing a "conspiratorial" role to Judaism in the breakdown of the German political and economic order during the interwar period. This is what emerges from the diaries of Alfred Rosenberg, Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, which indicates the reluctance of would-be allies such as nationalist Spain and Fascist Italy to recognize the existence of a "Jewish Question" haunting the European order.[51] The racialist attitude of the Nazi regime served to justify violence and murder for the purposes of appropriating land from other countries and for using cheap labor in order to expand the German economy. As far back as 1935 Hitler summoned the owners of industrial concerns such as "Krupp, Röchling, Kirdorf, Vögler, Poesngen [and] Stinnes" and reassured some of them that the raw materials needed for the expansion of their economic activities would be procured by dislodging the "inhuman races" from Eastern Europe.[52] In July–August 1942, Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer of the SS, told Johan Wilhelm Rangell, the prime minister of Finland, that "social issues can only be resolved [by killing] other [races] in order to get their land."[53] The notion of race permeated the whole ideological edifice of the Nazi Party, constituting one of the main pillars of the concept of nationhood advanced by the Hitlerite regime. This stance was informed by the primordialist philosophy that was part and parcel of Nazism. In the words of Alfred Rosenberg, "to awaken the racial soul to life mean[t] to recognize its highest value, and, under its dominance, to allot to other values their organic position in the State, in art, and in religion. That is the task of our century; to create a new human type out of a new view of life."[54] The central place occupied by the notion of the *Volk*

51. F. Bajohr and J. Matthäus (eds.), *Alfred Rosenberg, Diarios, 1933–1944*, trans. L. Cortés Fernández, T. de Lozoya Elzdurdía, I. Romero Reche and A. Valero Martín (Barcelona: Critíca, 2015), 240–41.

52. H. Eberle and M. Uhl (eds.), *El Informe Hitler—Informe Secreto del NKVD para Stalin, extraído a Otto Günsche, ayudante personal de Hitler y Heinz Linge, su ayudante de cámara, Moscú, 1948–1949*, Acta no. 462, Sección 5ta, Catalog 30 del Archivo Estatal de Historia Contemporanea de Rusia, traducido del alemán por Victor Eduardo Farías Zurita y Victor Farias Soto (Barcelona: Tusquets, 2016), 53–54.

53. K. Himmler (ed.), *Himmler—Segun la Correspondencia con su Esposa* (Barcelona: Taurus, 2014), 270.

54. See A. Rosenberg (1930) *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*—https://archive.org/stream/ TheMythOfTheTwentiethCentury/Myth_djvu.txt

marked a decisive break with any past undertakings in the realm of foreign policy. Viereck points out that Hitlerism made reference to a metaphysical tradition that had as its main component a metapolitical concept of nationalism, informed by romanticism, scientifically applied racism, "a vague economic socialism" and the transcendental energies of the *Volk*.[55] It should be noted that the Nazi racialist ideas were replicated, to some extent, by a body of thought that existed in the United States and other Western European countries. For instance, interracial breeding was seen by several Western European thinkers as detrimental to the efforts to create a better society in the postwar era.[56] The metapolitical connotations regarding the influence of the Nazi regime on the evolution of the German Question have to be considered within the role that occultism played in the development of Nazism. The Nazi Party wanted to awaken a belief in the "superhuman" qualities among the German people in order to launch the drive for domination of the European continent.[57] There was a sense of "duty" that informed the actions of the people in charge of carrying out the orders that led to the devastation of the European continent and the loss of millions human lives. In this context, the "evil" acts of the Nazi regime were carried out in a perfunctory manner, by making exclusive reference to the letter of law. This duty was undertaken in a "conscientious" and "honest" manner; in the sense that the perpetrators of crimes against humanity believed in the rightness of their cause.[58]

Nazism as a movement cannot be divorced from the personality of Adolf Hitler. Initially, Hitler was not considered a threat to the Weimar Republic due to his basic education and "simple" rhetoric. In a country that expected the cultured class to govern, it was unthinkable that Hitler would come to power.[59] In the wartime report compiled by William Langer, Hitler is described as a man with a steely determination to pursue the course of action needed for the geopolitical aggrandizement of Germany. The propaganda machinery ensured that Hitler was perceived by the German people as an individual endowed with superlative qualities, forged by the sheer power of will. There was a sense of religiosity that surrounded Adolf Hitler, who saw himself as the personal savior of the nation.[60] Langer points out that the notion of providence is crucial to understanding Hitler's mindset.[61] In fact, the word "fate" features prominently in *Mein*

55. P. Viereck, *Metapolitics—From Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler* (London: Routledge, 2004), 4–8.

56. A. Ludovici, *The Four Pillars of Health—A Contribution to Post-War Planning* (London: Heath Cranton, 1945), 23–26; J. Whitman, *Hitler's American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017).

57. A. Baker, *Invisible Eagle—The History of Nazi Occultism* (London: Virgin Books, 2000), 6; N. Goodrick-Clarke, *The Occult Roots of Nazism Secret Aryan Cults and Their Influence on Nazi Ideology* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 1–2.

58. J. Korczak, *Diario del Gueto* (Barcelona: Seix Barral, 2018), 139–142; see H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin Books, 2006).

59. S. Zweig, *El Mundo de Ayer* (Barcelona: El Acantilado, 2003), 455–56.

60. W. Langer, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler—The Secret Wartime Report* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), 49–50; 55–57.

61. W. Langer, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler—The Secret Wartime Report* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), 158–59.

Kampf. In one of the passages included in his autobiographical description of life in pre-war Vienna, Hitler refers to the "sense of mission entrusted upon him by providential forces.[62] "Fate" is also an important theme in order to understand the central place that the subjection of "lower human types" had in the Nazi eschatology.[63] In other words, Nazism attempted to bring about the end of history by projecting the Promethean destiny of Germany as a nation that would organize the social, cultural and economic life of Europe according to the diktat of the master race.

The concept of the *Führerprinzip* contributed to creating a new political order based on the delegation of collective moral responsibility to Hitler. According to the testimony given by Hermann Göring at the Nuremberg Trials, the *Führerprinzip* was an aspect of paramount importance to understanding the political transformation that took place in Germany during the 1930s. Göring stated that Nazism "considered the Leadership Principle necessary because the system which previously existed, and which we called parliamentary or democratic, had brought Germany to the verge of ruin."[64] The *Führerprinzip* entailed a blind obedience to the will of Adolf Hitler, whose "hierarchical leadership" was deemed as vital to the survival of the German nation. Gottfried Feder, a Nazi politician who worked at the Ministry of Economics from 1933 to 1934, posited that the "form of state most suited to the German character is sovereign control concentrated in a supreme head."[65] The notion of obedience to the Führer enabled the Nazi Party to exercise power in an effective way. This is what emerges from a piece of propaganda written by Robert Ley, Head of the German Labor Front:

> "The Führer is always right!" They may ask: "How do you know that?" You will answer: "I believe it." "And who tells you that?" "The Führer is always right. I sense it. I can prove it from the successes of the past, the things this man has done. He rose from a lowly worker and soldier to the Führer of Germany." If you persuade the people of this, that the Führer is always right, then our people's sacrifices will never be fatal, but will only make it harder, stronger and greater. If cowardice and unreasonableness have been defeated, if the people are confident, and if true popular leadership is present, the Führer will be able to do whatever he wants with the nation. He will be able to make important political decisions. The people will obey him blindly and follow him blindly.[66]

At the Nuremberg Trial, Gustave Gilbert, one of the psychological profilers who examined the defendants indicted for crimes against humanity, pointed out the matter-of-fact attitude exhibited by the Nazi leaders in regard to the events that occurred during World War II. Göring tried to find justification for the German expansionist drive by making

---

62. A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 13.

63. A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf* (London: Houghton Mifflin, 1998), 151.

64. The Trial of the Major War Criminals: Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, November 14, 1945–October 1, 1946, International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 419.

65. G. Feder, *Hitler's Official Programme and Its Fundamental Ideas* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1934), 69–70.

66. R. Ley "'Schicksal—ich glaube!,' Wir alle helfen dem Führer" (Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1937), 103–14.

reference to the need to defend the national community. He stated that, "It is only natural for the members of a group to feel a common bond and protect themselves and their identity."[67] Here we see a fundamental break with the idea of an established order based on an institutionalized arrangement conducive to actualizing the interests of the different units of the system of states and the individuals who form part of it. The Nazi new order revolved around protecting the right of the nation to be preserved as an "exclusive" polity, characterized by the existence of a *Führerdemokratie*—a system of government based on "anti-rationalist leadership."[68] The notion of exclusive national communities that permeated the Nazi credo entailed the spread of the security dilemma across the international order and the perpetuation of the environment of mistrust that characterized the 1930s. The Nazi regime was influential in propagating the deinstitutionalization of the international order by giving prevalence to the spiritual rather than the material concerns of Germany. The struggle for geopolitical recognition necessitated, according to Hitler, a Spartan view of life. In the *Second Book*, Hitler argued that "the merely material interest will rise in exact proportion as ideal spiritual outlooks are in the process of disappearing."[69] The Hitlerite mindset operated under the assumption that material means should be a contributing element to the spiritual elevation of the German nation:

> [M]any nations, at certain times, may have an interest in presenting the existing distribution of the world's territories as binding forever, for the reason that it corresponds to their interests, just as other nations can see only something generally manmade in such a situation which at the moment is unfavourable to them, and which therefore must be changed with all means of human power. Anyone who would banish this struggle from the Earth forever would perhaps abolish the struggle between men, but he would also eliminate the highest driving power for their development; exactly as if in civil life he would want to eternalise the wealth of certain men, the greatness of certain business enterprises, and for this purpose eliminate the play of free forces, competition. The results would be catastrophic for a nation.[70]

Another important aspect related to the uniqueness of Nazism is its willingness to bring about the political transformation of Germany through dynamic action. Hermann Rauschning, a former president of the Free City of Danzig Senate and erstwhile Nazi Party supporter, claimed that the aims of Nazi foreign policy were directed at creating a "universal political unsettlement" in order to keep the objectives of the regime "undefined."[71] Those who visited Nazi Germany during the 1930s were of the opinion that "National Socialism [was] a *revolution* […] still in the emergency stage."[72] The idea of permanent conflict was seen as of paramount importance in order to expand the

---

67. G. Gilbert, *The Nuremberg Diary* (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1947), 121.

68. R. Carr, "Community of Neighbours vs Society of Merchants: The Genesis of Reinhard Höhn's Nazi State Theory," *Politics, Religion and Ideology*, 16, 1 (2015), 1–22.

69. A. Hitler, *Second Book* (London: Enigma Books, 2006), 3.

70. A. Hitler, *Second Book* (London: Enigma Books, 2006), 10.

71. H. Rauschning, *The Revolution of Nihilism—Warning to the West*, trans. E. W. Dickes (New York: Longmans, Green, 1939), 245–51.

72. L. Stoddard, *Into the Darkness—Nazi Germany Today* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1940), 267.

geopolitical interests of Nazi Germany.[73] In *On Tyranny*, Leo Strauss wrote that (along with Communism) Nazism tried to destroy all traditions, history, ethics, and moral standards and replace them by a force under which nature and mankind were to be subjugated and conquered.[74] Camus claims that the racialist thinking of the Nazi state lacked "the ambition of universality." The French philosopher concludes that universality of values is dependent on the deification of reason. Conversely, Nazism and Fascism were nihilistic forces without any teleological sense of historical or civilizing mission. This nihilism was embodied in the need for "action," consummated in the perpetual search for new enemies.[75] From Hitler's speeches, it transpires that the German leader advocated a complete break with the old order:

> It is out of the question to think that such a revolutionary reconstruction could be carried out by those who are the custodians and the more or less responsible representatives of the old regime, or by the political organizations founded under the old form of the Constitution. Nor would it be possible to bring this about by collaborating with these institutions, but only by establishing a new movement which will fight against them for the purpose of carrying through a radical reformation in political, cultural and economic life. And this fight will have to be undertaken even at the sacrifice of life and blood, if that should be necessary.[76]

Ordinary German citizens claim that there was a spirit of renewal derived from the ascent of the Nazi Party to power. The electoral success of the Nazi Party took many people by surprise. There was a sense of unexpectedness that also took the Nazi leaders by surprise.[77] The Third Reich was a political movement that espoused primordialist rather than conservative tendencies. Stalin did not think that Nazism had a nationalist orientation, since "the Hitler party" was "a party of imperialists and, moreover, of the most rapacious and predatory imperialists among all the imperialists of the world." Also, Stalin did not think that Nazism was "socialist," as it was "a party of the enemies of democratic liberties [and] a party of medieval reaction."[78] Nazism's primordialist stance did not prevent Hitler from forging political links with the conservative elements that benefitted from Germany's drive for rearmament in the 1930s. In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union produced a document entitled *Falsificators of History*, which described the links between the British, French and American banking and industrial systems and the rearmament of Germany after Hitler came to power.[79] The ultimate

---

73. H. Rauschning, *The Revolution of Nihilism—Warning to the West*, trans. E. W. Dickes (New York: Longmans, Green & Company, 1939), 265–67.

74. L. Strauss, *On Tyranny* (New York: Free Press, 1991), 22–23.

75. A. Camus, *The Rebel*, trans. A. Bower (New York: Vintage Books, 1956), 177–79.

76. Hitler speech at the German Reichstag, 30/1/1937—http://www.hitler.org/speeches/01-30-37.html

77. B. Pomsel, *Mi vida con Goebbels: La historia de la secretaria de Goebbels: lecciones para el presente*, ed. T. D. Hansen (Barcelona: Los Libros del Lince, 2018), 40.

78. Soviet War Documents—Addresses, Notes, Orders of the Day, Statements, Report of Joseph Stalin, November 6, 1941, Embassy of the Soviet Union, Washington, DC, 13–14.

79. Soviet Information Bureau, *Falsificators of History—An Historical Note*, Moscow, February 1948, 6–10.

aim of the Third Reich was the reconfiguration of the international order in accordance with the pursuit of the strategic objectives outlined by Nazi Germany. The creation of a sphere of influence in the eastern part of the continent was to be carried out according to the *Lebensraum* principle, which entailed the establishment of a vital space for Germany there. Notwithstanding the existence of the notion of a "European community" among certain members of the Nazi leadership, the drive for mastery of Europe was undertaken with the view of establishing German hegemony over the continent. The Nazi plans for the postwar international economic order included the creation of an autarkic system of trade between the European nations, dominated by the military might of Germany and guided by the racialist ideology of National Socialism. It also provided for the creation of a *Lebensraum* in Eastern Europe by conquering the Western part of the Soviet Union and making it suitable for German colonization. The Nazi regime worked on the premise of creating an international political order based on cooperation with the United Kingdom and the United States for the "protection of the white race." Germany and Italy would be the nations that would undertake the task of preserving the "white race" in Europe through "the use of force and violence against other nations."[80] Martin Bormann, chief of the party chancellery, referred to the idea of creating an autarkic space capable of catering to the needs of the German population, stating that Germany faced "the task of cutting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to be able: first, to dominate it; second, to administer it; and third, to exploit it."[81] These circumstances augmented the spectrum of deinstitutionalization in the European political order. The untrammelled pursuit of geopolitical power was inimical to the idea of a multilateral institutionalized political order capable of bringing about a just settlement for all its constituent units.

3.4 The Expansionist Drive of Nazi Germany

The advent of the Nazi regime reflected the willingness to break free from a geopolitical order incapable of fulfilling the interests of Germany. The quest for hegemony propagated by the Nazi regime was not pursued according to a template based on the possibility of creating a sound institutionalist framework that could fulfil the needs of all the members of the international community.[82] The radical nature of the Nazi regime entailed that there was not much consideration given to the link between the pursuit of the national interest and the establishment of institutional mechanisms that could sustain peaceful interstate relations over a long period of time. Hitler was known for

---

80. H. Marcuse, "Nazi Plans for Dominating Germany and Europe: The Nazi Master Plan," in R. Laudani (ed.), *Secret Reports on Nazi Germany—The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 493.

81. Martin Bormann's Minutes of a Meeting at Hitler's Headquarters, 16/7/1941, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1549

82. K. Williams, S. Lobell and N. Jesse, "Beyond Great Powers and Hegemons—Why Secondary States Support, Follow, or Challenge," in N. Jesse, S. Lobell, G. Press-Barnathan and K. Williams (eds.), *The Leader Can't Lead When the Followers Won't Follow: The Limitations of Hegemony* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 18–19.

conceiving ideas in an incomplete manner, leaving much of the execution of policy to his acolytes. This situation entailed the lack of a precise program for a new global order. It is known that up until 1940–1941 Nazi Germany envisaged the possibility of some form of accommodation with the United States and the British Empire. Hitler hinted that the disruption brought about by Nazism could have been avoided if Germany would have been "given a free hand in Russia as well as a few colonies."[83] However, the notion of a European order embraced by Nazi leadership was primarily aimed at serving the interests of Germany, notwithstanding the moderate rhetoric used by some of its members:

> Adolf Hitler's goal […] is […] to bring order to this poor European people, tortured over the centuries and millennia, following the deep laws of development and progress. Only the Nordic can build states, and Europe has common Nordic roots […] It is obvious that 85 million Germans have the qualifications that our splendid race offers, and that in cooperation with allied Italy can and must claim the leadership of Europe. An Adolf Hitler had to appear to bring Europe in order, and this Adolf Hitler had to be born to the German people so that he could take the German people in his hand and fulfill this mission. Because of the victory of our weapons and soldiers we demand leadership, and we have it. We will happily bear the responsibility of bringing Europe order for all time.[84]

The lack of great-power management constituted a disruptive element that propped up the deinstitutionalization of the international order. The great powers of the day could not agree on the establishment of mechanisms that would avert the launch of Hitler's expansionist drive on the European continent. According to prominent British Foreign Office officials, the failure of the members of the League of Nations to dissuade Italy from invading Abyssinia in 1936 encouraged Germany to pursue its path toward geopolitical expansion.[85] Nazi Germany was willing to subjugate the European nations as either vassal or slave states. The evidence provided by notable Nazi leaders after World War II attest to this state of affairs. Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and War Production, acknowledged his own responsibility in the implementation of these plans. Speer stated that Hitler wanted to relegate France to the status of a "small nation," to convert the Russian and Polish peoples into slave nations and to exterminate the European Jewry.[86] Moreover, Speer also mentions the plans drawn up by the SS for a postwar colonial system of production in Eastern Europe, based on the use of slave labor.[87]

By 1938 Hitler had committed Germany to a definite warpath. The conservative elements within the Hitlerite regime became increasingly marginalized after verbalizing

83. A. Hitler, *Hitler's Table Talk, 1941–1944: His Private Conversations*, introduced by Hugh Trevor-Roper (New York: Enigma Books, 2000), 335–36.
84. R. Ley, *Internationaler Völkerbrei oder Vereinigte National-Staaten Europas?* (Berlin: Verlag der Deutschen Arbeitsfront, 1941), 33.
85. R. Vansittart, *The Mist Procession—The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart* (London: Hutchinson, 1958), 544.
86. A. Speer, *Inside the Third Reich*, trans. R. and C. Winston (New York: Avon, 1970), 657.
87. A. Speer, *Infiltration—How Heinrich Himmler Schemed to Build an SS Industrial Empire*, trans. J. Nuegroschel (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1981), 294–305.

their disagreement with the revisionist drive that was crippling the German economy. Hermann Göring had replaced Hjalmar Schacht as Reichsminister of Economics and Procession put in charge of making Germany self-sufficient for the purposes of launching a revisionist war. The propaganda efforts of the Nazi regime were aimed at instilling a strong eschatological perspective regarding the objectives of the war. Goebbels projected the idea of an idyllic German life with "happy people in a country blossoming with beauty."[88] The idea of a bright future for Germany was linked to the possibility of establishing an autarkic economic space in Europe. By 1938, Germany had restricted the amount of payments directed for trade with overseas sources. The U.S. Department of State reported, "comprehensive restrictions being enforced by the German Government upon payments to American citizens."[89] The decline of trade with the United States was in part the result of the closing of American markets to German goods as well as of the need to create the conditions for economic autarky.[90] The Reichsbank, under the leadership of Hjalmar Schacht, subsidized the construction of public infrastructure, enabling the Hitlerite regime to eliminate unemployment without risking a bout of inflation.[91] However, the long-term plans set in motion by the Hitlerite regime revolved around the possibility of attaining a dominant position in international affairs. The Hossbach Memorandum, presented at the Nuremberg Trial as evidence for Hitler's plans for a war of aggression on the European continent, outlined the idea of putting Germany on a war footing through the achievement of a self-sufficient economic system. Hitler emphasized the need to tie these plans to the preservation of the German people:

> The German racial community comprised over 85 million people and, because of their number and the narrow limits of habitable space in Europe, constituted a tightly packed racial core such as was not to be met in any other country and such as implied the right to a greater living space than in the case of other peoples. If, territorially speaking, there existed no political result corresponding to this German racial core, that was a consequence of centuries of historical development, and in the continuance of these political conditions lay the greatest danger to the preservation of the German race at its present peak.[92]

In regard to Germany's participation in the world economy, Hitler highlighted the impediments that the nation faced in order to place the goods that it produced in the international markets, a position made worse by the protectionism that had taken root as a result of the Great Depression. The worsening political and economic conditions

---

88. P. Longerich, *Goebbels: A Biography*, trans. A. Bance, J. Noakes and L. Sharpe (London: Random House, 2015), 528.
89. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of Germany (Wilson), Washington 29, 1938, FRUS, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East, and Africa, 420.
90. The Ambassador in Germany (Wilson) to the Secretary of State, Berlin, August 16, 1938—FRUS, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East, and Africa, 422–24.
91. H. Schacht, *The Magic of Money*, trans. P. Erskine (London: Oldbourne, 1967), 111–16.
92. Hossbach Memorandum, Berlin, 10/11/1937. Minutes of a Conference in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, November 5, 1937—http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/hossbach.htm

that affected world trade, and the escalation of the armaments race, were responsible for the path toward self-sufficiency.[93] Here we have a direct link to the question of enforcing Germany's legitimate claims in the international order:

> The establishment of Germany's position on a secure and sound foundation was obstructed by market fluctuations, and commercial treaties afforded no guarantee for actual execution. In particular it had to be remembered that since the World War, those very countries which had formerly been food exporters had become industrialized. We were living in an age of economic empires in which the primitive urge to colonization was again manifesting itself; in the cases of Japan and Italy economic motives underlay the urge for expansion, and with Germany, too, economic need would supply the stimulus. For countries outside the great economic empires, opportunities for economic expansion were severely impeded.[94]

According to the rationale espoused by Hitler, a revisionist war was the only method available to redress the delegitimization of Germany's interests. The path to war had been foreseen by prominent observers right at the start of Hitler's tenure in power. In 1933, the British Foreign Office appraised the outcome of the coming to power of Hitler in accordance with three distinct "uninviting" scenarios. Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, posited that the first scenario involved the collapse of Hitler "through economic failures," followed by a "military dictatorship or Bolshevism." The second scenario envisaged Hitler's success, which would lead to geopolitical revisionism and a general European war "in four or five years' time." The third scenario involved the launching of a preemptive war against Germany.[95] The

---

93. The Ambassador in Germany (Dodd) to the Secretary of State, Berlin, May 21, 1937, FRUS, The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East and Africa, 332.

94. Hossbach Memorandum, Berlin, 10/11/1937. Minutes of a Conference in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, November 5, 1937—http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/hossbach.htm

    At this point, it is important to focus on the logical validity of the Hossbach Memorandum. Its validity has been doubted by prominent historians such as A. J. P. Taylor as a piece of historical evidence. In addition, it is known that the notes of the meeting that took place in the Chancellery in November 1937 were written five days after the event and had not been authenticated by Hitler. Furthermore, the copy of the memorandum had been discovered by Kirbach, a German officer, after the end of the war and presented to the prosecution at Nuremberg. It is understood, that the copy presented by Kirbach has not survived. There is a possibility that the note might have been contrived in order to expose Hitler's aggressive plans and/or that the notes made by Hossbach after the meeting do not present Hitler's views in an accurate way. However, the Hossbach Memorandum can be incorporated as hermeneutical evidence. The views presented by Hossbach depict a state of affairs that denotes Hitler's will to revise the European order in order to cater to the needs of Germany. In addition, it also exposes the obstacles presented by the world economic situation in order to rehabilitate Germany in a peace way, notwithstanding of the aggressive stance of the Nazi leader. See W. Van der Dussen and L. Rubinoff (eds.), *Objectivity, Method and Point of View Essays in the Philosophy of History* (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 164–64.

95. I. Colvin, *Vansittart in Office—A Historical Survey of the Origins of the Second World War Based on the Papers of Sir Robert Vansittart* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1965), 23–24.

United Kingdom and other great powers responded to the geopolitical challenges posed by the Nazi regime in a very slow manner. The general crisis that led to World War II was magnified through the belief on the part of important segments of the British political establishment that it was possible to reach a "general settlement" on the European political order.[96] The United Kingdom refused to heed the approaches made by the members of the German military elite who plotted a coup against Hitler in 1938.[97] Winston Churchill, who opposed the policy of appeasement toward Germany practiced by the Conservative government headed by Neville Chamberlain, argued about the possibility of collective military action to stop Hitler's expansionist drive:

> If, for instance, Great Britain, France and Russia were even now to present a joint or simultaneous note to Herr Hitler personally, setting forth that an attack on Czechoslovakia would immediately be followed by common action; and if at the same time President Roosevelt would proclaim that this note carried with it the moral sympathy of the United States, with all that would follow therefrom-there would be good hopes, if not indeed almost a certainty, of warding off the catastrophe, which may so easily engulf our civilisation.[98]

The reduced scope of institutionalization engendered a general breakdown of the established political order because of the inability of the major powers to set up appropriate collective security mechanisms. The reluctance of the Roosevelt administration to intervene in the European continent and the unwillingness of European powers such as the United Kingdom and France to enter into a strong system of collective security are factors that were influential in the deinstitutionalization of the international order that unfolded during the 1930s. The lack of multilateral security arrangements was a factor that emboldened the Nazi leadership to continue with its revisionist drive. This state of affairs would ultimately lead to World War II.

3.5 Conclusion

The deinstitutionalization of the international order that had emerged since the unification of Germany in 1871 was generated as a result of a lack of willingness on the part of the great powers to put together the necessary mechanisms for the management of the European political order in a way that it could foster openness, communication and the incentives for the preservation of the status quo. The volatile internal balance of power that prevailed in the European political order was an aspect that exacerbated the security dilemma generated after German unification.[99] The great powers adopted a zero-sum

---

96. I. Colvin, *Vansittart in Office—A Historical Survey of the Origins of the Second World War Based on the Papers of Sir Robert Vansittart* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1965), 104.

97. See T. Parssinen, *The Oster Conspiracy of 1938: The Unknown Story of the Military Plot to Kill Hitler and Avert World War II* (London: Harper, 2003).

98. W. Churchill, *While England Slept—Political Writings: 1936–1939* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015/1939), 215.

99. See A. S. Sweet, W. Sandholtz and N. Fligstein (eds.), *The Institutionalization of Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

perspective regarding the fulfillment of their geopolitical interests. Furthermore, the system of states lacked a collective and multilateral institutional framework capable of ensuring that the fulfillment of interests would correspond with the stability of the international order. Collective and multilateral institutional mechanisms could have been influential in responding to the interests of revisionist powers like Germany, avoiding the type of mistrust that compels aggrieved states to renounce their sense of belonging to institutionalized frameworks.[100] The events that took place in the aftermath of German unification indicate that once a revisionist power engages in disruptive activities, the main actors of the international political order tend to react slowly to the gradual breakdown of the balance of power. The revisionist challenge instigated by Nazi Germany was propelled by the unfettered pursuit of national interest in the context of an absolute notion of sovereignty. The inability of the great powers to create an institutional framework aimed at legitimizing the geopolitical claims of Germany within the scope of the preservation of the status quo resulted in the expansionist drive launched by Hitler in the late 1930s and the general breakdown of interstate relations in Europe.

---

100. See M. Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism," *International Organization*, 50, 2 (1996), 325–47.

Chapter Four

THE PATTERNS OF THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER

4.1 Introduction

The explanatory framework that is used for understanding the geopolitical implications of the origins of the Cold War usually focuses on the conflictual aspects brought forth by the enormous political and military capabilities acquired by the United States and the Soviet Union during World War II. Furthermore, there is an emphasis on highlighting the inimical nature of the ideological templates that guided the foreign policy of the superpowers in the postwar era. This chapter posits the notion that the prevalence of conflict was a powerful influencer in the process of institutionalization that developed in the aftermath of World War II. This section of the book examines the concept of great power management as an instrument of institutionalization of the system of states that emerged after the war. This section of the book also pays attention to the establishment of the spheres of influence as an element of conviviality in the scheme of relations between the superpowers. The scheme of great power management that was deployed by the superpowers after World War II was informed by the need to advance their hegemonic interests within a normative framework that would secure the stability of the postwar international order. This chapter focuses on the way in which the concept of sovereignty was recalibrated in order to operationalize it as an instrument of institutionalization. This section will highlight the link between the abandonment of the notion of absolute sovereignty by the subaltern units of the superpowers' spheres of influence and the construction of a stable international order in the postwar era. This section also examines the importance of the implementation of multilateral mechanisms in order to preclude the onset of revisionist tendencies in the system of states. Finally, this chapter analyzes the way in which the bipolar settlement established after the end of World War II institutionalized the international order by creating equilibrium between the universalist aspirations of the superpowers and the need to attain a modicum of conviviality conducive to the establishment of a peaceful scheme of interstate relations. The bipolar balance of power that emerged in the aftermath of the war reduced the scope of conflict by preventing the rise of alternative geopolitical poles capable of threatening the hegemonic position of the superpowers.

4.2 Great-Power Management as an Instrument of Institutionalization

The superpowers established a dominant geopolitical position to avoid the sudden onset of disruptive tendencies in the nascent postwar international order. The hegemonic actions of the United States and the Soviet Union enabled the superpowers to retain the monopoly of the means of violence in the European continent and, to a large extent, in the peripheral zone of the system of states. There is a consensual as well as a coercive element attached to the concept of hegemony.[1] The prospect of military intervention was an instrument designed to preserve rather than disrupt the international order. The massive accumulation of military capabilities by the superpowers limited the possibility of an all-out war, which would have had dire consequences for the functioning of the international order. The prospect of military intervention also became an important instrument to dissuade other actors from challenging the hegemonic position of the superpowers. The political elites of the subaltern units of the superpowers' spheres of influence accepted the hegemonic order imposed by the superpowers, as it was a way to consolidate their own dominant position at a domestic level. In this context, the degree of coercion exerted by the superpowers served to create stability at the international and domestic levels. However, the potential intervention of the superpowers did not preclude a complete absence of friction within the spheres of influence. One of the main assumptions related to the concept of hegemony is that it "is always contested by challenges from those who are left out of the hegemonic project or placed in a subordinate position."[2] During the Cold War, the Soviet Union had to deal with internal revolt in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Western Europe and Japan gradually established their own geopolitical paths as well as increasingly independent trading mechanisms. The partial severance of the state of dependency vis-à-vis the United States is explained by the fact that hegemony depends on the "recognition" of that status by other nations.[3] The geopolitical outcome of World War II meant the entrenchment of a hierarchical ordering in which the hegemonic powers held "the right to make residual decisions, while the other party—the subordinate member—lack[ed] this right."[4] The relational symbiosis that emerged after World War II facilitated the management of the international order in an effective manner, due to the disparities of power that existed between the superpowers and the nations that made up their respective spheres of influence.

Ideology became a useful artifact in order to establish a specific construction of power and a particular way of deploying it in the wider world. In the case of the United States,

---

1. C. Gallaher et al. (eds.), *Key Concepts in Political Geography* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2009), 65.
2. M. Haugaard and H. Lentner (eds.), *Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 67.
3. J. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2003), 67.
4. D. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," *International Organization*, 50, 1 (1996), 7.

the American exceptionalist credo was crucial for the purposes of maintaining a grip on power in the areas of the world that were deemed of strategic importance to national security. American exceptionalism had a coercive component. American military and political intervention unfolded as a result of the belief in the moral superiority of the actions undertaken by the United States. American exceptionalism was effective as a geopolitical instrument because the areas of the world deemed to be of strategic relevance (the Western Hemisphere, Western Europe and Japan) were willing to accept the axiological configuration of the international order designed by the United States. The Soviet Union was able to consolidate its geopolitical standing in Eastern Europe thanks to the coercive presence of the Red Army in that part of the continent. However, the Soviet geopolitical standing was also propped up by the genuinely pro-Soviet sentiment that existed among some segments of the population in the Intermarium. The Soviet Union was aware of the need to ensure that the countries that joined the communist bloc would not do so under complete duress. Moscow fostered the element of interstate cooperation among those countries, instructing them to sign a peace treaty among themselves before signing one with the Soviet Union.[5] Here we see the strong link that existed between ideology and great power management. There were religious (and eschatological) overtones attached to the manner in which the United States and the Soviet Union expanded their schemes of geopolitical action. The level of devastation caused by the quest for supremacy instigated by Nazism and Fascism in the 1930s and 1940s provided the background for the deployment of a geostrategic approach based on promoting the redeeming features of capitalism/democracy on the one hand, and Communism on the other. The exceptionalist and Eurasianist orientation that guided the foreign policies of the superpowers was underpinned by the idea that the projection of their values could be propounded in order to secure world peace. This element of soft power enabled the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise a great degree of management in the international order. The universalist rhetoric that underscored this geostrategic stance facilitated the comprehensive management of interstate relations. The experience of World War II was influential in prompting the American political leadership to work for a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, at least to the extent that it would lead to a system of cooperation in matters regarding the management of the nascent international order. The possibility of outlining a convivial arrangement for the purposes of managing the international order had significant historical antecedents. President Eisenhower pointed out that Russia had acquiesced to the transfer of Alaska to the United States in the nineteenth century and that the countries had been allies in the two major conflagrations of the twentieth century. President Eisenhower, who oversaw the expansion of the military and security establishment in the United States in the 1950s, also stressed that in spite of the ideological differences that separated these nations, the spirit of cooperation and unity was preferable to the alternative of a war between the two camps.[6] In this context, it is possible to argue

---

5. G. Dimitrov, *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949*, ed. I. Banac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 430–31.

6. D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949), 457–58.

that the creation of spheres of influence contributed to a stable framework of interstate relations conducive to the attainment of a *modus vivendi* between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The system of states that emerged from World War II was ideologized to an extent unseen in previous configurations of the international order. There seemed to be a realization on the part of the superpowers that the management of the international order depended on the successful construction of narratives that could be used to create mechanisms aimed at stabilizing interstate relations. Toward the end of 1948, the United States and its European allies began to outline a common security framework in order to deal with any potential expansionist drive on the part of the Soviet Union. It was thought that the ideological apparatus deployed by the Soviet Union, "serve[d…]as a powerful instrument for the achievement of this aim."[7] This narrative prompted the United States to establish its own sphere of influence in Western Europe. Ideology was used to carve out geopolitical realms both in the core area of Europe and the Third World. The ideological composition of the spheres of influence did not remain static. Instead, its evolution responded to the inability of the superpowers to maintain the hegemonic position acquired at the end of World War II. The economic growth experienced by Western Europe during the first three decades after the war generated a more independent geopolitical attitude, as seen in the creation of mechanisms of political and economic integration in the early 1970s. In the Soviet bloc, there were unsuccessful attempts to revamp the communist system and make it more amenable to the public. The inability of the Soviet leadership to adapt to the evolved nature of the international order in the 1970s would be one of the main reasons for the gradual erosion of their geopolitical power. In the case of the US sphere of influence, the legitimacy of the geopolitical strategy of the United States was based on ensuring that the independent centers of power created after the war would not clash with its hegemonic aims. Conversely, the Soviet leadership operated under the premise of maintaining a strong grip on the buffer zone established in Eastern Germany and the Intermarium.

The overwhelming amount of power possessed by the Soviet Union and the United States at the end of the war was conducive to the use of great power management as an instrument of stability in the nascent international order. In the previous chapter, we have seen the manner in which deinstitutionalization is brought forward by the inability and/or unwillingness of the great powers to achieve their interests in tandem with the preservation of a stable international order. Great power management can foster institutionalization by identifying "the emergence of orderly patterns" arising from "loosely organized or narrowly technical activities."[8] Great power management denotes a situation in which the prominent members of the system of states are able to compel other

---

7. Memorandum by the participants in the Washington security talks, July 6 to September 9, submitted to their respective governments for study and comment, Washington, September 9, 1948, FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 238.
8. P. Selznick, "Institutionalism 'Old' and 'New,'" in G. Peters and J. Pierre (eds.), *Institutionalism*, vol. 1 (London: Sage, 2007), 4.

units to adhere to a normative framework aimed at establishing a stable geopolitical environment. Effective great-power management manifests itself when the hegemonic forces of the system of states are able to accomplish their strategic goals without causing a disruption in the scheme of interstate relations. The successful deployment of great-power management is reliant on the willingness of a dominant power to exercise its hegemonic role according to the benchmarks of "legality, legitimacy and prudence."[9] This modality requires the allocation of substantial economic and political resources in order to maintain an edge over any would-be competitors. The centralization of geo-political power on the part of the superpowers was a crucial instrument for ensuring the stability of the postwar international order. In 1940, a young John F. Kennedy argued that the only way for the United States to outlast the totalitarian regimes that menaced the very existence of the democratic system of government was to be "prepared to equal the centralized effort of the dictators." Kennedy also warned against the dangers that emerge when states in a position of exercising a hegemonic role adopt an isolationist stance.[10] From this standpoint, one could posit that the actions of the superpowers in the field of foreign policy were influenced by an ideological orientation that called for the selective use of hard and soft power for the purposes of attaining basic geopolitical objectives and maintaining a stable international order.

The construction of hegemony is capable of generating an important level of institu-tionalization, which may be constituted as a "collection of norms, rules, understandings and, perhaps most importantly, routines." The level of institutionalization generated by great-power management entails the notion that, "if an institution is effective in influen-cing the behavior of its members, those members will think more about whether an action conforms to the norm of the organization than about what the consequences will be for [them]."[11] Here we see the manner in which geopolitical concerns inform the spectrum of institutionalization required for the purposes of keeping stability in the international political order. The political expediencies of the Cold War gave rise to the institution-alization of the system of states according to the pursuit of the national interest, albeit within the normative bounds imposed by international law. The United States embarked on a course of foreign policy that would demarcate the spectrum of internationalism in accordance with the projection of American power.[12] The Soviet Union used the element of great-power management by consolidating its position as an actor that suppressed the emergence of an independent geopolitical pole in the Intermarium. Great-power management contributed to the institutionalization of the postwar international order by preventing the advent of multipolarity. The end of the war constituted a unique moment in the history of the international order. The superpowers were in a position to influence the actions of a large constituency of nations over a sustained period of

---

9. W. Aslam, *The United States and Great Power Responsibility in International Society: Drones, Rendition and Invasion* (London: Routledge, 2013), 125.
10. J. Kennedy, *Why England Slept* (London: Hutchinson, 1940), 232–33.
11. G. Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The "New Institutionalism"* (London: Continuum, 2005), 29–30.
12. M. Mazower, *Governing the World—The History of an Idea* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 215.

time. The policies put in place during the initial stages of the Cold War contributed to establishing a normative framework that enabled the superpowers to accomplish their vital geostrategic goals.[13] The Soviet Union and the United States embarked on the task of reconstructing a continent that had been ravaged by war. The policies that they put in place would lead to the preservation of their national interest and the legitimization of their hegemonic position within their respective spheres of influence. Military and political intervention were applied in order to configure a viable system of states based on workable rules of conviviality. The notion of intervention is directly linked to the establishment of hierarchies that lead to the creation of "constitutive institutions" capable of ensuring the smooth functioning of the system of states.[14] In this manner, the concept of intervention led to the creation of a hierarchical ordering of the system of states that enabled the superpowers to further their geopolitical interests without risking an all-out confrontation. Great-power management was underscored by the establishment of a hierarchical ordering geared toward preventing the disruption of the international order created at the end of the war. This was done by setting in motion policies that averted the rise of revisionist powers that could have upset the bipolar configuration of the system of states. The scheme of foreign policy set in motion by the United States was influential in recalibrating the political culture of countries that had threatened the system of states in the interwar years, such as Germany, Italy and Japan. The superpowers ensured that intervention would take place in the geographical locales that they regarded as their spheres of influence. As far as the American sphere of influence is concerned, the emerging hierarchical ordering entailed the creation of geopolitical mechanisms that relegated Western and Eastern Europe to a subordinate position in the international order. The legitimacy of the great power management system was entrenched as a result of the willingness of the units that constituted the spheres of influence to abide by the rules imposed by the hegemonic powers.[15]

The great power management approach undertaken by the superpowers was guided by the willingness to actualize their geopolitical interests in a pragmatic manner. This *modus operandi* entailed that the projection of ideological principles was not to be applied in order to disrupt the principle of coexistence that was tacitly agreed upon by the superpowers. In the case of the United States, the expansion of the values of democracy and free trade was undertaken in the areas of the world that were deemed of vital importance for the accomplishment of Washington's geopolitical design. The United States undertook the task of democratizing West Germany and Japan and linking their economies to a system of free trade. This was done as a matter of interest; rather than as a matter of principle. The United States did not expand the values cited above to the

---

13. C. Peevers, *The Politics of Justifying Force: The Suez Crisis, the Iraq War, and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 4.
14. J. Williams, "Order and Society," in J. Williams and R. Little (eds.), *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 15 and 21; B. Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 179.
15. D. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 188–89.

areas of the world that were part of the Soviet sphere of influence, as this would have led to a state of overt war between the two superpowers. At the same time, it would have been very difficult to impose liberal values in Eastern Europe, an area of the world with a different type of political and economic development. This stance would not have resulted in the furtherance of American interests, since the economies of Eastern Europe were not as rich as those of the "industrial perimeter." In the case of the Soviet Union, the upholding of Marxist ideological principles was a second-order consideration. What mattered most was the enforcement of Moscow's geopolitical interests. The Soviet Union focused on exerting the level of intervention that was necessary for the purposes of catering for its security needs. This meant that their scheme of intervention would be confined to the eastern zone of occupation in Germany and Eastern Europe. As we can see, the great power management exercised by the superpowers was undertaken by balancing the drive to advance basic geopolitical interests with the need to create a convivial framework of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

4.3 The Redefinition of the Concept of Sovereignty and Its Influence on the Spectrum of Institutionalization

One of the main consequences of the expanded role of great power management in the institutionalization of the international order was the revamp of the concept of sovereignty. The subaltern units that were "managed" by the superpowers were compelled to relinquish a modicum of sovereignty in order to ensure the stability of the system of states. The concept of sovereignty is subject to permanent evolution. As such, the extent to which the state is able to exercise the monopoly of power within the territory under its jurisdiction is subject to the domestic and external circumstances that prevail at any given historical juncture.[16] The communication channels established between the superpowers and the units that composed their respective spheres of influence were useful in order to maintain internal stability and to entrench the notion of solidarity and noncoercive cooperation. The process of institutionalization necessitated the reduction of the scope of sovereignty of the subaltern units of the system of states. This was done by expanding the influence of supranational institutions and international regimes, which were to be regulated according to the principles and interests espoused by the superpowers.[17] The establishment of a hierarchical system reduced the scope of sovereignty possessed by the lesser units of the system, which entailed that they would not impede the fulfillment of the superpowers' geopolitical interests. In this way, the reduction of the scope of sovereignty created a normative framework that functioned as a "constructed set of institutional constraints."[18] The notion of an emerging "world order," led by the United

---

16. R. Jackson, *Sovereignty—Evolution of an Idea* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), 112–13.
17. S. Krasner, "Problematic Sovereignty," in S. Krasner (ed.), *Problematic Sovereignty—Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 323.
18. D. Béland, "Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Historical Institutionalism Revisited," in A. Lecours (ed.), *New Institutionalism—Theory and Analysis* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 29.

States and the Soviet Union, compelled the subaltern units of the spheres of influence configured by the superpowers to relinquish the notion of absolute sovereignty.[19] The system of states that was established represented a stepping-stone towards the creation of a world order, since the social norms disseminated by the superpowers affected inter-state relations in every corner of the globe. The great level of intervention that took place in the Third World during the Cold War denotes the willingness of the superpowers to create a world order.[20] The United States exercised a high level of political and military intervention in the Western Hemisphere, in order to prevent the onset of revisionist tendencies that could have impaired the geopolitical interests of the United States. At the same time, the communist ideological propaganda that had been projected from Moscow since the 1930s had a distinct geopolitical orientation, as it parried the "purist" version of Marxism espoused by the Soviet Union against the reformist stance that characterized the social democratic parties of Western Europe, which were seen as pursuing a "policy of renunciation of the revolutionary struggle, of Socialism and of the dictatorship of the proletariat."[21] The idea of a world order was connected to the establishment of multilateral mechanisms geared towards preventing the spread of conflict. During this time, Churchill pondered about the lost opportunities for the multilateral resolution of conflict in the interwar period, stating that, "in the League of Nations there was erected a noble instrument which, even without the aid of the United States, if it had been given a fair chance, could have maintained the disarmament of Germany and preserved the peace of Europe."[22] The expansion of multilateralism was connected to the curtailment of sovereignty exerted by the superpowers in their respective spheres of influence. There was a particular distaste among American leadership regarding the possible establishment of bilateral treaties between European nations in the area of security, as this was bound to diminish Washington's geopolitical reach.[23] The Western European nations appeared to accept the existence of an international order based on multilateral rules of interaction.[24] This state of affairs might explain why France eventually acquiesced to being part of the security and economic structures that emerged in Western Europe in the late 1940s.

19. T. Ilgen, "Introduction," in T. Ilgen (ed.), *Reconfigured Sovereignty: Multi-Layered Governance in the Global Age* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2003), 6–36.

20. Kissinger describes the idea of "world order" as the "concept held by a region or civilization about the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of power thought to be applicable to the entire world." H. Kissinger, *World Order—Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History* (London: Penguin Books, 2015), 32 [EPUB].

21. "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)"—Short Course, Edited by a Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Authorised by the Central Committee of the CPSU, International Publishers (1939)—http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/HCPSU39i.html

22. R. Churchill (ed.), *The Sinews of Peace—Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill*, Speech at Metz, July 14, 1946 (London: Cassel, 1948), 172.

23. Note de la Direction D'Europe, Accords bilatéraux, Paris 26 mai 1947, Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1947 (1er janvier—30 juin), vol. 1, 901.

24. Entretien entre le President du Conseil des Ministres et le General George C. Marshall, Paris, 6 mars 1947—Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1947 (1er janvier—30 juin), vol. 1, 471.

The scheme of multilateral arrangements regarding the security of the Western world envisaged in its original formulation the possible inclusion of Iran into this institutional framework.[25] Moreover, the British government regarded the multilateral arrangement that stemmed from the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a, "contribution to the security of the West and the maintenance of world peace."[26] The creation of multilateral mechanisms for the purposes of bringing about a wider spectrum of world order meant the curtailment of sovereignty of the subaltern units of the system of states. In July 1946, American officials informed that the position of the Hungarian government was that "notwithstanding diplomatic recognition," Hungary was not in possession of "full sovereignty."[27] In addition to this, the Soviet Union used the element of economic help in order to exercise political control in Poland.[28] Interestingly, the French political establishment referred to the actions of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe as aimed at forming a "Slavic bloc" that did not follow the mandate of the United Nations.[29] Nevertheless, questions of sovereignty were deployed quite conveniently when it came to gaining a specific geopolitical aim. The Soviet Union vociferously supported Poland's expansion of its western frontiers at the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers in 1947.[30]

The curtailment of sovereignty was indicative of the need to correlate the expansion of certain universalist values with the attainment of a modicum of conviviality between the superpowers. After the end of World War II, Povilas Žadeikis, the representative of Lithuania in the United States, asked the Western democracies to help in the restoration of the country's sovereign rights, which had been infringed upon by the Soviet occupation.[31] The US Department of State had an official policy of "non-recognition of the incorporation" of the Baltic States to the Soviet Union.[32] The United States also gave "recognition to [the] representatives of the independent Baltic States."[33] However, the moral support that emanated from the American political establishment did not correlate

25. Cabinet Paper (49) 37, February 21, 1949—North Atlantic Pact—Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
26. Cabinet Paper 19 (49)—Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held on March 10, 1949.
27. The Minister in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State, Budapest, July 11, 1946—FRUS, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), 323.
28. The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, February 25, 1946—FRUS, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), 402.
29. M. Massigli, Ambassadeur de France à Londres a M. Bidault, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Londres, Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1947 (1er janvier—30 juin), vol. 1, 12 juin 1947, 1003.
30. The Ambassador in Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, January 13, 1947—FRUS, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria (1947), 144.
31. The Lithuanian Minister (Zadeikis) to the Secretary of State, Washington, January 31, 1947—FRUS, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria (1947), 151.
32. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Thompson), Washington, August 7, 1947—FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 582.
33. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), Washington, September 8, 1948—FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 431.

with any active support for the liberation of the countries that had become part of the Soviet sphere of influence. American officials highlighted that the initial stage of domination over the countries of the Intermarium consisted in achieving "absolute control over political leaders and parties," the severing of ties with the Western powers, the destruction of the, "bourgeoisie and landowners by nationalization and land reform and effected reduction of living standards to conform those prevailing in the USSR."[34] The curtailment of sovereignty was an important instrument used to resolve outstanding issues related to the management of the system of states. At the 1947 Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers, the Allies agreed to stipulate the prohibition of the union of Austria with Germany. The Allies made sure that this principle would be applied upon the restoration of sovereignty of both countries.[35] American officials operated under the notion that the most pressing issue in the postwar environment was "to bring about the restoration of economic, social, and political health in the world." In order to achieve this aim, there was a perceived need to establish "a widespread movement [for] the material and social well-being of the peoples of the world."[36] The concept of world order became increasingly correlated with the idea of creating a more just economic and political system in various parts of the world and giving fair treatment to former enemies. For instance, in 1946, James Byrnes, the US Secretary of State, stated that the interests of a world order would be better served if Italy were to be exempted from the imposition of harsh measures.[37] There was an implicit realization that the dominant position of the superpowers and their hegemonic position within their sphere of influence could only be sustained if the United States used the idea of a world order for the purposes of "bring[ing] about [a] peaceful settlement of whatever controversies may arise between her and other countries."[38] The curtailment of sovereignty was an important tool in order to rid the system of states of extremist tendencies like Nazism and Fascism, as these ideologies had been responsible for the disruptive practices that led to World War II. The Yalta Declaration foresaw the partial curtailment of sovereignty of the countries that were to be part of the spheres of influence created by the superpowers, for the purposes of restoring "internal peace" and to "carry out emergency measures for [the] care of distressed peoples and for [the] solution of pressing economic problems."[39] The

---

34. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, January 27, 1949—FRUS, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union (1949), 2.

35. Report of the Deputies for Austria to the Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, March 29, 1947—FRUS, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria (1947), 520.

36. General United States Policy Toward the United Nations—Statement by George C. Marshall, Secretary of State—FRUS, General; the United Nations (in two parts) (1948), 27.

37. The Secretary of State to the Assistant Secretary of State (Dunn) at London, Washington, February 26, 1946—FRUS, Council of Foreign Ministers (1946), 15.

38. The Special Assistant to the Secretary of State (Pasvolsky) to the Secretary of State, Washington, January 23, 1945—FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (1945), 87–88.

39. United States Delegation Draft of a Declaration on Liberated Europe, Yalta, February 5, 1945—FRUS, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, 861.

pursuit of the US national interest was therefore connected to the need to preserve a stable international order.[40] The international institutions established by the superpowers were meant to satisfy the geopolitical interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar era. The upholding of the notion of absolute sovereignty by the units of the system could have deterred the establishment of a "functioning core" of states guided by the values that served the interests of the superpowers.[41] Preventing the disconnectedness of the units of the system of states became an aspect of paramount concern for the superpowers. The search for a world order had attached to it the possibility of extending the scope of great-power management to the periphery of the international order, as seen in the wave of decolonization that took place during this period. The curtailment of the sovereignty of the Western European nations was bolstered by the granting of independence to the European colonies in Asia and Africa and by facilitating their admission into the United Nations.[42] There was a great deal of nationalist sentiment in the areas of the world controlled by colonial powers such as the United Kingdom and France, particularly in North Africa and the Middle East. The militant groups involved in the fight for self-government could have posed a significant threat to the normal functioning of interstate relations.[43] The system of states configured in these years established the notion that the possession of sovereignty was subject to the condition that the units of the system would not disrupt the normal unfoldment of interstate relations by adopting revisionist tendencies aimed at reversing the world order created by the superpowers. To a large extent, the possibility of attaining world order depended on the geopolitical demotion of the Western European nations by curtailing their scope of sovereignty.

The quest for a world order was an important ulterior motive behind the curtailment of sovereignty. This was a geostrategic element that led to the creation of a stable international order. The high level of conflict that was present in the geographical areas outside the Northern Hemisphere did not result in systemic disruption. The consolidation of multilateral mechanisms promoted by international organizations such as the United Nations was seen as a way of advancing the interests of the superpowers and as a means of creating a "peaceful world, in which each nation respect[ed] the sovereignty, integrity and way of life of the others in a friendly manner."[44] The concept of world order applied

40. C. Jonsson and J. Tallberg, "Institutional Theory in International Relations," in J. Pierre, G. Peters and G. Stoker (eds.), *Debating Institutionalism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 88.

41. T. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map* (New York: Putnam, 2004), 8.

42. Note de la Direction d'Asie-Océanie—Instruction du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères pour la negotiation d'un accord avec le Gouvernement provisoire du Viêt Nam, Paris, 29 mars 1946—Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1946 (1er janvier—30 juin), vol. 1, P. I. E. Peter Lang, Bruxelles, Bern, Berlin, Frankfurt, New York, Oxford, Vienna, 2007, 523.

43. Général Mast, Resident Général de France à Tunis a M. Bidault, Minister des Affaires Étrangères, Tunis, 19 janvier 1946—Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1946 (1er janvier—30 juin), vol. 1, P. I. E. Peter Lang, Bruxelles, Bern, Berlin, Frankfurt, New York, Oxford, Vienna, 2007, 117.

44. Report of the Special Ad Hoc Committee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Washington, April 21, 1947—FRUS, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 216.

through the reduction of the spectrum of sovereignty responded to the implementation of a geopolitical model designed to demarcate the boundaries of political action of the superpowers. In the case of the United States, world order was to be advanced through the expansion of its productive capacity and the militarization of its sphere of influence.[45] The protection of American geoeconomic interests was facilitated by the creation of institutions that would allow Washington to maintain order within the geopolitical area that was earmarked as vital to the accomplishment of its political and economic aims. The exercise of great-power management on the part of the United States contributed to establishing world order by imposing subjective values that regulated the behavior of the units that composed its sphere of influence. The notion of *world order* entailed a situation in which the units of the spheres of influence would "cede some of their autonomy and authority to regional bodies."[46] The establishment of organizations that fostered international cooperation advanced the notion of world order. The geopolitical interests of the United States were connected to the idea of an institutional framework geared toward promoting international organization. The United States worked to create a world order through the integration of the American economy into the economic space of its sphere of influence. Additionally, the concept of world order was underpinned by the projection of the liberal values that were inherent in the American exceptionalist stance that was undertaken in the postwar era. American officials labored under the assumption that "the basic purpose of national security policies" was to "maintain the fundamental American values and institutions which rest on the essential dignity and worth of the individual in a free society."[47]

In the case of the Soviet Union, the curtailment of the political sovereignty of the Eastern European nations led to the propagation of world order, because it suppressed the scope of independent action on the part of the nations of the Intermarium. The Soviet leadership claimed that the communist countries operated under a concept of sovereignty that was based on the popular "will of the people," instead of being a "bourgeois façade" that hid the interests of the dominant class.[48] The preservation of its role as the main center of communist power allowed the Soviet Union to actualize its geopolitical objectives. This situation allowed Moscow to prevent would-be revisionist powers within the communist world from projecting geopolitical interests that were inimical to Moscow's "grand design" for the postwar era. The ideological spectrum projected by the Soviet Union was influenced by a Eurasianist perspective, rather than the will to expand Communism. The Soviet Union operated with geopolitical concerns in mind. The creation of a buffer zone in the Intermarium had a significant geopolitical

45. See S. Krasner, *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

46. R. Haass, *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order* (London: Penguin Press, 2017) 122–23 [EPUB].

47. Summaries Prepared by the NSC Staff of Project Solarium—Presentations and Written Reports, Washington, undated—FRUS, National security affairs (in two parts) (1952–1954), 417.

48. R. Jones, *The Soviet Concept of "Limited Sovereignty" from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Brezhnev Doctrine* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), 88.

orientation, as it was informed by the willingness to recreate the old Russian imperial space.[49] The hegemonic practices established by the Soviet Union in the Eurasian heartland accelerated the process of institutionalization by reducing the scope of conflict between the superpowers. The Soviet leadership made use of notions of cultural affinity in order to justify the deployment of communist ideology. Moreover, references were made to the sacrifices of the Red Army during the liberation of Eastern Europe from the yoke of Nazism and Fascism. The contribution of the Soviet Union to the institutionalization of the world order was therefore connected to the formulation of norms of social behavior in a region that was culturally akin to Russia and similar in terms of economic development.

The establishment of supranational institutions became an important geostrategic instrument for both the United States and the Soviet Union, as these contributed to the founding of an international order based on the curtailment of sovereignty for the lesser units of the system of states. There is a strong connection between the actualization of geopolitical interests and the creation of multilateral institutions. The superpowers avoided the possible breakdown of the mechanisms of supranational governance because of "free riding" by calibrating the institutionalization of the Cold War international order according to their geopolitical needs and interests.[50] Supranational institutions reflected the political evolution of the United States and the Soviet Union. The American political personality was threatened by the rise of totalitarian ideologies during the interwar period. In the aftermath of World War II, the American political and economic system was threatened by Communism, an ideology capable of mobilizing the segment of the population that demanded socioeconomic transformation. The establishment of supranational institutions such as NATO and the creation of mechanisms of integration in Western Europe since the late 1940s responded to the need to ensure the expansion of the geoeconomic reach of the United States. French officials highlighted the interests of the banking sector in accelerating the re-establishment of normal economic relations in Europe through an increased level of central planning.[51] In addition to this, the spectrum of security acquired a growing level of relevance because of the "importance of economic and financial factors."[52] There was an assiduous connection between security and economic considerations. NATO was viewed as a precursor for the establishment of similar mechanisms of collective security in other strategic areas of the world, such as the Middle East.[53] The establishment of supranational institutions is conducive to enhancing

49. See S. Glebov, *From Empire to Eurasia: Politics, Scholarship, and Ideology in Russian Eurasianism, 1920s–1930s* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2017).

50. L. Gruber, *Ruling the World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 21.

51. M. Bonnet, Ambassadeur de France a Washington a M. Bidault, Minister des Affaires Etrangeres, Washington, 18 avril 1947, Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1947 (1er janvier—30 juin), vol. 1, 680; S. Cohen, *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 5–7.

52. Report of the Working Group on Organisation, to the North Atlantic Council, Washington, undated, FRUS, Western Europe (1949), 337.

53. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, Washington, March 16, 1949— FRUS, Western Europe (1949), 233.

clear lines of communication and access to markets and resources without having to exert domination in an overtly aggressive manner. The geostrategic model based on the expansion of supranational institutions enabled the United States to project a liberal orientation that served to legitimize its geopolitical aims. The creation of NATO and the mechanisms of European integration engendered assiduously developed economic ties between the United States and Western Europe. The Soviet Union also embarked on the process of building supranational institutions that could sustain the viability of its geostrategic realm. Eurasianist ideology was utilized for actualizing the needs and interests of the superpowers within the normative framework imposed by Communism. Eurasianism invoked elements of cultural affinity in order to secure the preservation of a territorial foothold for the Soviet Union in the European heartland.[54] Supranational institutions such as the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) fulfilled the role of propelling world order by creating predictable outcomes for its member states. In the case of the Soviet sphere of influence, the curtailment of sovereignty led to the consolidation of a world order sphere that had as its main purpose the prevention of encirclement by the capitalist powers.[55] The contraction of the sovereignty of the subaltern units of the spheres of influence established by the superpowers fulfilled an important role in the institutionalization of the postwar international order, as it ensured the creation of a stable system of states that would promote the main geopolitical interests of the superpowers.

4.4 The Bipolar Balance of Power as an Instrument of Institutionalization

The effective management of the postwar international order necessitated a reduction in the scope of the political and economic sovereignty of the smaller units of the system of states. This situation created a bipolar system of states that contributed to institutionalizing the postwar international order by ensuring the existence of a convivial arrangement between the superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union fought as allies with the expectation that they would be able to formulate the rules guiding interstate relations in the postwar era. The advent of bipolarity had the effect of advancing the interests of both superpowers after the end of the war. In his diary entry of April 6, 1942, Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador to the United Kingdom, outlined the possible configuration of a bipolar balance of power after the war:

> Germany, Italy and Japan will be crushed and weakened for a long time, France will be in the process of a slow and painful recovery, having lost its status as a great power…the USSR and the USA will represent the two social and international poles of socialism and capitalism in the post-war period. For in the USA capitalism will have preserved infinitely more of its

---

54. R. Dragneva and K. Wolczuk (eds.), *Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013), 92.
55. C. Clover, "Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland—The Reemergence of Geopolitics," *Foreign Affairs*, 78, 9 (1999).

vital juices by the end of the war than in England…This is why the post-war period will most probably be marked by a contest between the USSR and the USA rather than between England and the USA.[56]

The onset of the Cold War stimulated the establishment of an international order based on the existence of various ontological perspectives and social systems. The origins of the Cold War have to be appraised by taking into consideration that coexistence constituted the framework for a permanent dialogue between hegemonic powers with antithetical ideologies.[57] The geopolitical aspirations of both superpowers were universalist in nature, as the United States and the Soviet Union sought to spread their most cherished values to the wider world. However, these universalist aspirations were complemented by an ethical approach that validated the existence of "otherness" in the international political system. This was manifested in the mutual recognition of the spheres of influence that were configured in the aftermath of World War II. The evolution of the international postwar system indicates that, "hegemonic influence is constrained and limited by rules and institutions."[58] The superpowers did not regard each other as enemies to be eradicated from the international order. Instead, there was a tacit acknowledgement of their mutual right to exist. This state of affairs was responsible for constraining the hegemonic reach of both superpowers. The postwar international order was shaped by the crucial role that the superpowers played in creating the global arrangements needed for the preservation of a stable system of states.[59] The deployment of their power was based on the premise that a lesser range of collegiality between the units of the system of states could be an important factor of stability for the effective management of the international order. The bipolar system of states suppressed the emergence of any other force capable of challenging the dominant position of the United States and the Soviet Union as the main rule-makers of the international order.[60] The hegemonic position of the superpowers resulted in a clear demarcation between rule-makers and rule-takers in the international political system. The inception of a bipolar system of states led to establishment of a workable *modus vivendi* between the superpowers, underpinned by the existence of internal and external constraints to the exercise of military intervention. The great-power management exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union was influential for the purposes of containing the spread of violence within their respective spheres of influence.[61] The hegemonic practices put in place by the superpowers involved

---

56. G. Gorodetsky (ed.), *The Maisky Diaries—Red Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 1932–1943* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 426.

57. A. Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community—Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 101.

58. A. Watson, *Hegemony and History* (London: Routledge, 2007), 111.

59. A. Linklater and H. Suganami, *The English School of International Relations—A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 224.

60. See W. Fox, *The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace* (London: Harcourt Brace, 1944).

61. A. Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics—Theoretical Investigations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 161.

the pursuit of their national interest in a prudent manner, minimizing the risk of systemic disruption.[62] The framework of institutionalization was based on the creation of an environment in which conflict would not lead to the onset of disruptive anarchy. The normative framework that led to the establishment of this institutionalized environment reduced the security dilemma and enhanced the scheme of cooperation between the units of the international order. This can be seen in an eloquent manner in the close alliance forged between the United States and Western Europe. The economic gains made by Western Europe during the first three decades after the end of World War II did not result in the onset of revisionist tendencies vis-à-vis the United States. The creation of the transatlantic alliance is testimony to the tangible link between institutionalization and cooperation and the way in which it informed the functioning of the bipolar system of states.[63] The superpowers ensured the stability of the postwar international order by deploying their geopolitical power within their respective spheres of influence. Furthermore, the stability of the nascent system of states relied on a balance between the pursuit of hegemonic action and the establishment of social norms of interaction that could foster a relatively peaceful international order.

The reduction of disruptive violence was one of the most important geostrategic implications that emerged from the configuration of the bipolar balance-of-power system. Reducing the level of violence meant preventing would-be revisionist powers from using force to reverse bipolarity. The superpowers showed an interest in ensuring that their ambitious geopolitical designs would not result in the spread of conflict. A good example that corroborates this statement is that during the war the United States shared information regarding the use of nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. Truman had told Stalin about the existence of a "new weapon of unusual destructive force." Stalin replied by stating that "he was glad to hear it and hoped [that the United States] would make good use of it against the Japanese."[64] At the same time, the Soviet Union was interested in ensuring that its foreign policy would project an image of peace. This is why Andrei Gromyko, permanent representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, suggested a prohibition on the use of atomic weapons as well as their production and storage in response to the Baruch Plan of 1946, which advocated the use of global mechanisms to regulate the use of nuclear technology.[65] The availability of nuclear weapons put significant constraints on the possibility of an overt war between the superpowers. However, the high level of great-power management exercised by the superpowers prevented potential revisionist elements from disrupting the international order through the use of violence. Supranational institutions such as

62. N. Lewkowicz, *The German Question and the International Order* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 179–81.
63. H. Levy "What Do Great Powers Balance against and When?" in R. Paul, J. Wirtz, and M. Fortmann (eds.), *Balance of Power—Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 39.
64. H. Truman, *1945: Year of Decision* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 416.
65. E. Judge and J. Langdon (eds.), *The Cold War through Documents: A Global History* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 25–26.

NATO prevented former revisionist powers from seeking to redress the bipolar balance of power. There was a significant concern on the part of the superpowers to ensure the conditions for the preservation of stability through the bipolar balance-of-power system. Bipolarity was influenced by the "environmental factors" that affected the behavior of the superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union dealt with matters related to the configuration of bipolarity by making reference to their relative geographical isolation. The main prize of the ideological struggle that characterized the Cold War was Western Europe, with Germany as the most important pivot. The deployment of American exceptionalism and Eurasianism contributed to stifling the independent geopolitical stance of Europe in the postwar era. It is important to note that the aim of an international communist revolution was not completely discarded by the Soviet leadership. However, in the postwar scenario, the aim for equilibrium was informed by "short-term gains and long-term goals, and between the Soviet need for secure borders and the desire for the growth of the global Communist movement and worldwide proletarian revolution."[66] The institutionalization of the postwar international order according to a bipolar system of states would enable the Soviet Union to enjoy a dominant position as a result of the suppression of alternative geopolitical poles. The creation of a communist bloc eliminated the possibility of a "Third Europe," capable of being a geopolitical threat to Moscow. The possible establishment of an independent confederal structure in the Intermarium, such as the one delineated by General Władysław Sikorski in the 1930s, would have created a "Third Europe" in Central Europe, putatively capable of defending itself against the geopolitical claims of Germany and Russia.[67] The resilient attitude that emanated from the Soviet leadership was forged by the hardship suffered during the colossal fight against Nazi Germany for national survival.[68] The elimination of potential adversaries led to the entrenchment of the position of Soviet Russia "as the sole great power on the continent—a position unique in [Russian] modern history."[69] The suppression of European sovereignty was undertaken by preventing the possibility of establishing a "third pole," either in Western or Eastern Europe, since this would have restricted the scope of action of the superpowers. The suppression of European autarky had the effect of maximizing the position of the superpowers in the Cold War period. The attainment of a modicum of conviviality between the superpowers was an element of paramount importance in order to bring about that state of affairs. The official ideological line embraced by the Soviet leadership was based on the compatibility

---

66. K. Boterbloem, *The Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896–1948* (Toronto: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 324.
67. E. Feier and Ţ. Constantin-Vasile, "The New Intermarium Concept—A Strategic Alternative to the Eastern Border," *Eurolimes*, 96 (2016); V. Vasilenko, "The Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation Project in British Policy, 1939–1943: A Federalist Alternative to Postwar Settlement in East Central Europe?" *Canadian Journal of History*, 49, 2 (2014), 206.
68. I. Ehrenburg, *The Tempering of Russia*, trans. Alexander Kaun (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1944), 8.
69. British Plan for a Western European Bloc—FRUS, diplomatic papers: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference) (1945), 258.

between "ideological struggle" and "peaceful coexistence" with the Western powers.[70] Throughout the Cold War, Moscow labored under the assumption that a Soviet attack on Western Europe could only occur as an act of retaliation—if the Soviet Union were to be attacked first.[71] The imposition of social norms to be adhered to by all the members of the system of states contributed to establishing a multilateral framework that created more certainty than the vague bilateral assurances that the prominent powers had given each other during the interwar period.[72] The hegemonic practices of the superpowers engendered a bipolar system of states that bolstered their dominant position in the postwar era. The bipolar configuration of the system of states evolved in a gradual manner, taking into consideration the specific political circumstances that prevailed in each country. In any case, the bipolar system of states entailed a high level of interconnectedness between the hegemonic powers and the subaltern units. There was a certain reticence on the part of the United Kingdom and the United States to admit Italy into the Western Union, founded in 1948. However, the De Gasperi government counted on the support of the Vatican at the domestic level and on France at the international level; France wanted the scope of the "West" to include Italy.[73] The French government stated that a solidary approach between the United States and the European imperial powers regarding the system of tutelage of their territorial possessions was an important prerequisite to the effective functioning of the United Nations.[74] French officials held the view that the United States would be willing to have its own imprint on the scheme of international governance emerging from the United Nations.[75] De Gaulle was aware of the geopolitical implications of the ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the war, De Gaulle had expressed the need to ensure that France remained a combatant party in order to avoid a state of subordination to the Western allies after the end of the war.[76] De Gaulle envisaged the "enfeeblement" of Europe and the propagation of ideological tools in order to establish a geopolitical space underscored by the use of force.[77] The prevalent view among scholars is that the bipolar balance of power that took root during the Cold War was not conducive to the

70. V. Trukhanovskiĭ, *The USSR, Sixty Years of Struggle for Peace: British Foreign Policy during the Second World War, 1939–1945* (Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences, 1978), 8.

71. A. Gromyko and B. Ponomarev, *Soviet Foreign Policy: 1945–1980* (Moscow: Institut istorii SSSR, 1981), 141.

72. Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), *Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War: November 1937–1938* (Moscow: International, 1978), 113.

73. P. Craveri, *De Gasperi* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006), 377–84.

74. Rapport de M. Naggiar, Delegué à l'Assemblée de l'ONU a le President du Conseil. Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, Les questions colonales et l' Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies, New York octobre-decembre 1946, Paris 8 janvier 1947, Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1947 (1er janvier—30 juin), vol. 1, 66.

75. Note de la Direction d'Asie-Oceanie-Au Sujet de la Conference des Mers du Sud (Canberra 28 janvier-6 fevrier 1947), Paris 7 fevrier—Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1947 (1er janvier—30 juin), vol. 1, 287.

76. C. de Gaulle, *Memoires de Guerre-L'Unité, 1942–1944* (Paris: Plon), 1–2.

77. C. de Gaulle, *Discours et messages*, vol. 2: Dans l'Attente (1946–1958) (Paris: Plon, 1970), 662.

emergence of an "inclusive and consensual" way of organizing international politics.[78] To be sure, there was a significant reduction of the spectrum of sovereignty of the less prominent members of the system of states. However, this assertion needs to be qualified by stating that any elements of inclusion and consent that existed during the Cold War were made subject to the need to preserve the stability of the system of states. The emphasis on hegemonic stability did not prevent the superpowers from looking after the interests of their allies, provided these enhanced their own geopolitical interests and promoted international stability.

One of the most significant aspects related to the notion of great-power management is the idea of global governance. In a geopolitical sense, global governance may be understood as the creation of the circumstances that bolster the position of the hegemonic powers without exercising direct intervention. This situation entails the establishment of a normative framework that would function in accordance with the needs and interests of the superpowers. Both the United States and the Soviet Union advanced the spectrum of global governance by reducing the possibility that the subaltern units of the system of states might escape from the hegemonic influence of the superpowers. Global governance manifested itself in the creation of communications channels geared towards demarcating the geopolitical interests between the superpowers in a clear manner. The creation of extensive networks of international organization and regimes endowed the system of states with an important ontological link between political action and morality. The postwar international order established a clear connection between "law and justice," as seen in the extension of international regimes that advanced the cause of economic development in the benighted areas of the world.[79]

The geopolitical design implemented by the United States and the Soviet Union was justified on the grounds that it responded to the accomplishment of ulterior moral motives. The exceptionalist and Eurasianist geostrategic orientations were justified on the basis that they were fomenting the spiritual and material progress of the system of states. To a large extent, the spectrum of global governance emerged according to the shape of the "domestic interests" that prevailed within the United States and the Soviet Union. The opening of the Western European economy created excellent opportunities for consolidating the standing of American capitalism.[80] The Labour Party administration in the United Kingdom worried about the possible retreat of the United States from the international scene, in the same manner as had occurred after to World War I. The isolationist segment of the Republican Party in the U.S. Congress was concerned about the possibility that the money loaned to the United Kingdom would be used to embark on "radical" economic reform.[81] In addition to this, the level of destruction wrought by

78. M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds.), *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5.

79. See J. Preston Baratta, *The Politics of World Federation: From World Federalism to Global Governance* (New York: Praeger, 2004).

80. M. Hewson, and T. Sinclair (eds.), *Approaches to Global Governance Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 3.

81. J. Bew, *Citizen Clem: A Biography of Attlee* (London: Riverrun, 2016), 366–71.

World War II led to the acknowledgment that the right of the nations would have to be calibrated in accordance with the doctrine of human rights. This was seen in a clearer manner in the actions undertaken by the United States and its Cold War allies. The Western European powers and Japan gave up on the idea of projecting hard power, preferring instead to adopt a defensive attitude guided by the geopolitical design of the United States. In the case of the Soviet Union and its satellites, there was a discourse emanating from Moscow (and from the communist leadership in the nations of the Soviet bloc) about the benefits of socialism as an ideology capable of creating material progress. The curtailment of sovereignty and the projection of global governance legitimized the existence of a bipolar settlement that was conducive to the attainment of the geopolitical instruments of the superpowers and the establishment of a stable and relatively peaceful international order.

4.5 Conclusion

The institutionalization of the international order in the postwar period emerged in accordance with three geostrategic instruments deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union. To begin with, great-power management was exercised to an extent unseen in previous configurations of the system of states. The spheres of influence delineated by the superpowers constituted geopolitical realms that created stability in the nascent system of states. The superpowers undertook a significant number of responsibilities in the international order. The predictable interstate relations that existed in the postwar system of states were crucial for avoiding a slide into disruptive conflict. This was done with the ultimate purpose of maintaining the hegemonic position of the superpowers. The national interest of the hegemonic powers is actualized in cases when "institutions create greater regularity in individual behavior than would be found without the existence of those institutions."[82] This brings us to the second geopolitical instrument that determined the pattern of institutionalization in the postwar period: the curtailment of sovereignty of the subaltern units of the system. The behavior of the units of the system of states is moderated through a series of "prohibitions, obligations and permissions" that are linked to the fulfillment of the geopolitical concerns of the dominant states.[83] This was another novel method of institutionalizing the international order. In the aftermath of World War I the dominant powers made accommodation for the interests of emerging nations such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.[84] After World War II, there was a reverse trend: both the United States and the Soviet Union worked to suppress any form of

82. G. Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The "New Institutionalism"* (London: Continuum, 2005), 158.

83. G. Hayden, "Normative Analysis of Instituted Processes," in S. Fayazmanesh, and M. Tool (eds.), *Institutionalist Theory and Applications—Essays in Honour of Paul Dale Bush*, vol. 2 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998), 91–92.

84. C. Archer, *International Organizations* (London: Routledge, 2001), 15.

revisionism on the part of the units that composed their spheres of influence. This geostrategic instrument added another layer of stability to the postwar international order. The bipolar balance of power that was constituted after 1945 served to create an important spectrum of world order, as there was a realization on the part of the superpowers about the need to exercise wider global governance. The level of institutionalization of the system of states varies in nature and magnitude according to the specific historical juncture. The institutionalization of the postwar international order was the most comprehensive attempt to create a strong level of regulation in interstate relations. The power vacuum generated by the enfeeblement of Europe during the war period compelled the superpowers to set in motion a comprehensive scheme of regulation in a multilateral fashion. This is the most important feature of the process of institutionalization that unfolded during the early Cold War. The superpowers had a strong geopolitical orientation in mind when they implemented the institutionalization of the postwar international order. The reduction in the scope of sovereignty of the subaltern units of the spheres of influence carved out by the United States and the Soviet Union were facilitated by the deployment of "intersubjective meaning and shared understandings" between actors and the communicative actions that took place between them, especially when rules were infringed upon.[85] The United States and the Soviet Union exercised a large degree of great power management, directed at ensuring there would be a hierarchical ordering capable of actualizing their needs and interests in the postwar period. The curtailment of sovereignty contributed significantly to preventing the rise of geopolitical arrangements capable of marring multilateralism. The expansion of international regulation was meant to inject a higher level of predictability into the functioning of the system of states; preventing the emergence of reciprocal bilateral arrangements that would create uncertainty in the nascent postwar international order. The social norms that underpinned the foundations of this international order were configured in accordance with a system of meaning that facilitated the emergence of instruments of global governance.[86] The establishment of a bipolar balance of power created stability in the international order, at least in the sense that it concentrated power in the hands of a smaller number of great powers. The current configuration of the international order provides important counterfactual evidence in order to appraise the benefits of an international order marshaled by a reduced number of great powers. The volatile conditions that exist in the current configuration of the system of states are, at least to a certain extent, a product of the unwillingness and/or inability of the great powers to legitimize the existence of multilateral arrangements and a wide scheme of global governance.

---

85. A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. Rittberger, *Theories of International Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 16.
86. E. Adler and S. Bernstein, "Knowledge in Power: The Epistemic Construction of Global Governance," in M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds.), *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 294.

Chapter Five

AMERICAN GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS IN WESTERN EUROPE

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the idea that the United States facilitated the institutionalization of the international order through the enforcement of its vital geopolitical interests in Western Europe. The first theme to be broached in this section is centered on the idea that the element of political and military intervention allowed the United States to accomplish its geopolitical goals in Western Europe. Intervention took place in accordance with the hierarchical ordering that informed the configuration of the postwar system of states. The principle of intervention had a distinct functionalist perspective attached to it. Washington established the basis for an international order that facilitated the spread of free-trade practices. The devastation caused by World War II led to the imposition of a hierarchical ordering in which Western Europe retained a demoted geopolitical position vis-à-vis the United States. This hierarchical ordering was underscored by the establishment of an institutional framework that curtailed the scope of sovereignty of the Western European nations.[1] The principle of intervention brought about a level of institutionalization conducive to providing certainty to the unfoldment of interstate relations. At the same time, the hierarchical ordering that resulted from the curtailment of sovereignty imposed on the Western European nations allowed the United States to project values that would benefit the lives of the people across Western Europe.[2]

The second theme to be explored in this chapter is that *the scope of intervention was propelled as a result of the demise of the old political and social order in Western Europe.* The United States was a crucial actor in the recalibration of the political order in Western Europe. This facet of intervention responded to the need to attain a solution to the problems that affected the reorganization of the system of states in the postwar era. Western Europe faced a situation of potential social upheaval as a result of the dislocations that took place during the war. Furthermore, the scope of intervention established a collective identity directed toward advancing the economic interests of the United States in the postwar era. The intervention of the United States in Western Europe should be seen as a concerted effort to transcend the logic of self-help by establishing a transatlantic community united by common economic and geopolitical interests. The triumph of the

---

1. See D. Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011).
2. D. Mitrany, *The Progress of International Government* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1933), 79.

American model of capitalism, heavily influenced by the New Deal, was crucial in order to exert a significant amount of social transformation in Western Europe.[3]

The third theme to be examined is that *the political and military intervention of the United States in Western Europe arose as a result of the need to create a transnational community dedicated to the solution of common problems.* An important facet of this functionalist perspective is the emergence of international regimes, which gave the postwar international system a social identity anchored in the increasingly interdependent nature of the relations between the units of the system of states.[4] The functionalist orientation that informed the establishment of a transnational community of interests was underpinned by the need to balance "the strength of the state and the happiness of its inhabitants."[5] The United States created a transnational community of interests capable of resolving common problems by deploying a wide range of soft- and hard-power mechanisms.[6] The United States put in place policies that led to the establishment of a general settlement in Western Europe. In this context, the Marshall Plan—also known as the European Recovery Plan (ERP)—constituted an instrument that enabled the United States to achieve a workable economic order in the postwar era through the restoration of the Western European economy.

The fourth theme to be analyzed is centered on the idea that the *spectrum of intervention was magnified by the determination of the United States to forge a collective identity with the Western European nations and aimed at anchoring Washington's economic interests in the postwar era.* The principle of intervention, which led to the formation of an Atlanticist collective identity, became a crucial factor in the institutionalization of the postwar international order. The convergence of values between Washington and Western Europe facilitated the fulfillment of the main geopolitical objectives of the United States the postwar era.[7] The particular order prevailing in the system of states at any given historical juncture is the product of the interaction between the policy preferences of the main geopolitical actors and the institutional norms that guide interstate relations.[8] In this manner, institutions are instruments that are rationally chosen to allow the actors of the system of states to pursue their geostrategic goals.[9] From the perspective of American foreign policy, the choices

3. T. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions—A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 5 and 19.
4. J. Sewell, *Functionalism and World Politics—A Study based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Developments* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 1 and 5.
5. D. Mitrany (1933), 97; D. Mitrany and M. Garnett (1950) *World Unity and the Nations* (London: National Peace Council), 7.
6. R. J. Vincent, "Grotius, Human Rights, and Intervention," in H. Bull, B. Kingsbury and A. Roberts (eds.), *Hugo Grotius and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 249.
7. B. Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations—The Societal Approach* (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 80; J. O'Hagan, "Discourses of Civilizational Identity," in M. Hall and P. T. Jackson (eds.), *Civilizational Identity—The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 17.
8. See R. Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
9. S. Ersson and J. Lane, in S. Ersson and J. Lane (eds.), *The New Institutional Politics: Outcomes and Consequences* (London: Routledge, 2002), 8.

exercised in the aftermath of World War II were made in accordance with the pursuit of a set of interests that did not clash with the vital geostrategic needs of the Soviet Union.

5.2 The Hierarchical Ordering of the Postwar International Order and the "Grand Design" of Economic Intervention

The United States utilized its powerful position in order to set an economic "grand design" directed toward the accomplishment of the basic goals of American foreign policy in the postwar era. American policy makers concluded that the country's most vital economic interests depended on preventing the circumstances that brought about the Great Depression of the 1930s.[10] The economic depression of the 1930s left an indelible mark on the evolution of the American political system. When Franklin D. Roosevelt took office in 1933, he was aware of the possibility that he might have to assume dictatorial powers if the dislocations caused by the massive contraction experienced by the American economy would result in uncontrollable social upheaval. Roosevelt pointed out the great difficulties that occurred as a result of the economic depression, stating that the United States "was dying by inches […] because trade and commerce had declined to dangerously low levels [and] prices for basic commodities were such as to destroy the value of the assets of national institutions such as banks, savings banks, insurance companies, and others."[11] The Great Depression resulted in the loss of faith in the democratic system of government. Roosevelt was aware of the monumental task involved in reconstructing the country's economy and the need to centralize resources in order to tackle the political ramifications of the Great Depression. In his first radio address to the nation, the president stated that he reserved "the right to command in any phase of the situation" that confronted the United States.[12] The autarkic attitude employed by Germany and the other Western European nations, along with the push of the Japanese

---

10. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, London, January 19, 1944—FRUS, General: Economic and Social Matters (1944), 6.

11. Roosevelt's Fireside Chat, 7 May 1933—https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Roosevelt%27s_Fireside_Chat,_7_May_1933.

12. President Franklin D. Roosevelt speech to the American Legion, March 6, 1933—http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/pdfs/dictatorship.pdf. During the 1930s, there were some segments of American society that were pessimistic about the long-term survival of the democratic system. In 1933, retired Marine Corps General Smedley Darlington Butler informed the US Congress that a group of war veterans were plotting to dislodge President Roosevelt in a coup d'etat to be staged by individuals concerned about the socialistic turn taken by the newly installed president. Butler had also warned about the appetite that the business community had for the pursuit of war, an instrument that according to the former general, served to prop up its profits. While the literature on the alleged "Business Plot" is somewhat contradictory, it is safe to assume that Roosevelt's promises for a more interventionist role of the government in the economic process could have scared big business. They also regarded the abandonment of the gold standard as potentially leading to the onset of Fascism or socialism, as the removal of gold backing could have triggered an inflationary episode that would have dented the value of the US dollar. See S. Butler, *War is a Racket* (Port Townsend, WA: Feral House, 2003/1935); U.S. House of Representatives, Special Committee

leadership for the creation of a Co-Prosperity Sphere in East Asia contributed to the perpetuation of the state of economic malaise that affected the American economy. The main concern of the American policy makers in the postwar period was to maintain a relatively free international economy capable of ensuring a sustained level of prosperity for the United States.

In order to prevent the advent of another economic depression, American foreign-policy makers worked to establish a multilateral system of trade, discarding the possibility of currency and trade blocs that would hamper the export of the American production surplus. The reorganization of the world economy that took place as a result of the Bretton Woods Agreement of July 1944 reflects the hierarchical ordering that prevailed within the framework of relations established between the United States and the Western European nations. This was reflected in the reticence of certain segments of the British political establishment to acquiesce to the provisions of the Bretton Woods system. The Department of State claimed that "a majority of the directors of the Bank of England [were] opposed to the program [as …] financial control will leave London and dollar exchange will take the place of sterling exchange."[13] Moreover, the conversations between Roosevelt and Churchill at the Quebec Conference of September 1944 reveal that there was a concern among American officials regarding the possibility that the provision of Lend-Lease assistance to the United Kingdom might be used for exports.[14] The United States provided the United Kingdom with a loan of $3.75 billion in 1946 that was to be used for the purposes of addressing the growing commercial deficit accrued from the United States.[15] The rehabilitation of the Western European economies was deemed vital to securing world peace. However, economic rehabilitation followed, by and large a hierarchical ordering that was geared toward bolstering the dominant position of the United States in the postwar era. The restoration of the industrial networks of the world economy became the most important facet of the scheme of foreign policy deployed by the United States after the war. The Bretton Woods Agreement was aimed at assisting "reconstruction and development […] by facilitating the investment of capital for pro-ductive purposes, including the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encouragement of the development of productive facilities and resources in less developed countries."[16] The United States projected a foreign policy orientation underscored by a, "nondiscriminatory,

on Un-American Activities, Public Statement, 73rd Congress, 2nd session, Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1934.

13. The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, London, April 12, 1944—FRUS, *General: Economic and Social Matters* (1944), 110.

14. General Records of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury-Records of the Assistant Secretary—Monetary and Intl Affairs—Chronological File of HD White November 1934–April 1946 56 450 60 31 7 BOX 12 ENTRY 360P—Record of Conversation Between the President and Prime Minister at Quebec on September 14, 1944.

15. Cabinet Paper (47) 283 Cabinet-Dollar Programme in 1948, Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister for Economic Affairs, October 16, 1947.

16. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944—avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad047.asp.

multilateral trading system." The effective deployment of these policy instruments was facilitated by the overwhelming amount of political and military power that the United States accumulated as a result of its participation in the war.

The hierarchical ordering that guided relations between the United States and the Western European nations was reflected in the negative response given to the British request to maintain "preferential economic groupings" in the international economy.[17] However, ensuring the actualization of American geopolitical interests in the postwar scenario entailed that the Bretton Woods Agreement would have to cater to the differentiated nature of the capitalist system of production that emerged in Western Europe, where the establishment of the welfare state enfranchised vast segments of the citizenry through access to housing, education and healthcare as well as jobs in the enlarged public sector. The prosperity experienced by large segments of the Western European population was attained through a significant amount of economic planning. Just before the onset of the war, Harold Macmillan (future British prime minister, between 1957 and 1963) argued that in order to prevent the advent of widespread economic malaise, there was a need to frame the system of production along the principle of "freedom of enterprise, but with public controls."[18] The policy documents produced by the Labour Party during World War II indicate the willingness to reach a "middle way" between revolutionary socialism and the kind of laissez-faire system that would have left society vulnerable to radical politics. In 1941, G. D. H. Cole stated that, "what fundamentally differentiates us, who belong to the Fabian society and to the Labour Party, from Communists […] is the belief that it is possible to build a new society without throwing overboard those values which are our heritage from the past, developed under capitalism."[19] The dislocations provoked by World War II facilitated the "re-embedding" of social liberal principles of economic behavior into the economies of Western Europe. This can be seen in the rise of the welfare state and the stricter regulation of industrial relations, which was responsible for the partial de-commodification of labor.[20] This situation was responsible for ensuring that the expansion of free market practices would be accepted by large segments of the population, which were able to enjoy a significant level of socioeconomic enfranchisement in the postwar period. One of the main elements of the de-radicalized form of collectivism that emerged in this time was the "explicit or implicit commitment by governments to

---

17. G. J. Ikenberry, "The Political Origins of Bretton Woods," in B. Eichengreen and M. Bordo (eds.), *A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 155–56.

18. H. Macmillan, *The Middle Way* (London: Macmillan, 1939). In the aftermath of 1945, Harold Macmillan became aware of the need for the Conservative Party to become more in tune with the needs of the public, which had just elected a Labour government. Macmillan went so far as to suggest that the Conservative Party should change its name to the New Democratic Party. D. R. Thorpe, *Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan* (London: Chatto and Windus, 2010), 241–43.

19. G. D. H. Cole, *A Socialist Civilization in Programme for Victory—A Collection of Essays Prepared for by the Fabian Society* (London: Routledge, 1941).

20. K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (New York: Beacon Press, 1944/2001).

avoid economic collapse."[21] The Department of the Treasury became an interlocutor for the Keynesian ideas that were in vogue among British and American policy makers.[22] As we can see, the hierarchical ordering that took place in the international order was responsive to the needs of the units that were subordinated to the framework of geopolitical interests of the United States. American officials regarded the restoration of the Western European economies as crucial to the successful implementation of a system that would link up the American productive system to the world markets. The Bretton Woods Agreement envisaged the creation of an international monetary fund whose main purpose was to ensure "the restoration of world trade and its continuing expansion" by bringing about the stability of foreign exchange rates and the establishment of "better trade conditions."[23] American officials saw a link between the untrammeled flow of commerce and the stability of the postwar international order. The American government was aware of the intricate relationship that existed between trade and the establishment of a stable political environment both at home and abroad:

> In some countries foreign commerce constitutes a very large proportion of total national income. In other countries the percentage of national income that is produced by foreign trade is small. But even in the latter countries it is often the case that the marginal 10 to 12 per cent involved in foreign trade may spell the differences between prosperity and depression. For these reasons, a restored world economy cannot be imagined without the establishment of world trade on the largest possible scale and the with the least possible obstruction.[24]

American officials were aware of the implications of establishing a system that would cater to the needs of the Western European economies. The granting of the British loan and the abandonment of the idea postulated by the Department of the Treasury to transform Germany into an agricultural country are prime examples of the flexibility of the American position on matters pertaining to postwar reconstruction.[25] The United States set in motion a blueprint for the smooth transition to a managed monetary international regime that would ensure the unhindered flow of commerce in the postwar scenario. By the late 1940s, Western Europe became linked to the American economy as a result of the rehabilitative effects of Marshall Plan. The ERP was granted under flexible terms that resembled those relating to the $3.75 billion loan given to the United

21. R. Skidelsky, *The World After Communism—A Polemic for Our Times* (London: Macmillan, 1995), 85–87.
22. B. Steil, *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 27 and 683.
23. Document 397, July 8, 1944—Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944, vol. 1, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1948, 635.
24. Document 397, July 8, 1944—Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944, vol, 1, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1948, 636.
25. E. Helleiner, *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

Kingdom. However, the imposition of a hierarchical ordering encountered some resistance among the Western European countries, which sensed that the problems attached to postwar reconstruction would lead to their geopolitical demotion. The British government objected to the provisions that the United States wanted to impose in regard to economic cooperation, since these measures were not conducive to propping up the commercial position of the United Kingdom in the postwar era.[26] The British cabinet negotiated the possibility of "a waiver of interest and amortisation payments" on the loan that was asked from Washington.[27] The United States was prepared to make certain concessions in order to ensure the financial stability of the United Kingdom in the postwar era.[28] Here we see how the hierarchical ordering imposed by the United States on Western Europe correlated with the determination to ensure the maintenance of economic stability in the countries that had been affected by World War II.

The geopolitical interests of the United States were carried out in accordance with the need to make sure that the major industrial economies would be tied to a cooperative framework for the management of the international economy. The idea of the supranational management of the world economy became an intrinsic part of the grand geopolitical vision of the United States for the postwar scenario. The Bretton Woods agreements were influential in ensuring that the practices of the American capitalist system would be emulated by the Western European nations.[29] Additionally, they guaranteed that the surplus that the United States accumulated during the war could be exported to these industrial nations instead of being distributed at home. The American government concluded that, "a curtailment of [Western/East European] trade would mean increased demands on the United States, both in terms of money and in terms of physical supplies, much of which could not be provided without the institution of drastic domestic control."[30] The rationale behind the investment of public and private American funds for the "reconstruction and development" of the areas devastated by World War II was aimed at establishing a sound commercial policy in the postwar era and at maintaining high levels of employment in the United States.[31] The imposition of a hierarchical ordering had distinct geopolitical implications. The Bretton Woods system guaranteed that the United Kingdom and other Western European countries would not be tempted to combine forces in order to form a "third bloc" capable of counterbalancing the two superpowers. This putative "third bloc" could have included an independent and united Germany, potentially able to reestablish the autarkic economic system that the Hitlerite regime attempted to set up during the 1930s. Harry Dexter White, a senior

---

26. Cabinet 42 (48) Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, June 24, 1948.

27. Cabinet 53 (48) Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, July 22, 1948.

28. Cabinet 43 (48) Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, June 25, 1948.

29. F. Weaver, *The United States and the Global Economy: From Bretton Woods to the Current Crisis* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).

30. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5—E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5-Control of exports to the Soviet bloc, March 29, 1948.

31. The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Washington, June 15, 1945, FRUS, 1946, General; the United Nations, 1391.

US Department of the Treasury official and one of the architects of the Bretton Woods system, highlighted the geopolitical implications attached to the reorganization of the world economy in the postwar period:

> Military expenditures, lack of confidence, and fear of war "on a scale unprecedented and unimaginable in its destructive potentialities" had delayed economic recovery and impeded world trade. Political developments since 1945 had in short thrown a money wrench into "the delicate machinery of world economic development and reconstruction." The British loan and the Marshal Plan […] had helped enormously, "but these efforts are not enough to compensate for the losses sustained by the world because of the split of One World into at least two.[32]

The hierarchical ordering that was configured within the US sphere of influence had as its main purpose the creation of the conditions that were necessary for the entrenchment of the American system of production. The establishment of a bipolar system entailed that the United States could not expand its commercial sway into the areas of the world that were under Soviet control. The American grand geopolitical vision for the postwar international order entailed the bandwagoning of the Western European nations into the American sphere of economic influence. Consequently, the United States undertook measures to ensure the economic viability of these nations and their acceptance of American hegemonic interests. The hegemonic principle that the United States labored under was informed by an interventionist approach geared toward replicating the New Deal policies at a global level. The Bretton Woods system, which would remain operational until 1971, reflected the imposition of the fundamental economic interests of the United States on the spectrum of international cooperation that emerged after the end of World War II. The Bretton Woods system prevented the establishment of protectionist barriers in an economically reconstituted Western Europe. The system envisaged an assiduous link between public and private concerns.[33] It pays to highlight that the geopolitical interests of the United States could not have been achieved without a soft hegemonic drive, calibrated in accordance with the specific interests of the Western European economies. The level of political and economic intervention would be restricted to the attainment of those goals, while providing significant leeway for the Western European economies to implement social policies that deviated from the American capitalist system.[34] For the United States, the fate of Western Europe and its industrial resources were vital to its grand design for the postwar international order. The American industrial and political establishment operated under the assumption that the wartime economic

---

32. D. Rees, *Harry Dexter White—A Study in Paradox* (London: Macmillan, 1973), 404–5.

33. Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for a Bank of Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations, November 24, 1943—Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944, vol. 2, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1948, 1616.

34. See B. Eichengreen, *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

expansion could only continue in the context of an international economic system based on the principle of free trade. This "grand design" entailed that Western Europe was compelled to absorb the surplus of goods generated by the American economy. The United States wanted to prevent the emergence of a protectionist Western European economic bloc that would hamper the expansion of the American economy. The integration of Germany (or at least West Germany) with the other Western European economies was necessary to "prevent war," one of the "chief national concerns" of the United States in the postwar era.[35] It was argued that "Germany [was] becoming the theater of an ideological struggle." American policy makers argued that "the Western democracies [had an advantage] over the east: they are known to all Germans for their higher standard of living in which, in one way or another Germans who look westward hope to share."[36] Free trade within the scheme of economic integration was a vital instrument in order to prevent the onset of radical politics. US Secretary of State Cordell Hull had concluded, mirroring the mainstream view of the Roosevelt administration, that "unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition with war."[37] By 1947, the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements highlighted that reductions in tariffs were aimed at directly benefitting "large and small enterprises" in the United States. In addition to this, the United States was prepared to create a more lax environment in order to import items for an amount that would be approximate to the goods exported to the wider world.[38] The commitment to a freer commercial environment was one of the factors that propelled the intervention of the United States in World War II. The American vision of an international trading system that would be unhindered by protectionist policies inspired the terms of the political and economic aid bestowed upon the United Kingdom during the war. The Atlantic Charter provided that the achievement of a durable peace hinged upon the "fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field." and the ability "to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance."[39] The Master Lend-Lease Agreement signed between the two countries in 1942 prescribed the removal of discriminatory practices in a more explicit manner, putting forward the vision of a free system of exchange through "the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and […] the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers."[40] The model of government

35. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5—E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5-Notes on the Berlin situation by Charles Saltzman, April 7, 1948.
36. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5—E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5-Memorandum for General Hilldring. Some recommendations on policy. Signed J. K. Galbraith and Edward S. Mason, September 12, 1946.
37. C. Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. 1 (Irvine, CA: Reprint Services Corporation, 1993), 81.
38. Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements (Brown) to President Truman, Washington, April 2, 1947, FRUS, General; The United Nations (1947), 909–10.
39. Atlantic Charter, 14/8/1941, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.
40. Preliminary Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 23/2/1942—http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade04.asp.

intervention applied to the running of the domestic economy would be implemented in the management of the world economy for the purposes of ensuring the unhindered flow of commerce. This philosophy became the rationale behind the Bretton Woods Agreement, which aimed to check the threat of international conflict arising from competing economic blocs by promoting trade anchored in policies like the fixed exchange rates, the convertibility of Western European currencies to the US dollar (subsequently tied to the gold standard) and the lowering of tariffs.[41] At the same time, the dollar ended up occupying a decidedly central role in the Bretton Woods system, instead of the reserve currency position that had been envisaged originally.[42]

The creation of international institutions capable of monitoring the free system of exchange was also geared toward protecting the industrialized nations of the world against the threat of Communism. The configuration of two political and economic blocs after the war should be understood as a simplification exercise on the part of the United States. Washington gave up on the idea of co-opting the Central and Eastern European economies and bringing them into the capitalist camp, as this approach would have exacerbated the situation of looming conflict vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Instead, the United States strove to adapt the highly industrialized economies of Western Europe to the American model of production. The United States had to ensure that would-be competitors, such as a putatively autarkic Western Europe and/ or a reconstituted British Empire, would toe the line imposed by Washington in economic matters. This is an important aspect of the hierarchical ordering that emerged in the postwar period. The US sphere of influence effectively furnished the system of states with an important element of institutionalization.[43] The establishment of a hierarchical ordering created a collective identity that facilitated the reconstitution of the global financial architecture in accordance with the main tenets of American capitalism.[44] The implementation of this "grand design" depended on the exercise of strong political leadership on the part of the United States. This was accomplished by capitalizing on the economic dislocations that took place during the war and the power vacuum generated by the demise of Nazi Germany. There was a distinct functionalist perspective in the way in which the hierarchical ordering imposed by the United States contributed to institutionalizing the system of states that emerged after World War II.[45] The United States was able to exercise effective management of the international order by reducing the spectrum of collegiality among the units of the

41. D. Andrews (ed.), *Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations since Bretton Woods* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).

42. E. Conway, *The Summit-Bretton Woods, 1944—J. M. Keynes and the Reshaping of the Global Economy* (London: Pegasus Books, 2015), 372.

43. See N. Inayatullah and D. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference* (London: Routledge, 2004).

44. R. Pollard, *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 37–41.

45. A. Groom and P. Graham Taylor, *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations* (London: University of London Press, 1975).

system—most crucially within its sphere of influence. The reduction of the scope of sovereignty of the Western European powers became a functionalist instrument that ensured the actualization of the geopolitical "grand design" outlined by the United States.[46]

5.3 The Prospect of Social Upheaval and the Spectrum of Economic Intervention

The hierarchical ordering propelled by the United States became one of the mechanisms used to bolster Washington's "grand design" for the postwar international order, one that would ensure economic stability for the Western Bloc while fulfilling the needs and interests of the United States. The prospect of social upheaval informed the spectrum of economic intervention. The Western European countries faced the threat of a communist takeover as a result of the level of social and economic devastation resulting from World War II. In this context, the need to deal with the German Question provided an important element of institutionalization, as it was meant to shore up confidence in the establishment of a political and economic grouping capable of providing prosperity for the Western European nations. The need to deal with the German Question in an effective manner stemmed from the strategy aimed at ensuring that the most industrialized country in Continental Europe would be tied to a system of free trade in the postwar period. This is a facet that explains the shift in policy position from dismemberment (as envisaged by the Morgenthau Plan) to the maintenance of German unity to the fullest extent possible. The United States deployed foreign policy mechanisms directed at preventing the emergence of Germany as an independent nation capable of entering into an alliance with the Soviet Union.[47] In a draft prepared for the secretary of state in October 1946, it was stated that the spread of democratic tendencies was linked to the "elimination of cartels and excessive concentrations of economic power" and to preventing the "resurgence of those forms of political and economic organization which are the foundation of a policy of aggression."[48] Nevertheless, some reservations were expressed in important strands of opinion that were "critical of general policies of destruction [or of] limitation of possible peaceful productivity." These concerns were influential in creating the conditions for the rehabilitation of the German economy in order to supply the needs of Western Europe.[49] The hierarchical ordering imposed by the United States was crucial to assuaging the fears that pertained to the economic rehabilitation of Germany. Western European politicians such as Georges Bidault,

---

46. See L. Ashworth and D. Long (eds.), *New Perspectives on International Functionalism* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).
47. M. Leffler, "Interpretive Wars over the Cold War, 1945–60," in G. Martel (ed.), *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890–1993* (London: Routledge, 1994), 115.
48. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5—E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5—Draft from the Secretary of State, October 18, 1946.
49. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5—E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5—From Memorandum of Mr. Hoover Third Report.

the president of the provisional government of France between June and October of 1946, warned about the need to include European nations like Italy into the scheme of continental integration for the purposes of preventing the hegemonic dominance of Germany.[50] Moreover, the geopolitical expediencies of the postwar era were influential in creating an environment of opinion in Western Europe that regarded the rehabilitation of Germany as being of paramount importance for the reconstruction of the economic life the US sphere of influence. A report produced by the Liberal Party in the United Kingdom stated that while Germany "must not be allowed to establish such military force as will permit her to contemplate the possibility of successful aggression [she] must not be treated worse than other nations as regards economic, finance and 'welfare' matters."[51] The concern about preventing the onset of social upheaval was connected to the establishment of a Western Bloc detached from Soviet influence. The possibility of social upheaval was connected, in the minds of American policy makers, to the geopolitical implications of a rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union. Interestingly, in the last stages of World War II Goebbels outlined a description of American plans for the postwar international order, doing so with a high degree of accuracy and stating that the United States wanted "to ensure that [Europe] does not unite under a single power because they fear that would result in fierce economic competition." However, Goebbels also indicated that the United States did not "want to see a strong Germany, but on the other hand they do not want to see a strong Soviet Union."[52] This observation correlates with the way in which the United States dealt with the German Question in the postwar scenario. The main objective was to ensure that Germany would be able to partake in the system of free trade that American policy makers carved out in Western Europe. The realities of the postwar scenario and the further dislocations that were caused by the policy of reparations compelled the United States to work for the implementation of unilateral policies in Germany, which eventually led to the rehabilitation of the country's economy.[53] The social upheaval generated by the war left a power vacuum that endangered the long-term geopolitical interests of the United States. Lucius Clay, the military governor of the US zone of occupation in Germany, reflected on the connection between American policy toward Germany and the rest of Western Europe and the collusion between economic and security concerns in the postwar scenario. Clay highlighted the need to achieve a level of "economic recovery which restores the hope of livelihood [and] also brings back the will to be free." Clay pointed out that the United States expected the Western European nations to "strengthen their own defenses so that they will be prepared to withstand

50. G. Bidault, *D'Une Résistance a l'autre* (Paris: Les Presses du Siècle, 1965), 161.
51. *Germany after the War*—Proposals of a Liberal Party Committee under the Chairmanship of the Earl of Perth, Liberal Publication Department, London, 3–4.
52. H. Trevor-Roper (ed.), *Final Entries 1945—The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels* (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1978), 197.
53. The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris, Washington, May 9, 1946—FRUS, The British of Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe (1946), 550–55.

sudden onslaught until [America], acting under the pledge contained in the North Atlantic Pact, bring our great strength to bear against the aggressor."[54] The correlation between economic and security concerns entailed the economic rehabilitation of Germany. In order to prevent the advent of disruptive tendencies in the postwar scenario, American officials initially considered the idea of dividing Germany into several independent states. The most extreme pro-dismemberment view was presented to President Roosevelt in September 1944 by Harry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Department of the Treasury. The proponents of this policy option stressed that the Morgenthau Plan would have removed the threat of Germany dominating Europe, capturing German markets for the British and providing industrial plants for the victims of Nazi aggression.[55] The Morgenthau Plan entailed the economic rehabilitation of the Soviet Union through reparations and the extension of massive economic aid to Moscow, possibly in the hope that Stalin would not need to block off and exploit Eastern Europe in order to reconstruct the Soviet economy. The initial recommendations put forward by the Committee on Post-War Programs included the establishment of "democratic self-government" as well as terms of surrender that would not include a "war guilt clause." Most importantly, the Department of State did not recommend the partition of Germany, favoring instead the assimilation of Germany "into the world economy without discrimination other than that necessary for security controls."[56] The Department of State opposed the Morgenthau Plan on the grounds that partition of Germany into several states would, "not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force."[57] At the behest of Hopkins, Stimson and Hull, Roosevelt relinquished his initial acquiescence to the Morgenthau Plan, as it was not conducive to enhancing the security of the postwar international order.[58] The segment of the political establishment that advocated a high degree of American intervention in international affairs after the war continued to pursue the idea of reintegrating Germany into the system of states through the merging of its productive capacity with its Western European counterparts in the context of a system of free economic exchange.

The element of economic intervention exercised by the United States was directed toward normalizing the social situation in Germany and Western Europe. In the aftermath of World War II, the prevailing view among US government officials and

---

54. L. Clay, *Germany and the Fight for Freedom*, The Godkin Lectures at Harvard University (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 62.

55. J. Dietrich, *The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet Influence on American Postwar Policy* (New York: Algora, 2003), 12; W. Kimball, *Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan Germany, 1943–1946* (New York: Lippincott, 1976) , 44–45.

56. Memorandum by the Committee on Post-War Programs, Washington, May 31, 1944—FRUS, General, 1944, 303.

57. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Central European Affairs (Riddleberger), Washington, September 1, 1944—FRUS, Conference at Quebec, 1944, p. 83; Morgenthau to Roosevelt, Suggested Post Surrender Program for Germany, September 5, 1944, FRUS, Conference at Quebec 1944, 101–8.

58. H. Adams, *Harry Hopkins-A Biography* (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1977), 362–63.

leading members of the business community was that the German economy had to be restored, albeit within an orientation that would allow for the smooth functioning of commercial relations with the United States.[59] The main scope of action concerning the interventionism of the United States in the international economy was to prevent the onset of disruptive tendencies on the part of the nations that could pose a threat to its hegemonic position within its sphere of influence. This state of affairs constituted a significant departure from the manner in which the system of states had operated in the past. In the interwar years, the main units of the international political system could not construct a regulatory framework that would inform interstate relations. The imposition of interventionist policies denoted a "pursuit of primacy" that required a "hierarchy of settled political identities." This situation entailed that the dominant states made social rules that were to be followed by all the units of the international political system.[60] The United States was able to capitalize on the unprecedented nature of the power vacuum that existed in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II in order to impose a geopolitical compact that was geared toward creating a stable economic order capable of catering to US interests. Here we can see the way in which economic intervention contributed to reinstitutionalizing the system of states, as it gave a predictable ideological orientation to the Western European nations at a time of great political uncertainty. The economic intervention of the United States in Germany and the rest of Western Europe was undertaken with the ultimate aim of institutionalizing the postwar international order according to a non-autarkic perspective in matters pertaining to the management of the world economy. The social and political upheavals that had taken place in Europe during the interwar period were responsible for causing the deinstitutionalization of the international order. In this context, the rehabilitation of the Western European economies was undertaken with a functionalist purpose in mind.[61] The alignment of the geopolitical interests of the United States with the rehabilitation of the German economy ensured that the prosperity of a future German entity would be shared with other Western European nations and not be a cause for disruption of the postwar international order. The functionalist approach attached to the intervention of the United States in the German economy had a double-pronged purpose: namely, the reinstitutionalization of the international order in a manner conducive to preventing the onset of social upheaval and the alignment of the social norms that would otherwise guide interstate relations in keeping with US geostrategic interests.[62]

---

59. W. LaFeber, *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Documents* (Oxford: Wiley, 1971), 38.
60. J. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2003), 82.
61. W. Clemens, *Dynamics of International Relations: Conflict and Mutual Gain in an Era of Global Interdependence* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 515.
62. N. Onuf, *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2013), 206.

5.4 Intervention as a Functional Mechanism for the Attainment of a Geopolitical Settlement in Europe

Economic intervention was employed by the United States as a means to attain a favorable geopolitical settlement in Europe. The prevalent view among the members of the American establishment was that the United States, faced with massive surpluses of goods and capital, needed the economic reconstitution of Germany and Western Europe. The failure of the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers to keep Germany united provided Secretary of State George Marshall with the impetus to launch the European Recovery Plan, better known as the Marshall Plan.[63] European reconstruction required access to products manufactured in the United States. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Europe did not have the dollars to buy these supplies. The United States had a sizeable trade surplus, and its reserves were large and increasing. The Marshall Plan was designed to promote Europe's financial, fiscal and political stability; to stimulate world trade and to forestall an economic depression through the expansion of free markets. The Truman administration faced fierce opposition from the isolationist segment of the Republican Party, led by Senator Robert Taft, who proposed "to cut first-year funding from $5.3 billion to $4 billon" and opposed funding beyond "specific programs clearly necessary for subsistence, or clearly helpful in increasing […] production by Western European nations."[64] Senator Arthur Vanderberg ensured that this amendment would be rejected by the US Congress.[65] The political situation that was developing in Western Europe proved to be crucial in order to "push the Marshall Plan over the goal line by highlighting both ruthless Soviet expansionism and growing European vulnerability." The communist takeover in Czechoslovakia, and the prospect of a victory by the Communist Party in the upcoming Italian elections helped to garner support for the ERP within the Republican Party. To be sure, there were concerns regarding the possibility that foreign aid may have "drained off" domestic markets, and that this foreign aid would result in American businesses being subject to competition with foreign concerns On June 13, 1947, Senator Vanderberg wrote that the countries in receipt of foreign aid should not regard this policy instrument as a "substitute" for "helping themselves." Senator Vanderberg regarded these actions in terms of "reciprocal benefits" to be accrued from engaging in foreign intervention.[66] Vandenberg stated that the efforts to help Europe "should not invite anxieties that [the United States] shall rush into

---

63. M. Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 56.

64. J. Patterson, *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).

65. L. Haas, *Harry and Arthur—Truman, Vandenberg, and the Partnership that Created the Free World* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 216.

66. A. Vanderberg, *Private Papers of Senator Vanderberg* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 375–76.

imprudent and inadequately seasoned plans." The economic intervention exercised in Western Europe was calibrated in order to help with the reconstitution of their economies, albeit in the context of the furtherance of vital US geostrategic interests. In May 1947, the Department of State highlighted the need to "shore up confidence" in finding a solution to the problem of Western Europe's reconstruction. The Department of State also indicated that the aid granted to Europe had not been sufficient to wean the continent off American help. One of the Policy Planning Staff papers, produced in August 1947, underlined that the critical economic situation developing in countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Italy would entail a reduction in imports.[67] This would have been conducive to the advent of another economic depression or further redistribution of surplus at home.

From this standpoint, it is possible to argue that the economic rehabilitation of Germany and Western Europe had a distinct geopolitical component: namely, preventing the emergence of a "third bloc" capable of exercising political and economic autarky. In the latter stages of World War II, the Department of State outlined the view that "the greatest danger confronting the occupying powers is the emergence of a Germany able and ready to play off these powers against each other."[68] In this context, the US task was to "convince France that the United States has a permanent security interest in Europe and that it will support this interest by long-term commitments." In regard to the United Kingdom, the Department of State highlighted that "the evolving world balance has Washington and Moscow as its poles and accordingly the United Kingdom can no longer pursue an independent course on the continent. Instead, it must in the long run base its security upon the United States."[69] Questions of economic rehabilitation were tied to the establishment of a geopolitical settlement favorable to the United States. It was argued that the economic recovery of Europe "could not be separated from the recovery of the Western zones of Germany."[70] There was a strand of opinion that held that preventing "Germany from starting a third world war in the next generation" was not necessarily linked to full economic restoration.[71] However, the political realities of the Cold War changed that perception. The ERP was linked to the strand of thinking that held that "the economic well-being of the rest of the world require[d] the revival of production in

67. A. Nelson, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers*, vol. 1 (New York: Garland, 1983), 1–73.

68. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5—E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5-The Permanent Objectives of American Policy Toward Germany.

69. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5—E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5-The immediate goals of Germany policy.

70. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5—E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5-Draft of Proposed Statement by General Clay.

71. General Records of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury-Records of the Assistant Secretary-Monetary and Intl Affairs-Chronological File of HD White November 1934-April 1946 56 450 60 31 7 BOX 12 ENTRY 360P—Memorandum: Long Range Program for Germany, January 19, 1945.

Germany."[72] By 1947, the Truman administration was concerned about, "the prolonged delay in adjusting the German economy to production for peaceful purposes."[73] In August 1947, the Department of State indicated that the basic objective of the ERP was to make sure that the Western European economies would be able to operate without, "abnormal outside support, taking full account of basic changes in European conditions such as political developments in Eastern Europe."[74] The delicate political and economic situation in Western Europe prompted the American government into action. The ERP was implemented as a result of the personal endeavors of George Marshall, the US secretary of state, who took the initiative to put together the financial aid package directed at rehabilitating the economies of Western Europe. Marshall described in his memoirs the manner in which he proceeded to implement the aid package:

> [T]here were only three or four people that were aware of what I was going to do—I think, two, possibly three in the State Department, and the president. No one else, because I knew if it got out and got into a debate in Congress beforehand, we would never make the move.[75]

In any case, Marshall had an assiduous relationship with the US Congress, as seen in the strategy meetings that he held with Senator Vanderberg. Marshall gave testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reassuring the congressional leadership that Europeans would not "use their recovery to injure American business interests," and that the Senate "would be frequently consulted in the day-to-day operations of the program."[76] Marshall told the House of Representatives that the situation Western Europe faced required immediate action, adding that, "left to their own resources there will be [...] no escape [...] from economic distress so intense, social discontents so violent, political confusion so widespread, and hope of the future so shattered that the historic base of Western civilization [...] will take a new form in the image of the tyranny we fought to destroy Germany."[77] The United States experienced difficulties in convincing its Western European partners about the need to endorse the ERP. The British government, led by Clement Attlee, had difficulties in gathering the support of the left-wing elements within the Labour Party, which thought that the British government was being "slavishly pro-American."[78] The political expediencies that emerged in the European political setting by 1947 created an environment that was propitious for the adoption of

---

72. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5 E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5-U.S. Objectives and Achievement in Germany-Economics-Rough Draft.
73. US Department of State—Certain Aspects of the European Recovery Problem from the United States Standpoint, July 1947, Clifford Papers, Subject File, European Recovery Program.
74. Summary of State Department's Position of European Recovery Plan, August 26, 1947, Clifford Papers, Subject File. European Recovery Program.
75. G. Marshall (with Forrest Pogue) *Interviews and Reminiscences* (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991), 559.
76. D. Unger and I. Unger, *George Marshall—A Biography* (New York: Harper Collins, 2014), 410.
77. D. Unger and I. Unger, *George Marshall—A Biography* (New York: Harper Collins, 2014), 411.
78. M. Jago, *Clement Attlee—The Inevitable Prime Minister* (London: Biteback, 2014), 276.

the ERP. The reluctance of the Soviet Union to allow its satellite countries to join the ERP constituted a significant milestone in the division of Europe into two spheres of influence. The split between the Western European countries and the Soviet Union was not unavoidable. Georges Bidault stated that at the Paris Conference of 1947, when the European nations met to discuss the practical implications of the ERP, France worked to establish the basis for continental unity:

> I suggested that all of Europe—allied, neutral, and ex-enemy countries—should participate in the Marshall plan […] Molotov obstinately refused everything. He rejected any programme covering the whole of Europe because, he said, such a programme would undermine the sovereignty of each individual nation. I took infinite pains to settle our differences, to propose clauses that would reassure everyone, to discard all plans that might have compromised the sovereignty of any nation; but Molotov continued to repeat the same objections.[79]

The Soviet refusal to allow the Eastern European countries to join the ERP constituted a significant milestone in the process of configuring the general settlement that would guide transatlantic relations in the postwar era. The ERP became an important instrument in the creation of an integrated market and a prosperous and stable Western European community, secure against the dangers of communist subversion. In a letter addressed to Eleanor Roosevelt on March 16, 1948, Truman stated that the "European Recovery Program and the proper strengthening of [the] military setup [were] the only hope […] for peace in world."[80] Under the framework of the ERP, the revival of Germany was undertaken within the context of an overall rehabilitation and integration of the Western European economies. Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson pointed out in a speech made in Cleveland, Mississippi, on May 8, 1947, that, "European recovery [could not] be complete until the various parts of Europe's economy are working together in a harmonious whole. And the achievement of a coordinated European economy remains a fundamental objective of our foreign policy."[81] This statement denotes that the primary aim of the United States was to establish the mechanisms needed for the purposes of generating a workable geopolitical settlement in Western Europe. The implementation of the ERP attests to the importance of the element of great-power management in the propagation of a durable political settlement. The Department of State realized that the position of weakness of the German economy was leading to "economic misery" in Western Europe, a situation that ultimately resulted in the strengthening of communist parties across that region.[82] The political realities of the aftermath of the Cold War

79. G. Bidault, *Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault*, trans. M. Sinclair (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967), 150–51.

80. R. Ferrell (ed.), *Off the Record—The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1980), 126.

81. D. Acheson (1947) "The Requirements of Reconstruction," speech delivered in Cleveland, Mississippi, May 8—www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/8-8.pdf#zoom=100

82. D. Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), 241–44.

prompted the United States into decisive action in order to reverse the chaotic situation that existed in Western Europe. On June 5, 1947, Marshall explained the dire economic situation that affected the economies of the continent and the political repercussions attached to it:

> Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products (principally from America) are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character. The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and Europe as a whole.[83]

There seemed to be a great deal of consensus among the Western powers regarding the need to implement the mechanisms required to initiate the economic rehabilitation of Germany and Europe. Lord Strang, the British permanent undersecretary of state for the UK, US and French zones of occupation in Germany from 1947 to 1949, illustrated in a clear manner the dire economic situation that affected the Western zones of occupation, highlighting that, "unless the coalfields could run into adequate production and unless substantial imports of grain could be made available, there was likely to be widespread malnutrition and something near starvation in many places."[84] Marshall hinted at the necessity of establishing an economic grouping in Western Europe, underlining that any plans geared toward placing "Europe on its feet" could not be undertaken unilaterally. The process of implementation of the ERP indicated that the United States was willing to exercise great power management in order to bring about a general geopolitical settlement in Europe. The rhetorical context that informed the application of the ERP also contributed to engender the bipolar system that operated in Europe for the duration of the Cold War. The actions of the United States promoted "a diffusion of power" that facilitated the emergence of a geopolitical realm in Western Europe, one that enjoyed a great deal of internal freedom in order to establish programs of social rehabilitation.[85] The ERP created the conditions for the geopolitical split of the European continent. Alluding to the Soviet Union, Marshall warned that any government that would attempt to block the process of economic recovery of other countries could not expect to receive help from the United States.[86] The early postwar international order should be viewed as a latent "tripolar system." This is because there was a pervasive belief among US policy makers that "Germany represented a potential third power whose defection or allegiance would determine

---

83. Press Release issued by the Department of State, June 4, 1947—FRUS, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 238.
84. L. Strang, *Home and Abroad* (London: André Deutsch, 1956), 231–32.
85. J. Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics* (London: Routledge, 2003), 80.
86. Press Release issued by the Department of State, June 4, 1947—FRUS, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 239.

the overall balance of power." Moreover, the American political establishment held the view that "a united Western Europe could eventually emerge as a third center of geopolitical power."[87] By correlating the "grand-design" thinking to the economic recovery of Western Europe the ERP became an influential tool for enforcing a bipolar outcome in Germany and Europe. This is what transpires from a statement delivered by George Marshall in January 1947:

> [T]he United States put into effect certain measures susceptible of immediate application. These concerned Germany, where we have major responsibilities as an occupying power. It was apparent that there was no immediate prospect of a German peace treaty nor any like-lihood that the Soviet Union would cooperate in establishing a balanced economy for all of Germany as provided in the Potsdam Agreement. Therefore, we had to take what steps we could to enable the Germans to pull their own weight in Europe and at an early date to ter-minate reliance upon Britain and the United States for the essentials of existence now lacking in western Germany.[88]

The United States provided its Western European allies with a lot of room for inde-pendent action. Indeed, the whole purpose of the ERP was to allow those nations to develop the mechanisms that were necessary for the purposes of rehabilitating their economies within a social democratic orientation. The flexibility shown by the United States demonstrates the "self-correcting" nature of hierarchical orders. The United States calibrated its actions according to the way in which the nascent international order evolved.[89] The functionalist approach undertaken in the implementation of the ERP was geared toward institutionalizing the international order by providing the mechanisms for the resolution of problems of common concern—at least as it applied to the incipient transatlantic community of interests.[90] The functionalities attached to the ERP enabled Washington to put together a series of measures aimed at creating a general settlement beneficial to the interests of the United States and its Western European allies. The boundaries of institutionalism imposed by the United States ensured that the general settlement that emerged in Western Europe would be intimately linked to the enforce-ment of US geostrategic interests. Furthermore, the ERP represented a heuristic tool that facilitated the emergence of an institutionalist framework capable of ensuring that the sovereignty of the Western European nations would be subsumed by the parameters of great-power management imposed by the United States in its sphere of influence.[91]

---

87. J. MacAllister, *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 11.

88. Marshall speech to the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, January 15, 1948—marshallfoundation. org/library/6-167-speech-to-the-pittsburgh-chamber-of-commerce-january-15-1948.

89. S. Cohen, *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 56.

90. A. Lecours (ed.), *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).

91. See N. Rengger, *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond International Relations Theory?* (London: Routledge, 1999).

5.5 Intervention as an Instrument for the Establishment of a Collective Identity in the Postwar Era

The element of intervention applied by the United States in Western Europe was influential in the creation of an Atlanticist collective identity. This identity was entrenched by the process of bloc formation that took place in Western Europe. This process required the recalibration of the political and economic tenets of the main Western European nations. There was a gradual realization by the Western European nations that the devastation that had taken place on the continent constituted an opportunity to reformulate their political, social and economic tenets. In 1948, Italian Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi stated that the challenge of the Italian government "was to educate people to [the] necessities of engaging their future with [the] Western powers as there was a very strong effort being made by communists and philo-communist elements to combat such a policy."[92] Trachtenberg emphasizes the importance of looking at policy issues in the context of the historical circumstances that engender them.[93] The political expediencies of the postwar period were crucial for the purposes of creating a common collective identity between the United States and Western Europe. The Cold War created an intense level of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, which has to be understood from the "perspective of 'culture' as well as of 'power.'"[94] French politicians also understood that the political expediencies of the early Cold War period were conducive to the forging of a strong alliance with the United States. De Gaulle was aware that France could not recover its old standing in international affairs. He also told Churchill that the position of the United Kingdom was going to be diminished as a result of its own loses and expenditures, impending decolonization and the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers.[95] For the Western European nations, the only way to avoid a slide into geopolitical irrelevance was to bandwagon into a system of collective security with the United States.

This collective identity presupposed the establishment of a common oppositional stance against the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership responded in an antagonistic manner to the formation of common economic and geopolitical instruments in Western Europe at the behest of the United States. The Soviet press criticized the ERP, stating that "Marshall proposes or rather demands quick formation of notorious western bloc but under unconditional and absolute leadership of American imperialism." The Soviet leadership stated that the formation of this bloc entailed a "plan for stifling democratic progressive forces and conversion of all Europe into colony of dollar empire."[96] Stalin

---

92. The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Secretary of State, Rome, September 15, 1948—FRUS, Western Europe (1948), 252.
93. M. Trachtenberg, *The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), x.
94. D. Reynolds, *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
95. C. De Gaulle, *Mémoirs de Guerre et Mémoirs d'Espoir* (Paris: Plon, 1970), 452.
96. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 26, 1947, FRUS, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 294.

emphasized that the "real aim of the Marshall Plan and the Paris Conference [was] to create a western bloc and isolate the Soviet Union with loans [that] would not be given without decisive limitations of the political and economic independence of the recipients."[97] The Soviet political establishment saw in the formation of a Western Bloc an antagonistic grouping of nations that was ready to forget the act of aggression undertaken by Nazi Germany. The Soviet leadership saw the London Conference of 1948 as an event in which "representatives of only a small group of states were included […] while a majority of the states which suffered most from German aggression were left outside this conference, [testifying] to the fact that the London conference was pursuing the goal of a narrow group of creators of the Western bloc, which is placed vis-à-vis all the rest of the states of Europe."[98] The hostile attitude exhibited by the Soviet Union was a powerful factor in the decision of the Western European nations to integrate their economic and political resources. At the same time, the configuration of a collective identity that would involve both the United States and Western Europe necessitated the elimination of the internal balance of power that existed in Western Europe since the Peace of Westphalia. An aspect of paramount importance was the elimination of potential hostilities between Germany and its neighbors. Bidault hinted that France would need reassurances in order to agree to the inclusion of Germany in the emerging Western Bloc.[99] In this context, the securitization of the Western European political space, thanks to the formation of the Western Union and NATO, provided solid mechanisms to both avert a recurrence of nationalist tendencies and to effect the restoration of an internal balance of power.

Most importantly, the notion of a collective identity was inexorably tied to the possibility of sharing the industrial resources of Western Europe. During the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers of April 1947, France clinched a deal with the United Kingdom and the United States in order to procure an increased amount of coal. The tripartite agreements signed in London on August 28, 1947, and in Berlin from December 1947 to January 1948, ensured the integration of the coal-production region of the Saar to France and a regular supply of coke for the rehabilitation of the French steel industry. Furthermore, the Accord of the Six in December 1948 created the International Authority of the Ruhr, in charge of the distribution of coal, coke and steel.[100] This is an important aspect of the process of bloc formation. The pooling of economic resources in Western Europe was a pivotal facet in the establishment of

---

97. The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Prague, July 10, 1947, FRUS, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 319.
98. The Soviet Ambassador (Panyushkin) to the Secretary of State, Washington, March 6, 1948, FRUS, Germany and Austria (1948), 354.
99. Summary of the conversation between Foreign Minister Bidault and members of the Senate Appropriation Committee and the of the Revercomb Sub-Committee, October 1947, FRUS, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 790.
100. R. Poidevin, La France et le Charbon allemande au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale, *Relations Internationales*, no. 44, Hiver (1985), 371–74.

a collective identity among the main industrial nations, since it eliminated the possi-
bility of overt competition. On June 28, 1948, on the eve of currency reform in the
Western-occupied zones, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, insisted on the
rehabilitation of Germany and its potential contribution to the process of reconstitu-
tion of the European economy, calling for the establishment of "a responsible German
government to be established as soon as possible," preferring a united Germany but
open to the possibility of forging ahead with the Western zones of occupation as the
main unit of reference.[101] On July 14, 1948, the United States and the US- and British-
occupied sections of Germany signed an economic cooperation agreement, consistent
with the Convention for European Economic Co-operation signed at Paris on April
16, 1948. The aims of the agreement were to achieve a "joint recovery program […]
in Europe." Most importantly, there was an emphasis on the necessity of bloc forma-
tion, underpinned by the "cooperation with other participating countries in facilitating
and stimulating an increasing interchange of goods and services."[102] The geopolit-
ical stance involved in the configuration of a collective identity had a functionalist
approach that can be "associated with the explanation and justification of an elite-
led process of international integration between states" as well as the reconciliation
between "technological change with political authority."[103] After the war, Churchill
indicated that "world organization" was to be strengthened on the basis of the "natural
groupings" that had emerged in the Western Hemisphere and in the Commonwealth
of Nations as well as in the formation of a sound partnership between France and
Germany. This would lead, according to Churchill, to the "recreation of the European
family" and the entrenchment of world peace.[104] The process of bloc formation was
undertaken with the view of establishing a collective identity rooted in Atlanticist and
European values. This collective identity would ensure that the geopolitical interests of
the United States in the postwar scenario would be pursued by making reference to the
community of interests that was established between the United States and Western
Europe. The geopolitical settlement that came about as a result of the formation of
a collective identity created a "neat hierarchy of spatial levels," which allowed the
United States to maintain a hegemonic stance in matters that were vital to the accom-
plishment of its geostrategic aims while allowing the Western European nations to
establish their own policies in societal matters.

---

101. Bevin speech at the House of Common, June 30, 1948—HC Deb 30 June 1948 vol. 452 cc2213-
      49—hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1948/jun/30/germany#S5CV0452P0_
      19480630_HOC_308
102. Economic Co-Operation Agreement between the United States and the US and British
      Occupied Areas in Germany, July 14, 1948—https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/
      bevans/b-de-ust000008-0262.pdf
103. L. Ashworth and D. Long (eds.), *New Perspectives on International Functionalism* (Basingstoke and
      New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 24.
104. R. Churchill (ed.), *The Sinews of Peace—Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill*, Speech at
      Zurich University, September 19, 1946 (London: Cassel, 1948), 200–201.

5.6 Conclusion

The hierarchical ordering that emerged in the postwar international order had a distinct functionalist perspective that contributed to enhancing the spectrum of institutionalization. Washington capitalized on the difficult economic conditions that affected Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II in order to implement its vital geostrategic objectives in the postwar scenario. The reduction of the spectrum of collegiality enabled the United States to apply a broad design for the management of the international order. The reduction of the scope of sovereignty of the Western European powers constituted a functionalist mechanism that ensured their compliance with the grand design outlined by the United States. The hierarchical ordering established by the United States in relation to Western Europe was aimed at preventing a situation in which the power vacuum generated by the defeat of the Axis nations would lead to the rise of an autarkic compact in Western Europe. This hierarchical ordering was also crucial in averting a possible overrunning of the continent by the Soviet Union.[105] The social and political upheavals that took place in Europe during World War II were responsible for the deinstitutionalization of the international order. The recalibration of the German economic process undertaken by the United States followed a functionalist rationale. The alignment of the vital geostrategic interests of the United States with the reconstruction of the German economy transformed the whole complexion of the postwar international order. This is because the economic intervention exercised by the United States was based on the premise of ensuring that the prosperity of a future German entity would be shared with other Western European nations.[106] This policy would eliminate the possibility of disruption in the postwar international order. This state of affairs was facilitated by the fact that Washington shunned a punitive approach in regard to the treatment of the German Question. The functionalist approach undertaken by the United States in relation to the sphere of economic intervention had as its main objective the reinstitutionalization of the international order, ensuring that the institutional mechanisms put in place would be compatible with the geostrategic interests of the United States. The ERP was an instrument that enabled the United States to implement a series of measures directed at establishing a European political settlement favorable to its geostrategic interests. The application of the ERP was undertaken according to a functionalist approach, as it provided an instrument needed to resolve common problems. The process of institutionalization propagated by the United States was based on the premise of ensuring that the general political settlement that emerged in Germany and Europe would facilitate the achievement of U.S. geostrategic objectives.[107] The integrative economic scheme

---

105. C. Kennedy-Pipe, *The Origins of the Cold War* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).

106. M. Leffler and D. Painter (eds.), *Origins of the Cold War: An International History* (London: Routledge, 2005); A. Baker *Constructing a Post-War Order: The Rise of US Hegemony and the Origins of the Cold War* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2016).

107. See V. Lowndes and M. Roberts, *Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

introduced through the element of the ERP prompted a situation in which the recon-
stitution of the economies of Western Europe would be informed by a reduction in the
scope of national sovereignty.[108] The process of bloc formation was entrenched through
the establishment of a collective identity rooted in Atlanticist values, which would ensure
that the geostrategic interests of the United States in the postwar scenario would be
pursued in reference to the need to preserve the economic prosperity and territorial
integrity of Western Europe.[109]

---

108. See G. Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).
109. See J. Pierre, G. Peters and G. Stoker (eds.), *Debating Institutionalism* (Manchester: Manchester
      University Press, 2013).

Chapter Six

THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE SCHEME OF INTERVENTION EXERCISED BY THE UNITED STATES IN WESTERN EUROPE

6.1 Introduction

Ideology was a crucial instrument in the deployment of American geopolitical power in the aftermath of World War II. There are a number of themes that emerge from the examination of the ideological input that guided US foreign policy in the early Cold War period. To begin with, *political ideas such as liberalism, occidentalism and American exceptionalism became important instruments of institutionalization.* These ideological principles were of paramount importance in the delineation of the geostrategic orientation of the United States in the postwar era. Ideology serves to map "social ideas" according to the discovery of specific "universal operations of the mind."[1] The identification of the ideological elements that guided US foreign policy facilitates an understanding of the geopolitical motivations behind the interventionist attitude adopted by the United States. It has been argued that "ideology, and what it tells you about yourself and your neighbors, plays a very large role […] in how countries behave toward each other."[2] The ideological input that informed the geopolitical stance of the United States dictated the scheme of foreign policy that would allow Washington to accomplish a specific set of objectives.

The second theme to be analyzed is *the influence of the policy of containment on the institutionalization of the Cold War international order.* The foreign policy framework deployed by the United States in the postwar era was inspired by the need to arrest the development of communist tendencies within the American sphere of influence. The policy of containment, as originally articulated, did not involve the deployment of elements of hard power in order to eliminate the communist governments in the Soviet sphere of influence. The concept of containment was geared toward attaining a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union, which would allow the United States to entrench the capitalist economic system and the democratic system of government within its own sphere of influence. The policy of containment was an ideological tool that reinforced "commitments to existing norms" among the countries that became part of the US sphere of influence.[3] The policy

---

1. T. Eagleton (ed.), *Ideology* (London and New York: Longman, 1994), 1.
2. H. Malik (ed.), *The Roles of the United States, Russia and China in the New World* Order (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), 31.
3. M. Brinton and M. Nee, *The New Institutionalism in Sociology* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 115.

of containment contributed to institutionalizing the postwar system by projecting into the wider world certain images and narratives that were part of American social life.[4] These were elements that legitimized the use of geopolitical power on the part of the United States. The policy of containment institutionalized the Cold War international order by demarcating the boundaries that would apply to the deployment of power by the United States. A third theme that emerges from the examination of the role of ideology in the scheme of intervention exercised by the United States is *the manner in which the Truman Doctrine served as an instrument to halt revisionist political tendencies in areas of vital geostrategic importance for the United States*. The Truman Doctrine made visible the rational orientation that is attached to the use of ideology when it comes to the delineation of a specific geopolitical course of action.[5] This doctrine, which came about as a result of the need to defend Greece and Turkey from communist infiltration, furnished the nascent international order with an important element of institutionalization, as it enabled the United States to check the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union in the European continent and beyond.

6.2 Liberalism, Occidentalism and American Exceptionalism and the Deployment of US Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of World War II

The recalibration of the concept of American exceptionalism according to a liberal and occidentalist orientation was aimed at implementing the grand scheme of US foreign policy in an effective manner in the aftermath of World War II.[6] The configuration of American exceptionalism that guided US foreign policy was informed by the projection of liberal values such as democracy, free market economics and the rule of law in Western Europe. These ideological elements facilitated the institutionalization of the postwar international order. To begin with, there was a dissemination of liberal principles that contributed to the articulation of a collective identity among the members of the American sphere of influence. The internationalist stance undertaken by the United States since the 1940s entailed that the exceptionalist tenets that informed American life had to be reorganized according to a liberal criterion. With regard to Germany, there was a will to avoid employing the tactics used by the Allies after victory in World War I—tactics that discredited "all attempts to promote liberalism and international cooperation."[7] The liberal orientation of the "grand scheme" of US foreign policy was propounded by organizations that embraced the internationalist thinking expounded by the Democratic Party during the 1930s and 1940s. Liberal organizations

---

4. H. Wiarda (ed.), *Grand Theories and Ideologies in the Social Sciences* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 119.
5. S. Orvis and C. Drogus, *Introducing Comparative Politics: Concepts and Cases in Context* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011), 22.
6. R. Meyer, K. Sahlin and M. Ventresca, *Institutions and Ideology* (Bradford: Emerald Group, 2009), 6.
7. Memorandum by the Committee on Post-War Programs, Washington, August 5, 1944, The Treatment of Germany—FRUS, Conference at Quebec, 1944 (1944), 57.

such as Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) advanced the cause of progressivism by working for the "achievement of freedom and economic security for all people everywhere, through education and democratic political action."[8] The liberal orientation of US foreign policy had an important economic component. Entry into World War II had increased the productive capacity of American industry, creating a tightly woven connection between business and the political establishment.[9] The main aim of the liberal camp was to create an environment of opinion opposed to leftist radicalism and to the isolationist thinking that prevailed within the Republican Party. The liberal principles that inspired the deployment of US geopolitical intervention were useful for attaining a workable relationship with the Western European countries after World War II. The liberal principles that guided the framework of intervention were meant to create a wider spectrum of political and economic freedom for Western Europe, whose social life had been deleteriously affected by the legacy of Fascist and Nazi rule.

Furthermore, the United States instigated efforts in order to propel the process of decolonization.[10] In November 1942, the Department of State issued the US Draft of a Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence, which outlined the agenda for decolonization. The United States envisaged that any nation in possession of colonies should "give its colonial peoples protection, encouragement, moral support and material aid and . . . make continuous efforts toward their political, economic, social, and educational advancement."[11] The expansion of liberal ideas became a mechanism that enabled the propagation of America's geostrategic interests in the postwar era. The reference to liberal values was crucial for the purposes of eradicating the autarkic economic tendencies that had existed in Western Europe in the interwar period. Moreover, the propagation of liberal principles was used to expand the commercial opportunities of the United States by ridding the system of the imperial networks that hindered free trade. The United States recalibrated its exceptionalist stance by adopting a multilateralist approach. One of the ways in which this manifested in the economic realm was by highlighting the "general effectiveness of the multilateral method of reducing tariffs compared with the bilateral method."[12] The United States manifested its interest in international economic collaboration for the expansion of world trade. The liberalization of trade was a caveat imposed on the United Kingdom, which was experiencing a "dollar shortage," in order to extend financial aid.[13] The United States was aware of the need

---

8. C. Brock, *Americans for Democratic Action—Its Role in National Politics* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs, 1962), 17 and 45.

9. See R. Latham, *The Liberal Moment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

10. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State, London, January 17, 1949, FRUS, 1949. Western Europe, 526.

11. U.S. Draft of a Declaration by the United Nations on National Independence, March 9, 1943—FRUS, 1943, General (1943), 748.

12. The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman), Washington, December 2, 1943—FRUS, General (1943), 1119.

13. The British Chargé (Balfour) to the Secretary of State, Washington, July 29, 1947—FRUS General; The United Nations (1947), 968.

to grant tariff concessions to the countries in the industrial perimeter of the world. The establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1948 paved the way for a more liberalized commercial environment.[14] The liberal orientation that informed the US foreign policy apparatus incorporated the possibility of espousing a social element in the administration of the economic process. This was an aspect of paramount importance in the management of relations with Western Europe, which emerged from World War II with the will to recalibrate capitalism in order to establish a more equitable social compact. In France, for instance, there was a lively debate regarding whether the economy should have a free market or *dirigiste* orientation.[15] There was a realization that the vibrancy of the democratic system of government depended not only on sound economic and social conditions but also on the effective design of political institutions.[16] Nevertheless, there were also some apprehensions regarding the turn to the left that affected the Western European political spectrum after the end of the war, especially in the context of the victory of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom in 1945.[17]

The propagation of free-trade practices and the democratic system of government within America's sphere of influence had significant repercussions for the domestic environment. The confrontation that began to unfold between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the creation of a social and cultural environment that was clearly informed by the dichotomies attached to the enemy-friend narrative. As such, the ideologies that challenged the liberal and internationalist values propounded by the US government were eradicated from the political spectrum. This is eloquently manifested in the actions that unfolded during the "Second Red Scare" and the rise of anti-communist rhetoric in the United States during the 1950s.[18] The American political establishment acknowledged the need to employ an internationalist stance centered around possible military and political intervention in the areas of the world that were threatened by communist insurgencies. During World War II, an important anti-communist ideological strand of thinking remained vociferously opposed to the Soviet Union and communist ideology, holding the view that the ultimate aim of Communism was world domination. This ideological strand also regarded the principles of the New Deal as fundamentally opposed to the American political personality. In the aftermath of World War II, this segment of opinion emerged as the leading force in the propagation of the "Red Scare"

---

14. The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Trade Agreements (Brosn) to President Truman, Washington, April 2, 1947—FRUS, General; The United Nations (1947), 913.

15. The Second Secretary of Embassy in France (MacArthur) to the Associate Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Wallner), Paris, October 10, 1947—FRUS, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 768.

16. J. March and J. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review*, 78, 3 (1983), 738.

17. D. McLellan and D. Acheson (eds.), *Among Friends—Personal Letters of Dean Acheson* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1980), Letter to Mary A. Bundy, 30/7/1945, 61.

18. See R. Cohn, *Only a Miracle Can Save America from the Red Conspiracy* (New York: Wanderer Print, 1954); J. E. Hoover, *Masters of Deceit—The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It* (New York: Pocket Books, 1959).

that engulfed the United States.[19] The rationale for intervention was guided by the willingness to expand free trade and the democratic system of government in the wider world. Nevertheless, these aims were a second-order consideration to the need to maximize the US national interest by carving out a dominant position in world affairs. There were significant tensions between the most acerbic critics of Communism (who espoused a notion of exceptionalism that was more akin to the libertarian ideal) and the American political leadership. The Roosevelt and Truman administrations regarded the expansion of government-sponsored intervention in the US sphere of influence and the acceptance of the ideological variations that existed in Western Europe as a necessary compromise for securing the hegemonic position of the United States.

The process of institutionalization that took place in the postwar international order also had a distinct occidentalist overtone, aimed at giving conceptual force to the policies needed to secure the position of the United States as a superpower. The idea of protecting "Western civilization" became a "rhetorical commonplace" that justified the deployment of certain policy choices on the part of the United States; namely, the political and economic intervention of the United States in Western European affairs through the instruments of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the ERP.[20] The US political leadership understood that the American way of life could not be exported in its entirety to all areas of the world that were part of the US sphere of influence. The commitment to an occidentalist course of action in the realm of foreign policy entailed the acceptance of military dictatorships in Southern Europe and the Western Hemisphere in order to arrest the expansion of Communism. Occidentalism also meant the acceptance of mixed economies in Western Europe. These countries were tied to the United States in a free-market environment but with very high levels of government intervention in the economic process. The intervention exercised in Western Europe had a decided occidentalist aspect that informed the efforts to protect the continent from Soviet penetration and to contribute to its economic reconstruction. The configuration of the Western Bloc was geared toward advancing "the spiritual consolidation of Western civilization."[21] Political intervention was directed at establishing a geopolitical foothold in the Eurasian continent, hence enabling the United States to deploy its power in the wider world in an effective manner. In this context, the idea of sponsoring European unity became an aspect of paramount importance for the purposes of entrenching the US geostrategic position. The American Committee on United Europe was an instrument that helped the United States to accomplish this objective in the postwar scenario. The process of European integration was fostered by the European Movement, sponsored by the United States, which consisted of a "group of organizations urging rapid unification in Europe, focusing their efforts upon the Council of Europe and counting Winston

19. G. Sirgiovanni, *An Undercurrent of Suspicion—Anti-Communism in America during World War Two* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction, 1990), 193–95.
20. P. T. Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy—German Reconstruction and the Intervention of the West* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 241.
21. The Chargé in London (Gallman) to the Secretary of State, London, December 22, 1947—FRUS, 1948. Western Europe (1948), 1.

Churchill, Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer, Léon Blum and Alcide de Gasperi as its five" honorary presidents.[22] The occidentalist approach undertaken by the US foreign policy apparatus ended the internal balance of power in Western Europe, eliminating the frictions that hindered the smooth unfoldment of interstate relations in the continent. The United States offered a dispassionate view regarding matters of economic integration that was based on a functionalist approach to the institutionalization of the postwar international order. This is what transpires from a speech given in 1953 by George C. Marshall (US Secretary of State between 1947 and 1949), in which he stated that "[w]hile we are not in close contact with the details of [European] problems, neither are we indifferent to them, and we are not involved in [Europe's] historical tensions and suspicion."[23] The actions of the United States after the end of World War II created an occidentalist rhetorical place propped up by the need to prevent a frontal attack against "Western civilization" on the part of the Soviet Union. The implementation of the Truman Doctrine had an important occidentalist component, underpinned by the idea that saving Greece from the communist threat entailed saving "Western civilization."[24] Occidentalism represented an ideological stance that was meant to demarcate the cultural specificity of the Western world vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and communist ideology in general. Western European leaders such as Georges Bidault pointed out to the American political leadership that the local communist parties intended "to eradicate Western civilization."[25] Alcide De Gasperi, the prime minister of Italy, also highlighted the importance of ensuring an assiduous rapport with the United States in order to secure the stability of Western civilization.[26] As the threat of communist ideology in Western Europe increased, there was a growing acceptance of the need to set the foundations for the institutionalization of the Western Bloc.

The occidentalist overtone that informed the deployment of US foreign policy in the postwar scenario was influenced by the exceptionalist ideology that is part and parcel of the American political personality. According to Myrdal, the central concept that underpins the idea of the exceptionalism of the United States is "the essential dignity of

---

22. R. Aldrich, "OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948–60," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 8, 1 (1997), 184. Interestingly enough, towards the end of the 1950s, the Department of State expressed some concerns about the viability of extending the framework of integration beyond the original six members of the Common Market (West Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg), as it was thought that it would "put a halt to progress toward real European integration." Memorandum of Conversation—European Integration—September 29, 1959—FRUS, 1958–1960. Western European integration and security, Canada (1958–1960), 150.

23. George C. Marshall, Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1953—www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1953/marshall-lecture.html

24. The Chargé in Greece (Keeley) to the Secretary of State, Athens, November 29, 1947—FRUS, 1947. The Near East and Africa (1947), 424–25.

25. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, Paris, January 28, 1947—FRUS, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 689.

26. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs (De Gasperi) to the Secretary of State, Rome August 22, 1945, FRUS, Europe (1945), 1025.

the individual human being, of the fundamental equality of all men, [and the] inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and [...] fair opportunity."[27] Lipset identifies five key principles at the core of the American Credo: "liberty, egalitarianism (of opportunity and respect, not result or condition), individualism, populism, and laissez-faire."[28] The legacy of the Puritan tradition contributed to entrenching the notion that the American people have a natural propensity to embrace the values of democracy and liberty. The expansion of the United States across the North American continent during the nineteenth century was legitimized by the idea of promoting democracy and economic self-sufficiency. According to the concept of the "Manifest Destiny," the United States represented the best hope for the future of mankind. The principles of equality of men and the guarantee of freedom of conscience, religion and association were powerful factors that motivated the United States to deploy its power in order to work for the progress of mankind.[29] The notion of American exceptionalism, applied to the sphere of foreign policy, has its most symbolic embodiment in the ideas put forward by President Woodrow Wilson at the Paris Conference in 1919. The emphasis on the freedom of the seas, the rule of international law and the democratic ideal had been powerful influencers in Wilson's decision to enter World War I. During the Paris Conference, Wilson put forward his "Fourteen Points," which were meant to underpin the consolidation of liberal democracy in Europe. Wilson worked for an international order that would rely on open diplomacy, a reduction of military forces, the territorial integrity of nations based on ethnic alignment and the equality of nations large and small before international law.[30]

In World War II, the United States undertook the fight against the Axis by making reference to the putative superiority of the moral values of the American nation. The United States was willing to mobilize its economic, political and human resources for the purpose of ridding the world of authoritarian ideology, particularly in Western Europe. American exceptionalism constitutes an important variable in the understanding of the motivations that guided the United States in the realm of foreign policy after World War II. The presence of extremist ideologies such as Communism and Nazism in the international order helped to galvanize America's will to propel its geopolitical power in the wider world. In the aftermath of the war, the American political personality was underscored by the existence of a system of government based on a "vital center," with a strong emphasis on the entrenchment of individual rights within the interventionist and community-oriented approach of Roosevelt's New Deal.[31] American exceptionalism created certain identities that would help to configure the international order in a manner that would facilitate the fulfillment of the geopolitical interests of the United States in the

27. G. Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (London: Transaction, 1995), 3.
28. S. Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 31.
29. J. O'Sullivan, "Manifest Destiny," 1839—www.civics-online.org/library/formatted/texts/manifest_destiny.html
30. President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, January 8, 1918: avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp
31. See A. Schlesinger, *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949).

postwar era. The effective deployment of an exceptionalist strategy in the US sphere of influence instituted an element of order backed up by the use of hard power. This state of affairs compelled the Soviet Union to finalize similar arrangements in its own sphere of influence. The exceptionalist stance espoused by the United States contributed to institutionalize the international order according to the bipolar balance-of-power system. The exceptionalist tendencies adopted by the United States were a significant factor in the transformation of the ideational composition of the international order. The victory of the Allies in World War II represented the triumph of the American worldview over Nazism and Fascism. The exceptionalist stance that propelled US foreign policy in the postwar era enabled Washington to exercise an effective management of the international order. The projection of America's exceptionalist values was influential in establishing the social norms that would regulate the US sphere of influence. American exception-alism contributed to ridding the US sphere of influence of revisionist tendencies and aligning the interests of the Western European nations with the geopolitical needs of the United States. The level of intervention exercised by the United States coincided with the evolution of the society of states toward the acceptance of a hierarchical ordering based on the geopolitical dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union.[32]

6.3 The Policy of Containment and the Institutionalization of the Postwar International Order

The liberal, occidentalist and exceptionalist ideological elements became significant influencers in the configuration of the policy of containment, designed to halt the poten-tial spread of the communist ideology in Western Europe and other areas of strategic concern for the United States. There is a strong ideological component that informed the implementation of the policy of containment. The hostile attitude undertaken by the United States (and the European nations) vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the 1930s was guided by the huge differences that existed between the two countries in political and economic terms. The Soviet Union had a highly authoritarian political system under the leadership of a brutal dictator. The country's economic system was diametrically opposed to that of the Western Allies. In the late 1920s, the Soviet Union embarked upon a process of industrialization that was aimed at providing the country with the sinews of war in case of a foreign attack. The Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany in 1939, sharing the spoils of defeated Poland and, to certain extent, facili-tating Germany's march into Western Europe in 1940. American policy makers identi-fied a pattern of aggressive behavior by the Soviet Union that led to the emergence of the policy of containment. The political realities that transpired in the postwar era prompted the United States to put in place mechanisms to contain the advance of Soviet power. In 1946, George Kennan, the head of the Policy Planning Staff at the Department of

---

32. A. Watson, *The Evolution of International Society—A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2002), 301.

State, wrote in his diary that the possibilities for the "relief of Soviet pressure" depended on two variables. To begin with, Kennan broached the possibility of "internal dissension which would temporarily weaken Soviet potential and lead to situation similar to that of 1919–30." Kennan also examined the possibility of the "gradual mellowing of Soviet policy under influence of calm resistance abroad."[33] Kennan had envisaged that the geopolitical power of the Soviet Union would wane over time. At the end of World War II, Kennan posited this theory in an essay entitled *Russia's International Position at the Close of the War with Germany*:

> [T]he Soviet Union's position […] was more likely in the long run to weaken it than to strengthen it. The reasons went back yet again to Gibbon, ancient Rome, and "the unnatural task of holding in submission distant peoples." The U.S.S.R. had taken over, or incorporated within its sphere of influence, territories that even the tsars had never controlled. The peoples affected would resent Russian rule. Successful revolts "might shake the entire structure of Soviet power."[34]

Nevertheless, American policy makers operated under the assumption that the Soviet leadership would again put the country on a war footing in the aftermath of World War II. In February 1946, Stalin announced the implementation of contingency plans regarding the realignment of the Soviet system of production. This state of affairs denotes the entrenchment of a hostile attitude toward the Western powers. The increase in industrial production was meant to provide the Soviet Union with the necessary capabilities in order to fight a war against any potential enemies.[35] Furthermore, there was a realization that the efforts propagated by the United States in order to attain a wider scheme of cooperation with the Soviet Union had been constantly rejected by Moscow.[36] The policy of containment was originally devised as a mechanism by which to attain a peaceful and orderly scheme of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Toward 1948, the policy of containment acquired a more aggressive stance. However, the aggressive overtone contained in NSC20/4 indicates that the efforts to contain Soviet power precluded the possibility of an all-out confrontation. The focus of attention was placed on bringing about some form of accommodation with the Soviet Union. NSC20/4 had attached to it a number of fundamental objectives, including the reduction of the "power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations" and a modification of the "conduct of international relations by the government in power in Russia,

---

33. G. Kennan, *The Kennan Diaries*, ed. F. Costigliola (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2014), 204.
34. J. L. Gaddis, *George Kennan—An American Life* (London: Penguin Books, 2011), 611 [EPUB].
35. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 12, 1946—FRUS Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), 694.
36. Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), Washington, May 27, 1948, FRUS Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 876–79.

to conform with the purposes and principles set forth in the UN Charter."[37] In spite of the willingness to attain a modicum of accommodation with the Soviet Union, American policy makers were aware of the negative implications of the potential expansion of Communism into the wider world. NSC/7 stated that the ultimate aim of the Soviet Union was to achieve "world domination." The report emphasized that the "defeat of the forces of Soviet-directed world Communism [was] vital to the security of the United States." The United States was therefore compelled to organize a "counter-offensive aimed at mobilizing and strengthening [America's] own and anti-communist forces in the non-Soviet world, and at undermining the strength of the communist forces in the Soviet Union."[38] Moreover, there was also a realization that the hegemonic drive of the United States would have to be based, at the very least, on maintaining a firm grip on Western Europe.[39] Immediately after the capitulation of Germany, De Gaulle expressed the view that the postwar international order would be characterized by the prevalence of "war." De Gaulle believed that the United States allowed the Soviet Union to get too deep into Western and Central Europe, creating a cleavage that would lead to the onset of geopolitical imbalances.[40] The very idea of containment had an important level of correlation with the concerns expressed by Western European leaders regarding the threat posed by communist ideology. American policy makers were concerned with the need to avoid an all-out confrontation with the Soviet Union. The implementation of a strategy geared toward averting the spread of Communism would involve the use of covert operations, "including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world."[41] A direct and overt confrontation with the Soviet Union would have led to the disruption of the nascent international order. In any case, there was a general context of suspicion that clouded the spectrum of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. US ambassador Walter Bedell Smith, stationed in Moscow between 1946 and 1949, concluded that in spite of the existence of a number of important tactical fluctuations, the main aim of Soviet foreign policy was the attainment of world domination. Smith argued that in order to avoid this situation

37. NSC20/4 November 23, 1948—U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security, United States national security policy: U.S. objectives and programs for national security; estimates of threats to the national security; military posture and foreign policy; organization for national security—FRUS, 1952–1954. National security affairs (in two parts) (1952–1954), 225.

38. A report to the national security council by the Executive Secretary (Souers), NSC 7, Washington, March 30, 1948, FRUS, 1948, General; the United Nations (in two parts) (1948), 546–48.

39. Summary of Discussion on Problems of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Europe, Washington, May 20, 1947—FRUS, 1947, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 235.

40. See J. R. Tournoux, *La Tragédie du General* (Paris: Plon, 1967).

41. National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects Source Washington, June 18, 1948. NSC 10/2—https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292

from happening, the United States had to ensure the vitality of the system of free enterprise in the Western world.[42]

Walter Lippmann made an interesting observation regarding the policy of containment, stating that the United States would experience some difficulties in regard to the need to contain the Soviet Union "on land."[43] This is one of the reasons why the policy of containment was characterized by the deployment of air and naval resources to the outlying areas of the world. The policy of containment identified Soviet foreign policy intentions as directed toward reducing the strength and influence of the capitalist powers. In addition to this, it was widely believed that Soviet foreign policy was aimed at "deepening and exploiting […] conflicts between capitalist powers." The policy of containment included the notion that if armed conflict was to take place between the United States and the Soviet Union, Moscow would make sure that war turned into "revolutionary upheavals within the various capitalist countries."[44] The first stage of the policy of containment formulated by Kennan had as its main purpose the restoration of the balance of power in the international order, left unstable by the demise of Germany and Japan, and by the Soviet encroachment across Eastern Europe. The Labour government in the United Kingdom acknowledged the necessity to maintain a sense of unity among the "Western Powers," specially toward 1948, when it became clear that the Soviet Union was willing to exploit any "concessions" given to it in order to maximize its geostrategic position.[45] Already in August 1945 the British government realized that there might be a need to maintain a "large number of troops in Germany" for the purposes of avoiding a communist takeover of that country.[46] The 1948–49 Berlin Blockade was an important catalyst for the purpose of maintaining a state of "vigilance" in Germany.[47] Kennan's "strongpoint defense" rationale entailed the strategic protection of five vital industrial areas of the world; namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, Western Europe, Germany and Japan. The Department of State held the view that the political circumstances generated by World War II were responsible for the upheavals that impacted Western Europe.[48] Priority was to be given to the economic instruments of containment, as opposed to permanent military build-ups. A great deal of emphasis was placed on propping up the economic conditions of Western Europe. Kennan held the view that since "world communism is like malignant parasite which

42. W. Bedell Smith, *Moscow Mission—1946–1949* (London: William Heinemann, 1950), 297–322.
43. W. Lippmann, *The Cold War—A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1947), 12.
44. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 22, 1946—FRUS, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), 69.
45. Cabinet Paper 61 (48) Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet on September 22, 1948.
46. Cabinet Paper 18 (45) Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet, August 7, 1945.
47. Cabinet Paper 49 (154) The Berlin Airlift—Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July 15, 1949.
48. The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), Washington, May 23, 1947 United States Department of State/Foreign relations of the United States, 1947. The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 224–25.

feeds only on diseased tissue" there was a need to establish policies that would "solve internal problems of our own society, to improve the self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people."[49] According to Kennan, the main objective of containment was to resist communist infiltration "in sufficiently strategic places." The ERP is a perfect example of the implementation of this strategy, which also entailed the configuration of independent and self-confident centers of power rather than spheres of influence subservient to Washington.[50]

The second stage of Kennan's strategy involved the fragmentation of the international communist movement. The diplomatic recognition given by the United States to Tito's Yugoslavia can be regarded as an eloquent example of this modality. Furthermore, NSC 48/2 aimed to exploit the looming rift between Mao's China and the Soviet Union in order to weaken the communist bloc.[51] The Department of State concluded that Soviet foreign policy responded to the intrinsic weaknesses of the communist system. The prevalence of authoritarian tendencies, the difficulties derived from the establishment of an autarkic economic system and the sudden acquisition of "hostile" foreign territories were cited as potential sources of trouble. This situation entailed that the Kremlin was not in a position to initiate a war in Western Europe because of its relative weakness vis-à-vis the Western powers.[52] In this context, it seemed wise not to employ a policy of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. NSC 58/2 envisaged the containment of the Soviet Union through the fragmentation of the unity of the Communist Bloc. This aspect of the policy of containment seemed to rely on the idea that the weaknesses that existed within the Communist Bloc should be exploited to bring into existence governments that would be friendlier toward the United States.[53]

The third stage of the strategy of containment entailed the acceptance on the part of Moscow of the existence of an ideologically diverse international political order.[54] The nature of the Soviet system made it incumbent upon Washington to formulate a strategy conducive to the demarcation of spheres of influence that would enable the United States to accomplish its geopolitical objectives in the postwar scenario. Containment also relied on establishing an orderly scheme of relations between the two blocs. NSC68, produced by the National Security Council in April 1950, envisaged a "rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world […] with the purpose of reaching,

49. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 22, 1946—FRUS, 1946. Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), 708.

50. J. L. Gaddis, *George F. Kennan—An American Life* (London: The Penguin Press, 2011), 951–52.

51. A Report to the President by the National Security Council Washington, December 30, 1949—Top secret NSC 48/2—history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v07p2/d386.

52. Report prepared by the Division of Research for Europe, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, OIR Report No. 4998, Washington, July 1, 1949, FRUS, 1949. Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, 624–27.

53. Report to the President by the National Security Council, NSC 58/2, December 8, 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 5, 42 and 48 and 50.

54. J. Gaddis Lewis, *Strategies of Containment—A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 55–74.

if possible, a tolerable state of order among nations without war and of preparing to defend ourselves in the event that the free world is attacked."[55] However, the United States articulated the policy of containment with the ultimate purpose of establishing a modicum of conviviality in the system of states. General Dwight Eisenhower pointed out the long history of friendship between Russia and the United States, exemplified in an eloquent manner in the transfer of Alaska and in the fact that both countries were Allies in the two major conflagrations of the twentieth century. Eisenhower also stressed the fact that in spite of the ideological differences that separated both nations, the spirit of cooperation and unity were preferable to the alternative of a war between the two camps.[56] In the United Kingdom, the Labour government envisaged that there would be "no real likelihood of a war for many years." The relative weakness of the Soviet Union was a factor that prevented the slide into overt conflict. The ideological machinery of the Labour Party held the view that "the time when America could have launched a pre-ventive war against Russia is long past, and the failure of the Russian 1946 harvest, added to the appalling damage caused by the German invasion, has made it quite impossible for Russia to risk a major war against an America armed with atom bombs."[57] American policy makers realized the state of relative weakness of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the framers of the policy of containment labored under the assumption that the Soviet leadership would want to display military and political strength in order to compensate for their lesser capabilities.

There was a cultural component inherent in the policy of containment, which revolved around the fundamental incompatibility between Communism and the Western way of life, based, to a large extent, on the prevalence of Christian principles. Bishop Fulton Sheen stated in 1948 that "Communism is not just an economic system; it is a way of life[.…] It is the basic principle of Marxism that any attempt to reconcile capital and labor so that they both co-operate in peace and prosperity is a betrayal of com-munism."[58] The policy of containment contributed to institutionalize the international order by reducing the possibility of an all-out confrontation with the Soviet Union. The militarization of US foreign policy, ushered in through the policy of containment, had a strong preclusive element that demarcated the scope of geopolitical action of the United States in the postwar era. The policy of containment was complemented by a foreign policy orientation aimed at preventing the rise of revisionist tendencies within the US sphere of influence. The 33rd Policy Planning Staff paper, produced in June 23, 1948, envisaged that the United States should countenance the offensive stance of the Soviet Union. The report stated that "important sectors of the Soviet economy […] are in a state of serious backwardness and obsolescence." Most importantly, the report

---

55. A Report to the Nations Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay), NSC68, Washington, April 14, 1950—FRUS, 1950. National security affairs; foreign economic policy (1950), 272.
56. Eisenhower, D., *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1949), 457–58.
57. Labour Party, "Keep Left," *New Statesman*, London (1947), 31.
58. F. Sheen, *Communism and Conscience of the West* (Dublin: Browne and Nolan, 1948), 139.

also underlined that the Soviet Union would not be able to prevail in Western Europe using "direct military action."[59] The political intervention exercised by the United States was not restricted to Western Europe. In the aftermath of World War II, United States worked to achieve a modicum of regional organization in the Western Hemisphere. The American aims regarding the Western Hemisphere revolved around the attainment of a stable security environment and ensuring that no single power in the hemisphere would be able to threaten inter-American peace. The revisionist stance adopted by Argentina during World War II prompted the United States to grant a significant amount of military aid to neighboring countries, like Brazil, and to put together a series of measures aimed at isolating this country from the Pan-American Union.[60] The conference held in Mexico City in 1945 was influential in laying down a system of collective security in the Western Hemisphere, geared toward avoiding the possibility of an attack by a foreign power or any attack on the political integrity of any American republic.[61] The policy of containment was influential in the consolidation of the institutionalization of the international order, as it established important boundaries for the deployment of power in the postwar environment, demarcating the scope of intervention within a normative framework that prevented a further escalation of tensions. The policy of containment had a defensive element attached to it, as it sought to delineate the boundaries of Soviet expansion instead of pushing for an overt confrontation in order to reverse Moscow's hegemonic position in the postwar system of states. The international postwar order attained an important level of institutionalization thanks to the establishment of mechanisms that would dictate the circumstances and modalities involved in confronting the spread of Soviet power. In this manner, the policy of containment introduced a significant element of moderation in the functioning of interstate relations between the superpowers in the postwar scenario.

6.4 The Truman Doctrine and Its Role in the Institutionalization of the Postwar International Order

The Truman Doctrine, which became operational in March 1947, constituted a prime example of the implementation of the policy of containment. The Truman Doctrine made explicit the need to aid all countries threatened by Communism. President Truman's message to the US Congress referred to the Greek government's inability to cope with the communist insurgency. Truman announced that the United States would assist Greece as well as Turkey in the fight against Communism. Truman proclaimed that the world faced a choice between "one way of life […] based upon the will of the majority […] distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections,

---

59. A. Nelson, *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers*, vol. 1 (New York: Garland Publications, 1983), 282–91.
60. Memorandum prepared in the Department of State, Washington, January 2, 1945, FRUS, 1945. The American Republics, 366.
61. Act of Chapultepec—Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity (Act of Chapultepec); March 6, 1945 avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chapul.asp

guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression [and a] second way of life […] based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority."[62] There was concern regarding the possibility that a communist victory in the Greek civil war would impact negatively on the establishment of the Western Bloc. American officials stated that an unfavorable result for the United States in Greece would have emboldened the Soviet Union "to take further action to destroy [America's] position on the Eurasian landmass."[63] The Truman Doctrine was instrumental in establishing a sound social and political order in Europe. Truman held the view that, "[t]he establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice."[64] In this manner, the Truman Doctrine became a geopolitical tool geared toward arresting the possible spread of Soviet power in the European continent. American policy makers held the view that the Soviet Union was determined to launch an attack against the United States. Churchill 's speech in Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946 was pivotal for entrenching the notion that a more aggressive stance toward the Soviet Union was needed. The Truman administration adopted the view espoused by the Russian experts based at the Department of State, who "seemed to be with Churchill" in regard to the hostile intentions of the Soviet Union.[65] According to the Department of State, what restrained the Soviet Union from espousing a more aggressive stance was a belief about the possible slide of the United States into another economic depression.[66] Truman was unconvinced about the possibility of attaining a good working relationship with the Soviet Union. This is what transpires from President Truman's recollections from the Potsdam Conference: Truman stated that it was not surprising that "the Russians were not in earnest about peace. It was clear that the Russian foreign policy was based on the conclusion that [the United States was] heading for a major depression, and they were already planning to take advantage of [America's] setback."[67] Moscow regarded the Truman Doctrine as a hostile act against the Soviet Union. The demarcation of geopolitical boundaries was perceived as a sign of aggression aimed at fomenting a state of confrontation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Department of State reproduced an interview carried out between Hugo Baillie, the president of United Press, and Stalin, where the Soviet leader stated that it was imperative that the "kindlers"

---

62. President Truman Address before the Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives—March 12, 1947 http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-03-.12&documentid=31&studycollectionid=TDoctrine&pagenumber=1.

63. Report to the National Security Council by Executive Secretary of the Council (Souers), Washington, January 6, 1945, NSC/5—FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 4.

64. B. Bernstein and A. Matusow, *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History* (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1966), 165.

65. A. Donald, *Citizen Soldier—A Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 252.

66. Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State, NSC 20/2, Washington, August 25, 1948, FRUS, 1948, General; the United Nations (in two parts) (1948), 618.

67. H. Truman, *1945: Year of Decision* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1955), 342.

of war be "exposed and restrained."[68] At the same time, the content of the Truman Doctrine generated a significant political backlash in the United States, as it was believed that it would increase the risk of a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.[69] The Truman Doctrine constituted a corollary to the policy of containment. The Clifford-Elsey Report, which informed the implementation of the mechanisms involved in the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, emphasized its defensive orientation, stating that, "[t]he United States should seek, by cultural, intellectual, and economic interchange, to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that we have no aggressive intentions and that peaceable coexistence of Capitalism and Communism is possible."[70] Vandenberg, who saw a connection between the aims of the Truman Doctrine and the objectives of the United Nations Charter, held the view that "Truman's message to Congress was a hasty reflex action driven by the exigencies of the moment rather than a carefully plotted plan within the larger framework of US foreign policy."[71] Interestingly, Republican leaders were less resistant to the Truman Doctrine than to the ERP. Thomas Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate in the 1948 elections believed the Truman Doctrine "did not go far enough." He also supported the ERP, although he held the view that it was not sufficiently grounded in "businesslike realism."[72] US foreign policy was firmly grounded on the belief that the actualization of America's geopolitical objectives in the postwar scenario were connected to the establishment of a sphere of influence free from Soviet interference. This policy necessitated an expansion of the spectrum of militarization. Bernard Baruch, an adviser to President Roosevelt, highlighted the need to ensure that the United States would be in a permanent state of military alert in order to prevent the expansion of communist power:

> In 1945, we Americans did not understand that reality—the continuity of war and peace. We had suffered a million casualties, and had spent over three hundred billion in a terrible conflict. Now, we thought, it was time to get back to our ploughs, our lathes, our offices, and get on with the ways of peace. That meant getting rid of all the inconveniences, and disciplines associated with way, disciplines which we considered alien to our way of life. But what we failed to realize is that these disciplines are as essential to the waging of peace as they are to the waging of war."[73]

There was also an offensive element attached to the mechanisms needed to confront the threat posed by the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario, informed by the hostile

---

68. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Dubrow) to the Secretary of State, October 28, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), 794.

69. H. Gosnell, *Truman's Crises—A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 348.

70. C. Clifford (with Richard Holbrooke), *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), 125.

71. L. Kaplan, *The Conversion of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg—From Isolation to International Engagement* (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2015), 193 and 201.

72. R. Norton Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 470.

73. B. Baruch, *The Public Years* (London: Odhams Press, 1960), 352.

attitude that President Truman had toward Communism. The policy of containment represented an opportunity to wipe the slate clean and reconstitute the political orientation of Western Europe. In his diary entry of July 26, 1945, on the eve of the Potsdam Conference, Truman recorded his impressions on Communism and the forms of government that prevailed in Europe during the 1930s, stating that the communist system operated with "a few top hands [who] just take clubs, pistols and concentration camps and rule the people on the lower levels [and that] the Communist Party in Moscow is no different in its methods and actions toward the common man that were the Czar and the Russian Noblemen."[74] The political realities that emerged in the postwar scenario confirmed Truman's worse fears about the inability to achieve a more convivial relationship with the Soviet Union. In a letter received by Stalin on June 7, 1945, Truman mentioned the lack of democratic procedures in countries under the military control of the Red Army, such as "Hungary, Roumania and Bulgaria." Truman commented that he was "disturbed to find governments which do not accord to all democratic elements of the people the rights of free expression and which in their system of administration are […] neither representative of [nor] responsive to the will of the people."[75] There was a well-entrenched strand of thinking in the United States that considered the Soviet Union to be an enemy that harbored aggressive intentions toward the United States. The Department of State also postulated that at some point, the Communist Bloc would be in a position to confront the United States on an equal footing. A memorandum written by the Department of the Navy in 1946 indicated that the Soviet Union had the "ambition to become a first class sea power."[76] This state of affairs entailed the application of a preclusive geopolitical stance, which meant that, "for an indefinite period the peace of the world must depend on [the United States] having a superiority of force and being willing to use it to defend [world] peace if necessary."[77] The actions of the Truman Doctrine were imbued with the liberal and occidentalist values that underpinned the American projection of power in the wider world. In his inaugural presidential speech of 1949, Truman stated that "the American people […] believe that all men have a right to equal justice under law and equal opportunity to share in the common good [and] that all men have a right to freedom of thought and expression."[78] The notion of American exceptionalism propitiated by the Truman administration included an occidentalist overtone that became manifest in the process of bloc formation that unfolded in Western Europe.

---

74. R. Ferrell (ed.), *Off the Record—The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (Cambridge: Harper and Row, 1980), 56–57.
75. J. Stalin (ed.), *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941–1945* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1958), 241–42.
76. Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, July 23, 1946—http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/
77. The Chargé in Yugoslavia (Cabot) to the Secretary of State, Belgrade, July 7, 1947, FRUS, 1947. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 817.
78. President Truman's Inaugural Address—January 20, 1949—greatspeeches.wordpress.com/category/twentieth-century-speeches/harry-s-truman-speeches/

The Truman Doctrine facilitated the establishment of a Western bloc capable of arresting Soviet expansionism. Western cooperation among France, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries was furthered by the conference held in London in 1948. The failure to achieve a quadripartite solution in regard to the German settlement was cited as an element that propelled the formation of the Western Bloc, aimed at accelerating "the economic reconstruction of western Europe including Germany and of establishing a basis for the participation of a democratic Germany in the community of free peoples."[79] The protection of the vital strongholds in Germany, Europe and Asia entailed the creation of a military and intelligence establishment that would ensure the enforcement of US economic interests. The Truman Doctrine also led to the configuration of a scheme of cooperation in the security sphere between the United States and several Western European countries. In March 1948, the Brussels Treaty Organization was established between France, the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries, with the aim of establishing a scheme of mutual assistance in military matters. On June 11, 1948, the US Senate acquiesced to giving military support to the Brussels Pact. This piece of legislation would pave the way for the establishment of NATO in 1949.

The prospect of intervention in the external affairs of European countries did not find favor among certain segments of the political establishment. The idea of cooperation between the two superpowers was broached by prominent personalities, such as Eleanor Roosevelt. The former first lady suggested that "Secretary Marshall or President Truman should meet with Marshall Stalin to effect an overall solution of the problems between the two countries."[80] Henry Wallace, the former vice president, was an outspoken critic of the Truman Doctrine. Wallace thought that it would be conducive to a never-ending process of intervention by the United States in the wider world. Wallace also highlighted the need to use America's might in order to offer the "common man" an idea higher than Communism.[81] However, the Department of State argued that the United States should be proactive in advertising the benefits of the Truman Doctrine, whose main purpose was to approach "world problems in a defensive reaction to Communist pressure." Economic aid was to be given to ensure that the expansion of Communism in critical areas of the world would be halted.[82] The situation that was unfolding in Greece evolved from an "internal rebellion" into a concerted effort to undermine the country's independence. Paradoxically, there seemed to be a pervasive idea regarding the role that illiberal governments could play in order to arrest the advance of Communism in Europe.

---

79. Communiqué by the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Benelux countries, March 6, 1948 (London Six Power Conference), *Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of Berlin, 1944–1961*, HM Stationery Office, London, 97–98.
80. The Director of the Office of Public Affairs (Russell) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), Washington, March 27, 1947—FRUS, 1947. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 547.
81. R. Walton, *Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 144–48.
82. The Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), Washington, May 23, 1947—FRUS, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 229.

Diplomats within the Department of State stated that it was, "high time that the United States Government forsook the defensive and stopped apologizing for the present, allegedly "monarcho-fascist" Greek Government." It was argued that the "shortcomings" of this regime were "multitudinous, but it is by no means as bad as international public opinion has been led by repeated and insidious communist propaganda to believe."[83] The Department of State was aware that the Soviet Union regarded Washington's intervention in the internal affairs of Greece as an aggressive act. Moscow maintained that the United States was using the pretext of aiding the "allegedly oppressed section of the population" in order to expand its geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean Basin.[84] The Truman administration realized that the success of the Truman Doctrine relied on the efforts of the Greek people, who were "aware that the extensive aid of the United States will not alone be sufficient to meet the large costs of restoring public order and reconstructing productive facilities over a period of years."[85] Nevertheless, the importance of the Greek Civil War in the configuration of the geopolitical scenario that emerged in the postwar period meant that the crisis could not be resolved without American intervention, in spite of the "normal dislike" that a people might feel in regard to such matters.[86] There was a civilizational element that imbued the American intervention in Greece, whose official position was that they were not "the dollar imperialists the Moscow press would have the world believe." Instead, their actions were prompted by the will to restore the "sovereignty and dignity" of the Greek people.[87] At the same time, the scheme of financial aid provided to Turkey provoked a reaction among the Soviet leadership, which considered the policy of the United States in that country as a violation of Ankara's sovereignty as well as an action geared toward entrenching the interests of American capitalism.[88] The Soviet Union regarded the Truman Doctrine as a manifestation of the impending economic crisis that was about to affect the capitalist system of production in the United States. The Soviet press stated that, "as the economic position worsens, the American bourgeoisie is strengthening its assault on the working-class" by adopting an aggressive geopolitical stance.[89] The Truman Doctrine was the embodiment of the manner in which notions of American exceptionalism helped to deploy a global geopolitical strategy. US Department of State officials stated that "the American people

---

83. Memorandum by the Political Section of the Embassy in Greece, Athens, December 6, 1947—FRUS, 1947, The Near East and Africa (1947), 446.
84. The Greek Embassy to the Department of State, FRUS, 1947, The Near East and Africa, 196.
85. Draft of Note from Greek Government to the United States Government, May 22, 1947—Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Administration. Foreign Relations—Truman Doctrine (Greece and Turkey).
86. Monthly Report on American Mission for Aid to Greece, with attachments, September 20, 1947. Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files. Greece.
87. Press Release, Department of State, October 15, 1947. J. M. Jones Papers—Report on Greece, by George C. McGhee—Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey.
88. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1947, FRUS, 1947, The Near East and Africa, 199.
89. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 7, 1949—FRUS, 1949. Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union (1949), 617.

seem to have grasped the salient fact that [America] emerged from the recent war with vastly greater powers and responsibilities, which in turn magnify the duties and obligation of its officials and citizens alike."[90] The political intervention exercised by the United States was based on the premise of marrying the pursuit of the national interest with the establishment of a new moral framework of reference in the international order. The deployment of power by the United States in the aftermath of World War II was carried out in accordance with the willingness to entrench the values of freedom and democracy in the wider world.[91] The liberal orientation incorporated in the Truman Doctrine was crucial to advance the geopolitical interests of the United States in the postwar era. The process of institutionalization engendered by the policy of containment contributed to militarizing the international order by placing security matters as a central element of the management of the system of states.[92] The Truman Doctrine set a precedent for the application of intervention as an instrument to be utilized in cases where the US sphere of influence was threatened by revisionist tendencies.

The Truman Doctrine contributed to the institutionalization of the postwar international order by setting in motion the idea of continual geopolitical intervention within the US sphere of influence as demarcated during World War II, establishing "rule-like qualities which structure[d] political economic action and outcomes according to a logic of historically-based path dependence."[93] Seizing on the "critical juncture" that emerged as a result of the power vacuum generated in the aftermath of World War II, the Truman Doctrine entrenched the process of institutionalization of the international order by implanting the idea of sustained geopolitical intervention.[94] This state of affairs consolidated the emergence of a bipolar system of states. The Truman Doctrine gave notice about Washington's intention to defend its sphere of influence by military means. The main aim of the Truman Doctrine was to maintain the civilizational status quo in Western Europe, threatened by the Soviet Union.[95] The beginnings of the Cold War propelled the formulation of a rhetorical platform that would serve to justify America's engagement with the wider world.[96] The Truman Doctrine was also an instrument used by the government and the US industrial establishment for the purposes of expanding the American capitalist system in a concerted effort to avoid the onset of another

---

90. Henry Villard, Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs—Speech at Rotary Club, Charlotte, NC, May 5, 1947.
91. D. Chandler, *Constructing Global Civil Society-Morality and Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 58.
92. K. Booth, *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 160.
93. V. Schmidt (2010) "Analyzing Ideas and Tracing Discursive Interactions in Institutional Change: from Historical Institutionalism and Discursive Institutionalism." The Minda de Ginzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Open Forum, 3.
94. R. Collier and D. Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 27.
95. See R. Frazier, "'Universalism' and the Truman Doctrine," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 11, 2, Spring (2009), 3–34.
96. See L. Hinds and T. Windt, *The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945–1950* (New York: Praeger, 1991).

economic depression in the wake of World War II.[97] Moreover, the political implications of the Truman Doctrine should be appraised in the context of the creation of a national defense establishment, which put the United States on a sound war footing in order to deal with the Soviet threat in an effective manner.[98] The Truman Doctrine became a symbol of America's mission to bring modernity to the world through the elements of democracy, nation-building and economic assistance.[99]

6.5 Conclusion

The need to create a viable institutionalist framework in the postwar prompted the use of ideological tools that would entrench the centrality of intervention as a mechanism for the effective management of the system of states. American exceptionalism, recalibrated according to the values of liberalism and occidentalism, was used for the purposes of anchoring the scope of political intervention on the part of Washington in the postwar scenario. This phenomenon went in tandem with the consolidation of a hierarchical ordering based on the geopolitical dominance of the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar international order.[100] The United States was able to establish the social norms that would regulate the sphere of influence demarcated in the aftermath of World War II.[101] The Western European powers bandwagoned into the security and economic structures delineated by the United States to prevent further demotion in the international order. This was also an important facet of the process of institutionalization that took place in the aftermath of World War II, as "securing recognition […] sometimes involve[s] sacrificing Westphalian sovereignty."[102] The policy of containment played a crucial role in institutionalizing the postwar system of states. The policy of containment established a normative framework that served to avoid a disruptive level of confrontation with the Soviet Union, as it was based on the idea of protecting the US sphere of influence instead of propagating the untrammeled expansion of American power in the wider world. The policy of containment constituted an important milestone in the exercise of great-power management by the United States, as it meant that Washington would make a concerted effort to ensure the safety and vitality of its sphere of influence. The need to contain the expansionist orientation of the Soviet Union also propelled the curtailment of the scope of sovereignty enjoyed by

---

97. See J. Kolko and G. Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).

98. See E. Spalding, *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism* (Louisville: University Press of Kentucky, 2006).

99. See D. Merrill, "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 36, 1 (2006), 27–37.

100. See N. Wheeler, *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

101. See A. Watson, *The Evolution of International Society—A Comparative Historical Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2002).

102. S. Krasner, "Problematic Sovereignty," in S. Krasner (ed.), *Problematic Sovereignty—Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 2.

the units of the US sphere of influence, creating a hierarchical order that prevented the onset of revisionist tendencies in the postwar scenario.[103] The geopolitical instrument of containment enabled the United States to prevent the spread of communist power within the US sphere of influence. However, it was also a mechanism aimed at disciplining dissenting voices within the American sphere of influence, hence entrenching the hegemonic position of the United States in the postwar international order.[104] The Truman Doctrine constituted one of the main components of the policy of containment, for it sent Moscow a clear indication about the willingness of the United States to protect the areas of the world that were deemed of vital importance to its postwar geopolitical design. The Truman Doctrine militarized the foreign policy apparatus of the United States. The values that underpinned the policy of containment had a significant impact on the creation of a bipolar system of states, centered around the demarcation of strict geopolitical boundaries between the United States and the Soviet Union.[105] In this manner, the selective deployment of military power established through the element of the Truman Doctrine would be useful for bringing about a modicum of coexistence between the two superpowers.

103. See H. Kalmo and Q. Skinner (eds.), *Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
104. See D. Grimm, *Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept*, trans. Belinda Cooper (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).
105. See T. Paul, Wirtz, J. and Fortmann, M. (eds.), *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

Chapter Seven

SOVIET SECURITY NEEDS AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE POSTWAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER

7.1 Introduction

The Soviet Union contributed to institutionalizing the international order by establishing specific parameters of intervention within its sphere of influence. The demarcation of a bipolar system of states facilitated the regulation of interstate relations in the aftermath of World War II. Moscow outlined its grand geopolitical strategy by making reference to the great suffering brought by the invasion of the Axis' armies in 1941. The Soviet Union was compelled to fight a war of attrition against Nazi Germany, which resulted in economic and social devastation. The Soviet leadership was aware of the fact that the Western powers had not been very vehement in their opposition to the revisionist actions undertaken by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy during the 1930s. There was a segment of opinion within the United States and the main Western European powers that saw Nazi Germany as a bulwark against the spread of Communism on the European continent. This chapter examines three different themes connected to the role that Soviet security needs played in the institutionalization of the postwar international order. First, it will be argued that *the Soviet Union contributed to the institutionalization of the postwar international order by setting in motion the mechanisms needed to satisfy its security needs.* The strategy based on catering to those needs indicated the existence of self-imposed limits to Soviet geopolitical expansion. The establishment of a sphere of influence in Germany and Eastern Europe was indicative of Moscow's willingness to exercise a high level of management in the postwar international order. This mechanism was responsible for creating a stable political environment at home and a workable international order in the postwar era.[1] This strategy provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to reverse its position of relative vulnerability vis-à-vis the Western powers.[2] Second, *the Soviet Union restricted its scope of geopolitical action to the establishment of a foothold in Germany and a buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe.* The Soviet Union imposed a communist political and economic system on the

---

1. See R. Kanet, *Resolving Regional Conflicts* (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1998).
2. E. Haas, *When Knowledge Is Power—Three Models of Change in International Relations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 2.

Intermarium countries with the ultimate objective of ensuring their long-standing geo-political rapprochement with Moscow.[3] If the Eastern European nations would have been allowed to retain a greater modicum of independence in the postwar period, they would have gradually drifted away from the Soviet geopolitical realm, as in the case of Yugoslavia. The subaltern status of the Intermarium countries was not only prompted by the security needs of the Soviet Union but also by the fact that they had not been invited to join the Western Bloc.[4] Third, *the establishment of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe was made possible because of the "national front" strategy, which allowed the Soviet Union to legitimize the imposition of a communist political system in the Intermarium.* The "national front" strategy created the façade of political cooperation in the countries occupied by the Red Army. Nevertheless, the political expediencies of the early Cold War period prompted the implementation of instruments that led to the full Sovietization of the Eastern European countries. The preservation of geopolitical distinctiveness relied on the application of mechanisms that were necessary in order to cater to the security needs of the Soviet Union in the postwar era. In addition to this, the preservation of geopolitical distinctiveness enabled Moscow to consolidate the communist system of government at home. This was an important prerequisite in the effective deployment of Soviet power in the aftermath of World War II.

7.2 The Articulation of Soviet Security Needs as an Element of Institutionalization

The onset of the Cold War created a unique situation in the history of the inter-national order. Both superpowers made a commitment to exercise effective management of the international order through the sphere-of-influence system. This *modus operandi* consolidated the institutionalization of the system of states by preventing the advent of revisionist attitudes on the part of Germany as well as the countries of the Intermarium. The securitization of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era was informed by the fact that in the 1930s the Western powers (and the nations of the Intermarium) had not been willing to enter into a comprehensive alliance capable of dealing with the looming threat posed by Nazi Germany. The Soviet leadership operated under the premise that German aggression could have been stopped if the United Kingdom and France would "have arrived at an agreement as to [the implementation] of definite military measures against the attack [by a potential] aggressor."[5] This option would have resulted in the institu-tionalization of the European order according to the principle of collective security. The Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact of 1939 was a pragmatic option that entrenched the

3. G. Ginsburgs, A. Rubinstein and O. Smolansky, *Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation* (London: Routledge, 2016), 305.
4. M. Djelic, *Exporting the American Model: The Post-war Transformation of European Business* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 65.
5. V. Molotov, *Soviet Russia and Crisis—M. Molotov Explains U.S.S.R.'s Policy* (London: Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, 1939), 6.

geopolitical position of the Soviet Union in the short term.[6] The Soviet leadership wanted to prevent encirclement by the Western countries and the agglomeration of power by independent Central European nations, as this would have impeded the actualization of the most vital strategic objectives of the Soviet Union. The scope of Soviet foreign policy was magnified by the large degree of military capability acquired during World War II. The Lend-Lease aid given to the Soviet Union by the United States enabled Moscow to bolster its military status and to entrench its repressive apparatus.[7] The onset of World War II was seen by Moscow and its acolytes as a consequence of the capitalist drive for profit, which put the world "on a bloody path to war."[8] Most importantly, the spectrum of securitization was propped up by what the Soviet leadership referred to as "the constant threat of military intervention by the imperialist countries and of the restoration of capitalism through the armed might of international reaction."[9] The Soviet political and economic system was articulated in order to fend off any military threats posed by hostile powers. In order to achieve this goal, there was an emphasis on maintaining ideological purity; a policy that sometimes included the purging of elements that undermined "party policy."[10]

Stalin's leadership style had a profound impact on the manner in which the Soviet Union exercised its geopolitical power.[11] In a speech delivered on November 6, 1943, Stalin stated that "the lessons of the war show that the Soviet system proved not only the best form of organizing the economic and cultural development of the country in the years of peaceful construction, but also the best form of mobilizing all the forces of the people for resistance to the enemy in time of war."[12] This passage is quite significant, as it attests to the idea that the ideological template that guided the Soviet leadership in the postwar era was made subject to its security requirements. There is a significant link between the formulation of policy and the geopolitical orientation of the Soviet Union since the late 1920s. In the Report of the Politburo to the Plenum of the Party Central Committee, produced in November 19, 1928, Stalin stated that it was not only

6. On May 5, 1941, Stalin made a speech announcing the existence of a "war plan" against Germany, which would usher in "a new era in the development of the Soviet state has begun, the era of the expansion of its borders, not, as before, through a peaceful policy, but rather by force of arms." The content of this speech has been used in order to relativize the idea of the Soviet Union as a great power that contributed in a decisive manner to the victory of the Allies in World War II. See Stalin's speech of May 5, 1941, cited in A. Von Thadden, *Stalins Falle: Er wollte den Krieg* (Rosenheim: Kultur und Zeitgeschichte/Archiv der Zeit, 1996).

7. G. Jordan (with Richard Stokes), *From Major Jordan's Diaries* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1952), 268.

8. M. Ross, *A History of Soviet Foreign Policy* (London: Workers Library, 1940), 5.

9. K. Russell (ed.), *History of the USSR, Part III, From the Beginning of the Great Patriotic War to the Present Day* (Moscow: Progress, 1977), 102–3.

10. M. Matthews (ed.), *Soviet Government—A Selection of Official Documents on Internal Policies*, Resolution of the CC and of the CCC of the VKP(B), 28 April 1933 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), 168.

11. M. Kalinin, *The Soviet President Speaks—Speeches, Broadcast Addresses, and Articles on the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (London: Hutchinson, 1945), 71.

12. J. Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1945), 100.

necessary to build socialism in the Soviet Union but also "to [uphold] the independence of [the] country in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement," which consisted in having access to a level of technological advancement equal or superior to the one possessed by non-socialist countries.[13] During the 1930s, as the geopolitical environment became more hostile, there were consistent efforts made to consolidate the ideological purity of the regime. In July 1937 the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) earmarked for purging the elements that could sabotage the internal stability of the Soviet Union, including "kulaks," "members of anti-Soviet parties," as well as other social groups branded as "insurgent."[14]

The Soviet leadership held the view that the internal stability of the regime was tied to ensuring the establishment of a workable geopolitical arrangement with other prominent powers. This is the reason why the Soviet leadership was compelled to enter into an alliance with the Axis, as this arrangement entailed the possibility of having access to the "open sea" as well as the Mediterranean Basin.[15] Communist ideology also relied on "the conflict of interests between the imperialist Powers" as a factor that could entrench the geopolitical position of the Soviet Union and the cause of Communism.[16] The Soviet expansion into the Intermarium simplified the geopolitical structures that emerged in the postwar period. The establishment of a buffer zone in Central and Eastern Europe accelerated the construction of the Western Bloc, a grouping of nations that had a level of industrial resources that was vastly superior to the ones possessed by the Eastern European countries. The enforcement of Soviet security needs was carried out through a strict demarcation of the scope of geopolitical action. The Soviet Union achieved its security interests only in the geographical areas where the Red Army had a strong presence. The conflict that unfolded between the Soviet Union and the United States followed functionalist guidelines that consolidated the institutionalization of the emerging postwar international order. The Soviet Union refrained from intervening in the areas of the world that were deemed to be part of the US sphere of influence. Notwithstanding the American perception of an expansionist attitude on the part of the Soviet Union, Moscow refrained from making a decisive intervention in the Greek Civil War. While the United States and the United Kingdom actively aided the Hellenic Army, the Soviet Union was not compelled to help the communist forces there in a decisive manner.[17] The Soviet Union did not intervene in order to facilitate the establishment of

13. A. Cummins (ed.), *Documents of Soviet History, vol. 4: Stalin Grasps Power, 1926–1928* (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1998), 350.

14. D. Shearer and V. Khaustov, *Stalin and the Lubianka—A Documentary History of the Political Police and Security Organs in the Soviet Union, 1922–1953* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 199–205.

15. R. Sontag and J. Beddie, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941—Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1948), 217–25.

16. H. Goldberg (ed.), *Documents of Soviet–American Relations, vol. 1: Intervention, Famine Relief, International Affairs* (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1993), 314.

17. The Ambassador in Greece (MacVeagh) to Secretary of State, Athens, March 4, 1947—FRUS 1947, The Near East and Africa (1947), 90.

communist-led governments in France and Italy. The active intervention of the Soviet Union in Western European politics would have been detrimental to the accomplishment of the security needs of the Soviet Union, as it would have entailed a state of overt confrontation with the United States. Moreover, the Soviet Union was also wary of allowing the establishment of independent centers of communist power. In the aftermath of World War II Albania and Yugoslavia were ostracized by the Soviet leadership for pursuing independent geopolitical paths. This state of affairs indicates that the actualization of the security needs of the Soviet Union was formulated as part of an overall geopolitical strategy that enabled the construction of a relatively stable environment in the postwar period. The management of the ideological conflict that developed vis-à-vis the United States was an important influencer in the creation of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar period. The sense of anxiety that arose among the Soviet leadership was a significant element in the demarcation of Moscow's primordial interests. The establishment of geopolitical realms was aided by the relative freedom of action enjoyed by the Soviet Union. Nikolai Voznesensky, the chairman of the State Planning Committee of the Soviet Union between 1942 and 1949, stated that the "socialist economy is technically and economically independent of the capitalist countries. The Soviet Union does not refuse to take part in the international division of labor international trade. Nevertheless, the foundation of stability of the Soviet economy is its economic independence."[18] In any case, the rhetoric used to broadcast the main geopolitical aims of the Soviet Union was quite inflammatory. Stalin's election speech of February 9, 1946, amounted to a condemnation of the capitalist system led by the United States. The Soviet leader outlined a comprehensive review of the ideological factors involved in the outbreak of World War II:

> [The war arose] as the inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of present-day monopolistic capitalism [… T]he development of world capitalism in our times does not proceed smoothly and evenly, but through crises and catastrophic wars. Perhaps catastrophic wars could be avoided if it were possible periodically to redistribute raw materials and markets among the respective countries in conformity with their economic weight by means of concerted and peaceful decisions. But this is impossible under the present capitalist conditions of world economic development.[19]

The securitization of Soviet foreign policy had its origins in Russia's traditional concern with the preservation of a geopolitical and cultural sphere independent from the Western powers. After World War II, American officials stated that the "creation of a complete security zone around the parameters of the USSR appears to be the initiation of Soviet foreign policy as it was [the] initial aim [of the] Czarist foreign policy

18. N. Voznesensky, *Soviet Economy During the Second World War* (New York: International, 1949), 140.
19. J. Stalin (1947) "Speeches Delivered at Meetings of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District," Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow—Speech delivered by Joseph Stalin at a meeting of the Stalin electoral district, Moscow, February 9, 1946.

[… I]n implementing this aim today the USSR is attempting to reduce prewar economic dependence on, and cultural and political affiliations with, the western Powers."[20] The articulation of the primary geopolitical needs of the United States in the postwar era was effectuated through a concerted effort to denounce the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc that jeopardized the security of the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership regarded the formation of a Western Bloc as proof of the hostile intentions harbored by the United States and its Western European allies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In September 1946, Nikolai Novikov, Soviet ambassador to the United States, made clear that there was an Anglo-Saxon bloc hostile to the Soviet Union.[21] The element of bloc formation contributed to establishing a system of coexistence with the United States and its allies through the management of an independent geopolitical realm. The Sovietization of the eastern zone of occupation in Germany and the breakdown of four-power control in the occupied country would contribute to the formation of a Soviet-led bloc in Eastern Europe.

The Communist Information Bureau (COMINFORM) was created for the purposes of addressing the divergences that existed among the Eastern European governments on whether or not to attend the Paris Conference on the ERP in July 1947. The intended purpose of COMINFORM was to coordinate the actions between the communist parties under Soviet direction. COMINFORM became another instrument for the articulation and implementation of the set of interests that were deemed vital for ensuring the security of the Soviet Union in the postwar era. During the first COMINFORM conference, which took place on September 22–28, 1947, it was agreed that the main aim of the Communist Bloc was the "prevention of any possibility of a new aggression by Germany, and the United States, and Britain."[22] In October 1946, communist officials meeting in Poland had stated that the "arsenal of imperialism" was able to count on the "treasonable activities of right wing Socialists […] such as Blum, Attlee and Bevin, Schumacher, Renner and Saragat." This situation meant that the Communist Bloc was compelled to "muster its forces [and] work out an agreed platform of action […] against American imperialism […] and against right wing Socialists."[23] The members of COMINFORM also highlighted the need for the Communist Bloc to remain united in order to withstand the geopolitical drive exerted by the Western powers. COMINFORM denounced the social democratic political parties of Western Europe, which "endeavour[ed] to conceal the true predatory essence of the imperialist policy behind the mask of democracy and

---

20. Memorandum, "Soviet Policy Toward the Western Powers," April 4, 1946. Elsey Papers, Harry S. Truman Administration File. Foreign Relations—Russia (1946—report "American Relations with the Soviet Union").

21. Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Telegram, September 1946 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110808.pdf?v=c46f797bf3d939c2c328ac98eb778f09

22. G. Procacci (ed.), *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994), 457.

23. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, October 6, 1947—FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 596.

socialist phraseology, but who actually remain in all respects loyal accomplices of the imperialists."[24] In this context, the hostile rhetoric that emanated from the Communist Bloc was aimed at establishing the mechanisms needed for defending the Soviet Union and its allies from Western aggression. Ideological purity became an element to deter internal dissent and to outline clear guidelines for the projection of Soviet geopolitical power. During the second COMINFORM conference, which took place on June 19– 23, 1948, Yugoslavia was accused of strengthening "the position of Anglo-Americans and Italian reactionaries" due to its insistence on maintaining an independent stance on matters related to the status of the free territory of Trieste.[25] The ideological apparatus that informed Soviet foreign policy was subjected to the geopolitical needs of the Soviet Union in the area of security. Allowing internal divergences, as they pertained to the emerging geopolitical order, was perceived as being detrimental to the security needs of the Soviet Union.

The same rationale was applied to the Soviet refusal to accept ERP aid, which was seen as an attempt by the United States to influence the postwar configuration of the Eastern European economies—a state of affairs that Moscow considered to be inimical to its security interests.[26] When Molotov arrived at the Paris Conference in 1947 he realized that the ERP was meant to counterpoise the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and to erode the geopolitical projection of Soviet power on the continent. These conclusions led the Soviet delegation to withdraw from the Paris Conference.[27] The other Eastern European states immediately rejected the offer. The Soviet delegation to the Paris talks was told by the Kremlin to object to terms of assistance that could entail any limitation on the sovereignty of the Eastern European nations, or the violation of their economic independence. The Soviet Union's "alternative" to the Marshall Plan, which involved Soviet subsidies and trade with Eastern Europe, became known as the Molotov Plan, "designed to stimulate the growth and development of Eastern European economies by organizing markets for the disposal of goods and by coordinating supplies of the raw materials and capital goods needed for economic expansion."[28] These proposals would lead to the establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) in 1949.[29] The aspects of economic reconstruction were geared toward preventing the establishment of an independent geopolitical realm in Central Europe capable of joining forces with the Western powers against the Soviet Union. This state of affairs denotes the willingness of the Soviet Union to contribute to the

24. G. Procacci (ed.), *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994), 459.
25. G. Procacci (ed.), *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1994), 641.
26. D. Watson, *Molotov—A Biography* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 231.
27. G. Roberts, *Molotov: Stalin's Cold Warrior* (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2011).
28. K. Grzybowski, *Soviet International Law and the World Economic Order* (Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), 149.
29. S. D. Parrish and M. Narinsky, "New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Number 9 (2011), 40–41.

management of the international order by exerting a high degree of internal discipline in its sphere of influence. The formation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe was influential in order to outline the parameters for the accomplishment of Moscow's security needs in the postwar era. The establishment of a Communist Bloc created a buffer zone aimed at preventing the encroachment of the Western powers into the Intermarium. At the same time, it also provided a useful instrument for preventing the onset of revisionist tendencies in Eastern Europe. During the consultation meeting of the Soviet, Yugoslav and Bulgarian parties in Moscow in February 1948, Stalin accused Tito of creating an alternative center of communist power. The ideological challenge launched by Tito had important repercussions for the stability of the communist movement and the hegemonic position of the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario, because of the high level of popularity enjoyed by the Yugoslav leader. Stalin believed that Tito's insubordination "was not simply a blow to Stalin's self-respect, but also a dangerous precedent and a crack in the monolithic Soviet Bloc."[30] Yugoslavia was considered by the United States and the United Kingdom as "an aggressive junior partner in the Soviet hegemony." However, Tito pursued a course of geopolitical action that did not go hand in hand with the geopolitical aspirations of the Soviet Union in the postwar era.[31]

The Soviet Union was also interested in ensuring that the countries that made up the Communist Bloc would not act in a manner that would be detrimental to Moscow's geopolitical interests. Stalin admonished Georgi Dimitrov for including Greece within its plans for a Balkan Federation. This plan would have put the Soviet Union at loggerheads with the Western Bloc.[32] The break with Yugoslavia demonstrates that Moscow's highest priority was not the spread of communist ideology but to entrench its geopolitical interests. These are aspects of relevant importance in order to appraise the nature of the great-power management exercised by the Soviet Union. The scheme of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era was underpinned by the entrenchment of a sphere of influence managed with a high degree of internal discipline. This is also an aspect that contributed to the unfoldment of cooperative relations between the Soviet Union and the United States in the postwar period. Stalin cited the practical association forged between the Soviet Union and the United States during World War II as an informative example of the possibility of attaining a framework of cooperation between the superpowers.[33] According to the Soviet leadership, the attainment of good relations with the United States relied on the effective management of the

---

30. O. Khlevniuk, *Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator*, trans. N. Seligman Favorov (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 280–81.

31. The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary of State, London, November 13, 1947, FRUS, 1947, *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union*, 851.

32. G. Dimitrov, *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949*, ed. I. Banac (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 434.

33. J. Stalin, "Replies to Questions Put by Mr. Elliot Roosevelt, in an Interview," December 21, 1946 J. V. Stalin on Post-War International Relations, Soviet News, Moscow. Elliot Roosevelt, the son of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, had been present in the international conferences in which Stalin and his father participated.

sphere of influence that was being carved out in the Intermarium, as this order of things would prevent the onset of revisionist tendencies in the postwar international system of states. According to Stalin, both the United States and Soviet Union had an interest in maintaining a bipolar system based on a modicum of cooperation between the two superpowers.[34]

However, there was a strong possibility of an overt military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The Soviet Union had made an enormous effort in order to defeat the Axis. Ordinary Soviet citizens regarded the Great Patriotic War as a battle for freedom, undertaken by people who were loyal to the cause of the Soviet Union.[35] Moscow's foreign policy was underscored by the assumption that the Western powers could have launched a war of aggression against the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership continued to use inflammatory rhetoric regarding the role that the Western powers played in the onset of the Cold War. The spectrum of securitization, enhanced by the magnitude of the fight against the Axis, informed domestic and foreign policy to an extent unseen in the Western world. During the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, Nikita Khrushchev stated that after the end of World War II "the influence of reactionary and militarist groups began to be increasingly evident in the policy of the United States of America, Britain and France," which engaged in an imperialist drive toward "world supremacy, to suppress the working class and the democratic and national-liberation movements."[36] This stance had an important element of rationality attached to it. In July 1945, the Joint Planning Staff in the United Kingdom suggested that preparations should be made for an attack against the Soviet Union. These military preparations envisaged that "Great Britain and the United States [would] have full assistance from the Polish armed forces [which could] count upon the use of German manpower and what remains of German industrial capacity" in order to launch an attack against the Soviet Union.[37] In any case, military preparedness did not correlate with the political will to launch an aggressive war against the Western powers. The Soviet Union addressed its security needs by employing a double-pronged approach. For the Soviet leadership, it was imperative to establish a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe capable of preventing the possibility of encirclement by the Western powers. One of the most important aspects of this strategy was to avoid dissension among the members of the Communist Bloc and to articulate a sound and uniform ideological stance in order to tackle the revisionist tendencies espoused by countries like Yugoslavia in an effective manner.

---

34. J. Stalin, "Interview with Harold Stassen, April 9, 1947" (New York: International, 1951).
35. V. Grossman, *Crónicas desde el Frente de Batalla* (Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, 2018), 67.
36. N. Khrushchev, *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1956), 21.
37. "Operation Unthinkable: 'Russia: Threat to Western Civilization,'" British War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff [Draft and Final Reports: 22 May, 8 June, and 11 July 1945], Public Record Office, CAB 120/691/109040 / 001—https://web.archive.org/web/20101116152301/http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/

There was a pervasive notion among Department of State officials that the Soviet leadership was using "the capitalist encirclement bogie" for the purposes of generating support for a process of postwar reconstruction that would demand further sacrifices from the population.[38] Nevertheless, the fulfillment of Soviet security needs depended on attaining a modicum of coexistence with the Western powers. In order to achieve that goal, the Soviet leadership eliminated the option of extending its ideological influence into Western Europe. Instead, Moscow worked for the institutionalization of the international order in accordance with the spheres of influence system. The spectrum of securitization acted as a metapolitical category that informed the choices included in the geostrategic blueprint adopted by the Soviet Union. Security concerns, epitomized in the fear of encirclement and coupled with the need to maintain a strong grip on the Soviet population, were a powerful influencer in the construction of a geopolitical realm capable of preventing the formation of an independent "center of power" in the Intermarium and a potential military attack by the Western powers. The spectrum of securitization was socially and materially constructed to preserve the cultural and geopolitical specificity of the Soviet Union and its sphere of influence. Here we see the link between the Eurasianist perspective that traditionally guided Russian foreign policy and the concerns for security needs outlined by the Soviet leadership. The concerns for the protection of the Eurasian heartland, which included the Intermarium, were conducive to bolstering the notion of the putative encirclement by countries with direct access to the open seas. In this context, the deployment of a scheme of a foreign policy informed the spectrum of securitization and contributed to institutionalizing the postwar international order by demarcating the boundaries of geopolitical action by the superpowers. The delineation of a geopolitical realm according to the spectrum of securitization denotes the rationalist approach involved in the achievement of vital geostrategic aims in the postwar environment. The Soviet Union created a sphere of influence in an area of the world with which it shared certain common cultural bonds, a similar level of economic development and a general sense of estrangement from Western Europe. The entrenchment of Soviet security needs was structured according to a metapolitical narrative that had the ultimate effect of advancing Moscow's geopolitical aims in the postwar era. The spectrum of securitization was crucial to demarcating specific geopolitical boundaries and a sense of cultural and political distinctiveness that helped to institutionalize the postwar international order in line with the spheres-of-influence system.

7.3 The Establishment of a Geopolitical Foothold in Germany and a Buffer Zone in Eastern Europe

The entrenchment of a Soviet foothold in Germany initiated the process of bloc-formation in the European continent. The process of partition that emerged as a result

---

38. K. Drechsler (with C. Link) (ed.), *Alternative Concepts of United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1947— European and Global Aspects of Postwar Relations the Soviet Union (Documents)* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992), 149.

of the treatment of the German Question was indicative of a convivialist approach in the way that the great powers configured the postwar international order. Partition, accomplished in 1949 with the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Democratic Republic of Germany, would prevent the revival of Germany as a disruptive power. Securing a foothold in Germany was the minimum aim of Soviet policy in Germany. By the time the Allies met at the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers in March–April 1947, there was already a realization that the "Soviet bridgehead in Germany" would be consolidated.[39] The process of Sovietization that took place in Germany was a test tube for the establishment of Eastern European regimes that were friendly toward the geopolitical interests espoused by the Soviet Union. By retaining a foothold in Germany and accelerating the implementation of mechanisms needed to Sovietize the zone of occupation, the Soviet Union sent a clear message regarding its willingness to institutionalize a system of states favorable to Moscow's geopolitical designs. Germany was the only country that was potentially capable of launching a revisionist drive against Moscow within the geographical area controlled by the Red Army. The subjugation of the eastern zone of occupation in Germany sent a powerful message to any revisionist elements regarding Moscow's geopolitical intentions in the postwar scenario. The message was that the Soviet Union would do anything within its power to secure its sphere of influence, starting with the application of hegemonic practices in the part of Germany that was under its direct control.

In 1947, American officials held the view that the increase in tensions between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations would lead to a tough stance on the part of the Soviet Union at the Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers, particularly in regard to the issue of reparations from the Western zones of occupation in Germany.[40] By 1948, the spectrum of political and economic Sovietization proceeded in accordance with the specific circumstances present in each country and the cultural commonalities that existed vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. For instance, Sovietization proceeded at a more careful pace in Hungary than in Romania and Bulgaria.[41] The ideological stance adopted by the Soviet Union demarcated the scope of interests vis-à-vis the Western powers. Stalin was aware of the implications of stationing Red Army troops in Eastern Europe. The Soviet scheme of foreign policy in the postwar era was guided by Stalin's idea that, "[e]veryone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach."[42] Germany was a pivotal element in the scheme of foreign policy deployed by the Soviet Union. The security needs of the Soviet Union could only be fulfilled by establishing a permanent geopolitical presence in Germany. In order to accomplish that goal, the Soviet Union was eager to prevent the revival of an independent and militaristic Germany. This was a concern that was shared

---

39. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, January 7, 1947—FRUS, Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria (1947), 140.
40. Memorandum by the Secretary of the Office of the Political Adviser for German Affairs (Morris), FRUS, 1947. Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria, 887–88.
41. The Minister in Hungary (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, Budapest, January 6, 1948—FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 279.
42. M. Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (London: Penguin, 1962), 80.

by the United States. The Department of State held the view that, "the greatest danger confronting the occupying powers is the emergence of a Germany able and ready to play off these powers against each other."[43] The occupation of the eastern part of Germany was used by Moscow as a test tube for the Sovietization of the countries occupied by the Red Army. The "percentages agreement" agreed by Stalin and Churchill in 1944 (with the tacit agreement of Roosevelt) gave a clear indication that the split in Europe would evolve according to the logical pursuit of the national interests and within the framework of cohabitation, rather than being subject to blind ideological considerations.[44] Stalin held the view that the "question of borders" in Eastern Europe would be decided by military force. In this context, the discussion over the "percentages agreement" was, as far as Stalin was concerned, a negotiation over something that was already being decided by military means.[45]

Soviet thinking regarding the use of military force for the purposes of consolidating a buffer zone capable of protecting Moscow's security needs was quite rationalist in nature. The concept of a buffer zone ran counter to the idea of the expansion of military power beyond the extent that was needed to satisfy the security requirements of the Soviet Union. Soviet thinking on Germany and the international order evolved with national interest concerns in mind; as such, it unfolded in a cautious and highly rationalistic way. Ivan Maisky, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in charge of the reparations program, submitted a memorandum on January 11, 1944, calling for the creation of a "long period" of peace that would guarantee the security of the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario. Maisky stressed the need for the Soviet Union "to emerge from [the] war with favourable strategic frontiers." This "long period" of peace would allow the Soviet Union to become sufficiently strong to fend off any aggressive stance against her in Europe and Asia. Maisky also envisaged a situation in which Europe could become socialist, thereby excluding the possibility of conflict in that part of the world.[46] The elimination of aggressive tendencies toward the Soviet Union was partly facilitated by the emergence of a "middle way" approach to the management of the economies of the Western European nations and the influence that social democratic ideological thinking had on the configuration of the political compact of those nations in the postwar era. In mid-December 1944 Maxim Litvinov, chairman of the Foreign Ministry's Commission for the preparation of peace treaties, advocated the creation of

---

43. Miscellaneous German Files 1943–5 E.1174.E 59/250/49/4/4-5-The Permanent Objectives of American Policy Toward Germany.

44. See E. Mark, "Charles E. Bohlen and the Limits of Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe," *Diplomatic History*, 3, 2 (1979), 201–14; Mark, E. "American Policy Toward Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1946: An Alternative Explanation," *Journal of American History* (1981), 313–36.

45. S. Sebag-Montefiore, *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2014), 476.

46. See A. Filitov, "Problems of Post-War Construction of Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions During World War Two," in F. Gori and S. Pons (eds.), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, 1943–53 (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996).

regional groupings within the framework of the United Nations and under the aegis of the great powers with interests in the respective regions. There was a significant concern on the part of the Soviet leadership regarding the necessity to exercise great-power management to ensure the smooth functioning of interstate relations in the postwar period. Litvinov emphasized that the setting of "security zones" would only entail mutually beneficial military arrangements between the great and the small powers.[47] The Soviet Union regarded the curtailment of sovereignty of the nations that made up its sphere of influence as a necessary pre-requisite for the stability of the international order.

The configuration of spheres of influence originated in the pursuit of the war against the Axis. During the last stages of the war, the Red Army was instructed to hinder the advance of the Western powers into Eastern Europe.[48] By April–May 1945, Soviet strategy in the field of foreign policy revolved around two main aims. To begin with, the Soviet Union made significant efforts to consolidate its geopolitical foothold in Eastern Europe and to avert the possibility of British and American interference in that region.[49] The determination of the Soviet Union to capture Berlin was a symbolic element in the foreign policy strategy to be employed in the postwar scenario. The imposition of rigid spheres of influence, as they emerged from the liberation of Eastern Europe by the Red Army, constituted an important aspect of the institutionalization of the international order. Moscow viewed the element of interventionism as a mechanism needed to enforce specific bottom-line security interests. Stalin regarded cooperation with the Western powers as a preferable way of solving contentious issues.[50] The establishment of a sphere of influence in Germany and Eastern Europe was seen as an instrument that would prevent a slide into an overt confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The consolidation of a Soviet sphere of influence responded to the need to avoid encirclement by any hostile powers. The creation of a geostrategic space in Eastern Europe indicated a reaction to what was seen as the aggressive deployment of US foreign policy. The Soviet Union operated cautiously and with strict regard to the norms of behavior forged through the diplomatic interaction with the Western Allies during World War II. The establishment of a buffer zone in the Intermarium had the tacit support of the United States, which was not willing to risk a war in order to absorb the Central and Eastern European nations into its sphere of influence. The United States acknowledged, as far as its geostrategic objectives were concerned, that the Eastern European countries were "[o]f secondary importance on the European scene." This situation entailed that the United States would give up the possibility of extending its sphere of influence to the eastern part of the continent. The Department of State underlined that, "in the current two-world struggle [the eastern European countries] have meaning primarily because

---

47. V. Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War—Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–5* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 231–32.
48. V. Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War—Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–5* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 269.
49. C. Kennedy-Pipe, *Stalin's Cold War* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 66.
50. V. Zubok and C. Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 276–77.

they are in varying degrees politico-military adjuncts of Soviet power and extend that power into the heart of Europe."[51] This passage indicates that the Soviet Union put together a scheme of foreign policy that could be recognized as legitimate by the United States. The Intermarium constituted a geopolitical realm that was established with the primary intention of securing the most basic geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union in the postwar era.

The evolution of Soviet foreign policy unfolded according to the circumstances imposed by the interaction between the superpowers in Germany. The Soviet Union adhered to its own "grand design," aimed at preventing encirclement by the West. This strategy did not preclude the possibility of attaining a convivial settlement with the United States in regard to the management of the international order. The notion of vital areas of interest and the "two camps" theory endorsed by Andrei Zhdanov, Chairman of the Soviet Union between 1946 and 1947, entailed an underlying idea of coexist-ence between "the imperialist and anti-democratic camp" and the "anti-imperialist and democratic camp" in the postwar scenario.[52] Postwar Soviet foreign policy was informed by a feeling of anxiety regarding the intentions of its putative enemies. There was a preference among Soviet leaders for creating pragmatic diplomatic openings that would allow Moscow breathing space in order to entrench the socialist system of government at home and in its buffer zone.[53] This can be seen in the signing of the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact in 1939. The security strategy that emerged in the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II was defensive in nature. The "Iron Curtain" speech made by Churchill in 1946 prompted Stalin to highlight the need to reinforce the sphere of influence established by the Soviet Union in Germany and Eastern Europe. Stalin stated that, "Churchill [wanted] to unleash war with a race theory, asserting that only English-speaking nations are superior nations, who are called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world."[54] The Soviet press reported Churchill's speech as "anti-Soviet in essence" and as a "'call to war' inspired by [the] Anglo-Saxon doctrine of racial superiority."[55] Nevertheless, Churchill's speech made reference to the need to establish a strong frame-work of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom while acknow-ledging the security needs of the Soviet Union.[56] There was also a willingness on the

51. Policy Planning Staff Paper, Washington, August 25, 1949, FRUS, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union (1949), 21.

52. Speech by Andrei Zhdanov (member of the Soviet Politburo) at the founding of the Cominform (a Communist International Organization) in September 1947—educ.jmu.edu/~vannorwc/assets/ghist%20102–150/pages/readings/zhdanovspeech.html

53. See V. Mastny "Imagining War in Europe: Soviet Strategic Planning," in V. Mastny, S. Holtsmark and A. Wegner (eds.), *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West* (London: Routledge, 2013).

54. J. Stalin, Interview to "Pravda" Correspondent Concerning Mr. Winston Churchill's Speech at Fulton, March 1946, "J. V. Stalin on Post-War International Relations," *Soviet News*.

55. Ambassador Smith, Department of State, Incoming Telegram, April 5, 1946—http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/

56. W. Churchill, *The Sinews of Peace* ("Iron Curtain Speech") March 5, 1946—www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/120-the-sinews-of-peace

part of the United States to create the basis for a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union. Ambassador Smith attempted to assuage Stalin's fears regarding the possible launch of an aggressive war against the Soviet Union:

> While the United States could appreciate Soviet desires for security and participation in exploiting the world's raw materials, and consequently did not strongly criticize what seem to be some of the Soviet objectives, the methods used by the Soviet Union caused grave apprehension, and gave the general impression in America that the Soviet government did not mean what it said. Neither the American people nor the American government could take seriously the possibility of aggressive action against the Soviet Union by any nation or group of nations in the world today.[57]

In spite of the hostile rhetoric that emanated from both camps, there seemed to be a tacit acknowledgment of the need to incorporate the legitimate aspirations of both superpowers in order to create an international order capable of fulfilling their respective geopolitical designs in the postwar era. By restricting the sphere of influence to Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union was able to give shape to the institutionalized order that emerged after the end of World War II. This is because the retrenchment into a specific sphere of influence contained the possible expansion of Soviet influence into the "industrial perimeter." This state of affairs is indicative of the existence of a pragmatic approach to the solution of the problems that affected the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario. Moscow's main concern was to prevent a situation in which Germany or another hostile Western power would attempt to launch another military attack on the Soviet Union. From this perspective, the configuration of the spheres of influence fulfilled an important role in the institutionalization of the international order. The establishment of a buffer zone was an element that recreated the spectrum of institutionalization in accordance with the specific political expediencies that emerged after the war.[58] The demarcation of spheres of influence ensured that the conflictual aspects of the relations between the superpowers would not lead to the disruption of the institutionalized order. The idea of a buffer zone has an important geopolitical component attached to it. The Soviet Union wanted to prevent the emergence of an independent Intermarium, in the same way that the United States wanted to prevent the emergence of a revisionist Western Europe. During World War II, there were various proposals for the configuration of a Central European federation, to be split into Danubian, Balkan and Polish–Baltic components. At the Washington Conference of 1943, Churchill advanced ideas to the American

---

57. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 5, 1946 – United States Department of State/Foreign relations of the United States, 1946. Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946) http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/

58. S. Steinmo and K. Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth (eds.), *Structuring Politics—Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 16–17.

government for the federalization of the European continent.[59] Former Polish officials exiled in Western Europe made efforts to raise support for a Central European Federation, possibly split into a southern and northern groupings in the event of the liberation of the Intermarium from the Soviet yoke.[60] There were also various federalist proposals coming from Central European exile organizations, such as the Free Intermarium Charter of 1945 and the recommendation made by the Convention Draft of the Paris Club, which broached the creation of common economic and diplomatic structures in Central Europe after the end of the war.[61] The Intermarium, stuck between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, was seen by the Soviet leadership as a geopolitical realm that could be absorbed into a Communist Bloc. Although the Intermarium countries did not have political and economic principles that were identical to Communist Russia, they were not in a position to join the Western European bloc of nations. The differences in political culture and economic development, and the possible geopolitical quarrels that could have developed with the Soviet Union prevented the possibility of a strategic rapprochement between Western Europe and the Intermarium countries. The idea of a buffer zone needs to be understood as the geopolitical encroachment of the Soviet Union into the European continent, deployed according to a cautious approach that was designed to avoid the onset of overt conflict. This *modus operandi* followed the geopolitical vision espoused by prominent Soviet officials such as Ivan Maisky, regarding the international order that would emerge from the ashes of World War II:

> The British Empire will be significantly weaker […] not disintegration, but transformation) […] Against this background, two powers will present a somewhat different picture-the USSR and the USA. The USSR […] emerging from the war with a powerful army, a vast industry, mechanized agriculture and a wealth of raw materials, it will be the mightiest international power. The socialist system will help the USSR to overcome the grave consequences of the war faster than other countries. The USA, in its turn, will become the second-largest power because it will, by all appearances, suffer least from the war and will maintain its strength to a greater degree than anyone else.[62]

The Soviet Union fought the war with the specific intention of preventing another attack on its territorial integrity. The absorption of the Intermarium into the Soviet sphere of influence resulted from the primacy of geopolitical concerns over ideological considerations. The commonalities that existed between the Soviet Union and the Intermarium countries were seized by Moscow as an opportunity to accomplish certain geopolitical

---

59. Memorandum Proposed by the British Embassy, May 22, 1943—FRUS, Conferences at Washington and Quebec (1943), 168.
60. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Stevens), Washington, March 8, 1948—FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 405.
61. T. Lane and M. Wolański, *Poland and European Integration: The Ideas and Movements of Polish Exiles in the West, 1939–91* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 62–65.
62. G. Gorodetsky (ed.), *The Maisky Diaries—Red Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 1932–1943* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2015), 426.

aims. Calls for "Slavic unity" were nothing more than an excuse to retain a firm grip on the area of Europe that could have exercised an independent stance capable of upsetting a balance of power favorable to the Soviet Union and the United States. A putative "fourth bloc" of European nations (with Western Europe being, potentially, a "third bloc") could have diminished the capacity of the Soviet Union to entrench its security needs and to consolidate its hegemonic status in the postwar era. Therefore, the entrenchment of the security needs of the Soviet Union was closely linked to the attainment of the geopolitical control of the Intermarium.

7.4 The "National Front" Strategy and Its Role in the Legitimization of the Communist Political System in Eastern Europe

The Soviet Union imposed its political will on the countries liberated by the Red Army by establishing broad coalitions with other political parties. In turn, this would lead to the takeover of the system of government by communist forces and the establishment of "people's democracies." Unlike the eastern zone of occupation in Germany, which underwent a full-blown process of Sovietization after 1945, the political future of Eastern Europe remained relatively open for the first two years following liberation from Nazi rule. In some cases, strategic security needs and weak local communist parties led to direct Soviet control, as seen in the cases of Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. The "national front" strategy had already been evaluated by the time of the Seventh Congress of COMINTERN in 1935. By then, the aims of the communist movement had come to be identified with the geopolitical aims of the Soviet Union. In practical terms, this entailed that the priority was the defeat of Fascism, possibly in conjunction with "bourgeois" political parties.[63] In a letter signed by Georgi Dimitrov and Dmitriy Manuilsky for the attention of Stalin and Molotov in May 1943, it was stated that the cause of the working class was to be advanced, "in accordance with the best historical traditions of the national-liberation struggle of each given country."[64] The Department of State acknowledged that the support given by certain segments of the population to communist elements in Eastern Europe responded to the willingness to make a clear break with the political compact that prevailed in that region before the onset of World War II. US Department of State officials stated that the "activist policy of the Communists has gained for their organizations many members who are not communist sympathizers but who are disgusted with the conservatism, political bickering and passive resistance policies of the exile governments."[65] The tripartite Allied commissions set up in Eastern Europe were given the task of overseeing the fulfillment of the legal provisions agreed upon during the Yalta Conference. However, the presence of the Red Army hampered

---

63. E. H. Carr, *The Twilight of the Comintern, 1930–1935* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1982), 424–25.
64. A. Dallin and F. Firsov (eds.), *Dimitrov and Stalin, 1943–1945—Letters from the Soviet Archives* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 231.
65. Memorandum by Mr. Elbridge Durbrow of the Division of Eastern Europe Affairs, Washington, February 3, 1944—FRUS, 1944, Europe, 815.

the efforts to establish a democratic order in the region. This methodology had important pragmatic elements attached to it. Communist ideology was used by the Soviet Union to accomplish its most basic geopolitical goals.[66] The policies implemented by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe were propped up by the "national front" strategy, described by American officials as "sham coalition government(s) with Communists pulling the strings." Interestingly, the American representatives to the Allied control commissions in countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania complained about the "lack of clear-cut guidance on major matters of policy."[67] This state of affairs denotes the tacit acknowledgement of the American authorities regarding the configuration of the spheres of influence that was taking place on the European continent in the aftermath of World War II. The Soviet Union attempted to establish a functional sense of unity in Eastern Europe for the purposes of preventing the onset of another war of aggression by the Western powers.[68] Applebaum argues that both "Stalin and Hitler shared contempt for the very notion of national sovereignty for any of the nations of Eastern Europe."[69] In this context, Eurasianism became a powerful influencer in deciding which countries should form part of the Soviet sphere of influence. Soviet foreign policy was, to some extent, based on the idea of an "intercultural" political order, stemming from the principle of coexistence that informed the bipolar system of states.[70]

Romania occupied a central position in the scheme of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era. The strategy deployed by the Soviet Union was to participate in the coalition government and, most importantly, to infiltrate the military and security apparatus in order to establish communist rule.[71] By October 1946, the Department of State had issued reports about the lack of willingness of the Romanian government to ensure that elections would take place in a free environment, citing the, "suppression of personal liberties of candidates and their adherents."[72] By October 1947, all members of the opposition had been dismissed. The economy also took great strides toward Sovietization. Furthermore, the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party announced their merging in a "United Workers' Party" and members of the cabinet from other parties were dismissed and replaced by communists.[73] There was a similar pattern of communist takeover in Bulgaria. By early 1946, there were reports about the unwillingness

66. See E. Mark (2011), "Revolution by Degrees: Stalin's National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941–1947," The Cold War International History Project Working Paper, no. 31, 1–46.

67. The Acting Representative in Bulgaria (Horner) to the Secretary of State, Sofia, June 24, 1947, FRUS, 1947. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 14.

68. M. Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (London: Penguin, 1962), 81.

69. A. Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956 (London: Doubleday, 2013), 110 [EPUB].

70. A. Dugin, Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism (New York: Artkos Media Ltd., 2015), 88.

71. S. Roper, Romania: The Unfinished Revolution (London: Routledge, 2000), 16.

72. The Representative in Romania (Berry) to the Secretary of State, Bucharest, October 26, 1946, FRUS, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), 643.

73. R. R. Betts (ed.), Central and South East Europe 1945–1948 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 13–16.

of Bulgarian communists and the Soviet authorities to acquiesce to the establishment of a more representative government in Bulgaria. In late 1946 Georgi Dimitrov, a communist, was installed as the country's prime minister. His cabinet consisted of nine communists, five members of the Agrarian Party, two Socialists and two Zveno ministers.[74] The popular front government consolidated its position throughout the country and in December 1947 passed a new constitution that protected private property, but gave the state broad powers to reorganize economic activity.[75] The "Fatherland Front" established by the Bulgarian Communist Party took "the line of the Seventh Congress of the COMINTERN" in 1935, which entailed the reconciliation of Marxism with the specific needs of each nation. This policy entailed the collaboration between the Bulgarian Communist Party and noncommunist forces within the Popular Front political compact devised by Dimitrov.[76]

Poland was the most important Soviet geopolitical foothold in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union regarded Poland "as having been a reactionary state, oppressing both its national minorities and its own workers and peasants." The country was governed by an authoritarian regime in the lead-up to World War II. This state of affairs caused the Soviet leadership to consider the reconstitution of the country's system of government within the context of the emerging geopolitical scenario. The Soviet Union held the view that, "the territories which she herself has already occupied […] should certainly not be given back to Poland at all, and that the purely Polish-inhabited areas should not be given to any [conservative] Polish government.[77] The main geopolitical orientation employed by the Soviet Union revolved around depriving Poland of territorial possessions in the deeper segment of the Intermarium while enabling her to acquire territory formerly belonging to Germany. Moscow pressed for the incorporation of Eastern Prussia and Silesia into Polish territory. The increasingly friendly attitude of the Polish government toward Moscow became apparent in early 1946, during the negotiations for a loan from the United States. Some members of the Polish government accused Washington of advocating a "capitalistic" attitude toward the country.[78] Noncommunist leaders highlighted the fact that the Western powers did not exert a lot of effort to stop the communization of Poland. Stanisław Mykołajczyk, the Prime Minister of Poland in Exile between 1943 and 1944, pointed out that in the aftermath of World War II, Poland looked to the "Big Three to carry out the solemn promises made to what President Roosevelt once called 'the inspiration of the nations—Poland.'" Mykołajczyk stated that, "those pacts [had] been callously broken by Russia with only 'paper protests' from the

---

74. The Representative in Bulgaria (Barnes) to the Secretary of State, Sofia, January 15, 1946, FR*US, 1946. Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union* (1946), 53.
75. R. R. Betts (ed.), *Central and South East Europe 1945–1948* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1971), 46–49.
76. Y. Sygkelos, *Nationalism from the Left: The Bulgarian Communist Party During the Second World War and the Early Post-War Years* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 54.
77. D. Pritt, *Light on Moscow—Soviet Policy Analysed* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1939), 153.
78. The Ambassador to Poland (Lane) to the Secretary of State, Warsaw, January 5, 1946—FRUS 1946. *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union* (1946), 374.

remaining parties to the pledges, and no one has dared to raise a protesting voice in UN."[79] This statement provides evidence that attests to the fact that the communization of Poland was aided by the acquiescence of the Western powers. Jan Ciechanowski, the ambassador of Poland to the United States presented a formal complaint to Edward Stettinius in July 1945 regarding the official recognition of the United States of Poland's Provisional Government of National Unity, which included communist leaders. The ambassador stated that "for the second time in the history of the Polish Nation, it is being deprived of its independence, though this time not as a result of the events that took place in Eastern Europe alone, but as a result of a war which the United Nations waged in the name of law and justice."[80] The proclamation of the Council of National Unity, issued in July 1945, stated the disappointment of the Polish political leadership with the increasing influence of the Soviet Union in Polish affairs, on the grounds that Fighting Poland and the Underground Movement were in cahoots with Germany.[81] The process of Sovietization was also facilitated by the great losses suffered by the Polish armed forces. In October 22, 1945, Stalin agreed to Lavrentii Beria's proposal to retain in the "NKVD camps, arrested for spying [and] participation in diversion-terrorist and fascist organizations" a total of 14,721 Poles.[82] The Soviet Union was willing to exert a significant degree of violence in order to Communize Poland.

The "national front" strategy used by the Soviet Union in Poland was delineated in the spring of 1943, when Moscow sent instructions to Polish communists for the formation of a "united front" with the Polish Socialist Party. The strategy to be laid out for the purposes of gaining power was based on the projection of slogans such as "democratic power" and "national freedom."[83] The "national front" strategy was deployed by the Polish Workers' Party, which in 1948 morphed into the Polish United Workers Party, after its merger with the Polish Socialist Party. The Polish United Workers Party seized control of the system of government and established a strong collaboration with the Soviet Union. Then in 1944 the advancing Red Army did not decisively aid the Polish forces that participated in the Warsaw Uprising. The uprising, which was defeated, had been instigated by the Polish Home Army, which embraced a nationalist stance in political matters. After the war, the Soviet Union was interested in having a friendly government in Poland. The Polish leadership had to deal with a situation of utter economic destruction and what they felt was a lack of interest on the part of the United States in regard to the provision of funds needed to reconstruct the country's economy.[84] These

79. S. Mykołajczyk, *The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1948), 250.

80. Z. Szkopiak, *The Yalta Agreements—Documents Prior to, During and After the Crimean Conference, 1945* (London: Polish Government in Exile, 1986), 40–43.

81. The General Sikorski Historical Institute, *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, 1939–1945, vol. 2, 1943–1945 (London: Heinemann, 1961), 623.

82. W. Matierski, *Kremlin versus Poland 1939–1945—Documents from the Soviet Archives* (Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland: Institute of Political Studies, 1996), 107.

83. A. Kemp-Welch, *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 17–18.

84. The Ambassador in Poland (Gallman) to the Secretary of State, Washington, October 16, 1948, FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 573.

are factors that ultimately contributed to the establishment of a communist government in Poland.

The takeover pattern was slower in Hungary. In early 1946, the Department of State stated that the, "communist minority in Hungary[,] which is pressing for Soviet-Hungarian economic collaboration[,] continues to make effective use of the argument that Western Powers[,] including America[,] are disinterested in this country's welfare and that therefore Hungary's survival depends only on Soviet good will."[85] Although Socialist and Smallholders Party members remained in government, they were not able to influence the political process in any significant way. The apparent willingness to cooperate with other political parties disguised the fact that the communists acted under Stalin's orders. The evidence suggests that Sovietization had been intended from as early as 1945.[86] The Communist Party employed entryist tactics in order to gain control of the Hungarian government. These tactics included the utilization of nationalist overtones for the purposes of coopting "workers and small peasants out of conviction, intellectuals out of idealism, civil servants out of fear and opportunism, lumpen elements out of fortune-seeking" and former "Arrowcross men," who were promised impunity in exchange for collaboration with the communists.[87] By February 1948, Hungary and the Soviet Union had signed an alliance treaty that guaranteed communist control of the Hungarian political system.[88]

The communist takeover of Hungary was facilitated by the eagerness of the leaders who had been exiled in Moscow (such as Mátyás Rákosi, Mihály Farkas, Ernő Gëro and József Révai) to suppress the influence of the communist leaders who had remained in the country during the war.[89] The tactics put in place by the Hungarian Communist Party and the Soviet administrators included the gradual cooption of left-wing elements and the control of the bureaucratic and security apparatus. These circumstances led to the loss of power of the Smallholders Party and the replacement of Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy with Lajos Dinnyés.[90] The Western powers complained about Nagy's dismissal. The Soviet representative at the inter-allied commission replied that those who suggested the possibility of a communist takeover were recalcitrant elements that conspired against Hungary from "abroad."[91] The analysis of documents related to the meetings

85. The Minister in Hungary (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State, Budapest, February 9, 1946—*FRUS*, 1946. Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), 256.

86. L. Bohri, *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014), 5; Borhi, L. "The Merchants of the Kremlin: The Economic Roots of Soviet Expansion in Hungary," Working Paper No. 28 (Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project 2011), 1.

87. L. Kontler, *Millennium in Central Europe: A History of Hungary* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 392–93.

88. The Minister in Hungary (Chapin) to the Secretary of State, March 12, 1948—FRUS Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 309.

89. B. Cartledge, *The Will to Survive—A History of Hungary* (London: Timewell Press, 2006), 436–37.

90. L. Izsák, *A Political History of Hungary, 1944–1990* (Budapest: Eötvös University Press, 2002), 117.

91. The Acting Chairman of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary (Sviridov) to the Chief of the United States Representation on the Allied Control Commission (Weems), Budapest, June 14, 1947—FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 320.

held between the Eastern European leaders and Stalin regarding the configuration of a Communist Bloc denotes a sense of subservience to Moscow's diktat. According to a record of the conversation between Stalin and Zoltán Tildy, the Hungarian president, in February 1948, Tildy told Stalin that Hungary intended to have good relations with its neighbors.[92] It appears that Stalin was interested in ensuring that there would not be any friction in the scheme of relations between the nations of the Intermarium in the postwar period, as this would have impaired the possibility of constructing a unified Communist Bloc. The Soviet leadership wanted to avoid a situation in which the Intermarium countries would establish a bloc of nations capable of establishing an independent stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The joint declaration for a Polish–Czechoslovak federation of 1942 was an important antecedent in the efforts to create a Central European entity capable of acquiring its own independent geopolitical stance in the postwar scenario. Hungarian leaders highlighted the fact that the Western powers did not exert a consistent effort to prevent the communist takeover in Hungary. Nagy stated that the Western powers could have done more to sign an early peace treaty, as this would have allowed the democratic elements within Hungary to reorganize much more quickly and prevent a communist takeover.[93]

In Czechoslovakia, there was genuine pro-Soviet sentiment among the people, thankful for the liberation of the country by the Red Army. In May 1946, the communists obtained more than a third of the vote in a free election. The Soviet authorities worked to make sure that the Czechoslovak authorities would align their policies to Moscow's diktat. In February 1946, the Czechoslovak government desisted from requesting a loan from the United States because of the reluctance of some of its members to expand trade ties with the West as well as the pressure exercised by the Soviet Union on the matter.[94] Paradoxically, the Department of State held the view that the "national front" instrument moderated the influence of the Communist Party in countries such as Czechoslovakia.[95] During the 1945–48 period, Moscow worked to ensure that the Slavic nations would acquiesce to the process of bloc-formation desired by the Soviet Union. The establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe also depended on ensuring that the Eastern European countries would be willing to participate in such an arrangement. In spite of the drive for accommodation, the idea that the Intermarium could be incorporated into a Communist Bloc of nations appeared to be a legitimate option for the Soviet leadership. According to the Czechoslovak government minutes of a meeting held with Stalin in 1946,

---

92. Record of Conversation between J. V. Stalin and President of Hungary Zoltán Tildy in Moscow, February 17, 1948—digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118465.pdf?v=5be b7486fc8c99f5b593ac0fdbdb3447

93. See F. Nagy, *The Struggle behind the Iron Curtain*, trans. S. K. Swift (London: The Macmillan Company, 1948).

94. The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Prague, February 26, 1946, FRUS, 1946, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, 185.

95. The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Prague, June 19, 1947—*FRUS*, 1947, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 213.

the Soviets would welcome the settling of mutual relations between the two Slavic nations. This was discussed and generalissimo Stalin announced that he would be glad if an agreement could be reached soon […] He is for at least a partial agreement and an improvement of mutual attitudes. The members of the delegation informed the generalissimo about all the efforts which Czechoslovakia undertook with respect to Poland with this intention, and the minister had the opportunity to demonstrate during these conversations several details of the excessively difficult negotiations with the Poles.[96]

In February 1948, the communists realized the likelihood of being defeated in the upcoming elections and staged an outright takeover. The communists campaigned for the parliamentary elections to be based on a single ticket list, composed of National Front party members and ratified by the electorate in a referendum. Anti-communist purges ensued at universities, the press, professional bodies, the military and the civil service. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the road to Sovietization was established in three stages, starting with a, "fateful re-definition of the role of the Czech state in the European scene" and eventually leading to the replacement of local culture "as a prelude for the incorporation of Central Europe into the Soviet Empire."[97] The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was able to capitalize on the anti-German sentiment that prevailed in the country in the aftermath of the war to establish itself as the guardian of the national interest. The communist leadership was able to demarcate the boundaries between friend and foe by highlighting the contribution the Red Army played in the liberation of the country.[98]

The spectrum of Soviet economic domination in Eastern Europe was the subject of a British Foreign Office memorandum, which stated that "Russia's policy […] is] ruthlessly despoiling the countries occupied by the Red Army[, …] using their puppets to gear the economics of these countries to the Soviet machine." The memorandum also stated that the Soviet Union was "making exclusive commercial treaties and securing a predominant share in the control of basic industries from Germany and the Adriatic right across to Manchuria."[99] The instrument of entryism provided by the "national front" strategy went hand in hand with the application of full scale Sovietization. Soviet advisers and specialists were incorporated into the local apparatus for the purposes of ensuring standardization and obedience. Postwar circumstances were favorable to a communist takeover. The diktat of the Soviet Union filled a power vacuum originated by the German occupation and the disjuncture brought to the domestic political systems by World War II. The establishment of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe had as its

---

96. Notes from Czechoslovak Government Meeting Detailing Discussion from a Previous Meeting with Stalin, July 26, 1946, Translated from Czech into English—digitalarchive.wilsoncenter. org/document/110536.pdf?v=4d9b1344809943d457fdb4d89fcf8a78
97. I. Sviták, *The Unbearable Burden of History—The Sovietization of Czechoslovakia, vol. 1: From Munich to Yalta* (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1990), 112.
98. H. Renner, *A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 7.
99. Memorandum by Mr. Warner, Foreign Office, April 2, 1946—*Documents on British Policy Overseas (London: HMSO) (Series I, Vol. I) (1991)—Eastern Europe, August 1945–April 1946*, 346–47.

ultimate purpose the creation of political parties aligned to the mechanisms that would guide Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era. Until 1947, the "national front" strategy, based on the initial acceptance of the principles of parliamentary democracy, national autonomy, and a gradual transition to socialism, was still a viable option. However, the Truman Doctrine, the expulsion of the French and Italian communist parties from government and the introduction of the ERP irretrievably changed the political situation in Eastern Europe toward full Sovietization. The "national front" strategy ultimately served as a mechanism to gain a foothold in an area of the world that was deemed of vital geostrategic importance to the Soviet Union. Moscow was willing to apply the instrument of terror in order to maintain its geopolitical dominance in Eastern Europe.[100]

One of the salient features of the process of Sovietization that took place in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of World War II was the lack of effective support for the opposition parties on the part of the Western powers. This coincides with the pattern of institutionalization that emerged in the international order. The management of the nascent international order entailed the application of an effective scheme of intervention restricted to the spheres of influence demarcated by the superpowers. Western support for the Eastern European countries would have intensified conflict over parts of Europe that were not vital to the primary geopolitical objectives of the United States. Direct intervention was needed in the industrial core of Western Europe for the purposes of preventing a communist takeover. Eastern Europe did not merit the application of the same interventionist policy. At the same time, the Soviet Union was not willing to aid communist and left-wing elements that could have overtaken the systems of government in Italy and France. This modality would ensure the basis of coexistence in the postwar scenario. The configuration of the national front strategy indicates the willingness of the Soviet leadership to ensure that Moscow would be able to have a major say in the management of the postwar international order. Moscow's objective was to ensure that the nations that were part of its sphere of influence would be aligned to its geopolitical grand design. There was also a disposition to allow certain ideological deviations within the countries that formed part of the Communist Bloc. Taking into consideration the circumstances that prevailed in each geographical locale was an aspect of paramount importance for ensuring a modicum of political legitimacy of the "peoples' democracies." The Soviet Union had a genuine motivation in helping the Intermarium nations to reconstitute their economies after the devastation suffered during the war. At the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it was stated that "thanks to economic progress, the living standards of the people in the socialist countries have improved…the revolutionary reorganization of society in the fraternal countries during the early years was inevitably accompanied by considerable losses and difficulties[,] and large sums had to be spent to overcome the economic backwardness inherited from capitalism."[101] However, Moscow's ultimate aim was to establish a bloc of nations whose

---

100. R. Brackman, *The Secret File of Joseph Stalin—A Hidden Life* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 310.
101. *The Road to Communism—Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union-October 17–31, 1961*, Foreign Languages Publishing Department, Moscow, 18.

foreign policy would be in alignment with the geostrategic needs of the Soviet Union. The process of institutionalization that emerged in the postwar period reflected Russia's traditional stance of keeping its sphere of influence free from Western interference without directly confronting the Western powers.[102] This was an aspect of paramount importance for the purposes of bringing about the effective management of the postwar international order. In a speech delivered on November 6, 1945, Stalin stated that "[World organization] will be effective if the great powers which have borne the brunt of the war against Hitler's Germany continue to act in a spirit of unanimity and accord."[103] This passage indicates a tacit reference to the principle of noninterference in the spheres-of-influence system that was being configured as the fighting raged. The Soviet leadership made reference to the common cultural bonds between the Intermarium countries and the Soviet Union in order to justify the absorption of the Central European nations into the emerging Communist Bloc. In 1944, Soviet president Kalinin highlighted the need to attain an important measure of unity among the Slavic people, adding that "the fierce war which the Soviet people are prosecuting against the German invaders, and the victories of the Red Army naturally draw to our side all the freedom-loving peoples, especially the Slav peoples who are fighting for their freedom and independence."[104] The "national front" strategy was also geared toward preventing instances of revisionism in the Intermarium. The tepid support given to the communist side in the Greek Civil War attests to the concerns about preventing the establishment of independent centers of communist power in Southeastern Europe, which would have upset the emerging geopolitical equilibrium in the aftermath of World War II. Aleš Bebler, Yugoslavia's deputy foreign minister, highlighted that the independent stance taken by the partisan organizations that liberated the country was influential in establishing a good rapport with the Yugoslav people.[105] The entryist tactics applied by the Soviet Union in the Intermarium were aimed toward introducing an indigenous element in the process of communization. The "national front" strategy went some way toward ensuring that that the Soviet Union would be able to accomplish its geostrategic aims at a minimum cost. US Department of State officials highlighted the "Russian conviction that power is safe and most desirable when divorced from responsibility. Hence Russian predilection for seeking maximum of power and minimum of responsibility: for puppet states, front organizations and individual stooges."[106] The Greek Civil War is an eloquent example of the highly calculated moves taken by the Soviet Union in regard to the establishment of a geopolitical realm. Intervention was only exercised in the areas of Europe where

---

102. B. Frederking, *The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security Since the Cold War* (London: Routledge, 2007), 33.

103. J. Stalin, *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1945), 142.

104. M. Kalinin, *The Soviet President Speaks—Speeches, Broadcast Addresses, and Articles on the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union* (London: Hutchinson, 1945), 54.

105. See A. Bebler, *Peace and Greece*. The Permanent Delegation of The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, New York (1949).

106. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, July 15, 1945—FRUS, Europe (1945), 867.

the Soviet Union was able to use communist ideology for the purposes of advancing specific geopolitical aims. American officials indicated the importance of "the volume of assistance which International communist forces continues to provide from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to sustain the guerrilla movement."[107] The aid provided by communist forces stemmed from countries that had demonstrated an independent attitude toward Moscow. Yugoslav support for the communist elements was a show of force aimed at projecting the idea that Yugoslavia was prepared to fight for its political independence. The "national front" strategy and the abandonment of the idea of exporting the communist revolution were indicative of the will to contribute to the institutionalization of the postwar international order through the application of "deliberate political strategies."[108] The "national front" strategy created a metapolitical consciousness that established the notion that Communization was an indigenous process, rather than a phenomenon superimposed by Moscow. The "national front" strategy corroborates the idea that the Soviet Union used Communism as a redemptionist ideology that could be exported into areas of the world with a lesser level of economic development.

The "national front" strategy was informed by a metapolitical orientation that created the impression that the Soviet Union was not an imperialist power determined to apply the same coercive methods used by the United States in its sphere of influence. The "national front" strategy would be applied to the expansion of communist ideology into the Third World. The strategy of indigenization was of paramount significance for bolstering the geopolitical standing of the Soviet Union in the postwar international order. The "national front" strategy contributed to institutionalize the postwar system of states because it mirrored, to some extent, the strategy deployed by the United States in its sphere of influence. Ideological templates could not be exported wholesale to the countries that formed part of the superpowers' sphere of influence. Accommodation had to be made to the specific circumstances that prevailed in each locale. This *modus operandi* was applied to the superpowers' actions in Western Europe (in the case of the United States) and Central and Eastern Europe (in the case of the Soviet Union). The Soviet Union, just like the United States, was interested in advancing specific geopolitical interests. Ideology, per se, was a second-order consideration, made subject to the primordial needs and interests pertaining to the consolidation of Moscow's hegemonic position in the postwar international order.

7.5 Conclusion

The accomplishment of Soviet security needs contributed to institutionalize the postwar international order. The attainment of this goal necessitated a strategy based on the use

107. Fifth Report to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey, December 6, 1948. Truman Papers, Official File. OF 426: Foreign Aid-Greece and Turkey.
108. S. Steinmo and K. Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth (eds.), *Structuring Politics—Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 10.

of hard power in the areas earmarked as of significant importance to Moscow's geopolitical grand design. The fulfillment of Soviet security needs in the postwar era entailed the configuration of a postwar international based on the acknowledgment of the legitimate interests of the United States. Consequently, the security needs of the Soviet Union could only be accomplished by attaining a modicum of coexistence with the United States. This would be accomplished by refraining from expanding Soviet power into the US sphere of influence. The Soviet Union restricted the use of military power to the creation of a sphere of influence in Eastern Germany and Eastern Europe. The consolidation of a buffer zone in Eastern Europe and the clear decision to refrain from extending Soviet power into the Western part of the continent are elements that indicate the existence of a pragmatic approach to the solution of the problems that affected the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario. The main parameter used by the Soviet Union in the deployment of its scheme of foreign policy was the prevention of another major war launched by a hostile power. This objective was achieved by adopting a defensive rather than an offensive stance in geopolitical matters.

The foreign policy espoused by the Soviet Union under Stalin was not revisionist in the manner envisaged by Marx, Engels and Trotsky. The propagation of communist ideology was never intended to create momentum for an overhaul of the capitalist economic order as delineated by the United States. This is because the Soviet Union, under the leadership of Stalin, refused to disseminate a strategy based on the relentless pursuit of class warfare in every part of world, in the manner envisaged by orthodox Marxist ideology.[109] The Soviet leadership labored under a geopolitical perspective informed by the idea of "political actions [as] social ones" and the notion that "all military actions have political aims."[110] The strengthening of the communist system of government was influential in shaping the process of institutionalization that came about after World War II. The institutional perspective makes reference to the manner in which, "state and societal institutions […] shape how political actors define their interests and […] structure their relations of power to other groups."[111] From this standpoint, it could be argued that the articulation of the "national front" strategy underlined Moscow's willingness to use a significant degree of great power management in the postwar international order. The main purpose behind the reduction of the sovereignty of the nations that composed the Soviet sphere of influence was to align their systems of government with the strategic objectives of the Soviet Union. This modality entailed that the Soviet Union would have to permit certain deviations from the ideological blueprint outlined by Moscow. The establishment of "peoples' democracies" ensured that the countries that made up the

109. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, London, March 1850—www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/communist-league/1850-ad1.htm

110. J. Lider, *Correlation of Forces—An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist Concepts* (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), 1–2.

111. S. Steinmo and K. Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth (eds.), *Structuring Politics—Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 2.

Soviet sphere of influence would be able to retain a modicum of sovereignty; albeit in reference to Moscow's geopolitical preferences. Soviet foreign policy was guided by pragmatic geopolitical considerations rather than ideological concerns. The "national front" strategy and the process of bloc formation fulfilled the double purpose of maintaining the façade of cooperation while advancing the national interest of the Soviet Union. The scheme of foreign policy that was deployed by the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II was based on the need to establish a geopolitical foothold in occupied Germany. The presence of the Red Army in Eastern Germany would ensure that Germany or any other Western powers would be deterred from embarking on a war of aggression against the Soviet Union. At the same time, the establishment of a geopolitical foothold in Germany was crucial to maintain a firm grip on the Communist Bloc in the Intermarium.

Chapter Eight

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY AND THE FORMULATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POSTWAR ERA

8.1 Introduction

Communist ideology played an important role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era. Communism had already proven to be a useful instrument in defeating the Axis and maintaining the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. The efficacy of Communism emboldened the Soviet leadership to expand its geopolitical sway into the Intermarium, with the ultimate aim of creating a geopolitical realm that would ensure the fulfillment of the security needs of the Soviet Union. The first theme that will be explored in this chapter revolves around the idea that *the communist regime in the Soviet Union was strengthened as a result of the role that communism played in facilitating the victory over the Axis*. This meant, in practical terms, that Soviet Communism would facilitate the institutionalization of the postwar international order. The aspects of economic planning that are part and parcel of the communist ideology ensured that there would be an effective allocation of resources needed in order to defeat Nazi Germany and the Axis. The authoritarian nature of the communist regime was crucial in streamlining the decision-making process needed for the purposes of pursuing the Great Patriotic War in an effective manner. The outcome of World War II led to the recognition of Communism as a viable alternative to capitalism. This recognition, both at home and abroad, helped to consolidate the hegemonic position of the Soviet Union. The ideological narrative calibrated by the Soviet leadership endowed Moscow with "a sense of existential security" that was crucial to the extension of its geopolitical power.[1]

The second theme in this chapter relates to the idea that *the deployment of communist ideology did not hinder the possibility of establishing a modicum of cooperation with the capitalist democracies over a sustained period of time*. The Soviet leadership was prepared to engage in an assiduous diplomatic interaction with nations embracing a system of economic and political governance that was antithetical to Communism. The implementation of communist ideology was meant to entrench the geopolitical realm carved out in the Intermarium and to project an element of soft power among the progressive political parties in Western Europe. Most importantly, Soviet Communism did not shun the

---

1. M. Freeden, S. Lyman Tower and M. Stears (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 239.

possibility of cooperating with countries that embraced a different ideological template in political and economic matters. The Soviet Union had a precedent of establishing associative schemes with countries that had antithetical political systems, as seen in the overtures made toward Nazi Germany in the 1930s and the scheme of practical association established with the United States and the United Kingdom during World War II. The concept of institutionalization is informed by the idea that there is a gradual evolution in the configuration of the system of states as a result of "exogenous shocks."[2] World War II enabled the Soviet Union to strengthen its role as a purveyor of communist ideology. Although the Soviet Union exerted a great deal of influence among the Western European communist parties, the Soviet leadership acknowledged the necessity of preserving the distinct ideological orientation of Soviet Communism. This is an aspect of paramount importance in order to understand why the postwar international order was relatively stable. The Soviet Union exercised a careful and selective reading of Marxist ideology when it came to setting in motion the elements that would lead to the reconfiguration of the system of states.

The third theme examined in this chapter relates to the notion that *the distinct ideological edifice created to sustain the scheme of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era was informed by a strong Eurasianist component*. Russia, the main constituent entity of the Soviet Union, has traditionally seen itself as neither "West" nor "East." The Soviet scheme of foreign policy highlighted the divergence of values and interests vis-à-vis the Western world. In addition to this, *as an inland power, the Russian political leadership has traditionally regarded the position of the country as a Eurasian power as an aspect of paramount importance for sustaining the geopolitical status of Moscow as a prominent member of the international community.* The configuration of a specific "epistemic community" (bolstered by the configuration of the Communist Bloc) served as a "heuristic" mechanism that allowed Moscow to make informed decisions in the field of foreign policy.[3] Historically, Russia has been reticent to accept many of the social, political and economic tenets propounded by the Western nations. Russia has been traditionally encircled by the maritime powers of Western Europe and Japan. In the past, Russia responded to this situation by consolidating its geopolitical reach in the Eurasian continent. These are important considerations in order to understand the reasons behind the establishment of the spheres of influence system that operated during the Cold War. The absorption of the Intermarium into the Soviet sphere of influence contributed to institutionalizing the postwar international order by avoiding the advent of revisionist tendencies and the onset of disruptive war. The fourth theme to be examined concerns the idea that *the hardcore ideological aspects of communism were subordinated to the need to establish political control over the central part of the European continent.* Communist ideology was deployed, first and foremost, as a tool to establish a geopolitical grip over a large part of the European continent.

---

2. P. A. Sabatier and H. C. Jenkins-Smith, "The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment," in P. Sabatier (ed.), *Theories of the Policy Process* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 117–66.
3. K. Leicht and C. Jenkins (eds.), *Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective* (New York: Springer, 2012), 19.

8.2 The Strengthening of Communist Ideology in the Aftermath of World War II

Communist ideology established conditions that were essential for the attainment of victory in World War II. The Soviet leadership held the view that the fight against the Axis epitomized the struggle between the interests of the working class and international capitalism. According to the Soviet leadership, the capitalist class in the Western world used fascist rhetoric as a means of creating a false consciousness among the proletariat. The manner in which the Soviet Union withstood the Nazi invasion gave rise to a great deal of admiration in the Western world. There was a connection made between the valor displayed by the Soviet armed forces and the ideology that enabled the Soviet Union to carry the brunt of the fight against the Axis powers. The Soviet Union was able to marshal the resources needed to win the confrontation against the Axis by highlighting the state of legal equality enjoyed by the different nationalities within the Soviet Union and the common effort instigated by the workers of the Soviet Union in order to defeat the Axis. The official view that emanated from the Soviet Union was that the war was "a test of the strength of the socialist state and, at the same time, of socialism as a social system."[4] The hardship suffered by the Soviet population during the Great Patriotic War and the efforts exerted to defeat the Axis were factors that influenced the configuration of communist ideology at the inception of the Cold War. Moscow vindicated the scheme of foreign policy deployed during World War II by stating "the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War was substantially facilitated by the correct foreign policy pursued by the Soviet government."[5] The rhetoric that emanated from the Soviet leadership correlated with the need to preserve the strength of the Soviet state in case of the possibility of aggression by the Western powers. Georgi Malenkov, a member of the State Defense Committee during World War II, argued in 1949 that "the Soviet people do not fear peaceful competition with capitalism. That is why they are against a new war and stand in defence of peace, although they firmly know and are absolutely convinced that their strength is invincible […] They are showing it in the post-war years, when well-known imitators of the fascist barbarians are brandishing over the world the bloody sword of a new war."[6] Although Soviet foreign policy endorsed a defensive geopolitical approach, the rhetoric that emanated from Moscow was based on the idea that the country was ready to deal with a hostile attack by any foreign power. The Soviet leadership was guided by a scheme of foreign policy that subjected ideology to geopolitical requirements. Western communist parties understood that the "cult of the individual," which was generated around the figure of Joseph Stalin, was a response to the "position of the Soviet Union, for a long time exposed alone to the undertakings of a world of

---

4. A. Alexandrov et al. (eds.), *History of Soviet Foreign Policy—1945–1970* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 9.
5. A. Alexandrov et al. (eds.), *History of Soviet Foreign Policy—1945–1970* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 11.
6. G. Malenkov, "On the Road to Communism," *World News and Views*, 29, 46 (1949), November 12.

enemies. This necessitated an extreme test of the people's strength, an iron discipline, and strict centralization of power of the proletarian state."[7] The hostility of the Western world toward the Soviet Union served as an element that legitimized the strengthening of Communism in the aftermath of World War II.

The bureaucratic nature of the Soviet state under Stalin was underscored by the "nationalisation of the means of production; a planned economy; state monopoly of foreign trade [… putting] the preservation of what has been gained above the extension of the revolutionary conquests."[8] The defiant approach displayed by the Soviet leadership was a response to the friendly attitude exhibited by progressive-minded people across the world, most of whom regarded the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany as a vindication of communist ideology and the triumph of the interests of the working class over those of corporate Fascism. During a speech delivered in November 6, 1944, Stalin claimed that the spirit of multinational cooperation had been a pivotal factor in the victory over Germany. Stalin stated that "[t]he strength of Soviet patriotism lies in the fact that it is based not on racial or nationalistic prejudices, but on the people's profound loyalty and devotion to their Soviet motherland, [and] on the fraternal partnership between the working people of all nationalities in our country."[9] The victory over the Axis showed the potential that the communist ideology had for the transformation of the material conditions of life in society. The effort required to defeat the Axis required the abnegated effort of large parts of the population. Marxist ideology envisaged that the replacement of the "dictatorship of capital" with a socialist economic order would take place in a developed country. However, this was not the case, as the attempts to establish a socialist republic in Germany in the aftermath of World War I were not successful. After the success of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union began to put together economic policies that were aimed at advancing the material conditions of the working class. The Stalinist regime decided to abandon the policy of "Permanent Revolution," choosing instead to embark on the process of consolidating "Socialism in One Country." The volatile geopolitical conditions that prevailed in Europe during the 1930s prompted a reformulation of the role of ideology in the sphere of government action. As such, the protection of the national interest of the Soviet Union overrode any concerns regarding the expansion of communist ideology in the Western world. This state of affairs contributed to strengthening the communist system, providing it with the mechanisms needed to withstand any military attack by a hostile power. The Soviet leadership had good reason to doubt the long-term prospects of a convivial arrangement with the Western powers. There was a strand of opinion among certain sections of the Western European public that regarded Nazism and Fascism as "counter-revolutions," meant to stop the advance of Communism on the European

---

7. The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism—A Selection of Documents, Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, 170.
8. E. Mandel, *Introduction to Marxism*, trans. L. Sadler (London: Ink Links, 1979), 116.
9. J. Stalin, *War Speeches, Orders of the Day and Answers to Foreign Press Correspondents During the Great Patriotic War* (London: Hutchinson, 1945), 109.

continent. For instance, in the 1930s, Viscount Rothermere, the owner of *The Daily Mail*, had expressed sympathy towards Adolf Hitler, whom he regarded as a bulwark against Communism.[10] The fundamental distrust of the Western powers toward the Soviet Union is an aspect of paramount importance for understanding the manner in which communist ideology influenced the global order in the aftermath of World War II. The communist ideology propagated by Moscow was not centered on the possibility of realigning the world economic order. Instead, Soviet Communism was underscored by the policy of justifying the domestic and foreign policies needed to entrench the standing of the Soviet Union in the nascent international order.

The imposition of a collectivist form of thinking for the purposes of organizing social life constituted a metapolitical perspective that needs to be analyzed in order to understand how ideology served to advance the interests of the Soviet Union in the postwar era. The collectivist thinking enabled the Soviet Union both to defeat the Axis invasion and resist the encirclement by the Western powers.[11] The victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War provided justification for the policies of collectivization and industrialization undertaken by the Stalinist regime during the 1930s. The lack of willingness to embark on an offensive geopolitical drive beyond Eastern Europe constituted a careful exercise of pragmatism that enhanced the standing of Communism as an ideology capable of providing an explanatory framework for delineating a sound geopolitical strategy. Moscow labored under the assumption that the correlation of forces between the Soviet Union and the Western world called for the exercise of caution in geopolitical matters. According to the concept of correlation of forces, socioeconomic considerations dictate the manner in which interstate relations unfold.[12] The Soviet leadership worked under the assumption that world revolution could not be advanced in the political and economic circumstances that unfolded in the aftermath of World War II. This ideological orientation would be criticized by Western Marxists, who regarded the actions of the Soviet leadership as antagonistic to the interests of the international proletariat. According to this view, the Stalinist theory of "socialism in one country" expressed primarily the petite bourgeois conservatism of the [Soviet] bureaucracy, as well as the mounting appetite of the party apparatus for the privileges of power."[13] The ideological orientation espoused by the Soviet Union was directed toward propping up the geopolitical standing of the Soviet Union in the postwar era. In this context, "the

---

10. V. Rothermere, *Warnings and Predictions* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1939), 134.
11. E. Lásźló, *Individualism, Collectivism, and Political Power: A Relational Analysis of Ideological Conflict* (New York: Springer, 1963), 104.
12. According to Lider, the doctrine of correlation of forces is informed by three main assumptions. These include the, "interrelation between the domestic and external policies of any class […] the correlations of intrasocietal and international force produce a mutual impact […] the interaction of the domestic and internationalist role of the working class occupies a special place in both kinds of correlation." J. Lider, *Correlation of Forces—An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist Concepts* (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), 123.
13. E. Mandel, *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism—The Bitter Fruits of "Socialism in One Country,"* trans. J. Rothschild (London: NLB, 1978), 13.

defence of the [Soviet] 'bastion' was regarded as the number one task of the communist movement and the world proletariat, which gradually dictated a subordination of the international revolution to the (supposed) interests of the defence of the 'bastion.'"[14] American officials indicated that the low morale of the Soviet population in various parts of the country regarding the prospects for economic rehabilitation prompted the Soviet leadership to adopt a less aggressive stance in international matters.[15] Here we see the correlation between ideology and geopolitical concerns. The idea of being the beacon of the socialist world was inextricably connected to achieving a position of dominance within the international order. Most importantly, this notion meant disconnection from alternative centers of communist power. The assumptions that originate from the concept of correlation of forces enable us to understand the conditions that led to the ideological confrontation that took place in the aftermath of World War II. To begin with, the concept of class, so central to the notion of correlation of forces, was utilized for the purposes of entrenching the dominance of communist ideology within the Soviet Union. Soviet Communism projected a contrarian perspective, centered around the denunciation of the inequalities created by the capitalist system as well as the encroachment of the United States into the affairs of Third World countries. Soviet Communism had a redemptionist connotation that enabled Moscow to forge links with progressive parties in the Western world and beyond.

In spite of the use of inflammatory rhetoric, the Soviet Union propagated an ideological blueprint that was conducive to the attainment of a modicum of cooperation with the United States. Notwithstanding the obvious ideological differences that existed between the Soviet Union and the United States in the aftermath of World War II, Moscow was willing to work for the coexistence of the communist and capitalist camps. This state of affairs responded to the need to fulfill certain geostrategic requirements and interests in the postwar era. Ivan Maisky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, earmarked the value of "peace" as one of the most fundamental elements that underscored Soviet foreign policy in the postwar period. Maisky pointed out the policy of disarmament endorsed by the Soviet Union during the 1920s and the several nonaggression pacts made with nations such as Persia and Afghanistan, as well as the Baltic states, Finland and Poland. Maisky also mentioned the overtures made toward France and Czechoslovakia for pacts of mutual assistance in the 1930s as examples of the willingness of the Soviet Union to establish the conditions for a peaceful international order.[16] The need to create a peaceful geopolitical environment in the European continent in the postwar scenario was also highlighted by Andrei Gromyko, the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations between 1946 and 1948, in the following terms:

---

14. E. Mandel, *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism—The Bitter Fruits of "Socialism in One Country,"* trans. J. Rothschild (London: NLB, 1978), 14.
15. The Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, January 13, 1947—FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1947), 517.
16. H. Phillips, *Between the Revolution and the West—A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 135 and 152.

Since the end of the Second World War, European governments have been consistently pre-occupied with the question of how a new war can be averted and conditions created for peaceful cooperation. How can Europe, with its rich culture and great political experience, guard against armed confrontation? Surely common sense dictates that a secure peace can only be based on respect for the political-territorial realities that came into being on the continent as a result of the war?[17]

The need to attain a *modus vivendi* with the Western powers was qualified by the history of animosity that informed relations between the two camps before World War II. The Soviet leadership was emboldened by the defeat inflicted upon the Axis and the sense of economic and political self-sufficiency derived from having established a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. After the end of the war, the Soviet leadership was keen to underline the part that the Western powers played in preventing the onset of World War II. Stalin highlighted how the Western European powers refused to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union in order to stop the advance of Nazi Germany. Stalin stated that in the period leading up to World War II, "Anglo–French policy was aimed not at mustering the forces of the peace-loving states for a common struggle against aggression, but at isolating the USSR and directing the Hitlerite aggression toward the East, against the Soviet Union, at using Hitler as a tool for their own ends."[18] The Soviet leadership regarded the configuration of a bipolar system of states as an opportunity to establish clear boundaries that would foster conviviality in the postwar international order. The level of coexistence that was engendered in the aftermath of World War II was facilitated by the "disintegration of the world market" that took place as a result of the conflagration. According to Stalin, the search for new markets and the scope of intervention that was generated as a result of this state of affairs was responsible for demarcating the framework of relations between the two camps. Stalin added that "[t]he economic consequence of the existence of two opposite camps was that the single all-embracing world market disintegrated, so that now we have two parallel world markets, also confronting one another."[19] The Soviet leadership espoused the idea that the bipolar system could be an instrument for the stabilization of the postwar international order. American officials appeared to be willing to work for the configuration of an international order based on the coexistence between the two superpowers. The United States attempted to assuage the fears expressed by the Soviet Union regarding the possibility of an attack by a hostile power. In April 1946 US ambassador Smith communicated to Stalin the message that this possibility was not feasible "without the active support of the United States." Smith also stated that there was no "nation in the world with whom [the United States was] more interested in arriving at a basis of understanding than with Russia." Smith also added, in a reassuring manner, that the US government "felt that the future of the

17. A. Gromyko, *Memories*, trans. H. Shukman (London: Hutchinson, 1989), 186.
18. *Falsificators of History—An Historical Note*, Soviet Information Bureau, Moscow, February 1948, 16.
19. J. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR* (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1951/1972), 30.

world" would depend on the scope of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.[20] These comments go some way toward corroborating that the Soviet Union wanted to employ the principle of coexistence as a means to create the basis for the reinstitutionalization of the international order.

The concept of correlation of forces revolved around the assumption that the aims of the proletarians were internationalist in nature, whereas those of the bourgeoisie were of a nationalist disposition.[21] These assumptions, which contradicted the main tenets of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era, had a significant relevance in order to sustain the projection of soft power during the Cold War. The defeat of the Axis established a feeling of common purpose among the members of the working class all over the world. This common sense of purpose was crucial in elevating the standing of the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario and catapulting the country to superpower status. This is because the Soviet foreign policy strategy was deployed across the European continent by making reference to the manner in which social class dictated the distribution of capabilities in the international political system. Nevertheless, this narrative had a symbolic rather than a substantive component, as the primary objective of the Soviet Union was to consolidate its hegemonic standing in the postwar scenario.

The Soviet leadership harbored hopes about the possibility of an overall deterioration of the position of the capitalist world. The Soviet leadership held the view that the victory achieved during World War II would lead to "a mighty revolutionary resurgence" that would determine "imperialism's collapse in many Western and Eastern countries." It was expected that this state of affairs would lead to a significant political and ideological reconfiguration of world politics.[22] For the Soviet leadership, the expansion of communist ideology had to be correlated with the "strengthening" of Moscow's position in the international order. The ideological influence of the Soviet Union among the progressive circles of the Western world constituted a leveraging mechanism that tamed down the position of economic inferiority that Moscow had vis-à-vis the United States. The strengthening of communist ideology was an influential factor in the institutionalization of the postwar international order. The institutional mechanisms that were put in place to ensure victory over the Axis were used for the purposes of building the normative foundations of the international order. The establishment of these institutional mechanisms incorporated the recognition of Communism as an ideology that would be allowed to partake in the social life of the international order created in the aftermath of World War II. The communist ideology was strengthened as a result of the renewed level of legitimacy attained by the Soviet leadership. Communist ideology was seen as a viable mechanism of governance capable of fending off the threat posed by hostile powers. The heroic efforts of the Soviet Union, inextricably connected to the

20. Ambassador Smith to the Secretary of State, April 5, 1946—FRUS, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, 732–36.

21. J. Lider, *Correlation of Forces—An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist Concepts* (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), 131.

22. A. Alexandrov et al. (eds.), *History of Soviet Foreign Policy—1945–1970* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 9–10.

effectiveness of communist ideology, created a great deal of sympathy among progressive elements all over the world. The victory over the Axis prompted these progressive elements to overlook the harsh methods used by the Soviet Union in order to prevail in the struggle over the Axis. The collectivist and brutal methods of organization applied by the Soviet Union during World War II were influential in defeating the Axis. The Allies and the Axis also utilized collective methods of organization. The Axis powers used forced labor and annihilated millions of civilians. The Soviet Union justified these same brutal methods by referring to the need to defend the homeland from the yoke of Nazism and Fascism. The victory of the Soviet Union over the Axis was vital for the consolidation of the liberal orientation of the United States in regard to the configuration of the postwar international order. This is because the victory of Nazism would have meant the expansion of a tyrannical form of social, political and economic organization into the Western world. Victory in World War II legitimized Communism and allowed the Soviet leadership to strengthen its grip on power at home and in its immediate areas of influence.

8.3 The Spectrum of Cooperation between Communist Ideology and the Western World

In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union was able to launch a soft-power drive meant to capture the support of the working class as well as progressive-minded political parties in the Western world. The soft power of Soviet Communism was magnified as a result of the fact that the economies of the Western world adopted a mixed method of production. Marxist ideology is centered around the idea that the manner in which the means and relations of production are configured determine the nature of the legal and political systems.[23] Marxism sees a fundamental clash between the interests of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. According to Marxist ideology, this clash of interests would ultimately result in the replacement of the dictatorship of capital with a dictatorship of the proletariat and the actualization of the interests of the working class. The Soviet Union did not make considerable efforts to overhaul the system of government and the capitalist method of production in the Western world. However, the dissemination of Soviet Communist ideology influenced the development of the system of production in the West. The ideological confrontation that unfolded in the initial stages of the Cold War was a fight for legitimacy between the different ideologies that existed in the international system. Bobbitt argues that "the various competing systems of the contemporary nation-state (Fascism, Communism, parliamentarianism) that fought [World War II] all took their legitimacy from the promise to better the material welfare of their citizens."[24] Nazism and Fascism had been defeated. The point of confrontation had switched to the ideological divergences that existed between Communism and the

23. S. Hobden and R. Wyn Jones, "Marxist Theories of International Relations," in J. Baylis, S. Smith and P. Owens (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 144.

24. P. Bobbitt (2002), *The Shield of Achilles* [EPUB] 77.

Western values of liberal democracy, free markets and the rule of law, centered around the primacy of the individual. This confrontation eliminated, to a large extent, the possibility that left-wing parties would be in a position to bring in Soviet-style Communism to the Western world. In any case, the main point of confrontation between Communism and capitalism concerned the way in which to fulfill the material needs of the population. The ideological confrontation with Communism influenced the postwar consensus that took root in the West at the end of World War II, which was based on the creation of a social contract aimed at elevating the material well-being of the citizenry. In the aftermath of the war, E. H. Carr opined that "the fate of the Western world will turn on its ability to meet the Soviet challenge by a successful search for new forms of social and economic action in which what is valid in individualist and democratic tradition can be applied to the problems of mass civilization."[25] The Western powers regarded the ideological challenge presented by Communism as an opportunity to refine their own political and socioeconomic systems. The official line taken by the Soviet Union was that the "workers" became a subject of international relations. This official line contributed to deploying the symbolic power of the Soviet Union in Western Europe. This official line was underscored by the principle that "the formation of the world socialist system widened the framework of international relations." It was believed that the new order of things meant that "the working people themselves [...] take a direct and active part in strengthening the socialist community and, consequently, in implementing the principle of socialist interstate relations."[26] This state of affairs provided Western leftist parties with the opportunity to reshape the system of government and capitalist production, paying more attention to socioeconomic reform. The intervention of the United States in the reconstruction of the Western European economies was informed by the need to prevent the onset of a "totalitarian minority dictatorship."[27] It is also important to take into consideration that Soviet Communism was regarded by the international communist movement as a deformation of the template espoused by Lenin and Trotsky. In the aftermath of World War I, Rosa Luxembourg had warned about the perils that could come about when the tactics used to deal with the need to preserve the integrity of the system become articles of faith projected upon the international proletariat, as this was capable of ushering in the advent of totalitarianism.[28] At the same time, the "local" nature of the Bolshevik Revolution and its "reactionary" orientation since the late 1920s implied the will to preserve a Eurasianist orientation in matters concerning the spread of the geopolitical power of the Soviet Union.[29] Communist ideology was an instrument that provided

25. E. H. Carr, *The Soviet Impact on the Western World* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 106–13.

26. A. Alexandrov et al. (eds.), *History of Soviet Foreign Policy—1945–1970* (Moscow: Progress, 1974), 75.

27. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 4, 1945, FRUS: diplomatic papers, 1945. Europe (1945), 819.

28. R. Luxembourg, *La Revolución Rusa* (Barcelona: Página Indomita, 2017), 131.

29. S. Mazurek and G. Torr, "Russian Eurasianism: Historiosophy and Ideology," *Studies in East European Thought*, 54, 1/2 (2002), Polish Studies on Russian Thought, 120.

the Soviet Union with the intellectual framework needed in order to appraise how to mobilize its geopolitical power. The line of thinking imposed by Moscow was aimed at discrediting the ideas of social democratic parties and the right within the Soviet Union.[30] In any case, the possibility of working with social democratic parties in order to create a common front against Fascism remained open.[31] In this context, it is possible to see that the evolution of the international context was a determinant factor in the construction of foreign policy. All options remained tentative and subject to the geopolitical interests of the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario. The scheme of foreign policy mobilized by the Soviet Union was influenced by the political expediencies of the postwar period. On September 6, 1945, Ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr informed Bevin that there was a willingness to cooperate with the Western powers in Eastern Europe as a result of the fact that these nations were in possession of the atomic bomb.[32]

The Soviet Union showed inconsistencies regarding its support for the workers' movement. Its geopolitical scope of action in Western Europe was restricted by the new political realities that emerged in the postwar scenario. The tactics employed by communist organizations in Western European countries was to harangue the population against the threat posed by Germany and "international capital" in order to create a rapprochement toward the Soviet Union.[33] Soviet foreign policy followed the same cautious path adopted during the interwar years. Ambassador Ivan Maisky pointed out that France, Britain and the United States believed that Moscow worked for the establishment of a Soviet republic in Spain.[34] However, the geopolitical orientation of the Soviet Union was based on the assumption that the best way to bolster the strategic standing of the country was by not providing the Republican forces the help that they needed to win the war. The apparent incongruities pertaining to the application of Marxist theory can be understood in reference to the specific geopolitical needs of the Soviet Union. Stalin gave a number of reasons regarding the dissolution of the Communist International in 1943. Stalin maintained that the disbandment of COMINTERN exposed "the lie of the Hitlerites to the effect that 'Moscow' allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to 'Bolshevize' them [… and] the calumny of the adversaries of Communism within the Labour movement to the effect that Communist Parties in various countries are allegedly acting not in the interests of their people but on orders from outside."[35] George Kennan regarded the abolition

30. X. Joukoff Eudinand and R. Susser, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928–1934—Documents and Materials*, vol. 2 (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967), 564–69.
31. X. Joukoff Eudinand and R. Susser, *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934—Documents and Materials*, vol. 2 (University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967), 707–9.
32. G. Ross, *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin—British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1941–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 226–27.
33. The Ambassador in France (Caffrey) to the Secretary of State, Paris, February 19, 1947—FRUS, The British Commonwealth; Europe (1947), 690–91.
34. I. Maisky, *Spanish Notebooks*, trans. R. Kisch (London: Hutchinson, 1966), 60.
35. See J. Degras (ed.), *The Communist International*, 1919–1943, vol. 3, 1929–1943 (1971); "Resolution of the ECCI Presidium Recommending the Dissolution of the Communist International, 15 May 1943," *World News and Views*, 23, 22, 169, 29 May 1943, 476.

of COMINTERN as an effort to disguise the control exercised by the Soviet Union on the communist movement throughout the world. The geopolitical perspective on the origins of the Cold War serves to explain the organic evolution of the scheme of institutionalization that emerged in the postwar international order. Stalin's appraisal of the conditions that existed in the Soviet Union led him to press for the construction of socialism without having gone through the capitalist stage, as originally envisaged in Marxian ideology. Western left-wing parties increasingly adopted a Gramscian perspective based on the idea of exercising a hegemonic role in the ideological recreation of the political and economic system of Western Europe.

The adoption of evolutionary socialism was decried by Moscow due to the negative implications that it would have on the scheme of Soviet geopolitical action. Eduard Bernstein associated Marxian dialectic with the cult of violence and plebeian terrorism, arguing that "the theory which the Communist Manifesto sets forth of the evolution of modern society was correct as far as it characterized the general tendencies of that evolution. But it was mistaken in […] the estimate of the time the evolution would take […] The enormous increase of social wealth is not accompanied by a decreasing number of large capitalists but by an increasing number of capitalists of all degrees."[36] The transition of the Western European left to a reformist path, which included the acceptance of parliamentarian rule and the capitalist system of production; this created the ideological divergences that made impossible the implantation of Soviet Communism.[37] These are factors that were taken into consideration by the Soviet leadership, which redoubled efforts to consolidate an indigenous version of Communism at home. The dissolution of COMINTERN in May 1943 was justified in reference to "the deep differences in the historical roads of development of each country of the world, the diverse character and even the contradiction in their social orders, the difference in the level and rate of their social and political development and […] the difference in the degree of consciousness and organisation of the workers."[38] The dissolution of the COMINTERN responded to the specific foreign policy needs of the Soviet Union and the wartime alliance with the Western powers. The process of indigenization also affected the Western European communist parties that after the end of World War II became concerned with the need to maintain their reputation at a domestic level. This meant adopting a nationally oriented approach for the purposes of participating in the reconfigured system of government in countries such as Italy and France. Pietro Secchia, a prominent Italian communist leader, stated that the Italian Communist Party had been the only political force that had confronted Fascism. Italian communists were also influential in liberating the country from the yoke of Fascism as a result of the participation of communist elements in the partisan army. This was an element that legitimized the communist forces among

---

36. E. Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism—A Criticism and Affirmation* (New York: Huebsch, 1911), 8–9.
37. See L. Blum, *À L'Echelle Humaine* (Paris: Galimard, 1945).
38. Dissolution of the Communist International—May 15, 1943—https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/dissolution.htm

the Italian public.[39] Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the Italian and French communist parties was underscored by the need to remain a contrarian force within the emerging system of government. This state of affairs led to the establishment of close political links with the Soviet Union. American officials stated that the actions of the French communists after the end of World War II were aimed at convincing people that the United States was "pursuing a policy of economic enslavement of the world in general and France in particular."[40] In November 1947, the United States raised the possibility that the disturbances caused by communist militancy in Italy could be resolved by the participation of the party in the governance of the country. This situation, it was thought, could temporarily halt the possibility of "an all-out effort to seize power."[41] In an effort to consolidate support for their parties in Italy and France, Palmiro Togliatti and Maurice Thorez disseminated a rhetoric that identified the "Atlantic Pact with World War Three."[42] US officials underlined the difficulties that impacted on the French and Italian communist parties by 1947, as a result of the need to remain obedient to Moscow and, at the same time, endorsing a nationally oriented attitude in matters pertaining to foreign policy. It became more and more apparent that Soviet foreign policy was fundamentally geared toward advancing its national interest, as opposed to being a medium for the propagation of an international strategy for the dissemination of Communism.[43] This is another element that moderated the influence of Soviet Communism on the Western European political space.

The social liberalism propounded by certain schools of thought in Western European countries, like the United Kingdom, provided an important element of approximation between the Marxism and Western capitalism.[44] The social liberal approach (influenced in its philosophical aspects by the onset of Marxism) stated that capitalism should be the guarantor of the welfare of the citizenry. This would bring about a situation in

---

39. P. Secchia, Il prestito comunista per la vittoria della democrazia, *Unità Proletaria*, anno II nr.6 (1946) 11 February.

40. The Ambassador in France (Caffery) to the Secretary of State, Paris, November 15, 1946—FRUS, The British of Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe (1946), 470–71. It is worth mentioning that after the death of Stalin, Thorez criticized the way in which the Soviet leader entrenched certain limitations on democracy that he deemed necessary during the period of consolidation of communist rule. See M. Thorez, *Fils du Peuple* (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1970).

41. Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of European Affairs (Reber) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, November 28, 1947—FRUS, Western Europe (1948), 727.

42. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, March 19, 1949—FRUS, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union (1949), 813.

43. Memorandum by Mr. Norris B. Chipman, Second Secretary of Embassy in France, Paris, November 23, 1946—FRUS, The British of Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe (1946), 474.

44. A. Ulam, *Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), 23.

which disenfranchised social groups would not be tempted to seek redress by espousing radical ideologies. This symbiosis had a profound effect on the configuration of the socioeconomic system in Western Europe, where the dirigiste orientation became well entrenched in the postwar scenario. During World War II, the national government led by Churchill worked to create the mechanisms for the socioeconomic enfranchisement of the masses. Between 1940 and 1945, the coalition government led by Churchill put in motion several policies aimed at expanding the scope of intervention in the economic process and at resolving the social inequalities that existed in the country. In the aftermath of World War II, there was a preference among the members of the British electorate for a continuation of the program of social amelioration. This was reflected in the Labour Party manifesto outlined before the 1945 general election, which stated that they were planning "from the ground up—giving an appropriate place to constructive enterprise and private endeavour in the national plan, but dealing decisively with those interests which would use high-sounding talk about economic freedom to cloak their determination to put themselves and their wishes above those of the whole nation."[45] In any case, the Soviet Union exerted a symbolic and functionalist influence on the delineation of the political and economic systems that emerged in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II. The "managerial" nature of the Soviet state was to some extent replicated in Western Europe and the United States, particularly after the introduction of the New Deal by President Roosevelt.[46] There was a pervasive belief in both camps that the orderly development of socioeconomic relations and the preservation of the existing political order depended on the vital role of the state in providing an element of stability in the social sphere. The symbiotic relationship between the capitalist and communist ideologies made an impact on the democracies for as long as the Soviet system of socioeconomic production remained relatively vibrant. This symbiotic relationship entailed the possibility of influencing the institutional process in countries that were at the forefront of the fight against Communism. In the early 1940s, American communists worked with liberal internationalists in order to garner support for the mobilization of US forces. Grassroots organizations were also influential in expanding some of the tenets of communist ideology into US society.[47] This aspect of the ideological competition between the superpowers was highlighted by J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation between 1924 and 1972, who pointed out that "the Communist Party […] developed a trained and potentially effective leadership that overnight, should the situation become favourable, could expand into a mass organization of great potential power."[48] The American political establishment was aware of the symbolic implications of the Soviet victory over the Axis and about the functionalist perspective involved in the socioeconomic enfranchisement of the masses.

---

45. Labour Party Manifesto, 1945—www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1945/1945-labour-manifesto.shtml
46. J. Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1960), 200.
47. See B. Dodd, *School of Darkness* (New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1954).
48. J. E. Hoover, *Masters of Deceit—What the Communist Bosses Are Doing Now to Bring America to Its Knees* (New York: Pocket Books, 1958), 71.

Communist ideology helped to institutionalize the international order because of the manner in which it influenced economic thinking in the Western world. Furthermore, the ideological template espoused by the Soviet Union was of paramount importance for the purposes of demarcating the geopolitical boundaries needed for attaining a bipolar system of states based on the principle of coexistence. The Soviet Union adopted a stance that was inimical to the establishment of an international order dominated by one ideology. The approach undertaken by the Soviet Union differed in a significant manner from the stance undertaken by Nazi Germany, which regarded cohabitation with other ideologies as a threat to the interests of the Third Reich. Liberal capitalism and Communism were considered as *hostis perennis* to be eliminated from the international order desired by Nazi Germany. Conversely, the pragmatic approach undertaken by the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II contributed to institutionalizing the postwar international order. This non-maximalist approach was crucial for the configuration of an international order based on the establishment of social norms that led to the recognition of the legitimate interests of the Western Bloc. The nature of the relationship between Soviet Communism and the expansion of socialist values in Western Europe was complex. The Soviet Union did not seek to export its ideological template to Western Europe. Moscow employed a culturally-specific geopolitical blueprint centered on the preservation of the distinctiveness of Soviet Communism. Ideological expansion westwards would have meant a demotion in the geopolitical standing of the Soviet Union. A communist "Third Bloc" of Western European nations would have become a distinct geopolitical realm, very much along the lines of Yugoslavia and China. Marxist ideology in Western Europe had reformist tendencies that put it at odds with the Soviet Union. Cultural differences and a different metapolitical orientation would have prevented the establishment of a workable geopolitical arrangement in the postwar era. Marxist ideology, inspired to a certain extent by the experience of social reformism in the Soviet Union, served primarily to change the ideological orientation of conservative parties in Western Europe and to allow progressive political parties to exercise effective power. This state of affairs was propitiated by the looming threat of the Soviet Union and its symbolic position as a beacon of socialism. The symbolic and material elements related to the deployment of the geopolitical power of the Soviet Union enabled the Western European socialist parties to extract substantial concessions from the private sector and conservative-minded political parties, as seen in the establishment of the welfare state and the nationalization of industry in the postwar era.

8.4 Metapolitical Influences on Soviet Thinking

The deployment of a solid ideological framework capable of sustaining the interests of the Soviet Union in the postwar era was supplemented by the emphasis given to the cultural differences that existed vis-à-vis the Western world and the geostrategic position of the Soviet Union as an "inland" power. These are elements that had traditionally informed Russia's foreign policy before the onset of the Bolshevik Revolution. The differences that existed between the historical development of Russia (the main constituent part of the Soviet Union) and Western Europe were crucial in the delineation

of Soviet postwar foreign policy. The scheme of foreign policy put in place by the Soviet leadership was geared toward resisting the possibility of a Western advance on the areas of Europe that were regarded as of geostrategic importance to the needs and interests of the Soviet Union. Russia's foreign policy was traditionally informed by an Eurasianist perspective, which revolves around the consolidation of Moscow as an "inland" power capable of fending off the threat posed by the Western world.[49] Under this principle, the Soviet Union was compelled to secure the establishment of a geopolitical foothold in strategic parts of the European and Asian continents in order to avoid the possibility of encirclement by the Western powers.[50]

The Eurasianist ideology constitutes a rhetorical mechanism aimed at compensating for the socioeconomic and technological backwardness that existed between Russia and the Western world. Eurasianism stems back to the theories postulated by nineteenth-century Slavophile thinkers, who wanted to carve out a specific ontological place for Russia in the community of nations. The Eurasianist vision contributed to guiding Soviet foreign policy in the postwar period, as it was underscored by cultural considerations that allowed Moscow to delineate the limits of its geopolitical expansion. The Eurasianist perspective adopted by the Soviet Union was based on the idea of Russia as a "European imperium with a civilizing mission in Asia and elsewhere, and […] as an anti-Western force, a bulwark of Romantic visions of spirituality opposed to Western individualism and mechanistic relations."[51] There is a sense of historical continuity in the manner in which Russia deployed its scheme of foreign policy throughout the ages. The nation's cultural distinctiveness was traditionally informed by a metapolitical orientation that sees Russia as "the Third Rome, the pan-Slavic kingdom, the world headquarters of the Communist International." Furthermore, this metapolitical orientation allows Russia to believe in its sense of mission, which entails "Russia's paucity of formal alliances and [its] reluctance to join international bodies *except as an exceptional or dominant member*."[52] These are important considerations for the purposes of understanding the content of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era. The Soviet leadership was imbued in Eurasianist thinking, as the main purpose behind the use of communist ideology was to create a sphere of influence in its immediate neighborhood, capitalizing on the cultural, economic and cultural commonalities with the countries of the Intermarium in order to attain some basic geopolitical objectives. Taubman argues that Stalin was influenced by the constraints of "ideology and political culture" in the manner in which he outlined foreign policy.[53] The

49. A. Dugin, *Last War of the World-Island: The Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (New York: Arktos Media, 2015), 137.

50. M. Laruelle, *Russian Eurasianism—An Ideology of Empire*, trans. M. Gabowitsch (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 1.

51. M. Bassin, S. Glebov and M. Laruelle (eds.), "What was Eurasianism and Who Made It?" in M. Bassin, S. Glebov and M. Laruelle, *Between Europe and Asia—The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 1.

52. See S. Kotkin (2016), "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June.

53. W. Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983), xi.

Soviet Union legitimized the political control exercised over the countries that comprised the Communist Bloc by claiming that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was more democratic than bourgeois democracy.[54]

Soviet foreign policy was also informed by the tenets established by the "civilizationist" school of Russian foreign policy, which maintains that "Russian values [are] different from those of the West." The "civilizationist" school also made the case for the superiority of Russian cultural values, advocating "the identity of the 'Russian Empire'" in order to transcend the geopolitical constraints imposed upon Russia by the Western powers.[55] Notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union was a multinational empire ruled by communist ideology, the idea of encirclement and the estrangement from Western European cultural values remained a powerful influencer in the manner in which Moscow deployed its foreign policy apparatus in the postwar era. The Stalinist regime regarded the outcome of World War II as an opportunity to expand Soviet influence in an area of the European continent that had been part of the Russian cultural orbit before the onset of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

The cultural similarities between the Soviet Union and the Slavic nations of Europe provided the Soviet leadership with the impetus to expand Moscow's geopolitical links into Eastern Europe. The creation of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe corresponded to the cultural differentiation between West and East that guided the scheme of Russian foreign policy before the onset of the Bolshevik Revolution. The implementation of the policy of containment prompted the Soviet Union to secure its geopolitical standing as a Eurasian power. In late 1947, the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) estimated that the "political advance of the communists in Western Europe ha[d] been temporarily halted" as a result of the economic intervention of the US government. Moreover, the PPS stated that the arrest of communist expansion in Western Europe prompted the Soviet leadership to consolidate Moscow's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.[56] This statement reflects the pragmatic approach undertaken by the Soviet leadership in the realm of foreign policy. Moscow prioritized the entrenchment of the geostrategic position of the Soviet Union in the Eurasian heartland. The accomplishment of this objective, via the consolidation of a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, effectively put an end to Soviet expansionism into the Western part of the European continent. Soviet Communism did not have a *mondialiste* concept attached to it. Furthermore, the Eurasianist streak prevailed in Lenin's idea of a socialism in "one separate country" and Stalin's concept of a "Eurasian Empire" of Slavic nations.[57] Eurasianism is a geopolitical orientation that is more interested in the emphasis on geography that characterizes Russian nationalism than in

---

54. G. Sartori, *¿Qué es la democracia?* (Madrid: Taurus, 1987), 339.

55. A. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy—Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 7.

56. Report of the Policy Planning Staff—Resume of World Situation, November 6, 1947, FRUS, *General: The United Nations* (1947), 770.

57. Quoted in D. Shlapenthokh (ed.), *Russia between East and West—Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism* (Leiden: Brill, 2006, 168).

the eschatological perspective that characterizes the communist view of history.[58] In some ways, the Eurasianist orientation in geopolitical matters was entrenched by World War II. The advance of the German armies into Soviet territory was intended to be a war of annihilation in order to root out the "Asiatic influence on European culture." One of the most eloquent manifestations of this approach was the burning of Soviet schools and libraries, as evidenced by the civilians who were eyewitnesses to the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime on Soviet soil.[59] In 1942, Molotov stated that the Nazis wanted to destroy "Russian national cultural and the national cultures of the peoples of the Soviet Union, [aiming] at the forcible Germanization of Russians, Ukranians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians and other nationalities of the USSR."[60] From this standpoint, the Eurasianist orientation in geopolitical matters became an instrument that was aimed at maintaining the distinct political path of the Soviet Union by highlighting the cultural differences between the Soviet peoples and the Western world.

American observers believed that the Soviet Union used isolation and antagonism as a means to prop up the legitimacy of the Soviet system of government in the postwar era.[61] Antagonism and isolationism were values needed for bolstering the sphere of influence that the Soviet Union carved out in the Intermarium. The expansion of communist ideology into Western Europe could not possibly have resulted in the overturn of capitalism in that part of the world. The cultural differences that existed vis-à-vis the Soviet Union made impossible to transition toward a fully fledged communist system. There is good reason to believe that the antagonistic ideological stance undertaken by Moscow was a response to the need to coalesce support for the regime among the Soviet people—especially in the context of the difficulties involved in the reconstruction of the Soviet economy after the end of the Great Patriotic War.[62] Ideological factors became a useful tool to establish the conditions for the entrenchment of an antagonistic stance in relation to the Western powers, an approach that would ensure the continued acquiescence of the population to the sacrifices demanded by the Soviet leadership. The consolidation of a socialist bloc was carried out through the use of ideology as a medium to coopt the Central and Eastern European nations into a community of interests. The official line propagated by the Soviet leadership was that "the unity and solidarity of the Soviet and other peoples of the socialist community are determined by the uniformity of their socioeconomic system, common ideology (Marxism–Leninism), common interests in safeguarding their revolutionary socialist achievements and national independence against

---

58. P. Kelly, *Classical Geopolitics—A New Analytical Model* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016), 45–46.

59. *Soviet War News* (ed.), *Soviet Documents on Nazi Atrocities* (London: Hutchinson, 1942), 108–12.

60. Soviet War Documents—Notes of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, April 27, 1942—Embassy of the Soviet Union, Washington, DC, 114.

61. Memorandum Prepared in the American Embassy in the Soviet Union, June 1948, FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 894.

62. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, Moscow, January 13, 1947, FRUS, 1947. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 515–16.

imperialist reaction."[63] The Eurasianist perspective that informed Soviet foreign policy was well differentiated from the cultural elements that guided the political strategy of the Western European communist parties. Maurice Thorez, the French communist leader, espoused a strand of thinking regarding class warfare that approximated Stalin's ideas on that subject. However, notions of class warfare were influenced by Thorez's pragmatic approach and the moderate language used by the Popular Front.[64] The position of the Italian Communist Party was based on a Europeanist perspective that rejected the splitting of the Continent into two blocs in order to launch a war against the capitalist bloc.[65] In the late 1920s, the program of the Communist International underlined the special position occupied by the Soviet Union as the "land of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of socialist construction." The official line of the communist international movement was that the Soviet Union "inevitably becomes the base of the world movement of all oppressed classes [and] the centre of international revolution."[66] According to Stalin, the entrenchment of Communism in a country that was not as economically developed as the Western European industrial powers entailed a reformulation of Marxist theory in order to cater to the specific needs of the Soviet Union. Stalin also included a geopolitical caveat, which was based on the idea that this state of affairs revealed "the opportunist nature of the theory of 'permanent revolution.'"[67] Soviet foreign policy followed a rather cautious trajectory, based on consolidating the social system that prevailed in the Soviet Union. The specific geopolitical needs of the Soviet Union dictated the manner in which Moscow would project its soft power in Western Europe and beyond.

The cultural differences between the Soviet Union and the Western world are important in order to understand the ideological specificity of the Soviet Communism. As the political realities of the Cold War began to emerge, Western European communists acknowledged the differences that existed with Soviet Communism, dissenting "from the Russian view of democracy, liberty, and pluralism and affirm[ing … the need to avoid] the mistakes and authoritarian practices of the Soviet Union.[68] The Eurasianist orientation of Soviet foreign policy was consolidated as a result of the differences in economic development that existed in relation to Western Europe. As such, it provided a roadmap to protect the hegemonic standing of the Soviet Union in the postwar era.

American policy makers were aware of the historical aspects that informed the tenets of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar scenario. In October 1945, Averell Harriman, US

63. A. Alexandrov et al. (eds.), *History of Soviet Foreign Policy—1945–1970* (Moscow: Progress, 1974), 73–74.

64. S. Sirot, *Maurice Thorez* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2000), 209–10.

65. A. Agosti, *Palmiro Togliatti* (Turin: UTET, 1996), 365–66.

66. The Programme of the Communist International, together with the Statutes of the Communist International—https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/6th-congress/index.htm February 1929. Second Printing 1932, Modern Books, 23.

67. J. Stalin (1924), *The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists*—https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1924/12.htm

68. G. Schwab (ed.), *Eurocommunism—The Ideological and Political-Theoretical Foundations* (London: Aldwych Press, 1981), 306.

ambassador to the Soviet Union, highlighted the "endless, fluid pursuit of power" that was characteristic of "Russian statesmanship," and that also influenced communist ideology, which regarded "all other advanced nations as Russia's ultimate enemies and all backward nations as pawns in the struggle for power."[69] The "inland" mentality contributed to enhancing Soviet antagonism vis-à-vis the Western powers, particularly after the implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the ERP. In June 1948, the embassy of the Soviet Union in the United States pointed out the aggressive tone used by General Kenney of the US Air Strategic Command, who called for the use of atomic weapons against Soviet cities, as an example of the increasing hostility of the American government toward Moscow.[70] The prevalence of an aggressive rhetorical stance among American officials compounded the fears of the Soviet leadership regarding possible encirclement by the Western powers. The geostrategic position of the Soviet Union as an "inland" power was conducive to the concentration of power in the hands of the Communist Party. This constituted a deviation from the original intentions of the Bolshevik Revolution. Trotsky highlighted that the Soviet state, as it was configured by the Stalinist regime, was based on the bureaucratization of all aspects of social, economic and political life.[71] The Great Turn instigated by Stalin in 1928–1929 responded to the need to consolidate the position of the Soviet Union as a great power capable of managing the Eurasian heartland. The Soviet state was compelled to mobilize the bureaucratic apparatus of the state in order to collectivize agriculture and industrialize the country. According to Trotsky, the kind of socialism that was established under Stalin was "national and administrative in its nature," looking to the Communist International as a "necessary evil [that was] used so far as possible for the purposes of foreign policy."[72] This ideological stance explains why there was not a major confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the initial stages of the Cold War. The "inland" orientation of Soviet foreign policy under Stalin was an important mechanism for the purposes of demarcating the scope of geopolitical responsibilities of the Soviet Union as they pertained to the management of the postwar international order. Ideology was used as a tool to organize support for the Soviet Union among the international communist movement and to establish an environment of opinion favorable to the "inland" foreign policy mechanisms put in place by Moscow. George Kennan held the view that "the international communist machine" was being organized to "take advantage of [the] vacuum created by Nazi defeat and [the] difficulties of postwar readjustment."[73] In 1945, the Department of State produced a top-secret report stating that "the excesses [of the

---

69. Ambassador Harriman to the Secretary of State, October 23, 1945—FRUS: diplomatic papers, 1945. Europe, 901.

70. The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State, June 9, 1948, FRUS, 1948, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (1948), 886; F. Kofsky, *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1995), 227.

71. L. Trotsky (1936), *The Revolution Betrayed*, EPUB version, 111–12.

72. L. Trotsky (1936), *The Revolution Betrayed*, [EPUB], 201.

73. The Acting Secretary of State to the Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan), Washington, July 25, 1945, FRUS, Europe (1945), 872.

communist governments in Eastern Europe are] cloaked with the mark of respectability of *puppet* governments which have pretended to be executing anti-fascist purges." The report also indicated the different approach used by Western European communist parties, which "had to […] propose measures which would make communists more acceptable to their fellow citizens."[74] The cultural differences and ideological divergences that existed between Soviet Communism and its Western European counterparts naturally led to the delineation of a differentiated geopolitical orientation, aimed at propping up the position of the Soviet Union in the postwar era. The difficulties inherent in the possible expansion of Communism in Western Europe led to the entrenchment of an "inland" mentality by the Soviet leadership. The "inland" mentality was consolidated as a result of the belief of the Soviet leadership that the Soviet Union could only feel safe and on an equal footing with the United States if positions within the "American government" were to be filled with "progressives" instead of "monopolist capitalists […] and reactionaries."[75] The Stalinist regime reformulated communist ideology in order to bolster the internal legitimacy of the regime at home and to secure the Eurasian heartland from intervention by the Atlantic powers. The consolidation of the sphere-of-influence system, which responded to the main tenets of the "inland" foreign policy of the Soviet Union, was also facilitated by the element of willful neglect exercised by the United States and its allies in regard to the Intermarium. In the case of Czechoslovakia, where a communist government was installed by democratic means, there was a realization that the actions of the United States were not sufficient to prevent the takeover of the system of government by communist elements. The Soviet Union made a significant effort to create the social norms of conviviality that would guide relations between Moscow and the Intermarium. In a speech given in the presence of Edvard Beneš in 1945, Stalin made a significant gesture toward the Czechoslovak leader, apologizing for the "wanton" acts committed by the Red Army in that country. Stalin also referred to the possibility of configuring a "neo-slavic" bloc of nations, stating that "[w]e [Bolsheviks] wish that all will be allied irrespective of whether we are small or large, [and that] every nation will preserve its independence and arrange its life according to its ideology and tradition."[76] The Soviet geopolitical aims in the postwar scenario were legitimized by the passive attitude exhibited by the American government in regard to the establishment of a Soviet sphere of influence in the Intermarium. The United States were not overly keen to expand the values of democracy, freedom and capitalism in Eastern Europe. US ambassador Steinhard opined that, "our great mistake [was] waging a purely military war while the Soviet Union was waging a combined military and political struggle [which] contributed to the [US] loss of influence in Central and Eastern

---

74. Possible Resurrection of Communist International Resumption of Extreme Leftist Activities, Possible Effect on the United States, Washington, June 2, 1945, FRUS, the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945, 269.

75. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Dubrow) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, November 2, 1946, FRUS, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, 1946, 799–800.

76. E. Taborsky, *President Edvard Beneš-Between East and West, 1938–1948* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), 205–6.

Europe."[77] The reports that came out of Moscow indicated that the notion of "capitalist encirclement" compelled the Soviet leadership to work for the establishment of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the areas liberated by the Red Army.[78] The Soviet leadership was aware of the fact that the actions of the Western powers on the eve of World War II contributed to magnifying the country's weakness vis-à-vis Nazi Germany.[79] American officials indicated that the prospect of encirclement by the Western powers served to propel the "inland" orientation that guided Soviet foreign policy in the aftermath of World War II. The "inland" mentality had been a powerful influencer in the industrialization of the Soviet Union in the 1930s. The economic system implemented in the Soviet Union in the late 1920s ushered in a period of complete control of the state in the economic system and the rise of a managerial class that handled all aspects of public life in the Soviet Union. The industrialization of the Soviet Union in the 1930s furnished the country with the necessary instruments to withstand the invasion of Nazi Germany in 1941. Stalin saw the industrialization of the Soviet Union as an aspect of paramount importance in order to secure the long-term survival of the communist system. This is a facet of the Great Turn that was continually highlighted by Stalin during the 1930s. Stalin stated that the Soviet Union was "fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries." There was, therefore, a peremptory need to secure the position of the Soviet Union in the international order. To that effect, Stalin argued that the Soviet Union was compelled to "make good [that] distance in ten years" or face being crushed by the Western powers.[80] The Soviet leadership operated under the premise of a permanent security dilemma, prompted by the hostile actions of the United States and its allies.[81] The anxieties that emerged in the aftermath of World War II dictated the delineation of a scheme of foreign policy that was influenced by the Eurasianist and "inland" mentality that traditionally characterized Russian policy toward the Western world.

The notion of encirclement stemmed from the inability of the Soviet Union to project its social system to the West, and the fears regarding the loss of control of the Eurasian heartland. The concept of "socialism in one country" espoused by Stalinism was crucial in compounding the sense of encirclement. The Soviet leadership was aware of the inherent dislike of the communist system by Western politicians such as Winston Churchill, who was described as someone who was not keen on extending practical help to Moscow in 1941, as the Soviet Union was fighting for its survival.[82] After the

77. The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Steinhard) to the Secretary of State, Prague, April 30, 1948, FRUS, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1948, 747–48.

78. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State, FRUS, 1946. *Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union*, 788.

79. A. Gromyko, *The Overseas Expansion of Capital—Past and Present* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1985), 156.

80. J. Stalin, "On the Industrialisation of Russia," speech to industrial managers, February 1931. study.abingdon.org.uk/history/4th_stalin_1931.html

81. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State, FRUS, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union (1946), 789.

82. V. G. Trukhanovsky, *Winston Churchill* (Moscow: Progress, 1978), 271–73.

end of World War II, Stalin had told Averell Harriman, then the US Special Envoy to Moscow, that "communism breeds in the cesspools of capitalists," which attests to a solid ideological stance backed up by a serious examination of the political and economic realities prevailing in the European continent.[83] Harriman had also hinted at the fact that the sense of encirclement that guided Soviet foreign policy was motivated by the country's backwardness in relation to the United States and other Western powers.[84] The Soviet leadership had an interest in constructing their scheme of foreign policy upon the notion of encirclement. The policy of containment was perceived by Moscow as a hostile instrument, directed to undermine the position of the Soviet Union in the postwar scenario. Notwithstanding the defensive orientation of the policy of containment, there was also a perspective that regarded the pursuit of an aggressive stance against the Soviet Union as a tool to preserve the American way of life.[85] The sense of encirclement was also compounded by the fact that the West regarded the Soviet Union as a hostile power determined to expand its geopolitical sway at all costs.[86] The scheme of foreign policy rolled out by the Soviet Union responded to some of the most primordial concerns regarding the traditional position of Russia in the international order. The Soviet Union deployed its resources in reference to the cultural differences that existed between the Slavic cultural space and Western Europe. Any attempts to expand the influence of the Soviet Union in Western Europe could not be based on the possibility of bringing about a revolutionary takeover of the democratic system of government. Instead, the emphasis was placed on attempting to influence the political system through the local communist parties and on projecting ideological sympathy for the Soviet Union among progressive circles. The Eurasianist values that underpinned Soviet Communism meant that the Soviet system could not be exported to the US sphere of influence. From this standpoint, it was imperative for the Soviet Union to secure the "inland" via the configuration of the sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, as the position of the Soviet Union as a Eurasian power was seen as a vital instrument for retaining a hegemonic status in the postwar era. The Eurasianist orientation of Soviet foreign policy indicates the powerful influence of metapolitical considerations in the field of geopolitics. The Soviet Union was primarily interested in securing the geo-strategic position of the country in the postwar era. There was, in this sense, a significant level of continuation with the nationalist foreign policy of Tsarist Russia. Functionalist tendencies prevailed. However, the functionalist policies used by the Soviet leadership were informed by a distinct metapolitical orientation based on the perpetual fear of being the subject of an attack by the Western powers.

---

83. A. Harriman, *America and Russia in a Changing World—A Half Century of Personal Observation* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), 37.

84. A. Harriman and E. Abel, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1946* (New York: Random House, 1978), 547.

85. See G. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1966).

86. Report to the President by the National Security Council, Washington, November 23, 1948, NSC 20/4, FRUS, 1948. General; the United Nations (in two parts) (1948), 663.

8.5 Subordination of Ideology to the Political Realities of the Postwar Era

The subordination of ideological considerations to the political expediencies of the postwar era contributed to the institutionalization of the international order. There were a number of factors that contributed to establish these dynamics. The Soviet Union was severely damaged by the effort undertaken to defeat the Axis.[87] American officials took into consideration the fact that "the war-weariness of the Soviet people is as great, if not greater, than in the case of any other of the major countries." This state of affairs entailed that for the Soviet Union the most efficient way of deploying its scheme of foreign policy in the postwar era was by using *political*, rather than *military* means. However, toward 1948, American policy makers held the view that the Soviet Union was willing to use military means to bolster its hegemonic position in Eastern Europe. The reports produced by the National Security Council established that the "Soviet leaders may calculate that in the present changed circumstances certain further political positions, such as complete control of Berlin or Vienna, are essential to the political defense of their satellite zone in Eastern Europe, and they may feel themselves obliged to strike for the achievement of these objectives regardless of the resulting danger of war."[88] These considerations were quite logical, due to the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime. In order to overcome the constraints attached to the rational use of power, totalitarian regimes tend to engage in the process of "permanent revolution." Hannah Arendt uses this term, borrowed from Leon Trotsky, for the purposes of making reference to the way in which both Communism and Nazism continually used force in order to eliminate every possible form of internal opposition.[89] Authoritarian regimes are usually keen to project the image of ideological purity for the purposes of keeping their grip on power. This is an aspect highlighted by Mackenzie, who states that "whatever the phases of the historical development of Communism, its leaders have always emphatically concurred on one point—the overweening importance of a correct world view, sharply differentiating mankind into two irreconcilable camps of believer and nonbelievers."[90] In this context, the use of military power is an instrument used to entrench the hegemonic position of a totalitarian regime. Nevertheless, in spite of the central place occupied by ideology in the unfoldment of interstate relations during the Cold War, the sustenance of the structural interests of the superpowers demanded the use of a pragmatic approach. The signing of the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact in 1939 exemplifies the subordination of ideological concerns to specific geopolitical objectives.[91] Maisky cites that the pact agreed upon with

---

87. Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State, NSC 20/2, Washington, August 25, 1948, FRUS, General; the United Nations (in two parts) (1948), 617.
88. Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State, NSC 20/2, Washington, August 25, 1948, FRUS, General; the United Nations (in two parts) (1948), 619.
89. H. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1951), 390.
90. K. McKenzie, *Comintern and World Revolution, 1928–1943—The Shaping of Doctrine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 298–99.
91. D. Pritt, *The State Department and the Cold War* (New York: International, 1939), 63.

Germany in 1939 averted "the possibility of a united capitalist front against the Soviet Union" as well as a potential war against Japan in the Far East. Maisky also observes that the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact also thwarted the efforts of Chamberlain and Daladier to "impel Hitlerite Germany into war with the Soviet Union."[92] Here, we see how the Soviet leadership justified the use of a pragmatic approach in the sphere of foreign policy when the situation required it. This pragmatic approach was also used during the Cold War. The ideological confrontation that took place between the superpowers should not be exclusively seen in the context of a perpetual state of animosity between the United States and the Soviet Union. The ideological confrontation between the superpowers gave rise to the establishment of social norms of behavior in the postwar international order. Deutscher argues that in the aftermath of World War II, the Soviet Union pursued a "revolutionary" path based on the establishment of a political space with countries in need of economic reconstruction through the imposition of a communist regime.[93] This stance was geared toward strengthening the position of the Soviet Union as a hegemonic actor in the postwar scenario. Communist ideology was used as a tool to identify the best way to entrench the interests of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of World War II. The Soviet leadership did not regard communist ideology as an irredentist instrument aimed at launching an offensive drive in order to eliminate all other ideological alternatives from the international order. Instead, communist ideology was an instrument that allowed the Soviet leadership to interpret the best way to protect Soviet interests in the postwar scenario. This can be seen in a speech given by Stalin in February 1946:

> It would be wrong to believe that the Second World War broke out accidentally or as a result of the mistakes of some or other statesmen […] In reality, the war broke out as an inevitable result of the development of world economic and political forces on the basis of modern monopoly capitalism [… T]he unevenness of the development of capitalist countries usually results […] in an abrupt disruption of the equilibrium within the world system of capitalism, and that a group of capitalist countries which believes itself to be less supplied with raw materials and markets usually attempts to alter the situation and re-divide the "spheres of influence" in its own favour by means of armed force.[94]

The ideological roots of the foreign policy scheme outlined by Stalin were meant to respond to the evolution of the material circumstances that unfolded in the postwar system of states. According to dialectical materialism, the "accumulation of imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes" engenders abrupt qualitative transformation in any social space. This explains, at least partially, why Moscow was keen on entering into an alliance with the Western powers in 1941, and why the Soviet leadership was willing to retain a modicum of cooperation in the postwar era. The economic resources of the United States were crucial in the defeat of the Axis. This represented, according to historical and

---

92. I. Maisky, *Who Helped Hitler?* trans. A. Rothstein (London: Hutchinson, 1964), 201–2.
93. I. Deutscher, *Stalin—A Political Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 534–36.
94. Speeches by J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov delivered at election meetings in Moscow in February 1946, *Soviet News*, London, 3.

dialectical materialism, an abrupt qualitative transformation that prompted the Soviet Union to acknowledge the transition toward a bipolar international order.[95] The theoretical interpretations of Marxism–Leninism did not contradict the drive for pragmatism that informed Stalinist policy.[96] This state of affairs meant that the Soviet Union was compelled to correlate the scope of foreign policy to the attainment of accomplishable geopolitical needs and interests.[97] The Soviet leadership elaborated its scheme of foreign policy in accordance with the pragmatic needs that arose in the early Cold War period. This situation entailed the preservation of the hierarchical ordering that existed between the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. The ideological template imposed by Moscow was calibrated to ensure that the Eastern European nations would comply with the geopolitical requirements of the Soviet Union in the postwar era, which meant, in practical terms, purging the communist movement of any revisionist tendencies. The experience of the political repression that took place within the communist movement during the 1930s was an important antecedent to the state of affairs that unfolded in the aftermath of World War II. Members of several communist parties all over Europe had been defenestrated. This included political emigrés from countries where the Communist Party had been outlawed.[98] In order to accomplish its main geostrategic interests in the postwar period, the Soviet Union was compelled to reinforce the notion of "socialism in one country" as articulated by Stalin. The main aim of establishing a buffer zone in Eastern Europe was to enable the achievement of vital geostrategic objectives. The Soviet Union pressed for ideological uniformity in the field of foreign policy, underlining the need to maintain an antagonistic relationship vis-à-vis the worldview propagated by the United States and its allies. The Soviet leadership also wanted to avoid the spread of ideological heresy within its borders. This is one of the main reasons why the Soviet regime shunned the opinions of Evgenii Varga, the economist who had rightly predicted the "stability" of the capitalist system in the aftermath of World War II; thus, the regime went against one of the main tenets of communist ideology, which argues for the "inevitable" crisis of capitalism.[99] The realities of the Cold War period were crucial in ensuring that the Soviet Union would outline a scheme of foreign policy in which ideological considerations would be subject to the requirements of the emerging geopolitical scenario. Ideological principles served as instruments to calibrate the parameters that enabled the Soviet Union to respond to the rapidly evolving geopolitical scenario of the postwar era. Ideological rhetoric was deployed as an instrument for the exercise of power, rather than as a tool capable of imposing the institutionalization of the postwar international order without taking into consideration the needs and interests of the United States.

---

95. See H. Lefebvre, *Dialectical Materialism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
96. J. Lider, *Correlation of Forces—An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist Concepts* (Aldershot: Gower, 1986), 1–42.
97. J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1976), 838–40.
98. W. Chase, *Stalin—Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934–1939* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001), 369.
99. The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, March 15, 1949, FRUS, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union (1949), 590.

8.6 Conclusion

The prevalence of important structural geopolitical factors explains the manner in which the Soviet Union contributed to institutionalizing the postwar international order.[100] The sociological perspective on institutionalism places a lot of importance on the ideational and cultural factors that influence the configuration of institutions.[101] The metapolitical orientation of the Soviet Union was informed by the perennial danger of encirclement, due to its geographical location and the need to preserve a distinct cultural space in the Eurasian heartland. The fortification and legitimization of communist ideology was a crucial factor in establishing the basis for the institutionalization of the system of states in the postwar period. This state of affairs responds to the fact that the institutionalization of the system of states largely correlated to the political events derived from the pursuit of the war against the Axis. The narrative of distinctiveness correlated with the narrative of fear as an instrument of power, based upon "moral boundaries of identity" that were "produced and maintained" by making reference to external threats.[102] The social norms put in place by the Allies during wartime for the purposes of attaining victory over the Axis also provided the normative instruments needed to configure the postwar international order. The instruments put in place through the interaction between the superpowers during World War II amounted to the acknowledgement of the ontological equality of Communism in relation to the capitalist system in the postwar era. The successful prosecution of the war against the Axis attested to the effectiveness of Communism as an ideology capable of defending the country from foreign enemies. The manner in which the Soviet Union withstood the invasion of the German armies and secured victory in World War II generated a great deal of sympathy among the progressive political parties around the world, in spite of the harsh methods utilized by Moscow to attain this objective. The use of communist ideology was therefore influential in institutionalizing the postwar system of states, as it allowed the Soviet Union to articulate the manner in which its interests were to be accomplished. Soviet communist ideology was not calibrated in order to eliminate the Western capitalist system as one of the two ordering principles of the international order. This was a situation that differed in a radical manner from the volatile political environment of the 1930s and 1940s, when the advance of right-wing totalitarian tendencies threatened to create the basis for an international political system following one ordering principle. The scheme of foreign policy deployed by the Soviet Union retained the Eurasianist element inherited from Tsarist Russia. The similar level of economic development as well as the geopolitical estrangement suffered by the Slavic world was used to consolidate the sphere of influence that was created in the Intermarium in the postwar period. Cultural differences prevented

---

100. See E. Clemens and J. Cook, "Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change," *Annual Review of Sociology* 25 (1999), 441–66.
101. See W. Powell and P. DiMaggio (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
102. J. Agnew, *Globalization and Sovereignty* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), 100 and 106.

the Soviet Union from launching an ideological revisionist drive on Western Europe. Moscow wanted to secure the "inland" from Western infiltration through the consolidation of a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. This was a crucial prerequisite for the purposes of retaining a hegemonic position in the postwar international order. The input given by the Soviet leadership to the process of institutionalization in the postwar era was underscored by the need to remain free from any "external authority structures"[103] From this standpoint, one can understand why Moscow did not adopt a more collegial attitude in regard to the configuration of a true international communist movement capable of overhauling the capitalist orientation of the international order in the postwar era. The achievement of geostrategic interests in the postwar environment required the sustenance of the Soviet national interests through the endorsement of the "socialism in one country" policy articulated by Stalin. The spectrum of sovereignty of the Intermarium was reformulated for the purposes of ensuring the attainment of the vital geostrategic interests of the Soviet Union. The actions undertaken by the Soviet Union in the sphere of foreign policy were guided by the principle of utility rather than by the imposition of ideological principles on other countries. This is an element that denotes the willingness of the Soviet Union to exert an important level of great-power management in the postwar international order.

103. S. Krasner, "Problematic Sovereignty," in S. Krasner (ed.), *Problematic Sovereignty—Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 10.

Chapter Nine

CONCLUSION: THE GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

9.1 Introduction

The nuances involved the process of institutionalization that took place in the aftermath of World War II provide us with a useful learning instrument to ascertain the way in which the system of states is reconfigured at specific historical junctures. There were a number of important geopolitical implications that stemmed from the interaction between the superpowers during the early Cold War period. First, the metapolitical orientation that guided the scheme of foreign policy framed by the United States and the Soviet Union was informed by the concern about marrying notions of order and justice. This concern entailed that the motivation for the deployment of a geopolitical strategy was guided by the need to incorporate the "common man" as a subject of international relations. Second, the devastation of World War II created a disjuncture of the international order that led to the push for European unity in the postwar period. The creation of multilateral mechanisms of interstate relations in Western Europe was underpinned by the principle that the curtailment of national sovereignty would be conducive to preventing a slide into conflict *and* to elevate the material conditions of the population. This chapter also postulates that the interaction between notions of order and hegemony contributed to consolidating the institutionalization of the postwar international order. Furthermore, this chapter delves into the role that intervention played in the maintenance of an institutionalized geopolitical order in the postwar era.

9.2 The Interaction between the Concepts of Order and Justice

One of the most important implications of the ideological tensions that affected superpower relations during the early Cold War period was manifested in the growing interaction between the concepts of order and justice. The legacy of the two major conflagrations that took place in the European continent during the first half of the twentieth century entailed that the "common man" became a subject of international relations. This situation meant that the actions of the hegemonic powers were to be carried out by taking into consideration the needs of individual citizens. The untrammeled pursuit of power by the revisionist nations during the 1930s and 1940s led to the death of millions of people and the economic and social devastation of the European continent. The needs of the "common man" became part and parcel of the geopolitical scheme of action put forward

by the superpowers. The ideological tensions that arose between the United States and the Soviet Union reflected the different orientation regarding the fulfillment of the needs of the "common man." Polanyi points out that the "disruptive strains" of unemployment, class warfare and imperialist rivalries brought about the authoritarian "impasse" of the interwar period. One of the main consequences of the revisionist drive launched by the Axis was the "end to laissez-faire capitalism."[1] Both superpowers were aware of this situation. In 1944, Vice President Henry Wallace stated that although the United States and the Soviet Union each had a different "method of approaching the satisfaction of the need of the common man," both superpowers shared a common interest in bringing about a more just social order.[2] Prominent Western European leaders replicated this sentiment. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, Attlee argued about the need "to make a Europe in which the peoples will live more secure and happier lives." In order to bring about this state of affairs, the wartime Allies were tasked with the responsibility of constructing a "new Europe," which will retain "the best of the old but will discard much that was evil."[3] The authoritarian regimes that emerged in Europe during the interwar period justified their actions by referring to the requirement to fulfill the needs of the "common man." The meliorist efforts carried out in the Western and communist camps were necessary for the purpose of maintaining order and stability. There were, at the same time, commentators that decried the efforts to enmesh a socially minded perspective in interstate affairs. Morgenthau regarded the forces of propaganda and the "moral crusade" to win the mind of the "common man" as a most pernicious influence on interstate relations.[4] At the same time, Leo Strauss, pointed out the perils that exist when there is too much emphasis on following "the wishes of the people."[5] The international order that emerged in the aftermath of World War II had a liberal orientation because it effectively implemented rational mechanisms that served to elevate the material conditions of the common man.[6] There was a peremptory need to ensure that the quest for a stable geopolitical order would incorporate an element of social elevation that would legitimize the domestic and international compacts that emerged after the end of World War II. The question of order had a functionalist orientation: a more just social order could underpin the efforts to create a stable geopolitical order in the postwar era.[7] The Great Depression disproved the idea that the American model of capitalism could be replicated elsewhere.[8] During the 1930s, there was a gradual introduction of managerial methods

---

1. K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 209.
2. The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 21, 1944—FRUS, Europe (1944), 969.
3. Second Plenary Meeting July 30, 1946—FRUS, Paris Peace Conference: proceedings (1946), 38.
4. H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations—The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), 347–59.
5. See L. Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978).
6. See T. Burns and J. Connelly, *The Legacy of Leo Strauss* (London: Imprint Academic, 2010).
7. J. Benda, *La Traición de los Intelectuales* (Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, 2008), 15 and 35–36.
8. C. Lamont *You Might Like Socialism—A Way of Life for Modern Man* (New York: Modern Age Books, 1939), 288.

of governance in the United States and Western Europe. George Lansbury, the Labour Party leader between 1932 and 1935, stated that the United Kingdom was living "in the midst of a peaceful revolution. Slowly, but surely, what is known as the "corporate state" is being established in this country."[9] The kind of socialism advocated by people like Hugh Dalton, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1945 and 1947, aimed to induce wider access to goods and services for the majority of the population. Dalton opined that "complete economic equality […] is neither practically possible, nor ideally good. Nor is it necessary to the attainment of social equality and the classless state. But what *is* necessary is a very great reduction in our present economic inequalities."[10]

The partial reduction of the scope of sovereignty of the countries that were part of the superpowers' spheres of influence became an instrument to improve the material conditions of the individual. The restriction on the exercise of sovereignty compelled the abandonment of primordialist forms of nationhood by countries that disrupted the stability of the international order during the interwar period. This state of affairs facilitated the establishment of international organizations that endeavored to bring about a higher level of socioeconomic development for the individual. Both Communism and the liberalism exported by the United States advocated the use of empirical knowledge for resolving the problems that affected the world. This modality necessitated the use of *dirigisme* in both spheres of influence. The managerial approach was conducive to the erosion of the sovereignty of the nation and the empowerment of the individual, at least when it came to the issue of socioeconomic improvement. The collectivist approach that was required to win the war against the Axis entailed the acceleration of the efforts made to attain mass socioeconomic enfranchisement. The countries that participated in the victory against the Axis had a different ideological orientation regarding the functionalist elements required to attain this goal. However, all of them agreed on the need for state intervention in order to ensure the promotion of the needs of the "common man." Catering to the needs of the "common man" was a pivotal component of the process of stabilization that took place in the aftermath of World War II. It has been argued that the "lower middle class has played a significant role "in contemporary history," as this segment of society is usually prone to manipulation by radical politicians.[11] In this context, the element of "economic planning," crucial to ensuring that the "common man" would not be willing to endorse extremist political templates, was another element that gave shape to the increased level of institutionalism in the postwar period.[12]

Intellectuals like John K. Galbraith argued that the American system of governance would have to eradicate the thinking rooted in "poverty," due to the extraordinary set

---

9. G. Lansbury, *My England* (London: Selwyn and Blount, 1934), 9.

10. H. Dalton, *Practical Socialism for Britain* (London: Routledge, 1935), 319.

11. A. Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem," *The Journal of Modern History*, 47, 3 (1975), 410.

12. C. Ayres, "The Co-Ordinates of Institutionalism," *The American Economic Review*, 41, 2 (1951). Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, 48.

of circumstances that took place after 1945.[13] In many respects, the upgrade in living standards that originated at the inception of the Cold War reflected a change in the manner in which human societies procured for their material needs.[14] The functionalist perspective that informed the institutionalization of the postwar international order enabled the reconstruction of the international order in a manner that would benefit a larger segment of the world population. This stance entailed the reconstruction of the European social spectrum. As the fighting against the Axis went on, George Orwell wrote that World War II was going to "wipe out most of the existing class privileges, as there were "fewer people who wish them to continue."[15] Both the Soviet Union and the Western powers expressed concern for the improvement of the social conditions of the public. Moreover, there was a tendency to regard the formation of federalist structures as a prerequisite to bring about a greater spectrum of social reform. The push for the economic integration of the Western European nations attests to this state of affairs. In addition to this, the Soviet Union worked for the establishment of political and economic forms of coordination with its satellite states, which contributed to reconstructing those countries in the aftermath of the war. This conflict generated a significant disjuncture in the history of the international political system. This is because the superpowers were obliged to reverse the situation of deinstitutionalization that had affected Europe during the interwar years. The superpowers were able to manage the international order as a result of their ability to complement the exercise of military power with the use of soft power instruments geared toward ensuring the adherence of the units of the spheres of influence to the diktat of Washington and Moscow. One of the ways in which this was accomplished was by removing the ideological tendencies that could have caused a significant disruption of the postwar system of states, such as Nazism and Fascism. The elimination of "radical collectivism" as an influencer of interstate relations constituted one of the most important mechanisms to ensuring the durability of the new institutional order.

The authoritarian regimes of fascist extraction that had emerged in Europe during the interwar period called for the implementation of widespread social reform. During the interwar period, there had also been a push for the expansion of the ideas of a "national socialism" of Christian orientation, aimed at protecting the native population from "foreign" elements, and in which "harmony" between the different social classes would be brought forth by a measure of cooperation between capital and labor.[16] In 1937, in the midst of the Spanish Civil War, General Francisco Franco stated that the Nationalists were fighting for the people, for the working and middle classes, and "not for the capitalists." Franco committed to a program of social reform that would take into

---

13. See J. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (London: Mariner Books, 1998).
14. See K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation—Origins of Our Time* (London: Beacon Press, 2001).
15. G. Orwell, *The Lion and the Unicorn—Socialism and the English Genius* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1962), 69.
16. C. Codreanu, *Guardia de Hierro* (Munich: Colectia Omnul Nou, 1972), 36–37.

consideration the "fulfillment of duty" on the part of all segments of society.[17] The trad-itionalist orientation that informed right-wing authoritarian movements prioritized the primacy of the nation over the individual. Conversely, the United States proclaimed the primacy of the individual as one of the most important ontological elements linked to the expansion of democracy and free markets.[18] The *dirigiste* tendencies that emerged in the Western world were aimed at bridging the "gaps" created by free market forces, most notably in regard to the creation of full employment. Nevertheless, the outcome of World War II eliminated the possibility of the rise of totalitarian tendencies within the sphere of influence dominated by the United States. The Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc would retain some ideological sympathies among progressive political parties in the Western world. However, these outfits remained firmly committed to the democratic system of government. The concern with the creation of an anti-fascist bloc capable of arresting the entrenchment of residual authoritarian tendencies in the Western countries was superseded by the need to appear as a loyal ally in the fight against the propagation of Communism in Western Europe.[19] There was a pervasive idea among progressively minded political organizations that the "germs of totalitarianism" tend to lurk when the idea of the sovereign rights of nations and the duties of the citizenry are not reconciled with the rights of the individual.[20] The communist ideology propagated by the Soviet Union did not subvert the political system that operated in the Western world. Moreover, the collectivism employed in the Soviet Union did not succeed in providing the nations of the Third World with a workable alternative to capitalism.[21] The adoption of collect-ivist tendencies fractured the internal order of areas of the world such as Latin America and Africa. However, they did not go as far as engendering systems of government cap-able of reversing the dependency of those nations vis-à-vis the United States. Soviet foreign policy was guided by a sense of mission regarding the need to contribute to the socioeconomic elevation of the populations that inhabited Moscow's sphere of influ-ence. In addition to this, Soviet Communism projected a symbolic element of power as an ideology that could facilitate the socioeconomic enfranchisement of vast segments of the population. In any case, the scheme of foreign policy deployed by the superpowers in the aftermath of World War II was rooted in the concerns for the socioeconomic rehabilitation of the areas of Europe that had been devastated by the conflict. This state of affairs coincided with the need to ensure the stabilization of the domestic situation in the superpowers' spheres of influence and the nascent international order as a whole.

---

17. F. Sevillano, *Franco, "Caudillo" Por la Gracia de Dios, 1936–1947* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2010), 30.

18. A. Buchanan, *The Heart of Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 269.

19. P. Chiocchetti, *The Radical Left Party Family in Western Europe, 1989–2015* (London: Routledge, 2016), 33.

20. Q. Wright, *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations* (Berkeley: University of California, 1954), 295–96.

21. M. Katz (ed.), *The USSR and Marxist Revolutions in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 16.

9.3 The Push for a Greater Spectrum of European Unity

The aftermath of World War II constituted a historical juncture that was propitious for advancing a scheme of multilateral governance, epitomized in the drive toward a greater spectrum of unity in Western Europe. One of the main offshoots of the historical disjuncture that emerged as a result of World War II was the drive for European unity, which was seen as a means to avoid a descent into the levels of deinstitutionalization that had unfolded in the interwar period. The end of the internal balance of power in Western Europe was one of the main features of the Cold War. The defeat of Nazi Germany and the Axis led to a complete reconfiguration of the system of states. The great disjuncture that took place as a result of World War II led to the search for mechanisms of governance that could sustain a workable system of states. The Cold War had a distinct Eurocentric orientation. The division of the European continent into two camps dictated the bipolar nature of the postwar system of states. In this context, one of the most important instruments of multilateral governance was the formulation of an institutional framework for European unity. The political orientation that emerged in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II was informed by the idea of the primacy of the individual over the state. To a large extent, the enlarged spectrum of European unity was meant to advance the scope of rights of the individual and diminish the capacity of the state to act against the interests of the community. The advent of European unity echoed the most significant principles of the Enlightenment project. In the interwar period, Richard Coundehove-Kalergi, one of the main architects of the concept of pan-Europeanism, stated that "[m]an is an end and not a means. The state is a means and not an end. The value of the state is exactly the value of its services to human beings; in so much as it serves to develop man it is good,-so soon as it hinders the development of man it is evil."[22] Coundehove-Kalergi was adamant about the possibilities of socioeconomic improvement that could emerge from European unity.[23] The spectrum of European unity in the postwar period included a social liberal element that called for the use of the state as an instrument for the elevation of the individual.[24] The idea of pan-Europeanism advanced by Coundehove-Kalergi also had an important economic component attached to it. The period of deinstitutionalization of the interwar years had been marked by the inability and unwillingness of the Western European countries to pool resources in order to create an economic system that could put an end to the internal balance of power. The pan-Europeanist conception espoused by federalist authors and commentators was based on the possibility of the "merger of the European continent to a duty association, abolition of tariffs between European States and the creation of a pan-European

22. R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *The Totalitarian State Against Man*, trans. A. McFadyean (New York: Frederick Muller, 1938), 15.
23. R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Europe Must Unite*, trans. A. McFadyean (Glaurus, Switzerland: Paneuropa Editions, 1939), 30–31.
24. R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *The Totalitarian State Against Man*, trans. A. McFadyean (New York: Frederick Muller, 1938), 25.

economic area."[25] In 1915, pondering on the possibility of a European confederation, A. C. Bradley opined that the state could not be a "moral agent" with "reference to other states, unless it is so with reference to itself." From this perspective, the aim of the state was to ensure that individuals would be able to develop their "forces and faculties" to the fullest extent possible.[26]

In 1924, Max Waechter, a German-born British industrialist, stated that the configuration of a European common market was the main way to be able to compete on equal terms with the United States and, in the long run, Japan.[27] In the interwar period, Edo Fimmen, a Dutch trade unionist, wrote that the expansion of European capital would have to be followed by the configuration of a pan-European labor movement.[28] Édouard Herriot , the French prime minister between 1924 and 1925, regarded the idea of European federation as an instrument of "rationalization" in order to attain the level of wealth and prosperity enjoyed by the United States.[29] The structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, would be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations would count as much as large ones and gain their honor by their contribution to the common cause.[30] The federalist sentiment that emerged in Europe during the interwar period also found favor in the United States. Frank Vanderlip, a prominent banker and journalist, opined that the problem concerning the reconstruction of the European economy after World War I, had to be treated "as a whole." Here we see the willingness of prominent Americans for the United States to become an arbiter of world affairs through the element of economic intervention.[31] Aristide Briand, the French prime minister, spoke in 1929 in favor of a federative scheme in Europe, which was to be underscored by the gradual reduction of tariffs between the European states and the idea of an economic *rapprochement* as a "counterpart of political *rapprochement*."[32] In the interwar period, the principle of "self-determination" was seen as potentially dangerous for the preservation of peace, as it was likely to be based on the closing down of the public space to migration and the curtailment of interstate relations. The way to avoid conflict was to create a "community of interests" between

25. R. Coudenhove-Kalergi, *Paneuropa* (1923) eufundedproeutroll.wordpress.com/2014/06/08/eu-federalization-the-pan-european-manifesto-paneuropa/

26. A. Bradley, "International Morality: The United States of Europe," in E. Sidgwick et al., *The International Crisis in Its Ethical and Psychological Aspects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1915), 49.

27. See M. Waechter, *How to Abolish War—The United States of Europe* (London: T. C. P.), 1924

28. See E. Fimmen, *Labour's Alternative: The United States of Europe Or Europe Limited* (London: Labour, 1924).

29. E. Herriot, *The United States of Europe*, trans. R. J. Dingle (London: George G. Harrap, 1930), 46.

30. R. Churchill (ed.), *The Sinews of Peace—Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill*, Speech at Zurich University, September 19, 1946 (London: Cassel, 1948), 200–201.

31. F. Vanderlip, *What Happened to Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1919), 181.

32. A. Salter, *The United States of Europe and Other Papers* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1933), 100–104.

nations, bound together by loose legal ties.[33] Furthermore, the idea of a more orderly and humane world was connected to the possibility of enlightening the condition of humankind through education.[34]

In an article written in 1948, George Orwell, an advocate of Western European unity, described the circumstances that would lead to a more assiduous scheme of international organization. The onset of the atomic age meant that "democratic Socialism" had the potential to be implemented in "Western Europe" because of the tradition of "liberty, equality, and internationalism" that existed in places like "Scandinavia, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, the Low Countries, France, Britain, Spain, and Italy."[35] In some ways, the wider spectrum of European unity manifested the willingness to acquire the dimension of "nationhood" by transcending material concerns and establishing a system of values that would correlate to the cultural heritage of Europe.[36] Prominent thinkers looked at the federalist issue in a counterfactual manner, stating that the establishment of multilateral mechanisms would have prevented the onset of two major wars on European soil during the first half of the twentieth century. According to this perspective, further European integration could be propitious for depriving the nation-state of its absolute power and to improve the general conditions of a wide segment of the population.[37] The devastation caused by World War II was a powerful influencer in the push for a greater spectrum of European unity. In April 1943, Édouard Daladier, the former French prime minister, wrote in his prison journal that French leaders incarcerated by the Nazis, such as Léon Blum and Léon Jouhaux, believed in the necessity to build a "true European federation."[38] The idea of a more integrated Europe was linked to the possibility of social reform and the prevention of conflict between the European nations. The success of a possible federative scheme would need to be underpinned by the respect for "small states," with the ultimate view of limiting the "evil" tendencies that had led to two world wars.[39] In the aftermath of World War II, there was a drive toward reducing the security dilemma that had been implanted in the European continent as a result of the clash of interests between the great powers, particularly since the unification of Germany in the late nineteenth century. According to Ronald Mackay, a Labour Party member of the British Parliament, European unity would reduce the security dilemma because, under this arrangement, "the rights of the smaller states [would be] fully protected [...] Only by Federation can a free flow of trade be restored to Europe, which is the first

33. W. Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe—A Study of the European Alliance, 1813–1823 as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace* (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1920), 302–3.

34. H. G. Wells, *Guide to the New World—A Handbook of Constructive World Revolution* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1941), 143.

35. G. Orwell, "Toward European Unity," *Partisan Review*, London, July–August (1947)—http://orwell.ru/library/articles/European_Unity/english/e_teu

36. J. Benda, "Discours à la Nation Européene," *Folio*, Paris (1933/1993), 6.

37. W. B. Curry, *The Case for Federal Union* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1939), 152–53.

38. See E. Daladier, *Journal de captivité 1940–1945* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1994).

39. L. Kohr, *The Breakdown of Nations* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), 71–73.

step toward economic prosperity for the Continent."[40] Mackay envisaged the creation of a constitutional framework for the "United States of Europe" in which its parliament would have "exclusive power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation."[41] The functionalist orientation derived from the implementation of federal mechanisms was linked to the possibility of establishing a peaceful international order. This was an idea shared by several European leaders. Ferenc Nagy, the deposed Hungarian prime minister, stated that "if the simple people of the different nationalities learn to know, respect, and grow fond of one another, it will be easier to create a political unit that might be the cornerstone of a United States of Europe."[42] This view was echoed by Harold Nicolson, another Labour Party member of Parliament, who took the view that "Europe will only become a peaceful and prosperous continent if each of the present Nation States surrender something of their independence for the good of the whole." Nicolson indicated the necessity to "create something far wider and higher than the old League of Nations; [namely] the United States of Europe."[43] Pan-Europeanist thinking influenced the development of mechanisms of political and economic integration in the aftermath of World War II. During the 1947–1949 period there was an acceleration of the mechanisms of European integration, particularly in the area of defense and trade, as seen in the signing of the French–Italian Customs Union of 1948 and the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947 between France and the United Kingdom. Western European politicians thought that there was a need to "move forward on cooperation and unity without Germany," leaving the door open for that country to join in once a peace settlement was attained.[44] The resolution of the German Question was crucial in order to create a wider spectrum of European unity. Hannah Arendt stated that the solution to the "German Problem" lay in the establishment of federative mechanisms in Europe.[45]

In the late 1940s, it was envisaged that the path to federation in Europe would be centrally driven, through military alliance and economic integration.[46] US officials pointed out some of the frictions that emerged as a result of a wider scheme of European integration, claiming that the United Kingdom was "holding back, especially on many vital economic aspects of their own involvement with Western Europe."[47] Clement Attlee, the British prime minister, was not convinced that a federative scheme could be brought to fruition because every European state had "its old traditions and its special ideological

40. R. Mackay, *Federal Europe—Being the Case of European Federation Together with a Draft Constitution of a United States of Europe* (London: Michael Joseph, 1940), 111.
41. R. Mackay, *Federal Europe—Being the Case of European Federation Together with a Draft Constitution of a United States of Europe* (London: Michael Joseph, 1940), 238.
42. F. Nagy, *The Struggle behind the Iron Curtain,* trans. S. K. Swift (London: Macmillan, 1948), 460.
43. H. Nicolson, *Why Britain Is at War* (London: Viking, 1939/2010), 158–59.
44. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, Washington, March 29, 1949—FRUS, Western Europe (1949), 253.
45. J. Kohn (ed.), *Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994), 120.
46. E. Haas, "The United States of Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, 63, 4 (1948) December, 550.
47. The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State, Paris, October 22, 1949—FRUS, 1949. Western Europe (1949), 343.

set up." The skeptic stance toward federative matters prompted the Labour government to favor "every effort to effect greater European integration" without making a commitment to join it."[48] In any case, the political expediencies of the early Cold War period and the geopolitical interest of the United States in configuring a free trade area in Western Europe meant that the drive toward greater European unity would be unhindered. The idea of European unity was instrumental in the configuration of the Western Bloc. The conceptual framework that informed the process of the integration of the Western European economies married the notion of *Mitteleuropa* with the non-autarkic design imposed by the United States through the institutionalized system established at Bretton Woods. The process of economic integration was brought to fruition by amalgamating the resources of the industrial core of Europe within a political orientation that would prevent the onset of revisionist tendencies on the part of the national states.

The spectrum of coexistence between the different Western European nations was underpinned by calls for federative schemes aimed at reversing a long history of tensions between the main continental powers and at eliminating the possibility of war.[49] The element of great-power management was crucial to attaining a more federative approach to the problems that affected the continent of Europe. The establishment of a US sphere of influence in Western Europe was constructed with the ultimate aim of ensuring the end to the internal balance of power. Prominent international jurists took the view that the members of the system of states could not "leave the conditions of 1939 to continue[, and] that a large number of the difficulties which vex the world [could be] solved by the establishment of a democratic federation in Western Europe."[50] The process of institutionalization instigated by the superpowers in the postwar period represented an opportunity to impose a new world order that would do away with the tenets that guided interstate relations in the interwar period. Before World War II, the Western European nations had difficulties in establishing a political template that would combine the welfare of individuals with the needs and interests of the nation. The internal balance of power that operated in Western Europe then led to the permanent possibility of conflict. The imposition of liberal democracy in the American sphere of influence led to the entrenchment of the notion of the primacy of individual in the realm of politics.[51] The order that emerged in the aftermath of World War II established an identity of interests between the individual and the nation. This entailed the riddance from the international order of ideologies that would not appeal to the strict demarcation between the private and public spheres and the primacy of the needs and interests of the individual. The historical juncture of the early Cold War period led to the entrenchment of a federalist solution for the political and economic problems that affected the European continent. The idea of "Europe" as a political project that could serve as an instrument to end

---

48. C. Attlee, *As it Happened* (London: Odhams Press, 1954), 200.

49. Lord Lothian (1939), The ending of Armageddon—streitcouncil.org/uploads/PDF/ Lord%20Lothian-%20The%20Ending%20of%20Armageddon.pdf

50. See I. Jennings, *A Federation for Western Europe* (Charleston, SC: Nabu Press, 1940/2007).

51. See F. Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

the internal balance of power constituted an important element of institutionalization in the international order. To be sure, in the postwar period, the notion of European unity was subject to a significant level of intellectual debate. For instance, France, under Charles de Gaulle, adopted a more independent stance in matters concerning foreign policy and defense. However, the push and pull between supranational and intergovernmental mechanisms did not impede the construction of a social narrative that shunned the idea of conflict between the most prominent members of the institutional order that emerged in Western Europe.[52] This legacy continues, as there seems to be a willingness to preserve the mechanisms of European integration that were established in the aftermath of World War II, notwithstanding the current wave of populism that is engulfing the European continent.

In the aftermath of war, there was a willingness to go beyond the attempt to forge a normative framework capable of averting conflict. The idea of "Europe" allowed the continental powers to transcend the security dilemma that had become a feature of European interstate relations by creating a common geopolitical identity.[53] It was thought that the European federalist ideal would be used to avert a situation in which the rise of militarism and excessive nationalism would thwart socioeconomic advancement for the average citizen. This is an ideal that was part and parcel of the Ventotene Manifesto, written by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi in 1943, which stated that the federal project would lead to "the process of forming a European economic life freed from the nightmares of militarism or national bureaucratism." The Ventotene Manifesto also highlighted the need to create a political spectrum in which "rational solutions [would] replace irrational ones."[54] The intellectual debate over the manner in which to institutionalize the postwar international order was informed by the prevalence of multilateralist tendencies. The instrument of great-power management was crucial to bringing a multilateral international order into existence. The hegemonic practices rolled out by the United States in the aftermath of World War II, and the liberal overtones of its American exceptionalist template were influential factors in the propagation of the instruments that would lead to the economic integration of the European continent.[55] The implementation of the two main prongs of the policy of containment (the Truman Doctrine and the ERP) operationalized the idea of European unity. The application of a wider spectrum of European unity would not have been possible at a different historical juncture. The economic devastation and the power vacuum that was generated as a result of the the

52. G. De Keersmaeker, *Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory: Post-Cold War and the 19th Century Compared* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 170.

53. D. Pasquinucci, Inventare il Futuro per non ristaurare il passato. Altiero Spinelli nella resistenza in C. Rognoni Vercelli, P. Fonatana and D. Preda (eds.), *Altiero Spinelli, il federalism europeo e la resistenza* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2012), 63.

54. The Ventotene Manifesto (1941), www.federalists.eu/uef/library/books/the-ventotene-manifesto/

55. J. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization*, 46, 3 (1992), 568.

war was crucial in setting in motion instruments that would lead to a greater spectrum of unity in the European continent.

9.4 The Equilibrium between Order and Hegemony

The process of institutionalization that took place in the aftermath of World War II was propelled by a relatively high level of great-power management. Great-power management developed in the context of the establishment of multilateral mechanisms aimed at creating a greater level of coordination between the superpowers and the countries that formed part of their spheres of influence. The superpowers sought to create some equilibrium between the concepts of order and justice, with the ultimate view of ensuring the stability of the postwar international order. The hierarchical ordering that emerged after World War II was meant to preserve the hegemonic position of the superpowers. This objective was to be fulfilled by ensuring that the subaltern countries would benefit from the geopolitical actions of the superpowers, at least to some extent. The level of great-power management that was exerted by the United States and the Soviet Union in the postwar era led to equilibrium between order and justice, due to the expansion of multilateral mechanisms of global governance aimed at improving the material conditions that affected the system of states. The multilateral mechanisms propelled by the superpowers had the effect of bolstering the institutionalization of the international order because of the expansion of "generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse reciprocity."[56] The notion of order was inextricably connected to the possibility of preventing the rise of revisionist ideologies in the postwar international environment. The ability of any given power to ideate the geopolitical environment weakens as a consequence of the emergence of viable alternative ideologies. This situation can be better appraised by making reference to the events that have been taking place in the system of states in recent years. Since the onset of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–2009, the rise of illiberal democracy and authoritarian capitalism have been influential in weakening the power of the social narratives projected by the West, both at home and abroad.[57] The soft power of the Western nations has traditionally been underscored by the projection of the liberal values derived from the Enlightenment period. The bout of populism that is currently affecting the United States and Europe is imperiling the geopolitical dominance of the West.

One of the main lessons that can be learned from the role played by the United States and the Soviet Union as great powers that managed the transition to the postwar international order is the importance of the effective deployment of military and conceptual power into the system of states. The willingness on the part of the superpowers to employ force in order to defend their right to intervene in the spheres of influence carved out after World War II constituted a departure from past practice. The readiness to use force was an important mechanism in the enforcement of the social norms agreed

---

56. J. Caporaso, "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations," *International Organization*, 46, 3 (1992), 601–2.
57. G. Azar, "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers," *Foreign Affairs* (2007), 64.

upon during the process of institutionalization of the postwar international order. The interwar European order was held together by a number of loose alliances, including the Rome–Berlin axis, the alliance between France and Czechoslovakia, the Franco–Russian alliance, the Little Entente (formed between Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia against Hungarian revisionism), the Balkan League and the Rome Protocol (which linked Hungary, Austria and Italy in an alliance). These arrangements did not facilitate the maintenance of a stable geopolitical order. Multilateralism can be identified as an important element in the institutionalization of a system of states, since it creates the basis for predictable behavior among its constituents.[58] Arguably, the interventionist practices applied by the superpowers led to the maintenance of a stable international order. The element of order was also conducive to improving the material conditions of the units of the system of states. The nondiscriminatory expansion of trade, decolonization, the greater scope of understanding between nations and the extension of collective security instruments that came about as a result of the expansion of multilateralism contributed to enhancing the spectrum of justice in the postwar era.[59]

The principle of mutual recognition constituted a significant component of the social norms that sustained the working of the postwar international order, as it kept in check the security dilemma that informed the Cold War system of states. At the same time, considerations having to do with the attainment of a more just international order were of paramount importance for the purposes of establishing a stable system of states. The postwar international order was consolidated as a result of the fact that the national interest of the hegemonic powers was enacted within the context of the bipolar system of collective security underpinned by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This is an element of great significance when it comes to understanding the way in which the great powers institutionalized the international order in the wake of World War II. The regional security groupings that were established in the Western Hemisphere, Europe and Asia responded to Washington's desire to avoid the onset of autarchy in security matters on the part of the subaltern units of its sphere of influence. However, to some extent, the ordering principle established by the superpowers in security matters allowed the subaltern units to concentrate on their socioeconomic development, thereby enhancing the spectrum of justice in the international order. From this standpoint, one could also argue that the reduction of the concept of absolute sovereignty that affected the subaltern units of the system was another instrument that propelled equilibrium between order and hegemony in the postwar era.

The establishment of federalist arrangements in Western Europe was an important constitutive instrument of the equilibrium between the concepts of order and hegemony. The expansion of federalist arrangements went hand in hand with self-imposed limits on the spectrum of sovereignty on the part of the Western European nations. In 1941,

---

58. B. Mabee, *The Globalization of Security: State Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 33.

59. J. Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization*, 46, 3 (1992), 566.

George Orwell argued for the need to resolve the "antithesis between the man of science who is working toward a planned World State and the reactionary who is trying to restore a disorderly past."[60] As we have seen in previous sections, the maintenance of an orderly system of states was linked to the possibility of achieving a wider spectrum of socioeconomic enfranchisement for the masses. At the end of World War II, Henry Wallace argued that the main purpose of world organization should be the, "maintenance of full employment and the highest possible level of national income"—a task that "should be the joint responsibility of private business and of government."[61] The element of social reform instigated by the superpowers at a domestic and international level was linked to the possibility of constructing a more just international order in the postwar period. The high level of intervention that took place in the international order since the end of World War II was accompanied by the deployment of conceptual power, which was used as a mechanism to propagate adherence to the rules set by the great powers in their respective areas of influence. The enactment and implementation of rules of engagement entailed the creation of ideational conditions that would compel the lesser units of the system to adopt the principles projected by the superpowers. Nevertheless, the element of order that is attached to this *modus operandi* could not have been legitimized without expanding the idea of socioeconomic transformation in the system of states.

The establishment of the principle of coexistence between the superpowers also contributed to institutionalizing the postwar system of states according to an equilibrium between order and hegemony. The role of coexistence in the postwar international order was underscored by the principle of mutual recognition and the limiting of armed conflict to the peripheral areas of the world. The principle of recognition that underpinned the institutionalization of the international order in the aftermath of World War II was supported by the idea that the dominance exercised by the superpowers in their respective spheres of influence would not be contested. The principle of mutual recognition would entail the tacit acknowledgment that both superpowers were within their rights to quell any revisionist acts in their respective spheres of influence. During the Cold War, the United States would offer only a modicum of moral support to the Eastern European nations. There was not any significant attempt on the part of the United States to risk an all-out confrontation with the Soviet Union by embarking on a crusade to free the Intermarium from the yoke of Communism. Simultaneously, the support given by the Soviet Union to the insurgent movements in Latin America during the 1960s was mostly ideational in nature. In other words, it did not constitute a concerted attempt to overhaul the foundations of the international order based on coexistence and selective intervention within the superpowers' geopolitical realms. Instead, it was an ideational mechanism aimed at entrenching the symbolic idea of the redemptionist power of communist ideology. The Soviet Union provided Communist Cuba with an important lifeline

---

60. G. Orwell, Wells, Hitler and the World State (1941)—orwell.ru/library/reviews/wells/english/e_whws
61. H. Wallace, *Democracy Reborn* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1944), 194.

in order to ensure its economic viability in the context of the commercial embargo imposed by the United States. Cuba, a Soviet ally, diverted some of the funds received from the Soviet Union in order to provide assistance to left-wing organizations such as Montoneros in Argentina and Tupamaros in Uruguay. Nevertheless, the willingness to restrain from engaging in direct confrontation with the United States in the Western Hemisphere indicates that the Soviet Union respected Washington's right to exercise hegemonic practices in that part of the world. A similar situation developed in Western Europe, where the Soviet Union was able to exercise some element of soft power through its ideological influence on progressive political parties—albeit without any purposeful plan to subvert the geopolitical order that had emerged after the war. Here we see how the hegemonic practices propagated by each superpower correlated with the need to preserve a well-functioning system of states.

The two blocs were able to establish orderly relations in the early 1950s. One of the most important aspects of this stable order was the relative parity of capabilities between the United States and the Soviet Union. The US Department of State highlighted that "unless the power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union changes dramatically in [America's] favor, there is little likelihood of detaching a major satellite at any time without grave risk of war."[62] While the Department of State acknowledged the possibility that a satellite nation such as Eastern Germany could sever ties with the Communist Bloc, it was not envisaged that the United States would "precipitate hostilities."[63] From this standpoint, one could postulate that the interaction between hegemonic practices and the concept of order was propounded by the use of a rationalist scheme of foreign policy on the part of the superpowers. In this context, the ideological constructs that emanated from the liberal overtones of American exceptionalism were an important legacy of the postwar period. These liberal overtones were responsible for the "embeddedness" of the utilitarian practices of "market societies" in the system of states.[64] The principle of rational utility was not devoid of a social orientation. This is another way in which equilibrium between order and hegemonic practices was forged. The principle of rational utility included in the American exceptionalist template placed the individual at the heart of the concept of the political. This was an important element in the management of the international order, as national states in Western Europe (and beyond) began to establish a political framework that placed the rights of the individual in the same category as the rights of the nation.[65]

---

62. Summary paper approved by the Operations Coordinating Board, Washington, January 5, 1955, Analysis of the Situation with Respect to possible detachment of a major European Soviet satellite—FRUS, 1955–1957. Eastern Europe (1955–1957), 8–9.

63. Memorandum from Robert E. Delaney of the Office of Policy and Programs, Soviet Orbit Division, United States Information Agency, to Francis B. Stevens of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, FRUS, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe (1955–1957), 10.

64. K. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).

65. See K. Vašák, *The International Dimensions of Human Rights* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

9.5 The Role of Intervention in the Maintenance of an Institutionalized Geopolitical Order

The equilibrium between order and hegemonic practices and the overall stability of the international order necessitated the role of intervention as a mechanism that could facilitate the institutionalization of the system of states. The interventionist orientation employed by both superpowers is indicative of the functionalist perspective that informed the postwar international order. The superpowers used the element of intervention in order to prop up their geopolitical position in the international order. The commitment to the preservation of an orderly system of states was a factor of paramount importance in the establishment of a regulatory framework capable of maintaining stability while, at the same time, propagating the interests of the superpowers. The practice of institutionalization implemented by the superpowers shows that an intricate regulatory framework capable of guiding relations between states over a considerable period of time can be brought forth when national states possessing massive capabilities identify a correlation between the existence of multilateral frameworks of action and the attainment of their geopolitical objectives. The experience of the interwar years shows the difficulties that arise when countries attempt to actualize their interests outside the scope of multilateral action—especially in the complex and interconnected environment of the age of globalization. The experience of the interwar period shows that it is much easier for states to renege on their commitments when the mechanisms that regulate interstate relations are established on a bilateral basis. Recalcitrant actors may wish to compel other actors to break free from multilateral arrangements. However, the complex nature of interdependence means that the possibility of breaking free from multilateral arrangements will be substantially reduced. During the Cold War, the members of the Soviet Bloc united for the purposes of repelling the revisionist drive that took place in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In addition to this, in the Western Hemisphere, national governments did not follow Cuba's revisionist lead. Instead, the Latin American nations responded to the onset of Marxist-inspired terrorism by putting in motion a national security apparatus that crushed the possibility of a takeover by the guerrilla forces that enjoyed the support of Communist Cuba. In any case, the origins of the Cold War show that multilateral arrangements will remain in operation only if they succeed in bringing about the actualization of the geopolitical needs and interests of the hegemonic powers.

The role of intervention exercised by the superpowers was pivotal in order to deal with recalcitrant geopolitical tendencies on the part of the subaltern units of the respective spheres of influence. One of the main ways in which the superpowers ensured the compliance of the subaltern units was by incorporating countries with which they had some degree of cultural affinity and/ or similar levels of economic development. There were marked cultural affinities between the United States and Western Europe. The Soviet Union established a sphere of influence in an area of Europe that did not share the level of economic development enjoyed by the Western European countries. The process of intervention that took place in the Intermarium was propelled by the existence of cultural affinities between Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In this context, it may be argued that the process of intervention that developed after the end

of World War II was entrenched by the configuration of a "friend" identity between the superpowers and the members of their respective spheres of influence.[66] The institutionalization of the postwar international order unfolded as a result of the communication channels shared between the constituent members of the respective spheres of influence. From this perspective, established cultural ties might have facilitated the creation of a "friend" narrative that consolidated this bipolar system of states. This may explain why the Soviet Union and its satellites were not able to persuade the Latin American countries to adopt Communism. At the same time, the "friend" narrative was a consideration that caused the United States to refrain from undertaking a more vigorous stance in order to defend the cause of freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe. The "friend" narrative demarcated the scope of intervention of the superpowers, as it contributed to accelerate the process of bandwagoning that facilitated the institutionalization of the postwar era. The configuration of a "friend" narrative is inexorably connected to the development of common cultural ties over a long period of time. This facet explains the difficulties that could have arisen in regard to a possible associative scheme between the Eastern European countries and the Western Bloc. It could be argued that one of the main reasons why the United States refrained from attempting to liberate Eastern Europe was the lack of shared political values and the lesser level of economic development of those nations. Moreover, the process of bandwagoning that took place in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II indicates that the will to engage in revisionist activities decreases when there is a beneficial economic relationship between the subaltern units and the hegemonic power.

Another theme that emerges when examining the role of intervention relates to the prevention of disruptive revisionist tendencies in the postwar era. The superpowers deployed a high level of political and military intervention for the purposes of sustaining the stability of the international order. From this standpoint, intervention should be seen as the "discourse and practice" instigated by great powers in order to recreate the identity of the system of states in accordance with their geopolitical interests.[67] The lesson in great-power management that can be learned from the situation is that it cannot be expected that great powers would intervene to deploy their resources in political scenarios where there is no geostrategic interest at stake. World War II provided evidence of the interlinked nature of the threats that existed in the international order. The isolationism of the 1930s created the potential threat of infiltration by ideologies that were foreign to the American experience. The balance of power that emerged in the international order

---

66. Juxtaposing the narrative of Machiavelli's *The Prince* to St. Exupery's *Little Prince*, Grygiel states that "friendships arise slowly out of a process of 'taming' (*apprivoiser*) each other [...] Friendships take time, patience, and perseverance, for that is what is required to create the smoother rhythmic flow of mutual dependence." See J. Grygiel, "Two Princes," *The American Interest*, 10, October 6, 2014—http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/10/06/two-princes/

67. I. Forbes and M. Hoffman, "Introduction: Intervention and State Sovereignty in the International System," in I. Forbes, and M. Hoffman (eds.), *Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics of Intervention* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993), 2.

after the war was contrived to ensure that the recalcitrant and revisionist actors that may have expressed reservations regarding the hegemonic position of the United States would be duly disciplined.

The United States deployed an interventionist scheme of foreign policy that contributed to the institutionalization of the international order by employing "a compromise between the utopian conception of a common feeling of right and the realist conception of a mechanical adjustment to a changed equilibrium of forces."[68] The intervention exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union prevented the onset of disruptive conflict by pushing for the creation of supranational mechanisms and forms of communication based on multilateral guarantees that would reduce the security dilemma in the system of states. The reformulation of the notion of sovereignty was useful for avoiding the propagation of revisionist tendencies in the international order. The intervention of the United States was crucial in the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany and in securing a favorable outcome in the Italian and French elections of 1946 and 1948. This helped remove the spectrum of political autarchy in Western Europe. The elimination of the internal balance of power and the push for greater European unity was bequeathed to those nations by the interventionist policies of the United States. American intervention was pivotal in the adoption of a pan-European approach to the economic and political problems that affected the European continent. Moreover, the Soviet Union used the instrument of intervention for the purposes of preventing dissent in the areas of the Communist Bloc that were vital to its geopolitical design for the postwar era, as seen in the intervention made in the East German crisis of 1953, the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Czechoslovak Spring of 1968. In 1949, Mikhail Suslov, head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee, stated that "under the flag of anti-Communism, the warmongers form a kind of 'holy' alliance of the forces of imperialism, fascism, the Vatican and Right-wing Socialists."[69] Intervention was not just restricted to matters of security. Moscow was also interested in utilizing the element of intervention to establish clear lines of demarcation regarding the implementation of communist ideology, ensuring that the domestic policies of the satellite nations would be aligned with Moscow's geopolitical designs.

Intervention was an instrument of paramount importance to ensure the institutionalization of a geopolitical order favorable to the interests of the superpowers. The devastation cause by World War II gave the superpowers an important window of opportunity for creating the social norms of behavior needed to ensure the fulfillment of their geopolitical needs. The intervention exercised in the creation of spheres of political and economic influence contributed to the institutionalization of the postwar international order because it suppressed the possibility of a third and/ or fourth bloc capable of reinstating the internal balance of power in the European continent. Bloc formation in Western Europe accelerated the creation of the type of loose economic federation

---

68. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939* (London: Harper Collins, 1964), 222.
69. See M. Suslov, *The Defense of Peace and the Struggle Against the Warmongers—Working Class Unity for Peace* (Moscow: New Century, 1949).

desired by the German corporate interests since the late nineteenth century—albeit in alignment with the geopolitical and geoeconomic designs of the United States. The interventionist approach undertaken by the United States eliminated the possibility that Western Europe may have constituted itself as an autarkic bloc. In the case of the Communist Bloc of nations, bloc formation enhanced the level of integration of the economies of the Intermarium. As we can see, the instrument of intervention applied by the superpowers had attached to it elements of persuasion and coercion that were crucial in the creation of a system of states based on equilibrium between hegemonic practices and the attainment of an orderly postwar settlement.

9.6 Conclusion

There were a number of significant geopolitical implications derived from the interaction between the superpowers during the early Cold War period. The management of the spheres of influence exercised by the superpowers was crucial for the purposes of establishing an environment of conviviality in the international order, as it prevented the onset of an all-out confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. This kind of intervention indicated the commitment of the victors to transform Germany, to create a stable geopolitical settlement in Europe and to revolutionize the ethical foundations of the international order. Although the Allies had different interests in regard to the future of Germany and Europe, in order to attain their geostrategic goals they were compelled to maintain the ethical and functional cohabitation of the wartime years. A more integrated world and the emergence of two blocs meant the possibility of intervention like never before in the history of the international political system. The United States and the Soviet Union did not regard each other as enemies to be eradicated from the international order. Instead, there was tacit acknowledgement of their right to exist. The principle of mutual recognition that emerged in the aftermath of World War II contributed to institutionalizing the social norms that would cater to the needs and interests of the superpowers within a stable international order.

The onset of the Cold War propelled the establishment of an international order characterized by the assiduous interaction between the two superpowers and the acknowledgment of the existence of different ontological perspectives and social systems. The origins of the Cold War have to be appraised within the perspective of coexistence as a form of permanent dialogue between great powers possessing antithetical ideological templates. This state of affairs enhanced the scope of multilateralism and global governance in an expanded system of states.[70] The Cold War international order emerged in response to the idea that the concept of sovereignty that guided interstate relations would be enacted in accordance with the convergence of the economic and political values endorsed by the superpowers.[71] In this context, one may argue that great-power

---

70. A. Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community—Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 101.
71. B. Buzan, *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations—The Societal Approach* (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), 117–18.

management is most effective in the construction of a solid international order in cases when there is an intercultural approach to the division of labor needed to keep an orderly distribution of responsibilities between the main hegemonic powers. A metapolitical approach serves to bolster the establishment of a workable international order. The intercultural approach entails that each great power is best suited to create a community of interests in geographical areas where there is a possibility of establishing a common geopolitical identity. In order to ensure the prevalence of a system of states based on the principle of coexistence, it is important that each great power recognizes its own limitations when it comes to the deployment of power *and* the right of other great powers to operate within their own cultural sphere.

The articulation of the Cold War international system responded to the crucial role that the superpowers played in creating certain global arrangements needed for the preservation of a peaceful and durable status quo.[72] The notion of intervention is directly linked to the establishment of hierarchies that create the "constitutive institutions" that underpin the functioning of the system of states at a particular historical juncture.[73] The principle of intervention implemented in the aftermath of World War II was connected to the idea that the sovereignty of the nations that formed part of the respective spheres of influence would be subject to the implementation of the geopolitical interests of the superpowers. In this manner, the idea of intervention created a hierarchical ordering of the system of states that was conducive to further the interests of the superpowers without risking an all-out confrontation. The establishment of a hierarchical ordering through the exercise of intervention prevented the disruption of the international order by averting the rise of revisionist powers and by avoiding an overt state of military confrontation between the superpowers. This hierarchical ordering relegated Western Europe and the Intermarium to a subjugated position in the international order. The ontological demotion that was part and parcel of this hierarchical ordering would entrench intervention as one of the constitutive institutions of the postwar system of states.[74] The superpowers labored under the assumption that the stability of international order depended on a lesser spectrum of collegiality in matters related to the management of the system of states. The main lesson to be drawn from the superpowers' efforts to create a stable international order is that the effective management of the system of states entails the prevalence of a hierarchical ordering between rule makers and rule takers. This was done by curtailing the spectrum of sovereignty of the subaltern units of the sphere of influence managed by the Soviet Union and the United States. The international order was reshaped according to the principle of bipolarity. One of the consequences of this global arrangement was the suppression of the possibility of the emergence of a third

---

72. A. Linklater and H. Suganami, *The English School of International Relations—A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 224.
73. B. Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 179.
74. E. Adler and S. Bernstein, "Knowledge in Power: The Epistemic Construction of Global Governance," in M. Barnett and R. Duvall (eds.), *Power in Global Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 294.

and/or fourth geopolitical bloc capable of challenging the overwhelming supremacy of the United States and the Soviet Union as the main rule-makers of the international order. The hegemonic practices instigated by the superpowers resulted in a clear demarcation between rule-makers and rule-takers in the international political system.

The stability of the postwar international order was underscored by the element of coexistence, which manifested itself as a civilizing process bolstered by the internal and external constraints on the exercise of hard power. The idea of order denotes a process that is based on socially accepted norms that come about as a result of the actions that are put in motion by the hegemonic actors.[75] Accordingly, the application of intervention in the postwar scenario can be linked to the necessity to reconstruct a viable system of states based on workable rules of conviviality. The enactment of social norms was linked to the enforcement of vital geopolitical interests as well as the improvement of the material conditions of the system of states. The resolution of the most pressing issues concerning the configuration of the postwar international environment provided the framework for the establishment of the social norms that would guide the international order. There appears to be a symbiotic relationship between agency and structure that aided the configuration of the postwar system of states.[76] The great-power management exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union was influential for the purposes of containing the spread the violence within their respective spheres of influence.[77] The idea of coexistence was dominated by the notion that the superpowers were to actualize their own national interest by managing their respective spheres of influence through a combination of soft and hard power mechanisms.[78] The United States and the Soviet Union exercised violence in order to discipline their respective spheres of influence. Nevertheless, there was an understanding that the role of the superpowers was to impose social norms that would legitimize their dominant position. The hegemonic practices put forward by the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed a relatively high level of legitimacy due to their concerns for the elevation of the material conditions of the units that composed their respective spheres of influence and the importance given to the stability of the international order.

75. J. Williams, "Order and Society," in J. Williams and R. Little (eds.), *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 15 and 21.

76. C. Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations—Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 293.

77. A. Linklater, *The Problem of Harm in World Politics—Theoretical Investigations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 161.

78. J. M. Coicaud, "Conclusion: Making Sense of National Interest and International Solidarity," in J. M. Coicaud and N. Wheeler (eds.), *National Interest and International Solidarity—Particular and Universal Ethics in International Life* (New York: United Nations University, 2008), 289–90.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archival Sources

CAB 120—National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.
CAB 128—National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.
General Records of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury—National Archives, College Park, MD.
Miscellaneous German Files 1943–45—National Archives, College Park, MD.
State, War and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) Files—National Archives, College Park, MD.
Elsey Papers—Harry Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files, European Emergency—Harry Truman Library, Independence, MO.
Truman Papers, President's Secretary's Files, Greece—Harry Truman Library, Independence, MO.
J. M. Jones Papers—Harry Truman Library, Independence, MO.

Published Archival Sources

Alexandrov, A. et al. (ed.) (1974) *History of Soviet Foreign Policy—1945–1970*, Moscow: Progress.
Bernstein, B. and A. Matusow (1966) *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History*, New York and London: Harper and Row.
Degras, J. (ed.) (1971) *The Communist International*, 1919–1943, Volume III, 1929–1943, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1947 (1er janvier—30 juin), Volume 1.
Documents Diplomatiques Français: 1946 (1er janvier—30 juin), Volume 1.
Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series I, Volume I, HMSO, London, 1991.
Foreign relations of the United States (FRUS) Western European integration and security, Canada, 1958–1960.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Eastern Europe, 1955–1957.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) National security affairs (in two parts), 1952–1954.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) National security affairs; foreign economic policy, 1950.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, 1949.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Volume V, 1949.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Western Europe, 1949.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1948.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Germany and Austria, 1948.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Western Europe, 1948.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) General; the United Nations (in two parts), 1948.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, 1947.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) The Near East and Africa, 1947.
Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Germany and Austria, 1947.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) The British Commonwealth, Europe, 1947.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) General; The United Nations, 1947.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, 1946.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Paris Peace Conference: proceedings, 1946.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) General, the United Nations, 1946.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Europe, 1945.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) The British of Commonwealth, Western and Central Europe, 1946.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) The American Republics, 1945.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) The Far East, China, 1945.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Europe, 1945.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Europe, 1944.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Conference at Quebec, 1944.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) General: Economic and Social Matters, 1944.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Casablanca Conference, 1943.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Conference at Quebec, 1943.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) Europe, 1942.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East, and Africa, 1938.

Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East, and Africa, 1937.

Gooch, G. and H. Temperly (eds.) *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, vol. 3, London: HMOS.

History of the USSR, Part III, From the Beginning of the Great Patriotic War to the Present Day (1977), translated by K. Russell, Moscow: Progress.

Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of Berlin, 1944–1961, London: HM Stationery Office.

Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.) (1978) *Documents and Materials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War: November 1937–1938*, Moscow: International.

Von Oppen, B. R. (ed.) (1955) *Documents of Germany under Occupation 1945–1954*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London: Oxford University Press.

Primary Sources

Acheson, D. (1987) *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, New York: W. W. Norton.

Adams, H. (1977) *Harry Hopkins—A Biography*, New York: G. P. Putnam's.

Agosti, A. (1996) *Palmiro Togliatti*, Turin: UTET.

Attlee, C. (1954) *As it Happened*, London: Odhams Press.

Bajohr, F. and J. Matthäus (ed.) (2015) *Alfred Rosenberg, Diarios, 1933–1944*, Translated by Lara Cortés Fernández, Teófilo de Lozoya Elzdurdía, Isabel Romero Reche and Alicia Valero Martín, Barcelona: Crítica.

Baruch, B. (1960) *The Public Years*, London: Odhams Press.

Bedell Smith, W. (1950) *Moscow Mission—1946–1949*, London: William Heinemann.

Benda, J. (1933/1993) *Discours à la Nation Européene*, Paris: Folio.

Bew, J. (2016) *Citizen Clem: A Biography of Attlee*, London: Riverrun.

Bidault, G. (1967) *Resistance: The Political Autobiography of Georges Bidault* translated by M. Sinclair, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

———. (1965) *D'Une Résistance a l'autre*, Les Presses du Siècle, Paris.

Bismarck, O. (1968) *Reflections & Reminiscences*, edited by Theodore S. Hamerow, London: Harper Torchbooks.

Blum, L. (1945) *À L'Echelle Humaine*, Paris: Galimard.

Boemeke, M., G. Feldman and E. Glaser (eds.) (1998) *The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment after 75 Years*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Boterbloem, K. (2004) *The Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896–1948*, Toronto: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Brackman, R. (2001) *The Secret File of Joseph Stalin—A Hidden Life*, London: Frank Cass.

Bullock, A. (1983) *Ernest Bevin—Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951*, London: Heinemann.

Butler, S. (2003/1935) *War Is a Racket*, Port Townsend, WA: Feral House.

Carr, E. H. (1948) *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*, New York: Macmillan.

Churchill, W. (2015/1939) *While England Slept—Political Writings: 1936–1939*, London: Bloomsbury.

———. (1950) 'Conservative Mass Meeting: a speech at Llandudno, 9 October 1948', Europe Unite: Speeches 1947 & 1948, London: Cassell.

———. (ed.) (1948) *The Sinews of Peace—Post-War Speeches by Winston S. Churchill*, London: Cassel.

Clay, L. (1950) *Germany and the Fight for Freedom*, The Godkin Lectures at Harvard University, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Clifford Papers, Subject File, European Recovery Program.

Clifford, C. (with Richard Holbrooke) (1991) *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*, New York: Random House.

Codreanu, C. (1972) *Guardia de Hierro*, Munich: Colectia Omnul Nou.

Cohn, R. (1954) *Only a Miracle Can Save America from the Red Conspiracy*, New York: Wanderer Print.

Colvin, I. (1965) *Vansittart in Office—A Historical Survey of the Origins of the Second World War Based on the Papers of Sir Robert Vansittart*, London: Victor Gollancz.

Craveri, P. (2006) *De Gasperi*, Bologna: Il Mulino.

Cummins, A. (ed.) (1998) *Documents of Soviet History, Volume 4: Stalin Grasps Power, 1926–1928*, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.

Daladier, E. (1994) *Journal de captivité 1940–1945*, Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

Dallin, A. and F. Firsov (eds.) (2000) *Dimitrov and Stalin, 1943–1945—Letter from the Soviet Archives*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dalton, H. (1935) *Practical Socialism for Britain*, London: Routledge.

De Gaulle, C. (1970) *Discours et messages*, vol. 2: Dans l'Attente (1946–1958), Paris: Plon.

———. (1970) *Mémoirs de Guerre et Mémoirs d'Espoir*, Paris: Plon.

———. (1983) *Memoires de Guerre—L'Unité*, 1942–1944, Paris: Plon.

Deutscher, I. (1968) *Stalin—A Political Biography*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dimitrov, G. (2003) *The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949*, edited by Ivo Banac, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Djilas, M. (1962) *Conversations with Stalin*, London: Penguin.

Dodd, B. (1954) *School of Darkness*, New York: P. J. Kenedy.

Donald, A. (2012) *Citizen Soldier—A Life of Harry S. Truman*, New York: Basic Books.

Drechsler, K. (with C. Link) (ed.) (1992) *Alternative Concepts of United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1947—European and Global Aspects of Postwar Relations the Soviet Union (Documents)*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

Eberle, H. and M. Uhl (eds.) (2016) *El Informe Hitler—Informe Secreto del NKVD para Stalin, extraído a Otto Günsche, ayudante personal de Hitler y Heinz Linge, su ayudante de cámara, Moscú, 1948–1949*, Acta no. 462, Sección 5ta, Catalog 30 del Archivo Estatal de Historia Contemporanea de Rusia, traducido del alemán por Victor Eduardo Farías Zurita y Victor Farias Soto, Barcelona: Tusquets.

Ehrenburg, I. (1944) *The Tempering of Russia*, translated by A. Kaun, New York: A. A. Knopf.

Eisenhower, D. (1949) *Crusade in Europe*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Feder, G. (1934) *Hitler's Official Programme and its Fundamental Ideas*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Ferrell, R. (ed.) (1980) *Off the Record—The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*, Cambridge: Harper and Row.

Gaddis, J. L. (2011) *George Kennan—An American Life*, London: Penguin Books.

———. (1983) "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 7, 3, pp. 179–81.

———. (1982) *Strategies of Containment—A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

General Sikorski Historical Institute, *Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations*, 1939–1945, vol. 2, 1943–1945, London: Heinemann.

Goldberg, H. (ed.) (1993) *Documents of Soviet-American Relations, vol. 1: Intervention, Famine Relief, International Affairs*, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.

Gehlen, R. (1972) *The Service—The Memoirs of the General Reinhard Gehlen*, New York: World Publishing Times Mirror.

Germany after the War—Proposals of a Liberal Party Committee under the Chairmanship of the Earl of Perth, London: Liberal Publication Department.

Gilbert, G. (1947) *The Nuremberg Diary*, New York: Farrar, Straus.

Gillies, D. (1999) *Radical Diplomat: The Life of Sir Archibald Clark Kerr*, Lord Inverchapel, 1882–1951, London: I. B. Tauris.

Gisevius, H. (1966) *Adolf Hitler*, Barcelona: Plaza & Janes.

Goebbels, J. (1927) *Der Nazi-Sozi*, Elberfeld: Verlag der Nationalsozialistischen Briefe.

Gorodetsky, G. (ed.) (2015) *The Maisky Diaries—Red Ambassador to the Court of St. James, 1932–1943*, New Haven, CT: Yale Unversity Press.

Gosnell, H. (1980) *Truman's Crises—A Political Biography of Harry S. Truman*, Greenwood Press, CT: Westport.

Gray, A (1915) *The Upright Sheaf—Germany's Intentions after the War*, London: Methuen and Co.

Gromyko, A. (1989) *Memories*, translated by H. Shukman, London: Hutchinson.

———. (1985) *The Overseas Expansion of Capital—Past and Present*, Moscow: Progress.

Gromyko, A. and B. Ponomarev (1981) *Soviet Foreign Policy: 1945–1980*, Moscow: Institut istorii SSSR.

Grossman, V. (2018) *Crónicas desde el Frente de Batalla*, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg.

Harriman, A. (1971) *America and Russia in a Changing World—A Half Century of Personal Observation*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Harriman, A. and E. Abel (1978) *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1946*, New York: Random House.

Hasenclever, A., P. Mayer and V. Rittberger (1997) *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Healey, D. (1989) *The Time of My Life*, London: Michael Joseph.

Hearings before US Senate Subcommittee of the Committee on Military Affairs (1945) *Elimination of German Resources for War.* Report pursuant to S. Res. 107 and 146, July 2, 1945, Part 7 (78th Congress and 79th Congress), Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Himmler, K. (ed.) (2014) *Himmler-Según la Correspondencia con su Esposa*, Barcelona: Taurus.

Hitler, A. (2006) *Second Book*, London: Enigma Books.

———. (2000) *Hitler's Table Talk, 1941–1944: His Private Conversations*, introduced by Hugh Trevor-Roper, New York: Enigma Books.

———. (1998) *Mein Kampf*, London: Houghton Mifflin.

Hogan, M. (1989) *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–1952*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hoover, J. E. (1959) *Masters of Deceit—The Story of Communism in America and How to Fight It*, New York: Pocket Books.

Hull, C. (1993) *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, vol. 1, Irvine, CA: Reprint Services Corporation.

Jago, M. (2014) *Clement Attlee—The Inevitable Prime Minister*, London: Biteback.

Jordan, G. (with Richard Stokes) (1952) *From Major Jordan's Diaries*, New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Joukoff Eudin, X. and R. Susser (1967) *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928–1934—Documents and Materials*, vol. 2, University Park and London: The Pennsylvania State University.

Judge, E. and Langdon, J. (eds.) (2017) *The Cold War through Documents: A Global History*, London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kalinin, M. (1945) *The Soviet President Speaks—Speeches, Broadcast Addresses, and Articles on the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, London: Hutchinson.

Kennan, G. (2014) *The Kennan Diaries*, edited by F. Costigliola, London: W. W. Norton.

———. (1967) *Memoirs: 1925–1950*, Boston: Little, Brown.

———. (1966) *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, New York: W. W. Norton.

Kennedy, J. (1940) *Why England Slept*, London: Hutchinson.

Khlevniuk, O. (2015) *Stalin: New Biography of a Dictator*, translated by N. Seligman Favorov, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Khrushchev, N. (1956) *Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the 20th Party Congress*, Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House.

Klugmann, J. (1951) *From Trotsky to Tito*, London: Lawrence & Wishart.

Korczak, J. (2018) *Diario del Gueto*, Barcelona: Seix Barral.

Labour Party (1947) *Keep Left*, London: New Statesman.

Langer, W. (1972) *The Mind of Adolf Hitler—The Secret Wartime Report*, New York: Basic Books.

Lansbury, G. (1934) *My England*, London: Selwyn and Blount.

Laserson, M. (1945) *Russia and the Western World: The Place of the Soviet Union in the Comity of Nations*, New York: Macmillan.

Lefebvre, H. (2009) *Dialectical Materialism*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Ley, R. (1941) *Internationaler Völkerbrei oder Vereinigte National-Staaten Europas?* Berlin: Verlag der Deutschen Arbeitsfront.

———. (1937) "Schicksal—ich glaube!," Wir alle helfen dem Führer, Munich: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, pp. 103–14.

Longerich, P. (2015) *Goebbels: A Biography*, translated by A. Bance, J. Noakes and L. Sharpe, London: Random House.

McLellan, D. and D. Acheson (eds.) (1980) *Among Friends—Personal Letters of Dean Acheson*, New York: Dodd, Mead.

Macmillan, H. (1939) *The Middle Way*, London: Macmillan.

Maddox, F. (1981) *The Senatorial Career of Harley Martin Kilgore*, New York: Garland.

Maisky, I. (1964) *Who Helped Hitler?* translated by A. Rothstein, London: Hutchinson.

———. (1966) *Spanish Notebooks*, translated by R. Kisch, London: Hutchinson.

Malenkov, G. (1949) "On The Road To Communism," *World News and Views*, 29, 46, November 12.

Marshall, G. (with F. Pogue) (1991) *Interviews and Reminiscences*, Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Research Foundation.

Matthews, M. (ed.) (1974) *Soviet Government—A Selection of Official Documents on Internal Policies*, Resolution of the CC and of the CCC of the VKP(B), 28 April 1933, London: Jonathan Cape.

Matierski, W. (1996) *Kremlin versus Poland 1939–1945—Documents from the Soviet Archives*, Poland: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences.

McLellan, D. (ed.) (1982) *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mills, W. (ed.) (1951) *The Forrestal Diaries*, New York: Viking Press.

Molotov, V. (1939) *Soviet Russia and Crisis—M. Molotov Explains U.S.S.R.'s Policy*, London: Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee.

Mykołayczyk, S. (1948) *The Rape of Poland—Pattern of Soviet Aggression*, New York and Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book.

Nagy, F. (1948) *The Struggle behind the Iron Curtain*, translated by S. K. Swift, London: Macmillan.

Nelson, A. (1983) *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers*, vol. 1, New York: Garland.

Newman, B. (1948) *The Captured Archives—The Story of Nazi–Soviet Documents*, London: Latimer House.

Nicolson, H. (1939) *Why Britain is at War*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Norton Smith, R. (1982) *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times*, New York: Simon and Schuster.

Patterson, J. (1972) *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Phillips, H. (1992) *Between the Revolution and the West—A Political Biography of Maxim M. Litvinov*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Pomsel, B. (2018) *Mi vida con Goebbels: La historia de la secretaria de Goebbels: lecciones para el presente*, edited by T. D. Hansen, Barcelona: Los Libros del Lince.

Pritt, D. (1939) *The State Department and the Cold War*, New York: International.

Procacci, G. (ed.) (1994) *The Cominform: Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949*, Milan: Feltrinelli.

Proceedings and Documents of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1–22, 1944, vol. 1 and vol. 2, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office (1948).

Rauschning, H. (1939) *The Revolution of Nihilism—Warning to the West*, translated by E. W. Dickes, New York: Longmans, Green.

Rees, D. (1973) *Harry Dexter White—A Study in Paradox*, London: Macmillan.

Renner, H. (1989) *A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945*, London and New York: Routledge.

Roberts, G. (2011) *Molotov: Stalin's Cold Warrior*, Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books.

Ross, G. (1984) *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin—British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1941–1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rothermere, V. (1939) *Warnings and Predictions*, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.

Salter, A. (1933) *The United States of Europe and other papers*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Stankova, M. (2010) *Giorgi Dimitrov—A Biography*, London and New York: I. B. Tauris.

Schacht, H. (1967) *The Magic of Money*, translated by P. Erskine, London: Oldbourne.

Schacht, H. (1931) *The End of Reparations—The Economic Consequences of the World War*, London: Jonathan Cape.

Schlesinger, A. (1949) *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Sebag-Montefiore, S. (2014) *Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Sevillano, F. (2010) *Franco, "Caudillo" Por la Gracia de Dios, 1936–1947*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Shearer, D. and Khaustov, V. (2015) *Stalin and the Lubianka—A Documentary History of the Political Police and Security Organs in the Soviet Union, 1922–1953*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Sheen, F. (1948) *Communism and Conscience of the West*, Dublin: Browne and Nolan.

Sirot, S. (2000) *Maurice Thorez*, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Sontag, R. and Beddie, J. (1948) *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941—Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*, Washington, DC: Department of State.

Soviet Information Bureau (1948) *Falsificators of History—An Historical Note*, February, Moscow.

Soviet War Documents (1942) "Note of Vyacheslav M. Molotov, April 27, 1942," Washington, DC: Embassy of the Soviet Union.

Soviet War Documents (1941) Addresses, Notes, Orders of the Day, Statements, Report of Joseph Stalin, November 6, 1941, Washington, DC: Embassy of the Soviet Union.

Soviet War News (ed.) (1942) *Soviet Documents on Nazi Atrocities*, London: Hutchinson.

Speer, A (1981) *Infiltration—How Heinrich Himmler Schemed to Build an SS Industrial Empire*, translated by J. Nuegroschel, New York: Macmillan Publishing.

Stalin, J. (1976) *Problems of Leninism*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

———. (ed.) (1958) *Stalin's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941–1945*, London: Lawrence and Wishart.

———. (1951) Interview with Harold Stassen, April 9, 1947, New York: International Publishers.

———. (1951/1972) *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press.

———. (1950) *Stalin on Post-War International Relations*, Moscow: Soviet News.

———. (1947) "Interview to "Pravda" Correspondent Concerning Mr. Winston Churchill's Speech at Fulton, March, 1946," in, *J. V. Stalin on Post-War International Relations*, Soviet News.

———. (1947) Speeches Delivered at Meetings of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House.

———. (1945) *The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union*, New York: Greenwood Press.

———. (1945) *War Speeches, Orders of the Day and Answers to Foreign Press Correspondents during the Great Patriotic War*, London: Hutchinson.

Stettinius, E. (1949) *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference*, New York: Doubleday.

Stoddard, L (1940) *Into the Darkness—Nazi Germany Today*, New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce.

Strang, L. (1956) *Home and Abroad*, London: André Deutsch.

Suslov, M. (1949) *The Defense of Peace and the Struggle Against the Warmongers*, Moscow: New Century.

Sviták, I. (1990) *The Unbearable Burden of History—The Sovietization of Czechoslovakia, vol. 1: From Munich to Yalta*, Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.

Swain, G. (2010) *Tito: A Biography*, London: I. B. Tauris.

Szkopiak, Z. (1986) *The Yalta Agreements—Documents Prior to, During and After the Crimean Conference, 1945*, London: Polish Government in Exile.

Taborsky, E. (1981) *President Edvard Benes—Between East and West, 1938–1948*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.

The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism—A Selection of Documents, Russian Institute, New York: Columbia University.

The Road to Communism—Documents of the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—October 17–31, 1961, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing Department.

Thorez, M. (1970) *Fils du Peuple*, Paris: Editions Sociales.

Thyssen, F. (2017) *Yo Pagué a Hitler*, Seville Renacimiento.

Tournoux, J. R. (1967) Paris: *La Tragédie du General*, Plon.

Trevor-Roper, H. (ed.) (1978) *Final Entries 1945—The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels*, New York: G. P. Putnam's.

"Trial of the Major War Criminals: Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 Nov.1945–1 Oct.1946," Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal.

Trotsky, L. (1936) *The Revolution Betrayed*, New York: Doubleday, EPUB version.

Trukhanovsky, V. G. (1978) *Winston Churchill*, Moscow: Progress.

———. (1978) *The USSR, Sixty Years of Struggle for Peace: British Foreign Policy during the Second World War, 1939–1945*, Moscow: USSR Academy of Sciences.

Truman, H. (1955) *Year of Decisions, 1945*, London: Hodder & Stoughton.

Tsygankov, A. (2006) *Russia's Foreign Policy—Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Unger, D. and Unger, I. (2014) *George Marshall—A Biography*, New York: Harper Collins.

U.S. House of Representatives, Special Committee on Un-American Activities (1934) Public Statement, 73rd Congress, 2nd session, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Vanderberg, A. (1952) *Private Papers of Senator Vanderberg*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Vansittart, R. (1958) *The Mist Procession—The Autobiography of Lord Vansittart*, London: Hutchinson.

———. (1944) *Lessons of My life*, London: Hutchinson.

Voznesensky, N. (1949) *Soviet Economy During the Second World War*, New York: International.

Wallace, H. (1944) *Democracy Reborn*, New York: Reynal & Hitchcock.

Watson, D. (2005) *Molotov—A Biography*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wilkie, W. (1943) *One World*, New York: Simon and Schuster.

Zweig, S. (2003) *El Mundo de Ayer*, Barcelona: El Acantilado.

Web Sources

Acheson, D. "The Requirements of Reconstruction," speech delivered in Cleveland, Mississippi, May 8, 1947—www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/pdfs/8-8.pdf#zoom=100

Act of Chapultepec—Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity (Act of Chapultepec); March 6, 1945—avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/chapul.asp

Ambassador Smith, Department of State, Incoming Telegram, April 5, 1946—http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/

Anton, M. (2017) "America and the Liberal International Order"—https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/02/america-liberal-international-order/

Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 22, 1944 (1)—avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad047.asp

Atlantic Charter, 14/8/1941, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp

Bethmann-Hollweg, T., *The September Memorandum*, 9/9/1914—http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=1811

Bevin speech at the House of Commons, June 30, 1948—HC Deb 30 June 1948 Volume 452 cc2213-49—hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1948/jun/30/germany#S5CV0452P0_19480630_HOC_308

Bormann's Minutes of a Meeting at Hitler's Headquarters, 16/7/1941—http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1549

Bretton Woods Conference, First Meeting, July 3, 1944—www.centerforfinancialstability.org/brettonwoods_docs.php

Churchill, W., "The Sinews of Peace" ("Iron Curtain Speech") March 5, 1946—www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/120-the-sinews-of-peace

Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. *Paneuropa* (1923) eufundedproeutroll.wordpress.com/2014/06/08/eu-federalization-the-pan-european-manifesto-paneuropa/

Dissolution of the Communist International—May 15, 1943—https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/dissolution.htm

Economic Co-Operation Agreement between the United States and the US and British Occupied Areas in Germany, July 14, 1948—https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/b-de-ust000008-0262.pdf

"Eisenhower's Farewell Address to the Nation," January 17, 1961—mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm

George C. Marshall, Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1953—www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1953/marshall-lecture.html

Grygiel, J. (2014) "Two Princes," *The American Interest*, 10, October 6—http://www.the-american-interest.com/2014/10/06/two-princes/

Haivry, O. and Hazony, Y. (2017) "What Is Conservatism?" *American Affairs Journal*—https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2017/05/what-is-conservatism/

History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) –Short Course, Edited by a Commission of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Authorised by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., International Publishers (1939)—http://www.marx2mao.com/Other/HCPSU39i.html

Hitler speech at the German Reichstag, 30/1/1937—http://www.hitler.org/speeches/01-30-37.html

Hossbach Memorandum, Berlin, 10/11/1937. Minutes of a Conference in the Reich Chancellery, Berlin, November 5, 1937—http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/document/hossbach.htm

Interview with H.M. the King at Buckingham Palace, 8/10/1933—i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02987/PX5689635_Lewis-Wh_2987125a.jpg

Kennan, G., Telegram to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1946—http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm

Labour Party Manifesto, 1945—www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1945/1945-labour-manifesto.shtml

Lord Lothian (1939) The Ending of Armageddon—streitcouncil.org/uploads/PDF/Lord%20Lothian-%20The%20Ending%20of%20Armageddon.pdf

Macmillan, H. Speech 20/7/1957—http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_3728000/3728225.stm

"Manifest Destiny," John O'Sullivan, 1839—www.civics-online.org/library/formatted/texts/manifest_destiny.html

Marshall speech to the Pittsburgh Chamber of Commerce, January 15, 1948—marshallfoundation.org/library/6-167-speech-to-the-pittsburgh-chamber-of-commerce-january-15-1948/

Marshall speech at Harvard University June 5, 1947—http://www.oecd.org/document/10/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1876938_1_1_1_1,00.html

Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1850) Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League, London—www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1847/communist-league/1850-ad1.htm

National Security Council Directive on Office of Special Projects Source Washington, June 18, 1948. NSC 10/2—https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d292

Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, July 23, 1946—http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/

Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Telegram, September 1946—http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110808.pdf?v=c46f797bf3d939c2c328ac98eb778f09

Notes from Czechoslovak Government Meeting Detailing Discussion from a Previous Meeting with Stalin, July 26, 1946, Translated from Czech into English—digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110536.pdf?v=4d9b1344809943d457fdb4d89fcf8a78

NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950—fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68–9.htm

NSC 20/4 November 23, 1948—U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security -https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/coldwar/nsc20-4.htm

Orwell, G., "Toward European Unity," *Partisan Review*, London, July—August 1947—http://orwell.ru/library/articles/European_Unity/english/e_teu

———. (1941) "Wells, Hitler and the World State"—orwell.ru/library/reviews/wells/english/e_whws

Preliminary Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom, 23/2/1942—http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decade04.asp

President Franklin D. Roosevelt speech to the American Legion, March 6, 1933—http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/pdfs/dictatorship.pdf

President Truman Address before the Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives -March 12, 1947 http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-03-12&documentid=31&studycollectionid=TDoctrine&pagenumber=1

President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, January 8, 1918:—avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp

Proceedings of the Crimea Conference, February 4–11, 1945, www.taiwandocuments.org/yalta.htm

Programme of the Communist International, together with the Statutes of the Communist International—https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/6th-congress/index.htm February, 1929, Second Printing 1932, Modern Books Ltd.

Record of Conversation between J. V. Stalin and President of Hungary Zoltán Tildy in Moscow, February 17, 1948,—digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118465.pdf?v=5beb7486fc8 c99f5b593ac0fdbdb3447

Report to the President by the National Security Council Washington, December 30, 1949—Top secret NSC 48/2—history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v07p2/d386

Report to the President by the National Security Council Washington, December 30, 1949—Top secret NSC 48/2—history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v07p2/d386

Roosevelt's Fireside Chat, May 7, 1933- https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Roosevelt%27s_Fireside_ Chat,_7_May_1933

Rosenberg, A. (1930) *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*—https://archive.org/stream/TheMyth OfTheTwentiethCentury/Myth_djvu.txt

Speech by Andrei Zhdanov (member of the Soviet Politburo) at the founding of the Cominform (a Communist International Organization) in September 1947—educ.jmu.edu/~vannorwc/ assets/ghist%20102–150/pages/readings/zhdanovspeech.html

Stalin, J. The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists (1924)—https:// www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1924/12.htm

———. On the Industrialisation of Russia, Speech to industrial managers, February 1931. study. abingdon.org.uk/history/4th_stalin_1931.html

———. Stalin's speech to the Politburo on 19 August 1939—theeasternfront.org/mein_ sozialismus/downloads/articleI.pdf

Truman's Inaugural Address—January 20, 1949—greatspeeches.wordpress.com/category/ twentieth-century-speeches/harry-s-truman-speeches/

Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919–en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Versailles

Truman Address before the Joint Session of the Senate and the House of Representatives -March 12, 1947 http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/doctrine/large/ documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-03-12&documentid=31&studycollectionid=TD octrine&pagenumber=1

Ventotene Manifesto (1941)—www.federalists.eu/uef/library/books/the-ventotene-manifesto/

Wilhelm II to Paulus Krüger, 3/1/1896—http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document. cfm?document_id=754

Wilde, O. (1891)—*The Soul of Man under Socialism*—https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/ wilde-oscar/soul-man/

Secondary Sources

Acharya, A. (2013) *Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics: Whose IR?* London: Routledge.

Agnew, J. (2009) *Globalization and Sovereignty*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

———. (2003) *Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics*, London: Routledge.

Agnew, J., K. Mitchell and G. Toal (eds.) (2007) *A Companion to Political Geography*, Oxford: Wiley.

Aldrich, R. (1997) "OSS, CIA and European Unity: The American Committee on United Europe, 1948-60," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, 8, 1, pp. 184–227.

Alter, P. (2009) *The German Question and Europe—A History*, London: Bloomsbury Academic.

Andrews, D. (ed.) (2008) *Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations since Bretton Woods*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Angell, N. (1933) *The Great Illusion*, London: William Heinemann.

Applebaum, A. (2013) *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956*, London: Doubleday.

Archer, C. (2001) *International Organizations*, London: Routledge.

Arendt, H. (2006) *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil*, London: Penguin Books.

———. (1951) *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York: Harcourt, Brace.

Ashworth, L. and D. Long (eds.) (2014) *New Perspectives on International Functionalism*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Aslam, W. (2013) *The United States and Great Power Responsibility in International Society: Drones, Rendition and Invasion*, London: Routledge.

Assouline, P. (2017) *L'Épuration des Intellectuels*, Paris: Perrin.

Ayres, C. (1951) "The Co-Ordinates of Institutionalism," *The American Economic Review*, 41, 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Sixty-third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, pp. 47–55.

Azar. G. (2007) "The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 59–69.

Baker, A. (2000) *Invisible Eagle—The History of Nazi Occultism*, London: Virgin Books.

Baker, A. (2016) *Constructing a Post-War Order: The Rise of Us Hegemony and the Origins of the Cold War*, London: I. B. Tauris.

Barnett, M. and R. Duvall (eds.) (2005) *Power in Global Governance*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barnett, T. (2004) *The Pentagon's New Map*, New York: Putnam.

Bassin, M., S. Glebov and M. Laruelle (2015) *Between Europe and Asia—The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Baylis, J., S. Smith and P. Owens (eds.) (2013) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bearce, D. (2003) "Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace," *International Studies Quarterly*, 47, 3, September, pp. 347–70.

Bebler, A. (1949) *Peace and Greece*, The Permanent Delegation of The Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations, New York.

Benda, J. (2008) *La traición de los intelectuales*, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg.

Berghahn, V. (1996) *Quest for Economic Empire—European Strategies of German Big Business in the Twentieth Century*, Providence, RI and Oxford: Berghahn Books.

———. (1987) *Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bergmann, P. (2001) "American Exceptionalism and German 'Sonderweg' in Tandem," *The International History Review*, 23, 3, pp. 505–34.

Bernstein, B. (ed.) (1970) *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*, Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

Bernstein, E. (1911) *Evolutionary Socialism—A Criticism and Affirmation*, New York: Huebsch.

Betts, R. (1998) *Decolonization*, London: Routledge.

———. (ed.) (1971) *Central and South East Europe 1945–1948*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Billinger, R. (1991) *Metternich and the German Question: States' Rights and Federal Duties, 1820–1834*, Newark: University of Delaware Press.

Birnbaum, K. (1952) *The Casablanca Conference of January 14–24, 1943*, Stockholm: Wahlstrom and Widstand.

Blackbourn, D. and G. Eley (1984) *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bobbit, P. (2002) *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History*, London: Penguin Books.

Bohri, L. (2014) *Hungary in the Cold War, 1945–1956: between the United States and the Soviet Union*, Budapest: Central European University Press.

———. (2011) "The Merchants of the Kremlin: The Economic Roots of Soviet Expansion in Hungary," Working Paper No. 28, *Cold War International History Project*, Washington, DC, pp. 1–56.

Booth, K. (2007) *Theory of World Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Böhme, H. (1978) *An Introduction to the Social and Economic History of Germany—Politics and Economic Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Oxford: Blackwell.

Borchardt, K. (1972) *The Industrial Revolution in Germany 1700–1914*, London: Harper Collins.

Bowden, J. (2017) *Extremists: Studies in Metapolitics*, San Francisco: Counter-Currents.

Brandenburg, E. and A. Adams (1927) *From Bismarck to the World War: A History of German Foreign Policy 1870–1914*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brinton, M. and M. Nee (2002) *The New Institutialism in Sociology*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Brock, C. (1962) *Americans for Democratic Action—Its Role in National Politics*, Washington, DC: Public Affairs.

Brown, B. (1981) Schwab, G. (ed.) *Eurocommunism—The ideological and political-theoretical foundations*, London: Aldwych Press.

Buchanan, A. (2013) *The Heart of Human Rights*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buela, A. (2002) *Metapolítica y Teoría*, Buenos Aires: Editorial Teoría.

Bull, H., B. Kingsbury and A. Roberts (eds.) (1990) *Hugo Grotius and International Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bull, H. (1983–1984) Hagey Lectures, University of Waterloo, Justice in International Relations, 12–13 October 1983.

Burnham, J. (1960) *The Managerial Revolution*, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Burns, T. and J. Connelly (2010) *The Legacy of Leo Strauss*, London: Imprint Academic.

Butler, S. (2003/1935) *War is a Racket*, Port Townsend, WA: Feral House.

Buzan, B. (2014) *An Introduction to the English School of International Relations—The Societal Approach*, Cambridge: Polity.

———. (2004) *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. (1991) *People, States and Fear—An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Camus, A. (1956) *The Rebel*, translated by A. Bower, New York: Vintage Books.

Caporaso, J. (1992) "International Relations Theory and Multilateralism: The Search for Foundations," *International Organization*, 46, 3, pp. 599–632.

Carnevali, F. and J. Strange (eds.) (2007) *20th Century Britain: Economic, Cultural and Social Change*, London: Routledge.

Carr, E. H. (1982) *The Twilight of the Comintern, 1930–1935*, London: Macmillan Press.

———. (1964) *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939*, London: Harper Collins.

Carr, R. (2015) "Community of Neighbours vs Society of Merchants: The Genesis of Reinhard Höhn's Nazi State Theory," *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 16, 1, pp. 1–22.

Cartledge, B. (2006) *The Will to Survive—A History of Hungary*, London: Timewell Press.

Chambers, S. (2014) *The Lessons of Rancière*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chandler, D. (2004) *Constructing Global Civil Society—Morality and Power in International Relations*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chase, W. (2001) *Stalin—Enemies Within the Gates?—The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934–1939*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Chiocchetti, P. (2016) *The Radical Left Party Family in Western Europe, 1989–2015*, London: Routledge.

Chodakiewicz, M. (1917) *Intermarium: The Land between the Black and Baltic Seas*, London: Routledge.

Clemens, W. (2004) *Dynamics of International Relations: Conflict and Mutual Gain in an Era of Global Interdependence*, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield.

Clemens, E. and J. Cook (1999) "Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 25, pp. 441–66.

Clover, C. (1999) "Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland—The Reemergence of Geopolitics," *Foreign Affairs*, 78, 9, pp. 9–13.

Cochran, M. (1999) *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cohen, S. (2014) *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Coicaud, J. M. and N. Wheeler (ed.) (2008) *National Interest and International Solidarity—Particular and Universal Ethics in International Life*, New York: United Nations University.

Cole, G. D. H. (1941) *A Socialist Civilization in Programme for Victory—A Collection of Essays prepared for by the Fabian Society*, London: Routledge.

Collier, R. and D. Collier (2002) *Shaping The Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

Conway, E. (2015) *The Summit—Bretton Woods, 1944—J. M. Keynes and the Reshaping of the Global Economy*, London: Pegasus Books.

Coudenhove-Kalergi, R. (1939) *Europe Must Unite*, translated by A. McFadyean, Glaurus, Switzerland: Paneuropa Editions.

———. (1938) *The Totalitarian State Against Man*, translated by A. McFadyean, New York: Frederick Muller.

Curry, W. B. (1939) *The Case for Federal Union*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Dahrendorf, R. (1979) *Society and Democracy in Germany*, New York: W. W. Norton.

De Keersmaeker, G. (2016) *Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory: Post-Cold War and the 19th Century Compared*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dietrich, J. (2003) *The Morgenthau Plan: Soviet influence on American postwar policy*, New York: Algora.

Dittmer, J. (2010) *Popular Culture, Geopolitics, and Identity*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Djelic, M. (2001) *Exporting the American Model: The Post-war Transformation of European Business*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dogan, N. (2013) *Pragmatic Liberal Approach to World Order—The Scholarship of Inis L. Claude, Jr.*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Dorpalen, A. (1942) *The World of General Haushofer—Geopolitics in Action*, New York and Toronto: Farrar and Rinehart.

Dragneva, R. and K. Wolczuk (eds.) (2013) *Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy and Politics*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Duara, P. (ed.) *Decolonization: Perspectives from Now and Then*, London: Routledge.

Dugin, A. (2015) *Eurasian Mission: An Introduction to Neo-Eurasianism*, New York: Artkos Media.

———. (2015) *Last War of the World-Island: The Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia*, New York: Arktos Media.

Eagleton, T. (ed.) (1994) *Ideology*, London and New York: Longman.

Eichengreen, B. (2008) *Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Eichengreen, B. and M. Bordo (eds.) (1993) *A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Eisenberg, C. (1998) *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eley, G. (2002) *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elias, N. (1996) *The Germans—Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, edited by M. Schröter, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ersson, S. and J. Lane (eds.) (2002) *The New Institutional Politics: Outcomes and Consequences*, London: Routledge.

Fagan, G. and R. Munck (eds.) (2009) *Globalization and Security An Encyclopedia*, New York: Praeger.

Fayazmanesh, S. and M. Tool (eds.) (1998) *Institutionalist Theory and Applications—Essays in Honour of Paul Dale Bush*, vol. 2, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Feier, E. and Ţ. Constantin-Vasile (2016) "The New Intermarium Concept—A Strategic Alternative to the Eastern Border," *Eurolimes*, pp. 94–99.

Feis, H. (1970) *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–50*, New York. W. W. Norton.

Fergusson, A. (1975) *When Money Dies—The Nightmare of the Weimar Hyperinflation*, London: Old Street.

Fimmen, E. (1924) *Labour's Alternative: The United States of Europe Or Europe Limited*, London: Labour.

Finnemore, M. (1996). "Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from Sociology's Institutionalism." *International Organization*, 50, 2, pp. 325–47.

Fioretos, O. (2011) "Historical Institutionalism in International Relations," *International Organization*, 65, 2, pp. 367–99.

Fischer, F. (1967) *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, New York: W. W. Norton.

Foerster, F. W. (1941) *Europe and the German Question*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Flynn, G. (1990) *The West and the Soviet Union: Politics and Policy*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Forbes, I. and M. Hoffman (eds.) (1993) *Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics of Intervention*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Fox, W. (1944) *The Super-Powers: The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace*, London: Harcourt Brace.

Fukuyama, F. (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press.

Frantz, C. (1874) *Die preussische Intelligenz und ihre Grenzen*, Munich: Verlag des Literarischen Instututs von M. Huttler.

Frazier, R. (2009) "'Universalism' and the Truman Doctrine,' *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Spring, 11, 2, pp. 3–34.

Frederking, B. (2007) *The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security Since the Cold War*, London: Routledge.

Freeden, M., S. Lyman Tower and M. Stears (eds.) (2015) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gaddis Lewis, J. (1982) *Strategies of Containment—A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gaddis, J. L. (1983) "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, 7, 3, 1983, pp. 171–90.

Galbraith, J. (1998) *The Affluent Society*, London: Mariner Books.

Gallaher, C. et al. (ed.) (2009) *Key Concepts in Political Geography*, Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.

Garrison, J. and P. Shivpuri (1983) *The Russian Threat: Its Myths and Realities*, New York: Gateway.

Gillingham, J. (2016) *The EU: An Obituary*, London: Verso.

Gilpin, R. (1987) *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ginsburgs, G., A. Rubinstein and O. Smolansky (2016) *Russia and America: From Rivalry to Reconciliation*, London: Routledge.

Glebov, S. (2017) *From Empire to Eurasia: Politics, Scholarship, and Ideology in Russian Eurasianism, 1920s–1930s*, Dekalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press.

Gollancz, V. (ed.) (1941) *The Betrayal of the Left*, London: Victor Gollancz.

Goodrick-Clarke, N. (2005) *The Occult Roots of Nazism Secret Aryan Cults and their Influence on Nazi Ideology*, New York: I. B. Tauris.

Gormly, J. (1997) *From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three diplomacy, 1945–1947*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Gori, F. and S. Pons (ed.) (1996) *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, 1943–53, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Grimm, D. (2015) *Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept*, translated by B. Cooper, Columbia: Columbia University Press.

Grogin R. (2000) *Natural Enemies—The United States and the Soviet Union in the Cold War, 1917-1991*, New York: Lexington Books.

Groom, A. and P. Graham Taylor (1975) *Functionalism: Theory and Practice in International Relations*, London: University of London Press.

Gruber, L. (2000) *Ruling the World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Grygiel, J. (2011) *Great Powers and Geopolitical Change*, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Grzybowski, K. (1987) *Soviet International Law and the World Economic Order*, Raleigh, NC: Duke University Press.

Haas, E. (1990) *When Knowledge Is Power—Three Models of Change in International Relations*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

———. (1948) "The United States of Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, 63, 4, pp. 528–50.

Haas, L. (2016) *Harry and Arthur—Truman, Vandenberg, and the Partnership that Created the Free World*, Potomac Books, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Haass, R. (2017) *A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order*, London: Penguin Press [EPUB version].

Hall, M. and P. T. Jackson (eds.) (2007) *Civilizational Identity—The Production and Reproduction of "Civilizations" in International Relations*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hall, P. A. and R. C. Taylor (1996) "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies*, 44, 5, pp. 936–57.

Hasenclever, A., P. Mayer and V. Rittberger (1997) *Theories of International Regimes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Haugaard, M. and H. Lentner (eds.) (2006) *Hegemony and Power: Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Hay, C. (2016) "Good in a Crisis: The Ontological Institutionalism of Social Constructivism," *New Political Economy*, 21, 6, pp. 520–35.

Helleiner, E. (2014) *Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Herriot, E. (1930) *The United States of Europe*, translated by R. J. Dingle, London: George G. Harrap.

Hewson, M. and T. Sinclair (eds.) (1999) *Approaches to Global Governance Theory*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Hinds, L. and T. Windt (1991) *The Cold War as Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945–1950*, New York: Praeger.

Hitchins, K. (1994) *Rumania, 1866–1947*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hoffman, D. (2010) *The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy*, New York: Anchor.

Hooks, G. and B. McQueen (2010) "American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Military-Industrial Complex, Racial Tension, and the Underdeveloped Welfare State," *American Sociological Review*, 75, 2, pp. 185–204.

Hopf, T. (2012) *Reconstructing the Cold War—The Early Years, 1945–1958*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. (1998) "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory," *International Security* 23, 1, pp. 171–200.

Horowitz, D. (ed.) (1967) *Containment and Revolution*, London: Anthony Blond.

Hubatsch, W. (1967) *The German Question—A Documentary*, New York: Herder Book Centre.

Ikenberry, J. (2000) *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Ilgen, T. (ed.) (2003) *Reconfigured Sovereignty: Multi-Layered Governance in the Global Age*, Farnham: Ashgate.

Inayatullah, N. and D. Blaney (2004) *International Relations and the Problem of Difference*, London: Routledge.

Izsák, L. (2002) *A Political History of Hungary, 1944–1990*, Budapest: Eötvös University Press.

Jackson, R. (2007) *Sovereignty—Evolution of an Idea*, Cambridge: Polity.

Jackson, P. T. (2006) *Civilizing the Enemy—German Reconstruction and the Intervention of the West*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

James, A. (ed.) (1973) *The Bases of International Order—Essays in Honour of C A W Manning*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jennings, I. (1940/2007) *A Federation For Western Europe*, Charleston, SC: Nabu Press.

Jesse, N., S. Lobell, G. Press-Barnathan and K. Williams (eds.) (2012) *The Leader Can't Lead When the Followers Won't Follow: The Limitations of Hegemony*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Jones, R. (1990) *The Soviet Concept of "Limited Sovereignty" from Lenin to Gorbachev: The Brezhnev Doctrine*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kalmo, H. and Q. Skinner (eds.) (2014) *Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present and Future of a Contested Concept*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kalter, C. (2016) *The Discovery of the Third World: Decolonization and the Rise of the New Left in France, c.1950–1976*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kanet, R. (1998) *Resolving Regional Conflicts*, Chicago: University of Illinois.

Kaplan, L (2015) *The Conversion of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg—From Isolation to International Engagement*, Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press.

Kaplan, R. (2013) *The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate*, New York: Random House.

Katz, M. (ed.) (1991) *The USSR and Marxist Revolutions in the Third World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kelly, P. (2016) *Classical Geopolitics—A New Analytical Model*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kemp-Welch, A. (2008) *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kennedy-Pipe, C. (2007) *The Origins of the Cold War*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Keohane, R. (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, R. and J. Nye (1998) "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs*, Sep/Oct, pp. 81–94.

Kimball, W. (1976) *Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeat Nazi Germany, 1943–1946*, New York: Lippincott.

Kirk, R. (2003) *Roots Of American Order*, Wilmington, DE: Intercollegiate Studies Institute.

Kissinger, H. (2015) *World Order—Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History*, London: Penguin Books.

———. (1995) *Diplomacy*, London: Simon & Schuster.

Koenker, D. and Bachman, R. (eds.) (1997) *Revelations from the Russian Archives*,-Documents in English, Washington, DC: Library of Congress.

Kofsky, F. (1995) *Harry S. Truman and the War Scare of 1948: A Successful Campaign to Deceive the Nation*, London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Kohn, J. (ed.) (1994) *Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954*, San Diego: Harcourt Brace.

Kohr, L. (1951) *The Breakdown of Nations*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Kolko, G. and J. Kolko (1972) *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–54*, New York: Harper and Row.

Kontler, L. (2002) *Millennium in Central Europe: A History of Hungary*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Koschmann, J. (1997) "The Nationalism of Cultural Uniqueness Review of American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword by Seymour Martin Lipset," *The American Historical Review*, 102, 3, pp. 758–68.

Kotkin, S. (2016) "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics: Putin Returns to the Historical Pattern," *Foreign Affairs*, 95, p. 2.

Kramer, M. and V. Smetana (eds.) (2015) *Imposing, Maintaining, and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1989*, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Krasner, S. (ed.) (2001) *Problematic Sovereignty—Contested Rules and Political Possibilities*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Lacoste, Y. (2014) *La géographie, ça sert, d'abord, à faire la* guerre, Paris: La Découverte.

LaFeber, W. (2002) *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2000*, Boston: McGraw Hill.

———. (1971) *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947*: A Historical Problem with Interpretations and Documents, Oxford: Wiley.

Lake, D. (2011) *Hierarchy in International Relations*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

———. (1996) "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," *International Organization*, 50, 1, pp. 1–33.

Lamont, C. (1939) *You Might Like Socialism—A Way of Life for Modern Man*, New York: Modern Age Books.

Lane, T. and Wolański, M. (2009) *Poland and European Integration: The Ideas and Movements of Polish Exiles in the West, 1939–91*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Laruelle, M. (2008) *Russian Eurasianism—An Ideology of Empire*, translated by M. Gabowitsch, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lasswell, H. (1933) "The Psychology of Hitlerism," *Political Quarterly*, 4, 3, pp. 373–84.

Lásźló, E. (1963) *Individualism, Collectivism, and Political Power: A Relational Analysis of Ideological Conflict*, New York: Springer.

Latham, R. (1997) *The Liberal Moment*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Laudani, R. (ed.) (2013) *Secret Reports on Nazi Germany—The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Lecours, A. (ed.) (2005) *New Institutionalism: Theory and Analysis*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Leffler, M. and D. Painter (eds.) (2005) *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, London: Routledge.

Leicht, K. and C Jenkins (eds.) (2012) *Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective*, New York: Springer.

Lewkowicz, N. (2010) *The German Question and the International Order*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

———. (2008) *The German Question and the Origins of the Cold War*, Milan: IPOC.

Lider, J. (1986) *Correlation of Forces—An Analysis of Marxist-Leninist Concepts*, Aldershot: Gower.

Linklater, A. (2011) *The Problem of Harm in World Politics—Theoretical Investigations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. (1998) *The Transformation of Political Community—Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Linklater, A. and H. Suganami (2006) *The English School of International Relations— A Contemporary Reassessment*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lippmann, W. (1947) *The Cold War—A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Lipset, S. (1996) *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*, New York: W. W. Norton.

Little, R. (2007) *The Balance of Power in International Relations—Metaphors, Myths and Models*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lowndes, V. and Roberts, M. (2013) *Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Luxembourg, R. (2017) *La Revolución Rusa*, Barcelona: Página Indomita.

Mabee, B. (2009) *The Globalization of Security: State Power, Security Provision and Legitimacy*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

MacAllister, J. (2001) *No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943–1954*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Macdonald, D. (1995) "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War—Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism," *International Security*, 20, 3 (Winter, 1995–1996), pp. 152–88.

Mackay, R. (1940) *Federal Europe—Being the Case of European Federation Together with a Draft Constitution of a United States of Europe*, London: Michael Joseph.

Macmillan, H. (1939) *The Middle Way*, London: Macmillan.

MacMillan, M. (2009) *Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and Its Attempt to End War*, London: John Murray.

MacMillan, M. (2003) *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*, London: Random House.

Mahan, T. (2012) *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783*, New York: Dover.

Malik, H. (ed.) (1997) *The Roles of the United States, Russia and China in the New World* Order, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mandel, E. (1979) *Introduction to Marxism*, translated by L. Sadler, London: Ink Links.

———. (1978) *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism—The Bitter Fruits of "Socialism in One Country,"* translated by J. Rothschild, London: NLB.

March, J. and Olsen, J. (1983) "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review*, 78, 3, pp. 734–49.

Mariano, M. (ed.) (2010) *Defining the Atlantic Community—Culture, Intellectuals and Policies in Mid-twentieth Century*, New York and Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Mark, E. (2011) "Revolution by Degrees: Stalin's National-Front Strategy For Europe, 1941–1947," *The Cold War International History Project Working Paper*, no. 31, pp. 1–46.

———. (1981) "American Policy toward Eastern Europe and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1946: An Alternative Explanation," *Journal of American History*, 68, 2, pp. 313–36.

———. (1979) "Charles E. Bohlen and the Limits of Soviet Hegemony in Eastern Europe," *Diplomatic History*, 3, 2, pp. 201–14.

Marks, M. (2011) *Metaphors in International Relations Theory*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Martel, G. (ed.) (1994) *American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890–1993*, London: Routledge.

Masco, J. (2013) "Terror as Normality" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 69, 6, pp. 26–32.

Mastny, V., S. Holtsmark and A. Wegner (eds.) (2013) *War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West*, London: Routledge.

———. (1980) *Russia's Road to the Cold War, Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941–1945*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Mayer, A. (1975) "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem," *The Journal of Modern History*, 47, 3, pp. 409–36.

Mazower, M. (2012) *Governing the World—The History of an Idea*, London: Penguin Books.

Mazurek, S. and G. Torr (2002) "Russian Eurasianism: Historiosophy and Ideology," *Studies in East European Thought*, 54, 1/2, Polish Studies on Russian Thought, pp. 105–23.

McKenzie, K. (1964) *Comintern and World Revolution, 1928–1943—The Shaping of Doctrine*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Meinecke, F. (1946) *The German Catastrophe—Reflections and Recollections*, Boston: Beacon Press.

Melman, S. (ed.) (1981) *Inspection For Disarmament*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Merkl, P. (1993) *German Unification in the European Context*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Merrill, D. (2006) "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, March, 36, 1, pp. 27–37.

Meyer, R., K. Sahlin and M. Ventresca (2009) *Institutions and Ideology*, Bradford: Emerald Group.

Miller, J. and R. Vincent (eds.) (1990) *Order and Violence—Hedley Bull and International Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Mitrany, D. (1975) *The Functional Theory of Politics*, London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

———. (1933) *The Progress of International Government*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Mitrany, D. and M. Garnett (1950) *World Unity and the Nations*, London: National Peace Council.

Mitrovich, G. (2009) *Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Morgenthau, H. (2012) The *Concept of the Political*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Morgenthau, H. (1985) *Politics Among Nations—The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: McGraw-Hill.

Myrdal, G. (1995) *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, London: Transaction.

Nettl, J. (1951) *Eastern Zone and Soviet Policy in Germany 1945–50*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Neumann, F. (1942) *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, London: Victor Gollancz.

North, D. (2005) *Understanding the Process of Economic Change*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

North, D., J. Wallis and B. Weingast (2012) *Violence and Social Order: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ó Tuathail, G. (1992) "The Bush Administration and the End of the Cold War: A Critical Geopolitics of U.S. Foreign Policy in 1989," *Geoforum*, 23, 4, pp. 437–52.

Oakes, A. (ed.) *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Olson, M. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development," *American Political Science Review*, 87, 3, 1993, pp. 567–76.

Onuf, N. (2013) *Making Sense, Making Worlds: Constructivism in Social Theory and International Relations*, London: Routledge.

———. (2002) "Institutions, Intentions and International Relations," *Review of International Studies*, 28, 2, pp. 211–28.

Ortega y Gasset, J. (2008) *La rebelión de las masas*, Madrid: Tecnos.

Orwell, G. (1962) *The Lion and the Unicorn—Socialism and the English Genius*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Orvis, S. and C. Drogus (2011) *Introducing Comparative Politics: Concepts and Cases in Context*, Washington, DC: CQ Press.

Parssinen, T. (2003) *The Oster Conspiracy of 1938: The Unknown Story of the Military Plot to Kill Hitler and Avert World War II*, London: Harper.

Parrish S. D. and M. Narinsky (2011) "*New Evidence on the Soviet Rejection of the Marshall Plan*," Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper Number 9, pp. 1–53.

Paul. R., J. Wirtz and M. Fortmann (eds.) (2004) *Balance of Power—Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Peevers, C. (2014) *The Politics of Justifying Force: The Suez Crisis, the Iraq War, and International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Perlmutter, A. (1993) *FDR and Stalin: A Not So Grand Alliance, 1943–1945*, St. Louis: University of Missouri.

Peters, G. (2011) *Institutional Theory in Political Science*, London: Bloomsbury Academic.

———. (2005) *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The "New Institutionalism,"* London: Continuum.

Peters, G. and J. Pierre (eds.) (2007) *Institutionalism*, vol. 1, London: Sage.

Pierre, J., G. Peters and G. Stoker (eds.) (2013) *Debating Institutionalism*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Poidevin, R. (1985) "La France et le Charbon allemande au lendemain de la deuxième guerre mondiale," *Relations Internationales*, 44, Hiver, pp. 365–77.

Polanyi, K. (1944/2001) *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*, New York: Beacon Press.

Pollard, R. (1987) *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945–1950*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Powell, W. and P. DiMaggio (eds.) (1991) *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Preston Baratta, J. (2004) *The Politics of World Federation: From World Federalism to Global Governance*, New York: Praeger.

Pritt, D. (1939) *Light on Moscow—Soviet Policy Analysed*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Pursell, C. (1972) *The Military-Industrial Complex*, New York: Harper & Row.

Raack, R. C. (1995) *Stalin's Drive to the West, 1938–1945: The Origins of the Cold War*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Resis, A. (1981) "Spheres of Influence in Soviet Wartime Diplomacy," *The Journal of Modern History*, 53, 3, pp. 417–39.

Rengger, N. (1999) *International Relations, Political Theory and the Problem of Order: Beyond International Relations Theory?* London: Routledge.

Reynolds, D. (2007) *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rognoni Vercelli, C., P. Fonatana and D. Preda (ed.) *Altiero Spinelli, il federalism europeo e la resistenza*, Bologna: Il Mulino.

Roper, S. (2000) *Romania: The Unfinished Revolution*, London: Routledge.

Ross, S. (1996) *American War Plans—1945–1950*, London: Routledge.

Ross, M. (1940) *A History of Soviet Foreign Policy*, London: Workers Library.

Rostow, W. W. (1981) *The Division of Europe After World War II: 1946*, Austin: University of Texas.

Röpke, W. (1946) *The German Question*, London: George Allen and Unwin.

Ruggie, J. (1992) "Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization*, 46, 3, pp. 561–98.

Sabatier, P. (ed.) *Theories of the Policy Process*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Sartori, G. (1987) *¿Qué es la democracia?* Madrid: Taurus.

Schlesinger Jr., A. (1967) "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, 46, 1, pp. 22–52.

Schlesinger Jr., A. (1949) *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Schmidt, V. (2010) Analyzing Ideas and Tracing Discursive Interactions in Institutional Change: from Historical Institutionalism and Discursive Institutionalism, The Minda de Ginzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Open Forum.

Sewell, J. (1966) *Functionalism and World Politics—A Study based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Developments*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Shlapenthokh, D. (ed.) *Russia between East and West—Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism*, Leiden: Brill.

Sherry, M. (1995) *In the Shadow of War—The United States since the 1930s*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Sidgwick, E. et al. (2015) *The International Crisis in Its Ethical and Psychological Aspects*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sirgiovanni, G. (1990) *An Undercurrent of Suspicion—Anti-Communism in America during World War Two*, New Brunswick, NJ and London: Transaction.

Skidelsky, R. (1995) *The World After Communism—A Polemic for Our Times*, London: Macmillan.

Skocpol, T. (1979) *States and Social Revolutions—A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smyser, W. R. (1999) *From Yalta to Berlin*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Spalding, E. (2006) *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*, Louisville: University Press of Kentucky.

Spandler, K. (2015) "The Political International Society. Change in Primary and Secondary Institutions," *Review of International Studies* 41, 3, pp. 601–22.

Steil, B. (2013) *The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Steinmo, S., K. Thelen and F. Longstreth (eds.) (1992) *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Strauss, L (1991) *On Tyranny*, New York: Free Press.

———. (1978) *The City and Man*, Chicago: University of Chicago.

Stronski, S. (1945) *The Crimean Revenge, 1855–1945*, London: Polish Library.

Sweet, A. S., W. Sandholtz and N. Fligstein (eds.) (2001) *The Institutionalization of Europe*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sygkelos, Y. (2011) *Nationalism from the Left: The Bulgarian Communist Party During the Second World War and the Early Post-War Years*, Leiden: Brill.

Taubman, W. (1983) *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War*, New York: W. W. Norton.

Thies, J. (2014) *Hitler's Plans for Global Domination—Nazi Architecture and Ultimate War Aims*, translated by I. Cooke and M. Friedrich, New York and Oxford: Berghahn.

Thomas, W. (2001) *The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Thomas, H. (1987) *Armed Truce—The Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945–46*, London: Hamish Hamilton.

Thorpe, D. R. (2010) *Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan*, London: Chatto and Windus.

Tooze, A. (2007) *The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy*, London: Penguin.

Trachtenberg, M. (2012) *The Cold War and After: History, Theory, and the Logic of International Politics*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Trachtenberg, M. (1999) *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. (1991) *History and Strategy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Troebst, S. (2003) "'Intermarium' and 'Wedding to the Sea': Politics of History and Mental Mapping in East Central Europe," *European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire* 10, 2, pp. 293–321.

Tucker, R. (1971) *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Ulam, A. (1951) *Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Van der Dussen, W. and L. Rubinoff (eds.) (1997) *Objectivity, Method and Point of View Essays in the Philosophy of History*, Leiden: Brill.

Vanderlip, F. (1919) *What Happened to Europe*, London: Macmillan.

Vašák, K. (1982) *The International Dimensions of Human Rights*, New York: Praeger.

Vasilenko, V. (2014) "The Polish-Czechoslovak Confederation Project in British Policy, 1939–1943: A Federalist Alternative to Postwar Settlement in East Central Europe?" *Canadian Journal of History*, 49, 2, pp. 203–23.

Vaughan, J. (1973) *Soviet Socialist Realism: Origins and Theory*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

Verheyen, D. (1991) *The German Question—A Cultural, Historical and Geopolitical Exploration*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Viereck, P. (2004) *Metapolitics—From Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler*, London: Routledge.

Von Thadden, A. (1996) *Stalins Falle: Er wollte den Krieg*, Rosenheim: Kultur und Zeitgeschichte/Archiv der Zeit.

Waechter, M. (1924) *How to Abolish War—The United States of Europe*, London: T. C. P.

Walton, R. (1976) *Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War*, New York: Viking Press.

Watson, A. (2007) *Hegemony and History*, London: Routledge.

Watson, A. (2002) *The Evolution of International Society—A Comparative Historical Analysis*, London: Routledge.

Weaver, F. (2011) *The United States and the Global Economy: From Bretton Woods to the Current Crisis*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Wells, H. G. (1941) *Guide to the New World—A Handbook of Constructive World Revolution*, London: Victor Gollancz.

Wendt, A. (1995) "Constructing International Politics," *International Security*, 20, 1, pp. 71–81.

Wheeler, N. (2003) *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wheeler, N. J. (1992) "Pluralist or Solidarist Conceptions of International Society: Bull and Vincent on Humanitarian Intervention," *Millennium—Journal of International Studies*, 21, 3, pp. 463–87.

Whitman, J. (2017) *Hitler's American Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Wiarda, H. (ed.) (2015) *Grand Theories and Ideologies in the Social Sciences*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wight, C. (2006) *Agents, Structures and International Relations—Politics as Ontology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Williams, J. and R. Little (ed.) (2006) *The Anarchical Society in a Globalized World*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Williams, W. A. (1972) *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, New York: W. W. Norton.

Wilson Rowe, E. and S. Torjesen (eds.) (2008) *The Multilateral Dimension in Russian Foreign Policy*, London: Routledge.

Wolhforth, W. (1993) *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Woods R. and Jones, H. (1991) *The Dawning of the Cold War*, Athens: University of Georgia Press.

Wolff, S. (2003) *The German Question since 1919—An Analysis with Key Documents*, Westport, CT: Praeger.

Wright, Q. (1954) *Problems of Stability and Progress in International Relations*, Berkeley: University of California.

Wright Mills, C. (2000) *The Power Elite*, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Yergin, D. (1977) *Shattered Peace—The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, New York: Andre Deutsch.

Ziff, W. (1942) *The Coming Battle of Germany*, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce.

Zubok, V. (2009) *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press.

Zubok, V. and C. Pleshakov (1997) *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

INDEX

"Drawing together such diverse issues as the German Question, the balance of power, the role of ideology and the geopolitical interests of the Superpowers, Nicolas Lewkowicz has produced a challenging new interpretation of the way the Cold War global order was institutionalized after the Second World War."

—John Young, Professor of International History, Faculty of Arts, University of Nottingham, UK

The United States, the Soviet Union and the Geopolitical Implications of the Origins of the Cold War describes how the United States and the Soviet Union deployed their hard and soft power resources to create the basis for the institutionalization of the international order in the aftermath of World War II. The book argues that the origins of the Cold War should not be seen from the perspective of a magnified spectrum of conflict but should be regarded as a process by which the superpowers attempted to forge a normative framework capable of sustaining their geopolitical needs and interests in the postwar scenario. This work examines how the use of ideology and the instrument of political intervention in the spheres of influence managed by the superpowers were conducive to the establishment of a stable international order. The volume postulates that the element of conflict present in the early period of the Cold War served to demarcate the scope of maneuvering available to each of the superpowers and studies the notion that the United States and the Soviet Union were primarily interested in establishing the conditions for the accomplishment of their vital geostrategic interests.

Nicolas Lewkowicz, senior analyst at Wikistrat Inc. and fellow of the Royal Historical Society, has studied in the UK at Birkbeck, University of London and the University of Nottingham, where he received his PhD in history. The author of *The German Question and the Origins of the Cold War* and *The German Question and the International Order, 1943–48*, Lewkowicz has lectured at several British institutions, including the universities of Bristol, Birmingham and Nottingham.

Cover image: US and Soviet troops meet on the bridge over the Elbe River at Torgau on April 26, 1945. AP Photo.

ANTHEM PRESS
www.anthempress.com